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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates how (if at all) children ought to be influenced with respect to 
religion(s). To answer this question, I develop a theory of cognitive curriculum content 
and apply it to the teaching of religious beliefs and beliefs about religions. By ‘a theory 
of cognitive curriculum content,’ I mean a theory that determines which truth-claims 
belong on the curriculum, and whether or not teachers ought to promote students’ belief 
of those claims. I extend this theory to help educators to decide which attitudes address 
on the curriculum and whether or not to promote them. I then apply this to the case of 
religious attitudes and attitudes about religions. I argue that where having or failing to 
have a certain attitude makes a significant difference to students’ lives, it ought to be 
addressed by curricula. Where failing to have the attitude is irrational, this failure ought 
to be remedied; where having the attitude is irrational, that attitude ought to be 
discouraged; and where neither having nor failing to have the attitude is irrational, that 
attitude ought to be introduced and discussed without encouragement or 
discouragement. In so far as is practicable, educators should aim to acquaint students 
with arguments for and against having these attitudes and initiate them into the practice 
of assessing their soundness. The implications of this theory for extra-curricular 
influence, such as upbringing in the home, are also explored.
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Chapter One
THE RESEARCH QUESTION, ASSUMPTIONS AND PROCEDURES 
Introduction
My question is how (if at all) we may ethically influence children with respect to 
religions. In particular, by what means, and towards what ends (if any) may we do this? 
I will limit myself to discussing the ethics of deliberate attempts at formative influence 
for the purpose of delineating, for myself, a manageable but ambitious task; that is to 
say, a doctoral level task. A more perspicuous formulation of my question is this: What 
ethical claims (if any) do children have over us when it comes to our influencing of 
them with respect to religion, and what ethical claims (if any) have we over them in that 
regard?1 Indeed, they may have ethical claims over how we educate other children, 
since the way each child is educated will have a significant effect on the way that they 
treat others, and each likely has claim rights over how they are treated by others. By an 
ethical claim that A has over B, I mean a demand that can be made on A ’s behalf which 
B is ethically obliged to satisfy. It is common to think that people have such claims to 
life and liberty (at least claims to omissions, if not acts, and at least until they violate 
other significantly ethical claims).
The different, sometimes conflicting, ethical-claims that children are said to have in this 
domain include being initiated into their own cultural background, or that of their 
parents (Steven C. Vryhof);2 knowing what beliefs about momentous religious matters 
are best justified (Michael Hand);3 to come to an autonomous, critical position about
1 This ‘w e’ and ‘u s’ captures those who are both capable o f  influencing children, with respect to 
religions, and capable o f  controlling how they do so. Subsequent investigation may reveal that different 
people have different ethical burdens in this domain, but that is part o f  what is to be established.
2 Vryhof contends that “i f  a community is to survive, i f  individuals are to survive, both memory and 
vision must be persevered and passed on,” these being “a cultural memory -  their story, their identity, 
their cultural anchor points -  and cultural vision -  their imagined future and world and life view .” Steven 
C. Vryhof, ‘Between Memory and Vision: Schools as Communities o f  M eaning’, in Commitment, 
Character, and Citizenship: Religious Education in Liberal Democracy, ed. by Hanan A. Alexander, and 
Ayman K. Agbaria (London: Routledge, 2012), p. 47. Cultures are intrinsically valuable according to 
Callan, perhaps then, people should be initiated into them in order to ensure their survival (or at least we 
have reason to initiate people into them, because w e have reason to ensure their survival). Eamonn 
Callan, ‘The Ethics o f  Assim ilation,’ Ethics 115(3) (2005), pp. 471-500.
3 Michael Hand, ‘Religious Education,’ in Rethinking the School Curriculum: Values, Aims and Purpose, 
ed. by John W hite (London: Routledge Falmer, 2004).
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which religious claims are best justified (Andrew Wright);4 to be aware of what 
different religious affiliations people have and have had, as part of a more general 
understanding of diversity; to gain a comprehensive narrative, since it is a precondition 
of having evaluative knowledge (Trevor Cooling); 5 to be acquainted with the 
transcendent; to come to know what being part of a religion is like so as to make a more 
autonomous choice about whether to be religiously affiliated (Terence McLaughlin);6 to 
make good on the ills experienced in society.7 Being educated ‘about’, ‘within’, ‘into’,
D
and ‘from’ religion are also all aims that have been variously understood and defended. 
Generally, we may ask whether children ought to be advanced in a religion, encouraged 
and prepared to evangelize, forewarned and forearmed against faith, encouraged and 
prepared to denounce religion, insulated from religion, or not deliberately influenced 
with respect to religions, at all. One possible answer to our question is that we can do 
no wrong when it comes to influencing children with respect to religion, that whatever 
we do will be alright. In this case, children would have no ethical claims over us when 
it comes to our influencing them with respect to religion. Another answer is that 
children have a claim to be left to develop according to their un-perverted nature, and 
even a duty to insist on being so left. I do not think that either the maximally permissive 
or impermissive views are correct, as I shall argue in Chapter 6.
Ultimately my arguments are addressed to whomever the decision-making buck stops 
with; however, one’s ethics of influence will have something to say about whom it is
4 Andrew Wright (2000) ‘The Spiritual Education Project: Cultivating Spiritual and Religious Literacy 
through a Critical Pedagogy of Religious Education,’ Pedagogies o f  Religious Education, ed. by Michael 
Grimmitt (Essex: McCrimmon, 2000), pp. 170-187.
5 Trevor Cooling, ‘Contestable Beliefs in Education: Fairness and/or Neutrality?’ Oxford Review o f  
Education 38(5) (2012), pp. 551-566.
6 This last point is argued by Terrence H. McLaughlin, ‘Parental Rights and the Religious Upbringing of 
Children’, Journal o f  Philosophy o f  Education 18(1) (1984), pp. 75-83. This would seem a more 
plausible claim if a circumscribed anti-realism were true of religion (as opposed to global anti-realism, or 
realism about religion), since whether religious beliefs are true or false is not best rationally evaluated 
from a position in which one already believes them. On the other hand, if religions do not contain 
propositional content, and understanding them consists in knowing what it is like to indwell, then a ‘don’t 
knock it ‘til you try it’ attitude seems more appropriate.
7 It is often thought that education ought to derive its raison d'etre from redressing existent or foreseeable 
societal problems, as when the press claims that schooling is responsible for addressing moral crises, as 
seen during high profile crimes such as James Bulger’s murder. On this view, one need only identify 
those ills related to religion in society and target them, because children will have a claim right over each 
other not to perpetuate those ills. Some, such as the new atheists, Dawkins, Dennett, Hitchens and Harris, 
would argue that religion itself constitutes a societal ill, and might hope that education would redress it. 
Others would argue that irreligiousness is an ill to be redressed by religious initiation.
8 Gareth Byrne, ‘Encountering and Engaging with Religion and Belief: The Contemporary Contribution 
of Religious Education in Schools,’ in Toward Mutual Ground: Pluralism , Religious Education and 
Diversity in Schools, ed. by Gareth Byrne and Patricia Kaeran (Dublin: Columba Press, 2013).
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that the buck ought to stop with. It may, for instance, tell us both who it is that is 
responsible for satisfying children’s ethical claims, as well as what those claims are.
M ethodology
Purpose and Scope of Study
As explained above, the purpose of this study is to investigate how (if at all) children 
ought, ethically, to be influenced with respect to religion. This is a question about ethics 
rather than politics or law, and I hope to answer it by specifying what, morally, we 
ought to aspire to. I do not draw any difference between the use of the word ‘ethics’ and 
the use of the word ‘moral’ in the following, although I recognize that other authors do. 
After answering what children are entitled to morally, I will not go further and discuss 
how this ought to relate to legal expectations and sanctions. The relation between 
proper moral and legal expectations is complex and beyond the reasonable scope of an 
already large topic. Briefly though, saying that people have an ethical entitlement not to 
be harmed, or to be benefitted, does not obviously translate into a legal entitlement (e.g. 
making romantic scoundrelism illegal).
I ask about the ethics of influence, instead of the ethics of upbringing, or of education, 
or of schooling, since I am interested in formative influence per se, and believe that 
similar considerations are relevant, both to what kinds of upbringing and education 
children are entitled to, and also to questions of whether schooling embodies an 
appropriate expedient in their service. That is to say, the ethics of education and 
upbringing are best discussed in tandem, as parts of the ethics of influence. For this 
reason, my topic is broader than both of these topics, but it is not thereby unwieldy. 
There exists research on more specific topics than I address: the aims of upbringing; the 
aims of religious education; the justification of religious schools; the justification of 
evangelism. My project draws on and is relevant to all of these areas. They all fall 
within the remit of the ethics of influence, with respect to religion and indeed, 
contributions to each of those areas must already have implications for the others by 
virtue of this fact.
3
C ontribution to Knowledge
The research question that I address has both empirical and normative aspects. The 
contribution of this thesis is not empirical. It draws on existing empirical studies by 
others, and on more common knowledge that most human beings can reasonably be 
expected to have (for instance, the knowledge that human beings have parents, are 
mortal and can believe falsehoods as well as truths). Rather, the contribution of this 
thesis is to clearly frame an original research question, to clearly identify the sub­
questions whose answers will help us to answer our overall question, and then to 
assemble the most plausible answers available to those sub-questions so as to answer 
the overall question. One contribution made by this research, which is of particular 
interest, is its elaboration and application of the theory of propositional curriculum 
content which I previously developed from a systematic arrangement of some 
arguments made by Michael Hand.9 The present work extends that theory so that it 
captures the affective side of the curriculum, as well as the propositional side. It then 
applies this theory to religious beliefs and attitudes, and beliefs and attitudes about 
religion.
The A pproach of the Study
After clarifying the key concepts employed in the research question, the first task of the 
work is to identify sub-questions, the answers to which should, when taken together, 
answer the overall question. These seven questions are:
1. What are the sources of responsibility?
2. What is the content of responsibility?
3. In what respects are we apt to be formatively influenced?
4. What means of formative influence are available?
5. What ethical obligations and restrictions are there on the means by, and the ends 
towards, which we formatively influence children?
6. What is a religion?
7. How rational is religious belief?
9 John Tillson, ‘Towards a Theory of Propositional Curriculum Content/ Journal o f  Philosophy o f  
Education 48(1) (2014), pp. 137-148.
Each question will receive consideration in a chapter of its own, and in the order listed 
above, before, in Chapter 9, my conclusion, I come to summarise my answers to each, 
and explain what import, taken together, they have for answering our overarching 
question.
A minimally comprehensive answer to our central research question must consider how 
we can determine the difference between what is and what is not ethical, and how one 
comes to have ethical responsibilities at all. It must consider what sort of thing 
influence is, and where it fits on the ethical/ unethical distinction, and indeed, what 
ethical difference it makes when we are talking about influencing children, as opposed 
to adults. It must have a notion of what counts as a religion, and in what respects we 
may possibly be influenced with respect to it. It will also need to consider what the 
value of religion is. Having satisfied these desiderata, we should be in a position to 
answer our overarching question. It should be said that what is presented over the 
following chapters is an argument emerging from the employment of my method, rather 
than a documentation of the method itself.
Amongst the things required is some sort of ethical framework for prospectively 
selecting kinds of acts and for retrospectively evaluating particular influential (and 
potentially influential) acts.10 This has two parts. First, any plausible answer to our 
overall question must identify specific parties that have responsibilities to children, 
together with the content of those responsibilities. If either were lacking, it would be as 
though an unsigned, blank check were made out to children. For this reason, we require 
an account o f the sources of ethical responsibilities which identifies the bearers of 
responsibilities (benefactors), the beneficiaries of responsibilities, and the things that 
benefactors are responsible for doing or achieving. Second, an account of benefits and 
harms (or of wellbeing) is required to give content to the responsibilities. (In Chapter 3, 
we defend being godlike as a goal for being well, which accounts for why we should 
want to know, and should want to promote knowledge of momentous truths, as well as 
why we should want to be rational).
An account of influence and of potential influence should distinguish between 
formative and behavioural influence, and specify those respects in which we are apt to
10 On the notion of selecting ‘kinds of acts’ rather than particular acts, see Jonathon Dancy, ‘Ethics 
Without Principle,’ interviewed for 3:AM Magazine by Richard Marshall <http://www.3am 
magazine.com/3am/ethics-without-principles/> [accessed 23 June 2015].
5
be formatively influenced, as well as those means by which we are apt to be so 
influenced. A theory of ethical influence will draw on these materials. An account of 
religion is required which demarcates its extension. An account of the value (or status) 
of religion is required. Finally, an account of the application of the foregoing to 
religion, given it status, is given.
This work is essentially an exercise in organizing information and categories, and 
seeing where the implications of plausible (but not empirically discoverable) principles 
lead. As Wittgenstein remarks, “the problems [of philosophy] are solved, not by giving 
new information, but by arranging what we have always known.” 11 An account of 
whether these considerations apply to things other than religions would be interesting, 
although not essential to the research question: it could be suggestive of further research 
to be done in the same vain.
R esources C onsulted
The resources consulted here were selected because they seemed to be germane to 
answering my research question. The relevance of work is established, by whether it 
provides or criticises part of an answer to, or problematizes or offers some alternative 
way to couch the terms of my research question itself. As a whole, the thesis contributes 
to discussions of Eamonn Callan, Peter Gardner, Michael Hand, Terence McLaughlin, 
and John White about whether religiously partisan upbringing and education are 
ethically permissible. Many of these discussions were printed in the Journal o f  
Philosophy o f  Education. To make this contribution, the thesis engages with a range of 
literature in addition to that one, relatively discrete, body. For instance, it engages with 
bodies of literature concerning what counts as a religion, the value of religion, the
1 9validity of arguments for the existence of God, and concerning in which respects 
human beings are apt to be formatively influenced. The Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy’s critical surveys of existing philosophical literature on discrete, relevant 
bodies of philosophical literature were read in order to determine which particular 
works to read.
11 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell’s, 2010), §109.
12 Where the word is used as a proper name, I will capitalize it: e.g. “Lamb of God, you who take away 
the sins of the world: have mercy on us”. Where it is not a proper name, I will not capitalize it: e.g. “the 
god of revelation”; “one or more gods”.
M ethods
While it seemed that each of the sub-questions called for a slightly different method, in 
general, the research method employed primarily consisted of reading and critically 
reflecting on literature which offered considerations relevant to the answer of my 
research question. The critical reflection consists, firstly, of attempting to clarify the 
concepts employed and propositions asserted in order to establish whether or not 
apparent conflicts and harmonies between ideas are sustained at a deeper level. Where 
there are conflicts, we are forced to choose between them (on pain of contradiction). 
Much of the method can be described as conceptual analysis, which is largely 
theoretical, as distinct from empirical: one famous example has it that knowledge 
consists of ‘justified, true belief (albeit an example that no longer looks plausible in 
light of Edmund Gettier’s counterexamples).13 Another example is the arrangement of 
concepts in terms of generality and exemplification. Which categories are subsets of 
which other categories is the question and this is a philosophical question par 
excellence: for instance, if the above analysis holds, then knowledge is a subset of true 
beliefs, which are a subset of beliefs tout court. Such conceptual geography forms a 
precondition of sound experimental methods, for one cannot empirically confirm an 
incoherent hypothesis.
On the matter of what religion is, I assess a range of available methods for demarcating 
the extension of religion, and settle on an essentialist approach. I attempted to identify 
an essence of religion in the familiar philosophical manner of hazarding potential 
essences, and testing them with hypothetical, or actual scenarios that might constitute 
counterexamples, revising those suggested essences to avoid legitimate counter 
examples, and otherwise providing reasons why the supposed counter examples were 
not legitimate after all. This is a method we find exemplified in Plato’s dialogues, 
although I do not report on the application of the methods in the same way. Whereas 
Plato would imagine a two or more sided conversation, I might do the same but will not 
report it in that way; rather, I will collapse it into a single account, presenting arguments 
impersonally, except in so far as I attribute them to a source, or endorse them. Writerly
13 Gettier counter-examples are cases where we appear to have justified, true beliefs, but not knowledge: 
such as when I look at a twenty four hour clock twelve hours after it stops and truly believe, with 
justification, that it is, say, twelve o’clock. Edmund L. Gettier, Ts justified true belief knowledge?’ 
Analysis 23(6) (1963), pp. 121-123.
devices such as irony and literary subtlety completely drop out of this way of writing; 
thus, I try to be as literal, explicit and unambiguous as possible.
This thesis is largely a work of applied ethics, and I am persuaded by the writing of 
Bernard Williams that ethical questions cannot be answered by philosophy in itself.14 
What philosophy can provide ethical thought, though, is the procedure of reflective 
equilibrium by which we can hope to apply our ethical notions more consistently, 
revising them to create a more coherent whole (a procedure employed brilliantly by 
John Rawls and, in relation to non-ethical beliefs, David Lewis).15 One important part 
of this procedure is that of drawing analogies between cases. One anticipates that where 
there are no relevant differences between the cases, like judgements are required of 
each. Where one’s judgements are not alike in analogous cases, one then seeks to revise 
or suspend judgement. This method is admirably expounded by Ben Spiecker and Jan 
Steutel.16 The procedure works in the following way. One already has a range of ethical 
intuitions about particular cases, for instance: Oswald should not have shot JFK; the 
Police Sniper should have shot the armed man on a shooting spree; murderers should be 
executed; drawn out, torturous executions are wrong. With these in hand, one then 
attempts to do one of two things: 1) see whether these all fit together, and, if not, which 
of them can be jettisoned, or 2) attempt to see which principles can be formulated to 
explain the most, and revise fewest, of these intuitions. Preference would be given to 
the simplest, least extensive and most explanatorily powerful set of principles. Where 
one has intuitions which are left by the wayside, one would ideally have a theory of 
error; of how one came to have the mistaken view, and some respect in which it differs 
from the others in virtue of which it is not to be trusted, while they are (after all, it was 
not so long ago that they seemed to be on the same footing). In this way, a theory is 
generated from intuitions.
Spiecker and Steutel make the additional suggestion that the initial intuitions can be 
rendered more plausible by already being in accordance with principles, or theoretical 
generalisations (the example they give is that of Immanuel Kant’s principle of dignity). 
This suggestion seems doubtful: either the theory is just admitted as one (admittedly
14 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Abingdon: Fontana Press, 1985).
15 David Lewis, Counterj*actuals, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973); John Rawls, A Theory o f 
Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972).
16 Ben Spiecker and Jan Steutel, ‘Reflective Equilibrium as a Method of Philosophy of Education,* in 
Methods in Philosophy o f Education, ed. by Frieda Heyting, Dieter Lenzen, and John White (London: 
Routledge, 2002).
8
rather general) intuition among others or it is not admitted at all. No strength is added 
by generality; it is the process of reflective equilibrium which is meant to a) generate 
theory and b) lend it what plausibility it has. If theory is admitted as intuition (perhaps 
because one has successfully internalized bits of Kant’s philosophy), it is still the 
process of reflective equilibrium that is supposed to give that theory-intuition whatever 
extra-intuitive plausibility it can gain. It may be that people start off with different 
intuitions, and that the process will just bring people to different systems in light of that; 
this is a legitimate worry that I cannot completely diffuse, but will return to shortly. By 
way of neutralizing this point, Harry Brighouse has suggested using a wide reflective 
equilibrium, and engaging in a joint discussion with a wide variety of others about 
which intuitions to plug in, so as to compensate for irrelevant biases (such as race, age, 
and culture).17 There seem to be limitations on this; I should not like to co-create a 
system with, say, racist, sexist, and homophobic people. While such a methodology has 
its appeal, it does not suit a PhD project, unless the researcher were to use subjects, and 
not work, as co-partners in the production of a theory with their conversation partners.
Empirical moral psychology is closely related to, but distinct from, this approach, and 
is, I think, irrelevant in an important way. True, empirical psychology can reveal 
limitations about people that one’s ethical theory needs to accommodate in being 
psychologically realistic. However, conducting surveys indicating the variety of 
intuitions seems unhelpful; in particular, it will not tell us which of the intuitions are 
right. Indeed, they would be made no more right by some particular intuition being 
more common. One would need a theory about when intuitions are more likely to be 
right, and to determine whether the respondents were in such a state. Furthermore, if  
one doesn’t share their initial intuitions, it is only the process of reflective equilibrium 
that can help us to adjudicate between them. As David Lewis has emphasized, one starts 
off with one’s own judgements (and indeed, where else could one start off?), and 
revises from there. However, there is no guarantee that we will all be able to converge 
in our opinions through rational discourse.18
a theory cannot earn its credence just by its unity and economy. What
credence it cannot earn, it must inherit. It is far beyond our powers to
17 Harry Brighouse, ‘Afterword,’ in Diana E. Hess and Paula McAvoy, The Political Classroom: 
Evidence and Ethics in Democratic Education (London: Routledge, 2014), p 214.
18 For a reconstruction and illuminating discussion of David Lewis’ general philosophical method, see 
Daniel Nolan, David Lewis (Cheshire: Acumen Publishing, 2005), Ch. 9.
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weave a brand new fabric of adequate theory ex nihilo, so we must 
perforce conserve the one we’ve got.19
It may be that neither of us is making any mistake of method. We may 
each be bringing our opinions into reflective equilibrium in the most 
careful possible way, taking account of all the arguments, distinctions, 
and counterexamples. But one of us, at least, is making a mistake of 
fact.20
Anybody who talks for long enough will eventually contradict themselves. (This is 
perhaps a contingent, rather than necessary truth - presumably God would not
contradict himself, or a true messenger of God would not). If they notice the
contradiction, they will have a choice forced on them between which (if either) of the 
contradictory elements they wish to affirm if they hope to be consistent, and -  what is 
the same -  intellectually honest. While it is possible to avoid contradicting oneself by 
talking about different subjects, so that one makes very many propositions, none of 
which have anything to do with one another and so none of which can possibly 
contradict one another, that is not what people tend to do when they speak. Anybody 
that writes 90,000 words on a single topic will notice this rather keenly because they 
will have produced written evidence of what they have said, evidence that they know 
will be inspected for contradictions. Concordant ly, Gary Gutting has suggested that 
someone’s ability to sustain a point of view at length is evidence in its favour:
The mere fact of developing a claim in some detail may serve to
persuade us of its plausibility Since more detail is likely to lead to
problems, particularly when ideas are extended beyond their original 
domain, the more thoroughly and extensively a claim is developed 
without encountering problems, the more likely it is to be correct.21
In contrast, Richard Rorty makes the following remarks:
Eventually I got over the worry about circular argumentation by 
deciding that the test of philosophical truth was overall coherence, 
rather than deducibility from unquestioned first principles. But this 
didn't help much. For coherence is a matter of avoiding contradictions, 
and St Thomas's advice, ‘When you meet a contradiction, make a 
distinction,’ makes that pretty easy. As far as I could see, philosophical 
talent was largely a matter of proliferating as many distinctions as were 
needed to wriggle out of a dialectical comer.22
19 David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1986), p. 134.
20 David Lewis, Philosophical Papers, Volume One (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. xi.
21 Gary Gutting, What Philosophers Know: Case Studies in Recent Analytic Philosophy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 77.
22 Richard Rorty ‘Trotsky and the Wild Orchids,’ Common Knowledge 1(3) (1992), pp. 140-53, 145.
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For instance, if I were to remark that I would not mind traveling on a spaceship, but 
would dread exploring oceanic depths in a submarine, one might wonder what the 
relevant difference is. Supposing, for instance, that the levels of danger are identical, 
and so too are the claustrophobia and unpleasantness of dying should things go wrong, 
why then should I prefer one to the other? There may be a distinction such as the view 
being sublime from a spaceship and disappointingly murky under the sea. However, it 
is absurd to think that there will always be a distinction to alleviate every contradiction, 
sometimes there are no relevant distinctions to be made: for instance, no nifty 
distinction can salvage the self-contradictory notion of a ‘square circle’.
Clearly, consistency on a topic is not enough to render an account of things as true or 
good, it is rather a precondition (even if, as Gutting suggests, it gains credence with 
detailed development). What more is required? This is something plausibly provided by 
the process of reflective equilibrium. One takes initially plausible, but not sacrosanct 
beliefs, and attempts to systematize them, revising or rejecting them if they resist such 
integration. But that just aims for consistency. There must be something good or true 
on the whole about our initial intuitions, for the process not to be an exercise in 
systematic fiction writing. There is a large scope for empirical confirmation and 
refutation in all but ethics, and other evaluative claims, it seems, but even in the 
empirical domain we rely on perceptions, memory, introspection and what not, so ethics 
is no worse off in principle than is empirical confirmation.
Normative questions have an ineliminable, non-empirical aspect, it seems. Take the 
everyday question of what, if anything, one should have for lunch. Some empirical 
evidence may be relevant to deciding the matter, it may help to determine (among other 
things) what food is poison, cheap, or convenient to obtain. But the matter of which of 
these is good, best, or best, all things considered, is a non-empirical matter. Some may 
say that the evidence of being ill when poisoned counts against eating the poisonous 
stuff for lunch. But, there are, at some point, values which are not recommended by 
evidence; such as that illness is undesirable. One might say that they did not enjoy it 
when they were ill last time, but then one assumes that what is enjoyable is a relevant 
factor in what one should do in this case, and this is not determined by the evidence.
23 For an interesting discussion of how far this enterprise can and should be undertaken, see Thomas 
Nagel’s The View from  Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) in which he suggests that false 
reductions, and denials of the most evident features of the world can result from pursuing it over- 
zealously.
11
Furthermore, the questions of how to weigh up the values one has, and choose between 
conflicting values, are not empirical matters. The ineliminable, non-empirical aspect 
seems to be made good on by our intuitions, and the spectre of disagreement may be 
mitigated (if not negated) by the process of reflective equilibrium. If someone does not 
agree with my account of wellbeing, they may be able to challenge me by pointing out 
that it fails to account for something which is also good, but I will at some point need to 
share an intuition about what good is excluded. Incidentally, there is a very real 
possibility that my conception leaves out social goods and purpose, but again, it seems 
that we must work from shared intuitions (or perhaps learning) about what is good.
A research method might be expected to provide a correct answer to a specific question. 
That is to say, to both generate and justify an answer. Karl Popper dissented, arguing 
that what makes a view reliable is the fact that it is subject to no apt criticism, and that 
there is no possibility of justifying beliefs beyond this.24 One might ask how Popper’s 
dissent is justified, but that would be a funny question to ask a person who denies that 
views can be justified. He embraces the notion that all of our beliefs are based on 
nothing but prejudice; it is whether they are subjected to unending critique and retained 
only where they survive such a process that they might be considered (tentatively) to 
count as knowledge (or as close a thing to knowledge as we can come to having). For 
Popper, how we come about our conjectures is rationally immaterial; whether they 
came to us in a dream, by misunderstanding some other conjecture, or in a flash of 
inspiration, no method of production can be thought to produce reliable beliefs. Instead, 
it is by surviving the process of making novel predictions with the potential to be 
falsified by future evidence that lends our conjectures what credibility they have. 
Research methods seem like nonsense then, unless they are methods of critiquing what 
must, at root, be a prejudicial view. Generative cum justificatory research methods are 
untenable if Popper is right.
Indeed, what basis could one have for establishing the truth of a proposition? It seems 
that there are just three possibilities: Insisting on the proposition dogmatically; 
regressing to a further justificatory point, which itself will needs to be dogmatically 
asserted, or further justified by yet another point to which the same problem applies; or, 
by a circular justification. In the end justification must stop somewhere, and one hopes
24 Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth o f  Scientific Knowledge (London: Routledge, 
1963)
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that others will judge things similarly at some sufficiently basic level. Needless to say, 
none of these methods can ultimately establish the truth of our view. Some say that 
the foundations on which our views may be based are indubitable; that they cannot be 
simultaneously understood and doubted. Descartes presumed to find such a fact in the 
cogito\ his famous dictum, ‘I think, therefore I am’. Some believe that he did, but, it is 
far from clear that we can derive anything else from this. It is doubtful that the entire 
edifice of human knowledge can be derived from self-evident foundations such as the 
cogito. However, one also worries that we have no reason to trust the methods of 
discrediting views. If we have no grounds for asserting a claim, it is hard to understand 
how we have grounds for criticising a claim, for, surely, that involves presupposing 
some other claim to be warranted (e.g. claiming that Newtonian physics is false, 
because light bends presupposes that we’re right in thinking, due to observation, that 
light bends). Apart from this, the process of reflective equilibrium, many philosophical 
arguments need be inspected for their soundness, whether their inferences are valid, and 
their premises plausible. The robustness of one’s judgements in all these matters is 
checked by engaging the scholarly community through publications, and seminar and 
conference presentations.
Methodologically, I want to emphasize exact thinking, by means of the defining of 
terms, and the marking of relevant distinctions where there is a danger of ambiguity, or 
conflation. I want to argue for conclusions, and make my (more contentious) 
assumptions known so that people might know where they disagree with me, if they, in 
fact, do. The point of precision is to make clear when there is a disagreement, and what 
it is. This avoids arguing at cross purposes, and also guards against oscillating between, 
or otherwise, conflating distinct ideas. To give a trivial example: the bark of a dog and 
tree are utterly different, and remarking that ‘a tree’s bark is worse than its bite’ is 
obviously absurd. Unfortunately, however, some oscillations are more subtle. Everyone 
might agree that ‘what we need is good religious education!’ and, all nodding, 
completely overlook the disagreements about what constitutes good religious education 
(a surprisingly common occurrence). Moreover, not only are there disagreements about 
what is good, but also about what sorts of enterprises might be aptly described by the
25 Scepticism of our suggested premises is always possible. If sceptics are sincere, there will be no 
discontent between actions and thoughts: as when sceptics act on knowledge they deny having: preferring 
to leave by the door, rather than upstairs windows.
26 “I am, I exist, is necessarily true, every time I express it or conceive of it in my mind.” René Descartes, 
Discourse on M ethod and the Meditations (London: Penguin, 1968), p. 103.
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phrase "religious education’. It is not uncommon to hear a religious education pre­
service teacher say: what we need is good religious education, as if they have just had 
the last word in an argument, when it is only to say that religious education is not bad 
per se -  and to invite the follow up question: what constitutes good religious education? 
Indeed, it presupposes some interpretation of the phrase which could already be at cross 
purposes with what other people have in mind. Yet, more perniciously than 
exacerbating the difficulties of communication, one might use an expression to refer to 
several quite distinct things, and oscillate unknowingly between them.
What I hope to do is to systematically integrate claims that I take to be true, discarding 
beliefs which cannot be so integrated in the process. As I say, the research process is 
not recorded this thesis, but an argument built out of the research is. I will warn the 
reader now that, in the course of this thesis, I refer to fictional films and literature. The 
point of my drawing on such resources is usually illustrative, or to elaborate a thought 
experiment.
Key Concepts
My research question makes use of four core concepts, which will need some 
preliminary individuation and introduction before we proceed. Fuller discussion of each 
will follow in later sections.
Ethics
As I will argue in Chapter 2, what we can be morally responsible for is those of our 
actions and omissions which bear on the wellbeing of intrinsically valuable objects, 
such as human beings. Following Peter Singer, I accept the principle that “if it is in our 
power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything
27of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.” As to whose 
responsibility it is, I argue that the best person for the (ethical) job is responsible for 
making sure that it is done (an onus they cannot abdicate, but which falls 
simultaneously on the next best person if they drop the moral baton). While plausible,
27 Peter Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality,’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs 1(1) (1972), pp. 
229-24, p. 229.
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this answer does not easily accommodate the view that biological parents have a prima 
facie responsibility for their children’s wellbeing. I argue that it can, in fact, 
accommodate, and even ground, this view. The conception of wellbeing that I develop 
(in Chapter 3) is one which holds that the nearer an act brings human beings towards 
becoming like God, the better it is for them; the more it keeps them from becoming like 
God, the worse it is for them.
Influence
We ought to distinguish between two kinds of influence; that which makes a difference 
either to what others do, and (as a first approximation) that which makes a difference to 
who others are. Call these 'behavioural influence’ and 'formative influence’ 
respectively. It is the latter that we will be most interested in. The distinction will 
receive further attention later in this chapter.
C hildren
Childhood might be understood in two different ways 1) as a period of time subsequent 
to birth, 2) or as a state (which just so happens to last a period o f time, and come 
subsequent to birth). Children can be recognized as looking different from adults, and 
having different capacities from adults (some of which diminish or disappear with age, 
and some of which increase or appear with age). One might wonder whether childhood 
can be skipped, or whether childhood could ever come after adulthood. We might think 
that we can imagine cases of each: consider the hypothetical cases of a cloned adult, 
where a clone is created with all of the knowledge and skills of an original individual, 
and consider also the (curious) case of Benjamin Button, whose physical aging process 
runs in reverse. In this latter case though, the mental maturation of the Benjamin 
Button does not run contrariwise, and in the former case, the clone’s own mental states 
still piggybacks the normal mental maturation of the original person’s childhood. One 
could perhaps imagine a child being bom into the body of an adult, but needing to learn 
to occupy that body just as an infant leams to occupy that body. Childhood seems to me 
to be a period of physical and mental maturation, and these can be taken apart from one
28 F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Curious Case o f  Benjamin Button: And Other Tales o f  the Jazz Age (Auckland: 
The Floating Press, 2009).
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another; in the (fictional) case of a ‘child’ vampire, we might be inclined to say that 
despite having the physical form of a child, the vampire, when they reach the age of, 
say, twenty, is no longer a child, but an adult ‘in the body of a child’. We might 
describe the adult as being physically childlike. Similarly, in the case of, say, Lenny 
from O f Mice and Men, we might say that while mentally childlike, he is physically not 
childlike, and indeed, is not a child.29 Here, the notion of child-like suggests that there 
is some childish state, or states common to childhood. Could it be that were Lenny to 
have been made a vampire as a child, that he would never have ‘grown up’ either 
physically or mentally, and so would have been a child eternally (perhaps, ala the Lost 
Boys of Peter Pan)?30 That is a tough case that challenges the natural inclination that 
childhood is a lapse of time that is leant its importance by the states that tend to 
characterize it; for instance, a high degree of dependence and vulnerability. In fact, the 
term may not be well defined, and even if it is, it may be that having or not having 
certain capacities is what really matters for moral differences in how we treat 
individuals. For instance, we might instead talk about people who are not yet able to 
reason fully, rather than people who are ‘below the age of reason’, and thereby leave 
out people who have lost the ability to reason fully, or those who will likely never gain 
it without speaking of inhabitants of a certain age range, which is what children might 
appear to be.
Religion
Something is a religion, I will argue (in Chapter 7), if and only if it requires a) belief in 
(one or more) super-powerful beings and b) submission to them as having rightful 
dominion. There exist social structures which may be called ‘religions’ in a derivative 
sense, in that they are built around this primary sense of the word. A person is religious 
if they believe in one or more super powerful beings that they submit to, regarding them 
as having rightful dominion. A social group is religious if it shares a belief in one or 
more super powerful beings that it submits to, regarding them as having rightful 
dominion.
29 John Steinbeck, O f Mice and Men and the Moon Is Down (London: Penguin, 2010).
30 James Matthew Barrie, Peter Pan (London: Broadview Press, 2011).
16
W hat is an Ethics o f Influence?
I want now to map out the general terrain of the domain within which I offer this 
contribution, before getting underway. An ethics of influence would deal with the 
ethical rights and wrongs of influence.31 When we influence something, we make a 
difference to that thing; for instance, we might perpetuate a state of that thing that 
would otherwise cease, as when watering a house plant. Of special interest are the 
ethics of making differences to what people do (call this behavioural influence), and to 
those of their characteristics in virtue of which they are disposed to do what they do 
(call this formative influence). Let us say a little more to distinguish these concepts.
Form ative Influence and Behavioural Influence
We think of children as being impressionable, and of our childhood comprising our 
‘formative years’ in which we acquire dispositions which are hard to countermand. A 
formative influence is one which affects our formation, and, usually, we have in mind 
an influence undergone in childhood. I will use the term to capture an effect on our 
formation, without locating this purely in our childhood. Indeed, one might hope to 
reform a person later in their life and this should be considered as a hope to wield a 
formative influence, since reformation is a subset of formation.
While they are neither contrary nor contradictory notions, formative influence and 
behavioural influence are distinguishable. Consider the case of the conditioned reflex of 
salivating at the ringing of a bell that Ivan Pavlov induced in dogs. Compare this with 
the unconditioned reflex of their salivating on being presented with food. While one 
makes a difference to the dogs by presenting them with food, in that one stimulates their 
salivation, one does not thereby make any difference to those conditions in virtue of 
which they salivate. On the other hand, one does make a difference to those conditions
31 The difference between good and bad influences on people is not identical to the difference between 
ethical and unethical influences on people (unless you are an implausibly strong sort of consequentialist 
whereby people are not judged by the likely outcomes of their actions, but only the actual outcomes). I 
think of a scene in the HBO miniseries, Boardwalk Empire, Created by Terence Winter (HBO, 2010- 
2014) in which brothers Eli and Nucky Thompson, a corrupt politician and sheriff respectively, discuss 
their abusive father at his wake: he was not such a bad man, suggests Eli, since (he claims in all sincerity) 
they had both turned out alright. Quite apart from the joke that neither man seems to have turned out 
alright, one wants to say that their father still did wrong by beating and neglecting them, no matter how 
they had turned out; plausibly for a combination of the following reasons: 1) they were more likely to be 
worse off for their treatment in the long run, 2) the treatment was distressing at the time, 3) there was an 
absence of mitigating factors excusing the neglect. It seems that Thomas Nagel and Bernard Williams 
argue against this view somewhat in their defences of the concept of ‘moral luck*.
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in virtue of which they salivate if one regularly attends this with the ringing of a bell, 
since the bell alone will eventually suffice to stimulate the dogs’ salivation. While 
presenting a dog with food would count as a behavioural influence, it would not count 
as a formative influence. Conditioning a reflex, however, would count as both.
This example deals with influence at an unreflective level, having to do with 
involuntary responses. However, the same contrast exists at the reflective level too. For 
instance, a salesperson’s convincing of someone to buy their product seems to be 
largely a case of behavioural influence, rather than formative influence. Here, the 
salesperson influences action, not so much by making a difference to those internal 
conditions in virtue of which people do what they do (their dispositions), but instead by 
exploiting existing conditions. By contrast, a journalist’s attempt to persuade people 
into taking up an attitude that will affect the decisions that they will make in the future 
would be a case of formative influence, in virtue of changing their dispositions.
Or again, one may think of the threats of fines and prison (and of hell) as being 
deterrents and of the promise of financial rewards (and of heaven) as being inducements 
which might affect our decisions, but not our decision making apparatus. To put it 
another way, these things will affect our decisions, but not us. One might think that 
creating deterrents involves creating a belief, but it doesn’t, even though informing 
people about a deterrent is wise since otherwise the deterrent cannot deter. Instead, the 
relevant thing to the ethics of influence qua mental characteristics that determine action 
is not the creation of a deterrent, but informing people about the deterrent. It should be 
said however, that sustained conditioning through incentives and disincentives may 
affect a formative influence; if we take away the incentives and disincentives after a 
while, like scaffolding from a building, they may have helped to form habits and 
attitudes which make their continued presence unnecessary.
Potential and Actual Influence
Strictly speaking, the ethics of influence would seem to preside over that domain of acts 
which succeed in making a difference. However, we ought to broaden the scope of our
32 As was the case with Russia’s failure to warn the world about its doomsday device (a complex of 
buried nuclear bombs triggered to automatically explode if Russia were ever attacked) in D r Strangelove 
or How I  Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, dir. by Stanley Kubrick (Warner Bros, 1969).
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enquiry to capture the ethics of potential influence in order to capture those acts which 
fail to make a difference and yet might have done (such as giving unheeded advice). 
Consider here an analogy with the ethics of killing. The ethics of killing ought to 
capture such acts as attempted murder, even though the act does not count as an 
instance of killing. Proper to that domain, is the ethics of those acts which were 
intended as killings, whether successful or unsuccessful, and the ethics of acts which 
might have killed, though they were not intended to do so (as in some cases of gross 
negligence). Arguably, the ethics of killing ought to capture the ethics of acts which 
were unintentionally and unpredictably, actual acts of killing. Indeed, influence may be 
intended or unintended on the part of the influencer, and may or may not be recognized 
on the part of the influenced, but neither of these excludes the possibility of ethical 
evaluation. Nevertheless, it is deliberate attempts at formative influence that we will be 
concerned with in this inquiry.
The Ethics o f Influence, Qua Influence
The Ethics of Influence ought to be regarded as a distinct area within ethics. 
Concordantly, we should think of coercion, indoctrination, manipulation, misinforming, 
and lying as being among the stock ethical expressions of this area, while other ethical 
terms like murder, theft and greed are extraneous to it. True enough, it might be that 
many unethical acts make a difference to their dispositions, but it is not purely for this 
reason that they are unethical. Consider the case of an armed robber threatening a till 
clerk to open the register at a small local grocery store, in order to pay for a holiday. 
The tiller will almost certainly be traumatised by the experience, and this is an 
additional wrong to stealing. Furthermore, it would seem that in taking someone’s life 
instantaneously, one does something wrong without tampering with their dispositions.
W hy Should W e Care About the Ethics o f Form ative Influence?
Having a considered understanding of and approach to the ethics of formative influence 
is fundamental to having a considered and consistent approach to ethical schooling and 
upbringing, amongst other things including (but not limited to) therapy, immigrant 
assimilation, journalism, offender reform, and advertising standards. Qua activities of 
formative influence, it is important that we approach these areas with a consistent
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understanding of what kinds of influence are and are not ethically acceptable. I want to 
suggest that the very same obligation to inform can morally compel both the teacher 
and journalist in those roles, even creating a moral necessity for those roles. Indeed, it 
is ultimately from ethical obligations and restrictions regarding the communication of 
information and regarding influence more generally that activities like schooling and 
their curricula content and aims must be derived. That is to say, such considerations 
come prior to questions about what the aims of education ought to be or what content 
ought to feature on curricula. Qua ethically motivated, formatively influential activity, 
schooling ought to look to an ethics of influence to provide its very raison d'etre . One 
derives one’s idea of educational activities, indeed, one’s concept of education, from 
one’s ethics of influence, for the reason that our institutions ought to fit our rights. 
Concordantly, in the next two chapters, I explain the sources and content of 
responsibilities of influence.
Sum m ary
In this chapter we have introduced and explained our primary question and established 
what methods I shall use to answer it. Our question was how (if at all) children may 
ethically be formatively influenced with respect to religions. As we have seen, 
answering this question will involve separating out a series of sub-questions which will 
need to be addressed in order to answer the primary question. The relevant questions 
are:
1. What are the sources of responsibility?
2. What is the content of responsibility?
3. In what respects are we apt to be formatively influenced?
4. What means of formative influence are available?
5. What ethical obligations and restrictions are there on the means by which and 
the ends towards which we formatively influence children?
6. What is a religion?
7. How rational is religious belief?
Each question will receive consideration in a chapter of its own, and in the order listed 
above, before, in Chapter 9, my conclusion, I come to summarise my answers to each, 
and explain what import, taken together, they have for answering our overarching
question. The answers to these may be seen as somewhat modular, and readers may 
agree or disagree with my answer to each, while still agreeing that answers to each are 
needed, perhaps substituting this or that answer of mine for a preferred answer of their 
own, thereby reaching a different conclusion. Four concepts which are crucial to the 
investigation, namely, ethics, influence, children, and religion, were introduced. Having 
done this, we went on to say more about what an Ethics of Formative Influence might 
look like in general terms, asking what the ethics of influence qua influence was, 
distinguishing between formative and behavioural influence, and explaining why we 
should consider the topic to be an important one. With this in hand, we can now turn to 
answering our first sub-question, of how it is that anybody should be responsible to 
anybody else, or, equivalently, the project of identifying the sources of ethical 
responsibility.
C h a p ter  T w o
TH E SO URCES OF PARENTAL AND EX TR A -PA R EN TA L R ESPO N SIBILITY  
Introduction
I want to know how (if at all) children may be ethically influenced with respect to 
religions. Any plausible answer to this initial question must enable the identification of 
specific parties that have responsibilities to children, together with the content of those 
responsibilities. The alternative is to address an ethical cheque to children with either or 
both the amount and the patron missing. What is needed is answers to the questions: 
who ( if  anyone) has duties to act so as to influence children with respect to religion(s), 
and who (if anyone) has duties of omission on influencing children with respect to 
religion(s), and in virtue of what do they have them?1 In this chapter, after defending 
both moral objectivity and a proper contextual sensitivity of moral principles, I discuss 
two foundational questions regarding ethical responsibility:
1. What sorts of things can we properly be held morally responsible for at all? 
(Part of which involves establishing who or what can possibly have ethical 
claims over us, and part of which involves what sorts of claims can be had.)
2. In virtue o f what is it that people have the specific responsibilities that they in 
fact do?
In answer to the first question, I argue that what we can be morally responsible for is 
our actions and omissions which bear on the wellbeing of intrinsically valuable objects 
and subjects, such as human beings. Concerning the second, after criticizing the view 
that the specific moral responsibilities that people have is parasitic on the nature of 
relationships that they have, I discuss the view that they emerge from, of whether or not 
they are best person for the (ethical) job. While this answer is plausible, it does not 
easily accommodate the view that biological parents have a prima facie responsibility 
for their children’s wellbeing (for trying to avert harms to them and to ensure their 
benefit). I then discuss various attempts to say in virtue of what it is that biological
1 An act is the performance of some particular deed, and its omission is the failure to perform that 
particular deed. While some particular deeds amount to the omission of other particular deeds (for 
instance, spending all of July in Australia means not spending any of July in America), this does nothing 
to harm the distinction between acts and omissions.
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parents usually ought to accept responsibility for their children’s wellbeing. These 
include principles of fairness, ownership, naturalness, being best equipped, and, finally, 
whether responsibility for the wellbeing of children being occasioned by biological 
parentage makes for a plausible moral, axiom. I conclude that the principle of being the 
best person for the (ethical) job, can, in fact, accommodate the view that biological 
parents are usually morally responsible for their children’s wellbeing. I argue that the 
principle of ‘the best person for the ethical job’ is able to ground both parental, and 
what I shall call extra-parental, responsibility to children. Before summarising, I 
consider some problematic cases for the thesis of the primacy of biological parental 
responsibility for children’s wellbeing. I shall address the content of parental and extra- 
parental responsibilities in the next chapter.
M oral O bjectivity and Context Sensitivity
I want to defend the claim that value judgements may be right or wrong irrespective of 
what anyone happens to judge valuable. We act as if things were valuable; we refrain 
from acting in ways that damage those things which we take to be valuable, and we act 
in ways which advance and preserve those things which we think are most valuable. We 
act as if beholden to perceived obligations, and refrain from acting in ways that seem to 
us impermissible; we act in spite of what we might prefer to do, for instance. It seems, 
furthermore, that we cannot jettison our evaluations entirely, or take ourselves to always 
merely ‘project’ value rather than recognize it. While it might be psychologically hard 
or even impossible to switch all of our values at random, I want to suggest that it is not 
a logical possibility to think that it would be all right to simply change our judgements 
randomly (in a hypothetical, random attitudinal-amendment machine, say), or to undo 
all of our judgements and have none. This is because, to think that, would already mean 
that they were not really our judgements at all. To make sense of a sincere civil rights 
advocate being willing to undergo the risk o f becoming a racist, say, there would need 
to be some other sincerely held value that would be well served by entering the 
machine. Similarly, to think that all of our judgements merely reflect arbitrary 
preferences would be to have already abandoned them. It seems that we cannot step 
outside of our values. In having values, we are committed to our value judgements 
being right or wrong irrespective of what we happen to think, otherwise we would 
already be judging the objects that we value to be worthless. That said, we will likely
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find that our values can be made to form a more coherent whole than they do, by 
amending them in light of one another. Indeed, this process of mutual amendment (or 
reflective equilibrium) seems to be the best method for developing one’s ethical view 
(see the Methods section in Chapter 1).
While I readily acknowledge that value judgements have varied across time and place, 
and between cultures and individuals (amongst other things), I deny that whether or not 
these judgements were correct has been determined by any of these facts. At the same 
time, I also acknowledge that judgements can be properly sensitive to contextual 
features. In understanding how both things can be so, we do well to contrast primary 
and secondary moral entitlements, with the latter emerging from the former. We may 
say that all morally significant beings have primary moral entitlements to life and 
liberty no matter who they are, or where or when or to whom they were bom, but that 
there are some secondary moral entitlements that emerge from these primary moral 
entitlements which do vary between contexts. While nobody could plausibly have had a 
right to brain surgery in prehistoric times, since there was no such thing, they might 
more plausibly have had a claim to be looked after as well as possible (without thereby 
sacrificing anything else of equal moral importance). The secondary entitlement of a 
right to brain surgery emerges from the primary only in contexts in which brain surgery 
is (amongst other things) a reliable option.3 I offer these remarks only by way of 
showing the compatibility of moral objectivity and contextual sensitivity. Here, then, I 
allow that context sensitivity is compatible with moral objectivism. Misunderstood, the 
contextual sensitivity of objective and universal moral principles can sometimes 
generate bad questions about what is appropriate to certain contexts.
2 Indeed, one may resist the argument that differences of value go as deep as it is sometimes claimed: 
superficial differences of value are explained as emerging from applying shared values across time to 
different contexts. It is doubtful that this line of argument completely exhausts all differences of value, 
but it certainly mitigates it somewhat.
3 Some may say that there were no rights in pre-historic times, and certainly there were no legal rights, no 
United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or European Union Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. Indeed, laws are a social construct, but one may argue that there is a moral reality of rights, that 
laws can reflect, or fail to reflect. Some argue that morality itself is a social contract (notably, Hobbes, 
and Rousseau), but it seems that immoral contracts can be created. What I mean to contend is that in 
drawing up a contract which defines the good, the right and the just, some evaluative judgements have to 
be presupposed to justify those procedures, and indeed the fact that immoral contracts can be drawn; this 
shows that morality cannot just be defined into existence by contracts themselves. Indeed, a breach of 
contract (where one can get away with it, without damage to their reputation) cannot be written into the 
contract as bad thing without circularity, since it is presupposed by the very existence of contracts.
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It is common to ask what kind of education is appropriate in liberal democracies.4 
However, it seems bizarre to ask what kind of education is appropriate in an illiberal 
theocracy, or in a totalitarian state. One might more reasonably ask how an ethical 
education might be possible in the context of such an unjust state. However, one does 
not ask what kind of education was appropriate to children in Nazi-Germany, as if the 
official views of the country somehow made it all right to teach children the things that 
it did, and in the way that it did.5 One might argue that a liberal democracy is the only 
morally acceptable form of government, and then ask what forms of education are 
morally demanded within it. It might be that a moral kind of education prepares 
children to live in and be supportive of what is the best kind of government, morally 
speaking. Indeed, the factual circumstances about the kind of society we do happen to 
live in, do, to some extent, determine the sort of education that children should have; a 
moral education in Nazi-Germany and present day Ireland will both involve forcefully 
criticizing anti-Semitism, but it will likely only permit secrecy in Nazi-Germany.6 The 
context of Nazi-Germany created a moral compulsion for a secretive, politically 
subversive education; a context of liberal democracy might more likely create the moral 
compulsion for a more politically allegiant education. Deep political questions exist 
about how society ought, ideally, to be organized, about whether states ought to exist, 
for instance (Anarchists do not believe this). I do not want to presuppose or defend any 
answers here, and the forgoing remarks are merely intended to be illustrative. While I 
will defend the notion of extra-parental responsibilities to children from the wider 
community, this need not be thought of as presupposing or requiring the existence of a 
state. That said, in the present Irish context, for instance, it will not be alien to regard 
existing state infrastructure such as taxation, and government funding as the natural 
means to satisfy extra-parental responsibilities (i.e. satisfying those ethical entitlements 
that reach beyond parents’ responsibilities).
4 Commitment, Character and Citizenship is one book already encountered, in Chapter 1, footnote 2, 
which sets that as its central question.
5 It is worth bearing in mind various education-for-justice initiatives take themselves to exist in unjust 
conditions, and deliberate on how they might hope to raise consciousness, and change the conditions 
within which they operate.
6 It would be singularly inappropriate to reproach the White Rose group for the anonymity of their anti- 
Nazi graffiti and pamphleteering, since six were (as they could reasonably expect) beheaded for treason 
when they were apprehended.
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By W hom , to W hom , and in Virtue of W hat are Ethical D uties Owed?
Children plausibly have different ethical claims to particular acts and omissions over 
people corresponding to the different relationships they have to them. For instance, they 
seem to be owed special kinds of care (unique profiles of act obligations) by their 
parents, teachers, and doctors; we commonly think of parents as having special duties to 
their own children, rather than to other people’s children, for instance. While we might 
regard all people as having duties not to harm children (duties of omission), it seems 
that parents have a lion’s share of duties to promote their own children’s wellbeing 
(duties to act). One’s ethics of influence might demand of everyone that we do no harm 
where we attempt to influence other people’s children without demanding any attempt 
to influence other people’s children, or to forbear from doing so. On these views, what 
obligations of acts and omissions we have to children (and indeed to adults) turns on the 
character of our relationships to them. However, to assert that some relationships are 
special requires an account of how and why they are ethically special, how it is that 
they entail different ethical obligations (if they are not to be merely prejudicial). While 
we may be quite happy with the notion that one has special obligations to family and 
friends, this notion becomes darker when we speak about special obligations to 
countrymen, or to members of our sex, gender, class, race, or species, just in virtue of 
our belonging to the same categories.
Independent of the notion of special relationships is the plausible principle articulated 
by Peter Singer that “if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, 
without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, 
morally, to do it.” Notice that this principle does not turn on the nature of relationships. 
Whoever we are, we ought to prevent what harm we can from coming to others, 
whoever they are to us (“without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral
* Q t
importance,” that is). It is to argue that we have act obligations to ensure basic benefits 
for others; friends, family, countrymen, and distant strangers alike.9 Brighouse and
7 Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality,’ p. 229.
8 In ‘Persons, Character, and Morality,’ in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1981), 
Bernard Williams argues powerfully that bracketing motivations caused by our special relationships can 
seem pathological, and require ‘one thought too many of us’: as when I save my wife instead of a 
stranger, where there is nothing else to choose between them for both reasons, when it seems that I 
should just save my wife because she is my wife, without thinking any further.
9 In fact, the idea is not as circumscribed as this. To say we ought to act to prevent bad things from 
happening is not yet to specify what counts as a bad thing. So it might be that we have moral reason to 
prevent bad things from befalling non-human animals, plant life, human artefacts, and so on, not because
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McAvoy suggest that while “it is good for a child to have music lessons,” “providing 
them might take away money being spent on a parent’s education towards a more 
fulfilling career.”10 Here, an appeal is made to comparable moral worth. However, an 
appeal might have been made to basic goods; music lessons are not a basic good, the 
absence o f which constitutes a form of harm.11
I take it that coming to harm is a bad thing, although more substance must, and, in the 
next chapter, will, be given to this rather bare conception. On Singer’s principle, we 
owe the prevention of harm to others whoever they are, and so owe them action, rather 
than just omissions of action such as not harming them. But why should we accept 
Singer’s principle?
An A rgum ent for Singer’s Principle
When we have a principle which is conceived of as a source of explanation, it need not 
be amenable to explanation itself; it may be ethically basic. What can give it some 
rational credulity for the sceptical is its use in explaining other things which they are 
already ethically committed to. What then, can Singer’s principle explain to lend it 
credibility if it is to be conceived of as ethically basic? I think that Singer’s principle 
can explain both the intuitive appeal of the Problem of Evil, and the appeal of 
apologists’ best responses to it. The problem challenges theists, by asking why it is that 
such suffering persists, if God is able to prevent it, knows about it, and is morally good. 
Here, the suppressed premise seems to be that knowledge o f suffering, in addition to the 
power to end it, gives one the moral responsibility to do so, one which a morally good 
being would act on. This requires no special relation of God to those who suffer, but 
only to his power and knowledge, that, if he is good, he will use to end suffering. This 
looks like an application of Singer’s aforementioned principle. And indeed, the 
apologist’s usual responses that 1) suffering is a consequence of allowing free will, and 
2) suffering allows for moral growth, both draw on Singer’s qualification of not
of their import for human animals, but for their own sake. Cf Scott A. Davison, On the Intrinsic Value o f 
Everything (London: Continuum, 2012).
10 Harry Brighouse and Paula McAvoy, ‘Do Children Have Any Rights?’ in The Philosophy o f 
Education: An Introduction ed. by Richard Bailey (London: Continuum, 2010).
II Some might suggest that harm consists, to some extent, in the loss of goods, so that if one already 
enjoys music lessons, to lose them would constitute harm, while not being given music lessons in the first 
place would not count as a harm. On the other hand, this same analysis could not plausibly to starvation 
and nourishment.
“thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance.”12 One might say that, 
being our creator, God would have a special reason to relieve our suffering, but that 
relationship is not mentioned as part of the traditional problem, and there is no 
suggestion that, were God not our creator, he would be relieved of any onus to relieve 
innocent suffering. We have said something about the source of responsibility, about 
who can be responsible and in virtue of what, but what can they be responsible for?
Objects o f R esponsibility
What can we be responsible for? Talk of our responsibility for our actions and their 
consequences, together with responsibility for our omissions and the absence of desired 
consequences, are familiar; for instance, for my walking over the flower bed, and for so 
walking having damaged the flowers, or for my failure to water the flowers, and for the 
flowers not being kept alive. Also familiar is talk of responsibility for the completion of 
tasks, and for the condition of things and people; for instance, for (the task of) watering 
the flowers, and for the flowers’ (condition of) being alive. These are all connected, but 
are not identical. I could have done all that I could to keep something in a good state 
and yet have failed to have kept it in that state, and have to answer for how it is. On the 
other hand, I could be responsible, not for the state of plant, but for doing certain things 
to the plant: for feeding, and watering it, but not for what state it is in per se. While it is 
what outcomes actually obtain that is good or bad for us, it is for the outcomes we 
intend, and risk, that we are culpable in acting. In saying this, I have committed myself 
to denying that we can be responsible for the state of things independently of our 
actions, and omissions. But it is through the relations of our actions and omissions to 
the wellbeing of intrinsically valuable objects that they become morally significant (I 
use the word ‘objects’ broadly enough to include human beings, as in, ‘the object of 
one’s affections’).
What things and people are we responsible for the wellbeing of (in as much as our 
actions and omissions can ensure it)? Put differently, what things are we morally
12 These have been advocated by Alvin Plantinga, in God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1989) and by Irenaeus of Lyons, Against Heresies, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, Volume One, ed. 
by Alexander Roberts, James Donaldson, and A. Cleveland Coxe, trans. by Alexander Roberts and 
William Rambaut (Buffalo, NY: Christian Literature Publishing Co. 1885).
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required to keep bad things from befalling? It must be a bearer of intrinsic value,13 and 
have scope for harm and benefit. Nobody can be responsible for something that does 
not matter. Nor can anyone be morally responsible for something immutable. Since no 
harm or benefit can come to immutable objects, there is nothing that one can ensure and 
therefore nothing that one can be responsible for ensuring. Arguably, nobody can be 
responsible for self-sufficient things (for instance, people able to care for themselves 
but unwilling). However, one may reasonably doubt that anyone can be self-sufficient 
and yet still come to harm; perhaps a necessary condition for self-sufficiency is that it 
ensures its own wellbeing. We say that in order to merit responsibility from outside, a 
thing needs to be at least both vulnerable (not immutable), and unable to secure its 
wellbeing (not self-sufficient). Some may say further that those able but unwilling to 
secure their own wellbeing merit responsibility (thinking of those on suicide watch, or 
with self-destructive tendencies).
W hat Is It to Do a M oral W rong?
There seem to be two different kinds of wrong for which we can be blamed, namely 
acts (such as harming) on the one hand and omissions (such as allowing harms and 
failing to ensure basic goods) on the other.14 While an act can cause harm, an omission 
is not a cause of anything.15 However, a failure to cause something can thereby allow 
some harm or fail to procure some basic benefit, without playing a causal role; for 
instance, failing to feed one’s child allows them to starve (a clear case of coming to 
harm). Locking one’s child in a broom cupboard without human contact is wrong 
because it allows the child not to develop in ordinary and desirable ways (such as by
131 do not have an account of what it is that distinguishes something as being an intrinsic value bearer. I 
need only to be allowed that children count as bearers of intrinsic value. Jeremy Bentham has insisted 
that being of moral value requires sentience (or a capacity to endure pain), Scott A. Davison has argued 
that every concrete object is of intrinsic value. It seems to me that having benefit/ harm profile is a 
necessary condition of being of moral worth, but not a sufficient condition, further more something 
immutable might be of intrinsic value, but not moral significance - since it cannot be harmed or 
benefitted.
141 speak of failure to ensure basic goods, rather than failure to ensure goods tout court, since ensuring 
some goods, such as exotic holidays are surely supererogatory. A basic good might be that of proper 
nourishment, the negation of which would constitute a form of harm; that of being malnourished.
15 There is lively debate in metaphysics as to whether we bring about states of affairs through omissions. 
However, Helen Beebee has argued convincingly that there is “no need to think of [for instance] 
Godzilla’s lack of impingement [in our world] as a kind of causation.” My not feeding a plant doesn’t 
cause it to die, even though my feeding it causes it not to die. But this in no wise means I was not morally 
culpable for allowing the plant to die. Helen Beebee ‘Causing and Nothingness,’ in Causation and  
Counter/actuals ed. by L. A. Paul, E. J. Hall & J. Collins (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), pp. 291- 
308.
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becoming verbal, active and sociable, which are basic goods), that is, it constitutes
certain omissions. Furthermore, it also causes them to have a torturous existence quite
apart from what is being missed out on (not only does their lacking basic goods 
constitute a bad thing, but what is present to them is bad also).
Things are a little more complex than this, though: intentions, risks and outcomes are 
also important. For the moment, I shall talk of causing harm, and leave the matter of 
allowing harms, and failing to procure basic goods, to one side. We can distinguish the 
following: someone’s intending to do harm (whether or not their act makes harm likely, 
and whether or not it causes harm), someone’s acting in such a way that doing harm is 
likely (whether or not they intend to do harm, or realize that harm is being risked), and 
someone’s actually causing harm (even if they hadn’t intended to, or even done 
something that significantly risked causing harm). It seems that too much of an 
emphasis on actual outcomes obliterates the importance of the nature of our actions, and 
their underlying intentions, since whether or not we acted well comes down to how 
things may (even freakishly) turn out. I want to emphasize risk and intention, rather 
than outcome.16 So, more accurately, we do wrong when:
1. we intend to frustrate goods or bring harm
2. we fa il to intend to bring basic goods
3. when we risk frustrating goods or bringing harm,
3.1. unknowingly, but negligently
3.2. knowingly and irregardless.
We do wrong even if (through luck) no harm comes. Stipulation 3.2 captures the 
following scenario: I might greedily eat all of the food that my family has, and not feed 
my children because I enjoy gorging myself. In doing so, I did not intend for my family 
to come to harm even though I knew that they would; rather, their coming to harm was 
a bi-product of my intended outcome. Even still, my action seems no less wrong for 
that. Here, my action of eating all of the food was in part a knowing forbearance to feed 
my children, and that omission to feed my children and grant them a basic good is a
16 See Thomas Nagel, ‘Moral Luck’, in M ortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1979), and Bernard Williams, ‘Moral Luck’, in M oral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981) for a critique of this view.
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wrongful aspect of both my intentions and actions. While it is what outcomes actually 
obtain for us that are good or bad for us, it is for what outcomes we intend, and for what 
outcomes we risk, that we are culpable for. The next stage of our enquiry is to establish 
in virtue of what it is that people are responsible for averting harms and ensuring 
benefits for anything in particular.
W ho is R esponsible for W hat Actions Pertaining to W hose W ellbeing, and in  
Virtue o f W hat are they so Responsible?
We know what sorts of things we could possibly be responsible for (at least for our 
actions and omissions which bear on the wellbeing of vulnerable, value-bearers that are 
not self-sufficient), but how do we know what things (if any) we are in fact responsible 
for? It is certainly an interesting question as to how one acquires responsibility for a 
child’s development (and for other forms of influential practices, such as providing 
public information, immigrant assimilation, and offender reform). Indeed, it is an 
interesting question as to how one comes to have any moral responsibilities at all, 
whether, for instance, they are always or ever a matter of choice. In the next section, I 
shall argue that the responsibilities arise from being the best person for the moral job; 
However, first, I want to argue that moral responsibilities do not arise from roles, as is 
often thought.
We might say that a little league coach should attend all of their team’s training 
sessions, and that if they were unable to, then they ought not to be in that role. Indeed, 
we expect doctors to be good qua doctors and everyone else to be good in their role, but 
why have these roles and the duties that come with them in the first place? It seems that 
one takes on a responsibility distinctive of a role through a choice, and that one can opt 
out of that role (the first half may often be true in becoming a biological parent, though 
not always). Plausibly, however, the primary functions of roles address the 
vulnerabilities of value-bearers that create an ethical demand for those roles in the first 
place, vulnerabilities which place ethical demands on members of societies to fill the 
roles. Indeed, in the case of one’s role being a bad one, we should hope that its occupier 
sabotages their purpose as best they can; concordantly, Oskar Schindler is (rightly) 
admired for being a terrible munitions manufacturer for the German army during the 
Second World War. Bernard Williams points out that some people’s successes in their 
roles are precisely moral failings, even by their own lights:
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It is said of certain German Generals who during the war were appalled by 
Hitler’s policies that they were for a long time inhibited from setting to work 
against him by considerations of the oath they had taken, as officers o f the 
Wehrmacht, to obey him. Let’s suppose obedience to the oath could be 
established as certainly part of one’s duties as a German Officer; then what the 
Generals needed was to form the conception of things they had to do which 
were contrary to what they were supposed to do as German Officers; that is to 
say, it was no longer under the title, and in the role, of German Officer that they 
had to act. And this was a conception, which it seems, some of them found very 
difficult to form.17
Some have suggested that the relationship that teachers have to students makes certain 
demands of them.18 However, I do not think that it will do to start by explaining the 
nature of a relationship, and then proceeding to explain what responsibilities flow from 
that relationship. This is because what are understood to be the responsibilities are 
constitutive of the relationship. For instance, it would be absurd to suppose that just 
because someone was in a role they ought then to satisfy it. Rather, it is because they 
ought to assume a role that they ought to satisfy its duties. Indeed, we can think of cases 
where those playing a certain role in a relationship have no responsibility to stay in it, 
because there was no need for the role in the first place; think of a subordinate younger 
sister waiting hand and foot on her lazy slob of an older brother; the fact that they have 
such a relationship implies no duty to sustain the role.
There are many diverse kinds of relationships: husband-wife, parent-children, 
grandparent-grandchildren, godparents-godchildren, neighbours (in the sense of people 
living nearby), doctors-patients, and so on. Some of these relationships feature saliently 
in responsibilities that we expect people to fulfil with respect to one another, other 
relationships do not feature so prominently (‘lives two doors down from’, for instance 
or ‘wears the same colour hat as’). Some of these roles are more obviously social 
constructs than others, and the question is whether the roles have any moral basis for
17 Bernard Williams, Morality (Cambridge: Canto, 1993), pp. 51-2.
18 D.E. Cooper, ‘Teaching and Truthfulness,’ Studies in Philosophy and Education 27 (2-3) (2008), pp. 
79-87.
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the creation of the institutions in which they exist in the first place.19 I want to ask about 
a stage, logically prior to actual existing arrangements, which has to do with what 
arrangements should be brought into existence, that is to say, asking about whether the 
ethics of influence ought to have implications for upbringing and schooling, and not 
vice versa. In the next section, I consider the answer that the best person for the ethical 
job is responsible for making sure that it is done, a view which, I shall argue, has 
considerable plausibility.
The Best Person for the Job
It seems reasonable to leave tasks to those best placed and equipped to perform them, 
where they need to be performed (the best person for the job, as I will call them). So the 
individual nearest to the elderly person that fell over ought to help them up, and where 
they cannot provide sufficient care to them, to call out for someone that can (again, the 
nearest person whose powers will suffice). This is an onus that they cannot abdicate, but 
which falls simultaneously on the next best person if they drop the ‘moral baton’, so 
that in not bothering to help up the elderly person, the most able person thereby puts the 
next most able person under an obligation to take up the slack, without excusing 
themselves. Here, we have two rival goods to weigh up in the service of expedience, 
namely, proximity and competence. We often hear of people in need of complex 
surgery being flown to distant hospitals which specialise in such treatment (a case from 
2012 is that of Nobel Laureate, Malala Yousafzai, who, as a young girl, was shot in the 
head by a Taliban gunman, being flown to Birmingham, England for specialist 
treatment). There is a balance of immediacy and competency to be weighed up, since 
someone may be nearest by but least competent, or furthest away but most competent. 
There will be gradations in between, and, indeed, those most competent to a task may 
be equipped well above the level of expertise required for a task for it to be done 
sufficiently well. We may distinguish between ability and opportunity (more on this 
distinction in Chapter 3), and we may say that modem day doctors would be best able 
to look after the needs of ancient peoples in ill health, but have no opportunity to do so, 
being separated by the ages. Needs here (and throughout) are to be understood as basic
19 It is reasonable to say that they are created because people are a) not able to meet their own needs and 
responsibilities unassisted and b) unable or unwilling to respect other people’s needs unpressured, or at 
all.
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goods of vulnerable, value-bearers. The thought here is that being best able to do 
something together with having the opportunity to do it (through some combination of 
proximity, liberty, expertise, equipment and availability) is what obliges someone to
9 f tmeet needs. We might also add another clause: that of knowing about the need to be 
satisfied. It seems unreasonable to blame anyone for failing to help out in a disaster that 
they had no way of knowing to have been occurring.
It is possible to cultivate expertise, and obtain equipment (and, indeed, we can advance 
expertise and develop equipment). It is interesting as to whose job it should be to step 
up and fill the required expert roles (those roles dictated by needs). On the one hand, it 
is not as though it is alright for everyone to do just whatever they want (thus societies 
do well to reward those jobs most needed so that people are more inclined to take on 
those roles). On the other hand, it is not as though it is alright for society to allocate the
needed places and then draft people into those roles. This undermines the plausible
9 1
principle that people ought to have an open future. Perhaps drafting teachers and 
doctors should be done if the need for them desperately outweighed their supply, in 
spite of inducements. Indeed, it is often (falsely) attributed to Aristotle that one’s 
vocation is the overlap between one’s talents and society’s needs (some versions have it 
that it is the overlap between one’s talents and the world’s needs). A vocation here is 
thought of as being how one could most valuably employ one’s abilities in a career 
(which would hopefully be highly rewarding), whereas we want to know whether some 
people might have a duty to become certain types of professionals, or for certain 
professions to be created. This difference aside, it is a plausible enough starting point to 
consider that one may have an obligation to satisfy those roles at which our talents and 
society’s need intersect. Before going on to look at parent-child relationships, I want to 
defend my conception of ethics against a certain Kantian obj ection.
The V ery Idea o f Im perfect Obligations
I have argued that any ethics of influence must identify specific parties that have 
responsibilities to other specific parties, together with the content of those
20 The reference to ‘availability’, harks back to Singer’s principle: “if it is in our power to prevent 
something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, 
we ought, morally, to do it,” since it seems that one cannot neglect to help simply because one would 
prefer not to; one needs to have been doing something at least as morally important which was 
incompatible.
2f One thinks also of coercion, and inducement, and of brainwashing as morally dubious means of getting 
people to assume certain roles cf. Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 
23.
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responsibilities. I claimed that the alternative was to address an ethical cheque to 
children with either the amount or the patron missing. But this claim of mine is 
something that Kantians, such as Onora O’Neill, are concerned to deny. Following 
Immanuel Kant, Onora O'Neill distinguishes between perfect and imperfect obligations, 
perfect obligations having set benefactors, and imperfect obligations having unset 
benefactors. A set beneficiary is a specific person who is due a benefit from a specific 
benefactor. Where the beneficiary is unset, there is no specific person who is due a 
benefit. But “so long as recipients of the obligation are neither all others or specified
others, there are no rights holders and nobody can either claim or waive performance of
22any right.” However, I cannot even make sense of owing something to nobody in 
particular. If I ever owe anything to anybody, it must be in virtue of their qualifying for 
the benefit somehow. But this seems to make it a perfect obligation. I may not owe you 
something in all circumstances, but I may owe it you in some particular circumstances: 
I don't owe the time the train leaves at (if I know it) to everybody or anyone in 
particular, but I owe it to people who ask. If you ask, and I refuse to tell, you can object 
that I breached your right to know. We will now explore how these considerations 
might help us with deciding how (if at all) parents are responsible for their children’s 
wellbeing. Having defended my conception of ethics against a Kantian objection, we 
can go on to look at the import of my account for parent-child relationships.
The N ature o f Parent-Child Relationships
“Really,” my dad said. “I wouldn’t bullshit you about this. If you were more
trouble than you’re worth, we’d just toss you out on the streets.”
“We’re not sentimental people,” Mom added, deadpan. “W e’d leave you at an 
orphanage with a note pinned to your pajamas.”
These comments are made in jest, and are funny. The suggestion that attachment to 
one’s child is mere sentiment that ought to be trumped by a negative return on a
cost/benefit analysis is laughably absurd.24 Indeed, it is almost universally held that a
22 Onora O'Neill, ‘Children's Rights and Children's Lives,' Ethics 98(3) (1988), pp. 445-463,448.
23 John Green, The Fault in Our Stars (London: Penguin, 2012), p. 166.
24 But to laugh, it seems is to evince one’s position, without making an argument. Certainly the joke has 
some persuasive force, but it is not rational. It may be regarded as an intuition pump which shows up 
one’s feelings.
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child’s biological parents should, where possible, assume primary responsibility for 
their child’s upbringing. The emotionally charged word ‘abandonment’ is used where 
parents give their children up for adoption, for instance (though it should be noted that 
many young mothers have been coerced into giving their children up for adoption, or do 
so for their child to have a better life), and the word ‘neglect’ is used where parents fail 
to invest time, energy and consideration into their child’s upbringing. There is a 
powerful scene in the film There Will Be Blood, which illustrates this.26 There, the 
protagonist, Daniel Plainview, is brought to confess in an outburst of emotion in front 
of a Baptist congregation that “I've abandoned my child! I've abandoned my child! I've 
abandoned my boy!”
Biological parent-child relationships are not defined by proximity and expertise 
(although it is often thought that parent-child relationships ethically demand proximity
9 7and the cultivation of some expertise, among other things). Indeed, there are many 
things which we call needs that we do not think that all parents would even be capable 
of meeting; medical needs being the most obvious example. We might further suggest 
that children can have educational needs which outstrip what most parents can provide 
(especially parents working in non-educational contexts), and thus have to outsource the 
satisfaction of some of their child’s educational needs to others.
Proximity and ability would be relevant considerations for relieving parents of their 
parenting commitments, but it seems that parenting’s own commitments come from a 
source other than ability and proximity.
9 ^
25 Few other responsibilities could trump their responsibility for bringing their child up. One recalls Jean 
Paul Sartre’s example of a young man who had the choice “of going to England to join the Free French 
Forces -  which would mean abandoning his mother -  or remaining by her side to help her go on with her 
[difficult] life,” Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism (London: Methuen, 1973), p. 35. This 
decision can be paralleled with that of many fathers (and fewer mothers) that have gone to war, or 
pursued other projects which took them away from their children.
26 There Will Be Blood, dir. by Paul Thomas Anderson (Paramount/ Miramax/ Ghoulardi, 2007).
27 In fact, saying ‘biological parenthood’ is ambiguous between two or perhaps three senses, as shall 
explain now. These sense in which I meant it is: genetic parentage. There are disputes over the proper 
definition of motherhood, where that means who should be presumed in the first instance (sans defeaters, 
such as severe mental illness) to be female guardian, (or female primary carer, or parent) to bring up the 
child. The possible definitions are genetic, contractual (or ‘intent’ based), and gestational. The 
complexity emerges where a ‘traditional surrogate’ agrees to be both genetic and gestational mother to a 
child, but to give them up to another woman to raise the child (the contractual mother). On the 
contractual (or intent) definition, the surrogate cannot renege on the contract. On the gestational 
definition, the child would be supposed to be that of whoever carries and births the child. On the genetic 
definition, the child would be supposed to be that of whoever’s DNA it is that they share. It seems that 
where the concept of a biological mother comes apart, we should simply say that children can have two 
biological mothers: namely a gestational and a genetic mother. See Andrea Mulligan, ‘Surrogacy in the 
Courts: The definition of Motherhood’, <http://humanrights.ie/children-and-the-Iaw/surrogacy-in-the- 
courts-the-definition-of-motherhood/> [accessed 23 June 2015],
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One might use the writing of Bernard Williams to resist the idea that the responsibilities 
of parenthood are derivative of any universal ethical principle. One might draw 
especially on Bernard Williams’ paper ‘Persons, Character and Morality’ in which he 
characterizes the person who saves the life of his wife over that of a stranger for the 
reason that “it was his wife and in situations of this kind it is permissible to save one’s 
wife,” as having had “one thought too many.” It might have been hoped “for instance, 
by his wife” that he had saved her just because she was his wife.28 Williams argues that 
most people have reasons to live in the form of projects which they aspire to undertake, 
and that these can be intimately related to close, preferential relationships with other 
people. Where we must give up on these in favour of impersonal requirements of what 
he calls the morality system, we thereby lose what are our interests in living and
“generally one shouldn’t take advice if, were one to take it, one would have no reason
90
to go on living.” However, this is no explanation of a responsibility, but an argument 
for a ‘free pass’ on some moral responsibilities. The natural worry about such an 
approach is that it ultimately amounts to nihilism, with our only having those 
responsibilities we like, and our not really having those anyway.
The Source o f Parental Responsibility
In virtue of what is it that a biological parent has a specific set of act obligations to their 
child? There are various principles in virtue of which people potentially ought to accept 
responsibility for their biological children’s wellbeing, which we shall now assess. 
These include principles of fairness, ownership, naturalness, and being best equipped. I 
will ultimately defend an argument from them being best equipped to them having a 
specific set of act obligations. First though, perhaps responsibility for the wellbeing o f 
children being occasioned by biological parentage makes for a plausible moral axiom, 
just as Singer’s principle seems morally axiomatic.
M oral A xiom aticity
A responsibility to act as guardian might be thought to arise from biological parentage 
axiomatically, just as being best able to satisfy some need might be taken to be an
28 Bernard Williams, ‘Persons, Character and Morality’ in M oral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), pp. 1- 19, 18.
29 Elijah Millgram ‘D'où Venons-Vous, Que Sommes Nous, Où Allons-Nous?’ Reading Bernard 
Williamsy ed. by Daniel Calicut (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 141-165, p. 144.
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axiom of moral responsibility. If it is, then there may come times when rival parties 
have the same moral responsibilities, and one will need to trump the other, or else they 
will need to share the responsibility somehow. In the case of parenting, we want to say 
that the initial responsibility goes to the parent over the best equipped; indeed, if it did 
not, then there would hardly be room for special responsibility of biological parenthood 
at all. If we cannot find another principle in which it is rooted, then we may have to 
admit this.
It would seem wrong for anyone to take a child away from a biological parent, other 
things being equal. Indeed, it would often seem wrong for someone to take the child 
away from a biological parent, other things being unequal; wealth or social status, for 
instance.30 There is a strong presumption that the person or people that a new bom child 
would ‘go home with’, so to speak, from a maternity ward, is the mother, or mother and 
father, in the first instance. One consideration is the wellbeing of the biological parent; 
whether or not they want to be a parent, and if  they do, it would seem cruel to the parent 
to take them away. This suggests that parents have some rights of parenthood that can 
be distinguished from responsibilities of parenthood. Suppose it made no odds to the 
child’s wellbeing whether they stayed with the parent or not, it would seem odd, other 
things being equal, to say that there was no valance in the parent’s favour that their 
child should stay with them.
Fairness
It might be thought unfair for anyone to take on responsibility for a child that they did 
not create. It is least unfair that parents raise their own children. Here, then, one would 
expect that where a parent were keen, but moderately less able to parent their child than 
another person who was also keen to raise them, that they ought to leave the parenting 
to that person. However, this consequence also seems too counterintuitive. Furthermore, 
it seems that this case overlooks the wellbeing of the child in the first instance, instead 
looking to keep people free of unbidden responsibilities. However, it seems in the very 
nature of responsibility that it comes unbidden. This is nicely expressed by an exchange
30 In Gone Baby Gone, dir.by Ben Affleck (LivePlanet, Miramax, Ladd Company, 2007), protagonist, 
Patrick Kenzie, is forced to choose between allowing a child to live with her wealthy, middle class 
kidnappers, and her poor, ‘white trash,’ former drug using, uncouth, single mother. One thought that 
motivates him is that not only ‘other things being equal,’ is it better to be with one’s biological parents, 
but other things being unequal, it usually is too.
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from Peter Jackson’s adaptation of JRR Tolkien’s The Fellowship o f  the Ring, when 
Frodo confides in Gandalf, his mentor that he wishes he had never come to have the 
responsibility of destroying an evil, magical ring:
Frodo: I wish the ring had never come to me. I wish none of this had 
happened.
Gandalf: So do all who live to see such times. But that is not for them 
to decide. All we have to decide is what to do with the time that is given 
to us.31
Ownership
The parent-child relationship has sometimes been characterised as one of ownership, 
where parents are entitled to sell their children, or use them as any other piece of 
property. It is perhaps in virtue of one’s having in some sense made one’s children that 
one might be thought to own them. It has been thought the case that one cannot 
properly be held accountable for how one treats one’s own property. While it might be
T9foolish to destroy or harm one’s own property, one cannot be morally blamed for it. 
But this result is hugely counterintuitive. Indeed, on this model parents would not be 
responsible for their child’s welfare at all. This is to construe childhood as a form of 
slavery. One might urge that this is a false consequence of ownership. Modem UK and 
Irish law regards pet owners as being responsible for their pets’ welfare, while still 
being their owners. So too might one urge that this is true of slavery. However, there 
would seem to be something terribly wrong not only with whipping, raping and 
murdering slaves, but with owning people in the first place. One wonders why 
adulthood should release one from slavery, or whether one would remain the property 
of their parents until they both passed away, and whether they could transfer ownership 
before passing away. One might resist the notion of property altogether, and urge along 
Marxist lines that all property is theft. Alternatively, we might allow for the possibility 
of ownership and try to draw a distinction to separate those things which may be owned
31 The Lord o f  The Rings: Fellowship o f  the Ring, dir. by Peter Jackson (New Line Cinema, 2001), the 
remarks look different to those in the original text: “I wish it need not have happened in my time.” “So do 
I,” said Gandalf, “and so do all who live to see such times. But that is not for them to decide. All we have 
to decide is what to do with the time that is given to us, Tolkien, John Ronald Reuel, The Fellowship o f  
the Ring: Being the First Part o f  The Lord o f  the Rings (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012), p. 
50.
32 This too is still somewhat contentious, and indeed someone might resist the notion that we do not have 
any responsibilities to our property. Perhaps ownership might be limited by some moral norms: for 
instance, it would not be alright to bum a beautiful painting for the sake of it, just because we owned it.
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from those that may not. This is not easy to do. It is very tempting to suggest that the 
capacity for self-determination makes one’s ownership unethical, but sleeping people 
do not have it, nor do people in comas, nor perhaps some severely disabled people. We 
might say then that the capacity for self-determination is a sufficient but not a necessary 
condition for why one should not be owned. Notice that many non-human animals 
ought not to come under our ownership either, under this definition, since they too are 
self-determining.
N aturalness
Another raison d'etre for parents being responsible for their children is that it is in 
some sense, natural The Irish constitution is written with this in mind.33 Presumably, 
not to allow this would be a perversion of nature, of how things would go in a state of 
nature, or without interference. But it does happen in nature, to the extent that we can 
understand the expression ‘in nature’. Moreover, it seems that we can distinguish 
between what is natural, and what is morally acceptable. It seems that vindictiveness, 
jealousy and blood feuds are perfectly natural, but certainly not morally acceptable.
Having discussed the prospects of parental responsibility being understood as morally 
axiomatic, and as a consequence of more basic principles of fairness, ownership, 
naturalness, I will now defend an argument from them being best equipped to them 
having a specific set of act obligations.
Best Placed
It might be urged that it really is their ability to be best able to care for their children 
that makes biological parents responsible for their child. Parents usually love their 
children and want to do what is best for them; their desires overlap with what they think 
is in their children’s best interests (including satisfying their perceived needs, and 
keeping them from coming to perceived harm). It may be argued that this motivational 
drive makes parents the best equipped to nurture their children, or at least counts in 
favour of their being so considered. Kleinig and Hobson both argue for this conclusion:
33 The State acknowledges that the primary and natural educator of the child is the Family and guarantees 
to respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, according to their means, for the religious 
and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their children. (Article 42, 1).
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There is some reason to think that the developmental needs of children 
are likely to be met most successfully in an environment in which 
primary responsibility, and the authority that is derivative of that, lies 
with the parents. There are grounds fo r  believing that parents, more than 
anyone else, will have the kind of commitment to their offspring that 
will safeguard and promote their welfare interests.34
Parents should be the prime agents in their children’s upbringing, other 
things being equal, because they are the ones most likely to best 
promote the welfare of their children. It is the parents who have the 
most direct interest in their children’s welfare and the parent-child 
bonds of affection are more likely to ensure the continuous care and 
attention needed, even under the most difficult of circumstances. It is 
generally agreed by psychologists that the developing child benefits 
greatly from the intimate relationship with its parents and the sense of 
belonging and being loved that is normally present.35
It may be objected that what parents think is in their children’s best interests may not 
be. Jehovah’s Witnesses having refused to let their children to have blood transfusions 
in life-threatening situations, arguably, demonstrates this. So too does the practice of 
female genital mutilation. It seems that there are reasonable expectations of a good 
upbringing, connected with proper development that parents should be held accountable 
for, and not just any earnest upbringing will do. Indeed, both Kleinig and Hobson 
acknowledge this. It seems to be their contention then, that those who are in the best 
position to raise children have the responsibility to do so, and that (usually) that is their 
biological parents because (usually) their parents love them. If this works, then they 
will have placed the allocation of upbringing responsibilities within the context of the 
‘best person for the job’ principle.
This argument really only establishes that it is biological parents who love their 
children, who have a responsibility to them bring them up. This can seem strange in that 
a parent who chose to have a child, and then frivolously decided that they did not want 
to bring them up, had not broken some duty. Here, what would be wrong is the frivolity 
of the decision to have a child, rather than their giving up their child. Indeed, there is 
something worrisome about a biological parent who are parents out of a sense of 
responsibility alone, and not out of a sense of affection, and concern. Consider an 
emotionally indifferent parent, or indeed a parent who did not like children, or their 
child in particular, one who perhaps resented being responsible for them. It is hard to
34 John KJeinig, Paternalism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983), p. 145.
35 Peter Hobson, ‘Some Reflections on Parents' Rights in the Upbringing of Their Children/ Journal o f  
Philosophy o f  Education 18(1) (1984), pp. 63-74, 64.
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imagine such a person actually raising a healthy and happy child. It might be a rare 
case, perhaps the case of a psychopath, since it would be hard for most people to resist 
forming strong bonds with anyone that we spend a large amount of time with, and aim 
to care for. Even still, it seems false to say that children who are unloved and unwanted 
have no ethical claims over a world that is able to care for it, it seems that their parents 
in the first instance and anyone else who is most able after that, has the responsibility to 
help. However, willingness is important. Willingness seems to be part of the ability 
profile. A begrudging carer is hardly a real carer at all. It is contingent whether 
affections will grow or not, and perhaps one can take steps to make them do so; by 
spending time together, for instance, by enjoying activities together. It would only be 
when a person both willing and able to facilitate their wellbeing cannot be found, that a 
begrudging carer is to be drawn on.
Some might deny the idea that primary-caregiving-responsibilities going first to 
biological parents is anything but a social construct, devoid of moral character; 
biological parents just happen to be expected to be a primary caregiver in our society. 
But this is extremely implausible: this intuition can be encouraged by asking people 
what they think of a case of a child being taken away from biological parents and given 
to some other people for no special reason. This simply looks like a case of kidnapping, 
with wrong done both to parent and child. There may be social arrangements in which 
child care is diffuse, with no clear primary carer; these might include polygamous 
societies in which men have multiple wives all of whom take on responsibilities for 
raising one another’s children. Indeed these do seem to erode the somewhat atomistic 
sorts of responsibility which appear to be recommended on Singer’s principle.
Non-Biological Parents as Prim ary Carers
There are cases where we should not look to biological parents to take on the role of 
primary carer. By ‘primary carer’ I mean, the parental role in the normative rather than 
biological sense of the word. There are instances where plausibly, it is no shirking of 
moral responsibility that they do not take up this role. Some might even be concerned 
that I am outlining a sort of hierarchy whereby the best sort of upbringing is that 
facilitated by one’s two biological parents, and any other permutations of this are 
inferior in quality. This is not at all what I am defending. Furthermore, I am not arguing
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that initial responsibilities of primary caregiving always originate with parents, but only 
that, on Singer’s principle we can understand why they often do. There are many cases 
where it is not at all obvious that primary caregiving responsibilities go first to 
biological parents. While one can imagine speculative cases, such as where a child 
spontaneously came into existence without biological parents, there are actual cases. 
Let us consider some of those cases now.
Where a parent feels that they are not capable of being a primary carer; such cases 
might include rape victims who carry their child to full term pregnancy, perhaps out of 
a moral belief that their unborn child is entitled to live. Other cases could include 
mentalLy ill people who do not believe that they could adequately raise their children. In 
this case, there will be some fact of the matter about whether or not they could, and 
perhaps they could be persuaded that they could be good parents where that is true. 
However, if someone does not believe they could be a good parent, that is ground to 
take their worry seriously, and could very possibly become a self-fulfilling prophecy 
due to stress that child-raising in such a belief would likely cause.
There are cases where couples have more children than they were prepared for -  say a 
poor couple who saved up to be able to afford to raise one child, but unexpectedly had 
octuplets. It might be that the wider community should facilitate their raising these 
children where they want to serve as primary caregivers; by giving resources, time and 
energy for instance. Where the task outstrips their abilities, that task could not possibly 
fall on them as a duty.
Consider cases where the parent does not want to raise their child. One may wonder 
why they had the child. An explanation could be that the child had been unplanned, and 
had in a country where abortion is illegal. Alternatively, they might have been naive 
about what having children involved, have felt pressured into having a child, or have 
found that circumstances since trying and succeeding in conceiving had changed 
dramatically. One might ask: if they gave their child up for adoption, would they be 
doing the wrong thing? On the account that is sketched above, it not clear that they are, 
indeed, they would more likely be doing the wrong thing in raising a child with a sense 
of duty and resentment, since this is unlikely to be conducive to the child’s wellbeing.
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There are cases where biological parents enable others, such as gay or infertile couples, 
to become primary carers, through the donation of sperm and egg, and through 
Traditional surrogacy’ (as distinct from ‘gestational surrogacy’). Think of a surrogate 
mother, who agrees to have a child that she will not mother, although she will be that 
child’s biological mother in both a gestational and genetic sense. Suppose that the 
surrogate mother decides that she would rather raise the child that she has borne. It is 
not obvious whether she is doing the right, or wrong thing; she is backing out on an 
agreement and she may disappoint those with whom she has made the agreement. She 
may be damaging her own wellbeing by going through with her agreement, and handing 
over her biological child.36 On Singer’s principle we say that we ought to stop bad 
things from happening; breaking a contract would seem to be a bad thing, giving up a 
child that one loves would be a bad thing, refusing a child to someone who dearly 
wants, and has prepared to be a parent would seem to be a bad thing. Weighing up 
which of these is the least bad thing to do is no easy task. However, it does not seem at 
all obvious that there should be a presumption of primary caring responsibilities falling 
on the traditional surrogate: especially not when one considers the person who 
requested the child refusing to accept responsibility for their upbringing, perhaps 
because the child is disabled, or other than anticipated. There is a good question 
unaddressed by this chapter, and indeed, thesis as to whether there should be a 
presumption in favour of a mother’s assuming the role of primary carer where a dispute 
exists as to who it should be. Where does the moral onus for childcare fall? Some might 
criticize the ‘naturalization’ of motherhood, and regarded it as a form of oppression. 
Against this, I urge that, if in essence ‘first refusal’ to bring up a child goes to a mother 
over a father, this is a form of freedom which is clearly not extended to the father, and 
hardly Looks like a form of oppression at all. It might only be defended by a thesis of 
manufactured consent on which mothers are persuaded against their interests to want to 
bring up children. Also importantly we can imagine a case where a DNA donor and 
gestational surrogate agree in a contract that a third woman should be the mother, and 
that all three claimants disagreed as to whom should raise the child at the birth. It is this 
case that is of interest later.
36 We might say: no traditional surrogate mother can sign a binding contract in which she says she will 
unreservedly have a child on behalf of another person. That any such contract will have no ethical 
commitment on her to do so, any more than signing oneself into slavery ought to.
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Sum m ary
We want to know how (if at all) children may be ethically influenced with respect to 
religions. Any plausible answer to our initial question must identify specific parties that 
have responsibilities to children, together with the content of those responsibilities. In 
this chapter, after defending both moral objectivity and context sensitivity, I argued that 
what we can be morally responsible for is those of our actions and omissions which 
bear on the wellbeing of intrinsically valuable objects, such as human beings. After 
criticizing the view that the specific moral responsibilities that people have is parasitic 
on the nature of relationships that they have, I discussed the view that they emerge from 
whether or not they are best person for the (ethical) job. While this answer is plausible, 
I acknowledged that it does not easily accommodate the view that people have a prima 
facie  responsibility for their biological children’s wellbeing (for trying to avert harms to 
them and to ensure their benefit). I then discussed various attempts to say in virtue of 
what it is that biological parents ought to accept responsibility for their children’s 
wellbeing. These included principles of fairness, ownership, naturalness, being best 
equipped, and, finally, whether responsibility for the wellbeing of children being 
occasioned by biological parentage makes for a plausible moral axiom. I concluded that 
the best person for the (ethical) job is the one responsible for making sure that it is done 
and that it can, in fact, accommodate the view that biological parents have a prima facie  
responsibility for their children’s wellbeing. I argued that the principle of ‘the best 
person for the ethical job’ is able to ground both parental and extra-parental 
responsibility to children. Before summarising, I considered some problematic cases for 
the thesis of the primacy of biological parental responsibility for children’s wellbeing. 
In the next chapter, we shall address the content of these responsibilities.
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C h a p ter  T h ree
THE CONTENT OF PARENTAL AND EX TR A -PA R EN TA L
RESPO N SIBILITY  
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we discussed the sources of responsibility. In this chapter, we 
shall discuss the content of responsibility. I have agreed with Peter Singer that “if it is 
in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing 
anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.” 11 also argued 
that it is the person best placed to prevent something bad from happening that should 
morally do it. Singer’s principle requires some idea of what constitutes a bad thing. In 
this chapter, I contend that, other things being equal, an intrinsically valuable object’s 
coming to harm is a bad thing, while its being benefitted is a good thing. It will be 
argued that the nearer an act brings us towards becoming like God, the better it is for us, 
and the more it keeps us from becoming like God, the more it harms us. We shall also 
discuss the parental role, and extra-parental roles, which we can be responsible for 
playing in virtue of our being the best person for the ethical job. The justifications of 
paternalism are discussed, as is the value of autonomy, and the values of truth and 
truthfulness, before we summarise our findings.
The Good and the Bad, Harm s and Benefits
Singer’s principle requires some idea of what constitutes a bad thing (his own example 
is famine). It seems that coming to harm is a bad thing, and being benefitted is a good 
thing, but what is of harm and what is of benefit to human beings (and to children in 
particular)? The answer that I want to elaborate and defend is that the nearer an act 
brings us towards becoming like God, the better it is for us, while the more it keeps us 
from becoming like God, the more harm it is to us. God is “that than which a greater 
cannot be conceived,” 2 and that which helps us towards being in the greatest 
conceivable state , by giving us more powers, opportunities, knowledge, and goodness,
1 Singer, ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality,’ pp. 229-243, 229.
2 Anselm, Proslogion , trans. by Clement C.J. Webb, <https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Proslogion, Chapter 
IV> [accessed 18 June 2015].
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for instance , is in fact in our interests, rather than just what we might happen to think is 
in our interests. Atheists need not think that any such being exists to understand that 
being in such a state is properly desirable.
Adam s on God and Excellence
The view advanced here is to be distinguished from that of the prominent theist, R.M. 
Adams. For Adams, “God is ... that which best plays the role of the referent of the 
Good. ” “God is a particular, not a Platonic form or universal; but God is the Good, and 
so Adams suggests that the excellence of created things might consist in some kind of 
resemblance of God.”3 The view I defend is different from this. According to my view, 
God would be excellent and in the best possible state. There is a God role; that being, or 
those beings, which have all perfections, and anything which satisfies that role is 
maximally excellent. Things are more excellent by the degree to which they 
approximate the role. On this view, God’s condition (if the God role were satisfied) is 
not excellent because it happens to be satisfied by that particular individual (while 
whatever other conditions that individual might have been in would be equally good), 
but because there is some standard of excellence which that individual exemplifies. 
Atheists may accept the standard while denying that anything satisfies it.
O m nipotence, A bilities and Opportunities
In order to better understand this conception of wellbeing, we should distinguish 
between powers, and opportunities, understanding that God would have maximal 
powers and maximal opportunities to exercise them. The distinction is brought out in 
the following example. While I might be able to learn a foreign language in the sense 
that, were I to go to abroad and immerse myself in the language, I would indeed learn 
that language. I still might not have the opportunity to go abroad, and so my ability to 
learn a foreign language (given the opportunity), would seem pointless. It should be 
admitted that some abilities and inabilities are two sides of the same coin and a choice 
must to be made as to which ability/ inability pairing to have. For instance, one cannot 
be optimally good at long distance running and optimally good at sprinting 
(contingently, if not necessarily); indeed, God cannot logically do everything, since
3 Scott A. Davison, On the Intrinsic Value o f  Everything (London: Contiuum, 2012), p. 118.
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claims that God is omnipotent can present us with a paradox as to whether God could 
thereby make a stone that he could not lift.4 Consider an example about a trade-off in 
mental powers offered by Kevin Currie-Knight in a personal correspondence:
One trait (speed of processing) may be desirable but require a trade-off 
with another desirable trait (faster processing often means a less 
nuanced or less accurate processing). Consider ADHD-like processing 
(that sees bigger pictures over details and oscillates focus rapidly) and 
non-ADHD focusing (quicker to see details and pay attention to one 
thing at a time, for longer). It is fantastically difficult to say which of 
these is better, because the answer is almost surely contextual.
We can easily reply to this valuable insight that, while there are almost certainly trade­
offs to be made, one would be more nearly omnipotent, and thereby better off, in being 
able to process well, both quickly and slowly, as one thought appropriate. While one 
may have a constitutional penchant towards doing one more effectively, it is no reason 
not to train oneself in the other. As finite beings, it is true that we have to make choices 
about which of our talents to develop, and must develop one or some to the exclusion of 
others. However, that is no objection to the conception of excellence, but only to our 
being able to ultimately satisfy it.
Four O bjections to W ellbeing Construed as G odliness
There are some other difficulties with this conception of wellbeing that I ought to 
address. First, in emphasizing Godliness, we seem to be emphasizing independence, but 
it may be both impossible and undesirable to emphasize these over socialization and 
functioning well within teams (to emphasize independent labour to the division of 
labour into (fulfilling) specializations). Second, being human involves inhabiting a 
point of view on the universe, whereas being godlike may seem to involve transcending 
any parochial point of view, and seeing the universe under the aspect of eternity.5 
However, it would seem strange to recommend this as an ideal. In particular, it would 
seem strange to emphasize radical transformation out of human biological limitations: 
such as being uploaded onto computers to become maximally disembodied, for
4 Some respond to this sort of challenge by claiming that God cannot make a square circle because that is 
not a coherent proposition. However the two sides of the stone-making/lifting dilemma seem coherent: 
either God can make a stone he cannot lift, or God cannot make a stone that he cannot lift. And so God 
must (on pain of contradiction) be limited in one way or the other.
5 This description is in terms taken from Bernard Williams * Ethics and the Limits o f  Philosophy 
(Abingdon: Fontana Press, 1985); see especially Chapter 8, ‘Knowledge, Science and Convergence’.
instance. Third, emphasizing truth, power, and beneficence (in the sense of maximising 
truth and power in others) seems a little paltry, as it lacks much of a reason to live. 
Fourth, the conception of wellbeing that I have in mind may register a note of 
insensitivity, and political incorrectness. Firstly, one may think of blind people having 
heightened senses of smell and hearing, as a result of lacking sight. Furthermore, human 
beings with disabilities may prefer to think of themselves as simply having disabilities, 
rather than suffering with them, regarding their situation as an alternative way of being 
in the world, even regarding the word ‘disability’ as stigmatizing and condescending. A 
good example of such an attitude is demonstrated by some members of the deaf 
community, who take pride in their way of being in the world. Alternatively, lacking 
certain powers can give people a sense of purpose in overcoming their inabilities: either 
in respect of gaining powers (the power to walk again, perhaps, or the ability to read), 
with the journey having been more worthwhile than the destination. Indeed, one may 
think of the virtues which one cultivates by way of adjusting to life as being more 
important than how one is in the world. There is much truth in these objections, but I 
still want to maintain that (other things being equal) the more abilities one has, the 
better off one is, and the greater one’s abilities, the better off one is (and where things 
are not equal, it is because these access goods give one access to yet more goods). John 
Rawls expresses this point well:
Regardless of what an individual’s rational plans are in detail, it is 
assumed that there are various things which he would prefer more of 
rather than less. With more of these goods men can generally be assured 
of greater success in carrying out their intentions and advancing their 
ends, whatever these ends may be. The primary social goods, to give 
them in broad categories, are rights and liberties, opportunities and 
powers, income and wealth.6
Rawls’ list of “rights and liberties, opportunities and powers” and “income and wealth” 
seems to be collapsible into the categories of abilities and opportunities described above 
(with wealth, rights and liberties providing opportunities to exercise powers, or 
abilities). I want to add knowledge, and understanding to this list of access goods, as 
well as the ability to expand one’s knowledge and understanding. This is not just 
because opportunities to pursue projects require knowledge; indeed conceiving of
6 John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 92.
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projects, inventing or choosing between them requires knowledge too; but instead 
because knowing is partly constitutive of wellbeing.
W ellbeing and a Sense of Purpose
We might say that it is all well and good being better natured, more powerful and 
having more opportunities, but wonder what should we do with our increased power 
and opportunities. This is to ask the question that has been variously formulated as: 
what is best in life, how ought one to live, what is the meaning of life, and what is the 
good life? Should we simply make other people more powerful, and freer to use their 
powers, or are there some goods which powers and opportunities give us access to (they 
are after all access goods). While being given powers and opportunities is of benefit to 
us, and being disempowered and having opportunities restricted harms us, I have as 
much as acknowledged in my last paragraph that these cannot possibly be all that there 
is to value, even morally. Powers and opportunities are valuable because they enable us 
to avail of goods, to pursue worthwhile projects. I have said nothing about this so far. 
Further, good character is surely to be valued for itself and not for the effects it has, as 
the following consideration demonstrates. Imagine a moral monster plugged into a 
virtual reality machine living out all of their fantasies of wanton cruelty and destruction, 
convinced that it is real, without any possibility of actually harming anybody, even still, 
the content of their character and desires seems bad in itself. However, good character 
certainly does not promote harm or undermine benefits, and so is not a rival good.
Satisfying Preferences Is Not the Only Good
So far we have given answers to the questions ‘What sorts of things can we be morally 
responsible for?’ and ‘What counts as a harm or benefit for a human being?’ In answer 
to the first question, I argued that what we can be morally responsible for is those of our 
actions and omissions which bear on the wellbeing o f intrinsically valuable objects, 
such as human beings. My answer to the second question was that the nearer an act 
brings us towards becoming like God, the better it is for us, the more it keeps us from 
becoming like God, the more it harms us. In contrast to the account of wellbeing 
offered here, Peter Singer has defended the goal of maximising the attainment of
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people’s ultimate, informed, and rational preferences. The problem with this notion is 
that people may cut their preferences to fit what is available to them, that is, they may
Q
start to want what they get, where they do not get what they want. Indeed, one already 
has to admit at least one objective good on Singer’s view, namely the satisfaction of 
rational desires. But this seems implausible, because it makes what people’s preferences 
are completely arbitrary, with none better than any other; people don’t want good things 
because they are good, they just have wants, and these ought to be respected (it is 
nihilistic about all but one value, and then that value seem dubious in its solitude). 
Indeed, the specification of ‘rational’ preferences only seems contentful if there are 
objective values to rationally track. That said, it does seem that a person’s ability to get 
their own way is (other things being equal) a good, together with their having a range of 
ways that they might possibly get available to them, but that is so because there is a 
range of things which are in fact valuable or that might reasonably be thought 
‘valuable’. 9
An A dditional Claim Right
As per the arguments of the last chapter, we have rights to omissions of harms, and 
actions which keep us from coming to harm over each other. It may be that education 
and upbringing could help to cultivate characters of the sort that would respect these 
rights (it would be a bad thing if people didn’t stop bad things from happening and if 
we can stop that from happening through education, then we ought to (from Peter 
Singer’s principle)). If that is so, however, then it must be someone’s responsibility to 
raise children to respect these rights. Whose responsibility would it be though? 
Plausibly, it is something of a collective duty to enable this (to fund it, for instance),
7 Rawls also thought that wellbeing consisted in satisfying preferences, but insofar as one allows that that 
certain preferences are always rational, it allows for something of a minimal ‘objective list’ 
understanding of wellbeing, in addition to which a variety of preferences may be respected.
8 Amartya Sen has convincingly argued this point in an interview for Conversations with H istory by 
Harry Kreisler, <http://www.uctv.tv/shows/On-Theory-with-Amartya-Sen-Conversations-with-History- 
9510> [accessed 23 June 2015].
9 Here we may recall Bernard Williams’ argument that most people have reasons to live in the form of 
projects, without which they have no reason to live; see especially Bernard Williams, ‘Persons, Character 
and Morality,’ in M oral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19. Indeed, living 
for power, opportunities alone may constitute an empty existence. Perhaps then, any particular interests 
people develop -  whichever particular abilities and opportunities are developed -  are equally desirable, 
so long as they save off the diminishment of the powers and opportunities of others and of oneself. 
Perhaps they can be cultivated, or, more directively, instilled. But even this seems pointless; if the only 
value in Life is life itself, life seems without value. Life seems best understood as an access good, so that 
if there are no goods to access, it becomes worthless.
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and (again, as per the arguments of the last chapter), the duty of those best placed to 
execute the role to do so.
The Content o f Parental Responsibility
It is the content of the parental (or guardian) role that generates the need for it in the 
first place. It seems that children’s welfare needs require the generation of at least one 
person to play what we might call the parent role. The parental role is not to provide 
every type of care, but to have an overview of the care which children need, and ensure 
that they receive it; that they see a doctor when they are ill, get to school, that they eat 
and drink, and rest, that they are growing in powers, knowledge and beneficence 
(indeed, knowledge seems to be a precondition of power, if not equivalent to it (as 
shown by the case of Casandra)). The idea is that it is good to have an overseer of the 
beneficiary’s wellbeing. This role described thus far is administrative, but it further 
requires a depth of and pervasiveness of concern. It seems that children need stability, 
and strong loving relationships, both as a good in itself, and as a model of how to 
develop relationships in the future, and as a basis for enabling growth of powers, 
knowledge and beneficence. These are the wellbeing needs, and scope for their best 
satisfaction that generate the parent role, a role, which, as I argued in the previous 
chapter, is often (but by no means always) best satisfied by biological parents. There are 
also extra-parental responsibilities generated by the potential harms to which children 
are susceptible: responsibilities that out-strip the abilities of people who play the parent 
role, qua occupants of that role, to minister to.
The C ontent o f Extra-Parental R esponsibility
It seems that people who are not parents can either have duties to take over, or 
supplement parental responsibilities.
T aking Over Parental-Responsibility
While it is overwhelmingly agreed that, other things being equal, biological parents 
ought to raise their children (and indeed, other things being unequal they often ought to 
do so, too), it is also widely held to be incumbent upon wider society to relieve parents 
of their charge if they are abusive or negligent, or to assume some responsibility if they
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are overburdened. Biological parenthood is (we argued in the previous chapter) usually 
the point from which responsibilities of childcare originate, and from which they 
transfer over to others. What counts as sufficient reason to take a child into care is a 
point which is contested, but one which every society has a de facto  answer to evident 
in its policy, or lack of policy. Boris Johnson, London’s incumbent Mayor, 
controversially argued in a London paper that extremist parents and guardians ought to 
have their children taken away on the grounds that they ought not to be able to teach 
children doctrines of hate and violence; “radicalism is a form of child abuse” he 
argued.10 In his article, he focused on radical Islam and was accused of Islamophobia. 
His exclusive identification of Islam seems unfortunate given that Islam is not the only 
broad category within which there exist factions promoting doctrines of hate and 
violence, but it is surely one reasonable example among others (including the Christian 
group The Ku Klux Klan). Let us accept that often (usually, in fact) biological parents 
have a primary and original ethical responsibility to and for their own children. 
Original, in that the responsibility is theirs in the first instance, and taken from them 
where they are unable or unwilling to fulfil it, and primary in that, while others may 
owe some kinds and degrees of responsibility, theirs exceeds the kinds and degrees of 
responsibilities that anyone else owes to them. 11 Responsibility of parents can 
temporarily be transferred over to others who act in loco-parentis, such as carers, 
coaches, tutors, teachers, baby sitters and so on (but it is still thought that providing for 
the child financially, for buying food for instance, is a responsibility that falls on the 
parents shoulders, except where they are not able to or where others are happy to).
10 Boris Johnson, ‘The Children Taught at Home About Murder and Bombings,’ in The Telegraph, 
<http:// www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10671841/The-children-taught-at-home-about-murder-and 
bombings.html> [accessed 23 June 2015].
11 Allowing that biological parents do have a primary and original ethical responsibility to and for their 
own children, some wonder whether just anyone with the biological capacity to parent, ought thereby to 
have freedom to have and raise children, or whether it ought to be controlled through parenting licences. 
The thought being that some people are not adequate parents (which anyone who accepts that in some 
circumstances children ought to be taken from their care must accept), and that rather than being allowed 
to have children only to have them become somebody else’s responsibility, they ought not to be able to 
have children in the first place. A system intent on doing this would need to control birth -  perhaps 
through sterilization. In China, those who have become pregnant after having already had a child have 
been forced to have abortions. Indeed, whether prospective parents ought to be merely allowed or enabled 
to have children is also interesting. Furthermore, it is interesting whether there might be moral 
limitations, which need not, and perhaps ought not to be translated into legal limitations.
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We might say that this responsibility cannot be abdicated, that it is inalienable (as the 
Irish constitution does).12 But that does not mean it cannot be shared and to some extent 
mitigated (as when a parent leaves their child in the care of a reliable childminder or 
teacher). Furthermore, it seems that, since parents can neglect their responsibilities (can 
be abusive and do harm beyond allowing harm to happen, and failing to bring basic 
benefits), a duty can fall upon others to relieve parents of their charge.
Indeed, parents may be mistaken about what is in their children’s interests even where 
they are diligent in serving those perceived interests. It may be reasonable to give 
parents a large margin for error in determining what is in their children’s interests. This 
is partly because what counts as an error may not be always obvious, partly because 
some errors matter less than it matters that parents maintain a close relationship with 
their children. However, we cannot reasonably think that parents are infallible in this 
regard; even sincere, well-intentioned parents can be mistaken. While an important 
question is indeed when parents ought to be relieved of custody, it is not our question.
Supplem enting Parental Nurture
It seems that often there are many aspects of children’s wellbeing that parents cannot 
adequately minister to or provide for. Health and education are obvious examples of 
both. Where keeping children from harm in these domains outstrips the means and 
abilities of parents, it seems that responsibility falls beyond parents to the wider 
community (where that community is able to meet those basic elements of wellbeing). 
This would be the arguable basis for free healthcare, and, more importantly in this 
enquiry, free education (at least for those unable to secure it for themselves). I shall 
argue in Chapter 6 in some detail that children have extra-parental claim rights to be 
educated, and in Chapter 9 will explain how this relates to religion.
12 “42: The State acknowledges that the primary and natural educator of the child is the Family and 
guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, according to their means, for the 
religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their children.” The Irish Constitution, 
<http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/en/constitution/> [accessed 28 June 2015]. “What exactly is it that 
cannot be alienated when one has an inalienable right to X —X  itself or the right to A?” asks Joel Feinberg 
in his 1978 article, ‘Voluntary euthanasia and the inalienable right to life/ Philosophy & Public Affairs 
7(2), pp. 93-123. There, he argues persuasively that it is the right to X, rather than X. Concordantly, one 
could give up one’s children, but it would seem then that one could have them returned later. Perhaps it is 
defeasible; one has that right, but it can be trumped by conflicting claim rights, but in that case it is hardly 
inalienable.
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Paternalism , Autonom y and Entitlem ent
I will now argue that children’s having claims over their guardians does not entitle 
guardians to compel their children to benefit from those claims; instead, additional 
paternalistic arguments are needed to make that case. Guardians might well have such 
an entitlement and it may be closely connected to their responsibilities, however, the 
two are not identical, and must be separately justified. The thought is this: children have 
certain ethical claims over their parents in the first instance that they do not have over 
anyone else (until their parents seriously and obviously fail in satisfying these): to be 
physically nourished, for instance. However, supposing that they did not want to be 
nourished, it would not follow  that children ought to be force fed by their parents. 
Again, it might be that children should be force fed, but not just from parents’ 
responsibility to satisfy claims that their children have, for it seems that claims are 
things that their holders can waive.
More naturally, we would think of justified compulsion as requiring some good for 
others; we think of ourselves as having obligations to others rather than to ourselves, or 
at least of having the right to veto our own obligations to ourselves and others’ 
obligations to us, but no right to veto our own obligations to others. To take an example 
given by Jonathon Wolff during a conference keynote address: a more compelling 
reason to wear seatbelts in cars than to avoid doing damage to oneself, is to avoid doing 
damage to someone sitting in the seat in front; this example was used in a UK public 
advertising campaign in which a young boy without a seatbelt crushes his mother’s 
chest when he is flung forward into her seat during a collision, while he himself comes 
off comparatively unscathed. Concordantly, it raises few eyebrows when it is suggested 
that criminal offenders ought to be compelled to undergo a process of rehabilitation in 
order to reintegrate into civil society. To motivate compulsion to receive entitlements, 
plausibly we should begin by contrasting wards and wardens. If one ever properly has 
wardenship over somebody else, one’s ward, rather than being entitled to have their 
own decisions regarding their own wellbeing respected completely, one has a 
responsibility to commit their ward to what one thinks best for them. This might well 
take the form of compelling one’s ward to benefit from an entitlement.
To leave it to children to exercise and waive claims is to respect their autonomy, and at 
this point in our investigation, it is an open question as to whether, and if so, adults 
ought to respect children’s autonomy. Arguably, while children have rights to
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wellbeing, they do not have rights to self-determination, where they are not yet 
competent choosers:
Children often do not grasp the ramifications, for them or for others, of 
the choice they make. This is true even of very simple decisions (what 
to eat for lunch; how long and with whom to play after lunch; how early 
to go to bed), let alone decisions about whether to waive or claim their 
rights.13
For adults, because they generally have a better sense of what will serve 
their well-being than any other agent does, we think that they should 
have a great deal of control over how and whether these interests are 
met. Young children are in a different condition, and do not have an 
interest in controlling as much of their lives as adults do.14
Even still, according to Brighouse and McAvoy, children do “have a powerful interest 
in the conditions and resources needed for them to develop into the kinds of beings that 
have agency interests.” 15 Where they are not competent choosers, those best placed to 
oversee the satisfaction of children’s wellbeing needs (to keep them from harm, and 
ensure that they receive basic benefits) have a duty to do so.
Champions of promoting autonomy and reason sound a little unrealistic in the case of 
small children whom in practice they would prefer to be obedient, to follow instructions 
and complete set tasks. Lest anyone should think that children are naturally good, and 
are poisoned by a corrupt world, one is tempted to point to a brilliant website which 
chronicles the poor reasons for which children tantrum (e.g. the reason one young boy 
is bawling is that “he is not allowed to put his hand in the toilet”).16
Indeed, young children’s consent counts for less than adults’ consent, since children 
give their consent much more readily than adults do. Adults, just by virtue of the 
accretion of knowledge through experience, are in a stronger position to make 
judgements about what will secure their own wellbeing (although, they may not make 
good decisions, and may act contrary to what they know is in their interests, perhaps 
through giving in to the pull of addictions, or the attraction of a nearer good at the 
expense of a more significant, longer term good).
13 Harry Brighouse and Paula McAvoy, ‘Do Children Have Any Rights?’ in The Philosophy o f  
Education: An Introduction, ed. by Richard Bailey (London: Continuum, 2010), pp. 78-85, 76.
14 Ibid, pp. 81-82.
15 Ibid.
16 ‘Reasons My Kid is Crying,’ <http://www.sunnyskyz.com/bIog/119/36-Reasons-My-Kid-Is-Crying- 
Temper-Tantrums-You-Can-t-Help-But-Laugh-At> [accessed 23 June 2015].
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Harm s and Benefits to Children
We might say that children have rights to actions which prevent their coming to harm, 
but no right to self-determination, because they are not competent choosers. But since 
this is not true of all and only of children, the morally relevant category would seem to 
be ‘incompetent choosers’, rather than ‘children’. Another point about children is that 
they are going through a formative phase. Childhood is a phase in the sense that one 
passes through it before adulthood, and it has an effect on one’s adulthood:
There has been a tendency among moral and political philosophers to 
regard children as proto-adults and to see their interests primarily in 
those, future oriented, terms.17
Thus they consider the fundamental responsibility they bear toward 
their children to be the obligation to provide the kind of supportive 
environment those children need to develop into normal adults, where 
normal adults are supposed to have the biological and psychological 
structures in place needed to perform the functions we assume that 
normal, standard adults can perform.18
We can overemphasize these points, since adulthood is not a formative terminus (as 
Kevin Williams has emphasized).19 Indeed, we can think of all of life as constituting a 
process of growth and becoming, or as constituting a phase (before death). Furthermore, 
as Brighouse and McAvoy point out, even supposing that we know a child to have a 
terminal condition which will prevent them reaching adulthood, they will still have
“interests in the present day,” “there are goods available to her in childhood [...] the
20value of which is not reducible to the role they play in human development.” 
Matthews argues that children are better able at some things than adults (such as 
learning a second language), and are not to be understood as adults minus certain 
abilities. 21 But we cannot allow the pendulum to swing too far in this direction: 
children are vulnerable and impressionable. Childhood is a period which comes before
17 Brighouse and McAvoy, p. 81.
18 Gareth B. Matthews, ‘The Philosophy of Childhood,’ The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy 
(Spring 2014 Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta,
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/childhood/> [accessed 23 June 2015].
19 “An irony about the ascription of authority to adults is that it introduces a sharper distinction between 
the worlds of children and adults than can be justified. Adulthood should not be envisaged as an 
emotional, intellectual or career terminus” Kevin Williams, ‘Conscripts or Volunteers? The Status of 
Learners in Faith-Schools,’ in Philosophical Perspectives on Compulsory Education, ed. by Marianna 
Papastephanou (London: Springer, 2014), pp. 131-141, 133.
20 Brighouse and McAvoy, p. 81.
21 Gareth B. Matthews, ‘Getting Beyond the Deficit Conception of Childhood: Thinking Philosophically 
with Children,’ in Philosophy in Schools, ed. by Michael Hand and Carrie Winstanley (London: 
Continuum 2008), pp. 27-40.
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adulthood (barring the tragedy of childhood fatality), in which people do well to 
develop their powers (especially those that are more easily acquired then). It is a period 
in which one does well to promote those learning objectives that constitute a well 
formed adult for this reason. The thought is not that when people reach adulthood that 
they no longer have something to learn, or have no obligation to learn, but simply that 
learning happens best in childhood, and those who do not receive such tutorage suffer 
for it in later life. However, children finish schooling at a certain age (which varies 
from country to country in which schooling is enjoyed or endured), not when they 
achieve certain required capacities. Indeed, those who have reached this age and not 
even been through those formal educative procedures are not thereby denied autonomy- 
rights, are not compelled to attend school, or kept from voting or drinking. It is 
disingenuous for any such system to stress capacity based autonomy-rights, or attempt 
to justify its practices on their basis. It is perhaps reasonable to think that it would be 
cruel to keep people in schools until they have attained certain standards, especially if 
they show no sign of likely doing so: at some point, the benefits of schooling (such as 
powers) do not warrant the costs of restriction (namely, opportunities). For instance, it 
would be absurd to compel schooling until old age if a student had failed to attain the 
minimal standards generally desired of students in order to graduate. Indeed, it would 
seem that students who had not graduated by adulthood would not have a claim right to 
such an education, since it would extend beyond what anybody would reasonably be 
expected to offer.
Young children are more impressionable than adults. They are more deeply, and more 
comprehensively receptive to influence than adults. Early influences are thereby too 
easily irrational, and too hard to shake, and so more is at stake than with the formative 
influence of adults. Early influences enter deep, permeate subsequent learning, and are 
harder to separate out and reject rationally. Indeed, “Socrates was tried by the Athenian 
courts in 399 BC and executed, on charges, among other things, of “corrupting the
9 2youth.” '  The charge was corrupting the youth , and not corrupting people of just any 
age. The motivating consideration here is likely that the youth are more impressionable, 
and need to be protected by laws whereas adults do not.
22 Bernard Williams, ‘Plato: The Invention of Philosophy,’ in The Sense o f  the Past: Essays in the History 
o f Philosophy, ed. by Myles Bumyeat (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 148-186.
2 Could parents be accused of corrupting their children, or is the parent’s conception of corruption and 
honesty that count? Suppose the parent did not live up to their own standard or honesty?
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In summary, Children are best able to learn while young and may reasonably have a 
paternalistic attitude taken to them to further their own benefit, and while adults might 
benefit from compelled learning, it is especially cruel to restrict opportunities into 
adulthood, with childhood being understood as a period of time rather than a physical or 
mental state. But since children are more impressionable than adults, special concern 
needs to be paid when exercising influence over them.
K nowledge, Rationality, Autonom y and W ellbeing
What do knowledge, rationality and autonomy add to one’s wellbeing? When 
exercising one’s autonomy in voting for leaders, or government policies, or choosing 
what products to buy, or which school to send our child to it is, (all other things being 
equal) better to be informed than to be uninformed or, which is a special case of being 
uninformed, misinformed. There seems to be something special about informed 
decisions, and its specialness consists in having valuable real options, theoretical 
rationality (which tracks the truth), and practical rationality.
First, informed decisions rely on real alternatives in order to be meaningful. We need 
only mention Henry Ford’s edict that his customers could have his cars in any colour 
they wanted, so long as they wanted his cars in black, to illustrate this idea. Second, 
there are general prohibitions on lying, on not checking one’s sources, on not verifying 
results, on failing to gather information, on not telling the truth, the whole (relevant) 
truth and nothing but the truth. It might be thought that the premium on informed 
consent creates the need for truthfulness: for gaining someone’s consent through 
misinforming them looks like a case of manipulation. However, theoretical rationality is 
required for us to track the truth, and is required for the possibility of informed consent. 
Third, informed choice means nothing if we do not know what to do with the 
information we have, e.g. how to derive a good choice from the information available.24
24 One’s ability to understand information so as to be informed already requires some degree of 
rationality. Two generals advising a senior commander may have all of the same information, and one 
may be more talented than the other and so make the better decision, but that is not to say that one is 
more rational than the other. While the more talented general might plot a better strategy through some 
imaginative leap, which they then find to be better than other available options, we could say that were 
both to fully understand both the options and advantages, they would opt for the same course. This is to 
be understood as practical rationality.
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A few tempering considerations should be raised at this point. First, we can be spoiled 
for choice, and this can worsen our choice; we will likely choose better between three 
options than between three hundred. Second, all other things are not equal when it 
comes to informing our decisions: informing ourselves requires time, energy and all the 
more so the less are our talents at doing so (by research and critical reflection). Indeed, 
it can be well to defer to expert opinion on the questions of what to think, and on the 
question of what to do. Third, there is a powerful value that can conflict with these 
values, namely happiness. We might say that an informed choice can still undermine 
our wellbeing, and we would have been better off having had the choice made for us. It 
is cited as an example in Thaler and Sunstein’s book Nudge that parents are happier 
when they are not given the decision of whether or not to artificially preserve the life of 
their child who will never have any reasonable quality of life. Another example might 
be Sophie's Choice, from William Styron’s book of that name, in which a Jewish
2 5woman is forced to choose between saving the life of one or the other of her children.
These important considerations notwithstanding, there still seems to be something 
special about informed decisions. Having the power to make a decision and the political 
freedom to do it is to be called autonomy of action. And it requires rationality, truth 
tracking and real options. Enabling informed consent ought to be one aim of 
upbringing. Ensuring real options is more a matter for political and economic theory. 
Cultivating practical and theoretical rationality is the other matter. All of this is so 
because (as argued earlier) of the existence of many valuable options and the difficulty 
in appraising them decisively.
W hy Seek and Share Truth?
It may be that knowing the truth is often beneficial, but not always so. Is benefit what 
justifies truth telling, or is benefit something extraneous which perhaps sometimes 
trumps whatever it is which justifies truth telling? Sometimes, it seems better to believe
25 William Styron, Sophie's Choice (Open Road Media, 2010).
26 A quandary about whether to exercise paternalism or respect for autonomous choice (requiring further 
reflection): Singer’s principle seems to force us (if we are to be moral) to prevent harm coming to 
someone, but it might be that violating someone’s wishes is morally worse than letting them come to 
harm. What happens if they would prefer to come to harm? Suppose that is there considered preference. 
Do we respect their preference, or force the good on them? Acknowledge our own fallibility might 
encourage epistemic humility enough to defer to their judgement of what is best. Suppose they do not 
think it was for the best and that they want to be perverse, do we then defer to both our judgement and 
theirs and prevent them?
a falsehood, which has some pragmatic approximation to the truth, when we are not 
able to understand the complexity of the truth. This comes out in Michael Hand’s 
example of telling young children that “all berries are poisonous.”27 Here a falsehood 
goes proxy for the truth; it is not as useful as the truth, if that was attainable, but it will 
do where it is not attainable.
The value of truth was powerfully challenged by Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil, 
where he asked, “granted that we [happen to] want the truth: why not rather untruth? 
And uncertainty? Even ignorance?”28 “The falseness of an opinion is not for us any 
objection to it,” he continued, more pertinent is the matter of “how far an opinion is 
life-furthering, life preserving, species-preserving, [or] perhaps species rearing.”29
We are fundamentally inclined to believe [that] the falsest of opinions 
[...] are the most indispensable to us; that without a recognition of 
logical fictions, without a comparison of reality with the purely 
imagined world of the absolute and immutable, without a constant 
counterfeiting of the world by means of numbers, man could not live — 
that the renunciation of false opinions would be a renunciation of 
life.30
The most obvious response to Nietzsche is this: objecting to truth in this fashion, 
presupposes access to the truth. Thus, when he comments that “ we are fundamentally 
inclined to believe the falsest of opinions are the most indispensable to us,” we are 
fundamentally inclined to believe this (if indeed we are) because it is true. Indeed, if 
Nietzsche truly recognizes “untruth as a precondition of life,” he is put in the awkward 
position of vouching for the untruth o f certain propositions, while at the same time 
depending on thinking they are true to in order to live at all.31 This objection can be 
mitigated somewhat however, in that Nietzsche might respond that he is only able to 
embrace the truth at a great cost, and one which not worth the price to anyone else; and 
perhaps then, only briefly, before he must shun the truth. Further, one might bear the 
truth in order to better protect others from it. This latter option is paternalistic to be 
sure, but so too is education altogether.
27 Michael Hand, ‘Religious Upbringing Reconsidered,’ in Journal o f  Philosophy o f  Education 36(4) 
(2002), pp. 545-557.
28 Nietzsche, Beyond Good And Evil, trans. By Helen Zimmern, <http://www.gutenberg.org/ files/4363/ 
4363~h/4363-h.htm> [Last accessed 30 June 2015], §1.
29 Ibid, §4.
30 Ibid.
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More generally, the thought is that practical and theoretical reason can recommend 
contrary beliefs. Indeed, whether to employ theoretical reason appears to be a question 
for practical reason, as does how long to spend thinking about something is also a 
practical question. While theoretical reason might suggest assent, dissent, or 
agnosticism, whether or not to believe truly appears to be a matter for practical reason. 
Consider the case of Pascal’s Wager. Pascal argues that it is less costly to believe 
wrongly that God does not exist than it is to believe wrongly that God does exist. I do 
not think that the argument works in this instance but it could work in some other 
instances. He concludes that where theoretical reason is indecisive, practical reason is 
not. Some might doubt that one can, as a matter of fact, convince oneself of a 
proposition which one self-consciously does not think is true. It is perhaps easier to 
imagine at the level of the subconscious. It is matter of some puzzlement, but an 
empirical matter, and one we have reason to believe is both possible and not 
uncommon.
Sympathetic examples of paternalistic lies (and not mere over-simplifications) include 
the following. A soldier who is moments from dying on a battle field may be better lied 
to about the severity of his condition. But here the misinformation will not likely affect 
the autonomy of his decisions (such as changing his will). Similarly ip the film Titanic 
(Dir. James Cameron, 1997), a mother in a third class compartment puts her children to 
bed, reading them a story as the ship goes down, with no hope of their escaping, 
judging it better that they should pass away without the anxiety of knowing their fates. 
“A mere omission,” some might object. True, but a lack of truthfulness and the illusion 
of safety may easily require the support of lies. Somewhat differently, in Interstellar 
(Dir. Chris Nolan, 2014) the protagonist decides to leave his daughter on earth in 
attempt to save all humanity without telling her that humanity is in peril, since “when 
you become a parent, one thing becomes really clear, and that is you want to make sure 
your children feel safe.” Here he has withheld information, but, were he pressed, he 
might have had to lie in order to preserve his daughter’s sense of safety. Here, it is his 
child who he is protecting from the truth; perhaps were she an adult, he might have 
been less inclined to conceal the truth from her, since it would figure significantly in
32 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, in Œuvres, ed. by L. Brunschvigg (Paris: Hatchette, 1925), part III, §233.
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what decisions she would go on to make. For these examples, T.S. Eliot’s words come 
to mind:
Go, go, go, said the bird: human kind
Cannot bear very much reality33
Indeed, Timothy D. Wilson (whose work on narrative we shall consider in a Chapter 4) 
emphasizes happiness over truth, after an initial emotional upheaval when a lover 
leaves us “we can take a step back and put as good a spin as we can on what happened,” 
he says.34 “Our wellbeing is intimately tied up with the way in which we think about 
ourselves and our place in the world.”35 “What kinds of perspectives [narratives] make 
us happy? Research reveals three key ingredients: meaning, hope and purpose;” 
“meaning answers to the most basic questions about human existence and our place in 
the w o t M ,”  “optimistic people cope better with adversity,” “it helps to see ourselves as 
strong protagonists who set our own goals and make progress towards them.”36
Perhaps what matters is that people are happy, not that they are informed. Some 
information will disrupt people’s lives and make them unhappy. It might be the case 
that, in practice, nobody ever knows well enough what will happen when people are 
informed and so one cannot use the balance of probable happiness to dictate whether or 
not to inform. It is sometimes said that what one does not know, cannot hurt them. This 
is clearly false in the case of smoking: not knowing that smoking causes cancer does 
not mitigate the effects of smoking. In many cases, it may be that the information 
would help them make decisions which will more likely benefit them (as with the 
smoking example). On the other hand, if someone’s wife had cheated on them, but feels 
ashamed and would never do so again, it may only be that telling the husband could do 
nothing but ruin the relationship that it is in everyone’s interest to preserve. Indeed, it 
may be in the interest of the wife to delete her memory of having done so, should that
33 T.S. Eliot, ‘Burnt Norton’, from The Four Quartets, <http://www.davidgorman.com/4Quartets/l- 
norton.htm> [accessed 23 June 2015].
34 Timothy D. Wilson, Redirect: The Surprising New Science o f  Psychological Change (London: Allen 
Lane, 2011), p. 13.
35 Ibid, p. 40.
36 Ibid, p. 51.
37 On the other hand, it is clear that sometimes beliefs are self-fulfilling, and would not have been true, 
had they not been believed: a soldier’s conviction that he would make it out of the war alive, for instance 
increases their likelihood of survival).
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be possible. Some are wont to respond that the relationship was already ruined, and 
that this would merely make it apparent. But this is not from either one of their points of 
view, but only from some third-personal perspective which may remain un-manifest for 
the duration of the relationship. The point is put (rather gratuitously for this context) by 
John Stewart Mill’s remark that “it is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”39 If one really pushes 
the disruption line of thought by suggesting that one’s suicide was an inevitable result 
of one’s being informed, Mill’s ‘better to be Socrates satisfied’ line might begin to look 
a little pale, but this is rarely the case. There would seem to be a duty to inform, paired 
with informing sensitively.
So how can one respond to Nietzsche? One approach is that which R.S. Peters took, 
with his transcendental arguments. These were designed to show that truth is hiding in 
the background of everything we value, that an interest in truth presupposed in valuing 
anything at all. Another is offered by Robert Nozick who asks whether we should rather 
live our lives in an experience machine, than encounter reality. We will look at each of 
these in turn starting with a consideration due to E. Jonathan Lowe.
Truth is Unitary
If truth is, as E. Jonathan Lowe argues convincingly, unitary, then it is no good hiving 
off one area of inquiry to be insulated from requirements of truth, or systematically 
attempting to so insulate it, since all facts must be consistent with all other facts. “Truth 
is single and indivisible or, to put it another way, the world or reality as a whole is 
unitary and necessarily self-consistent.”40 Indeed, lies multiply to maintain the illusion, 
the more so, the more our worldview is compromised with untruths.
Transcendental Arguments
R.S. Peters’ Transcendental Arguments attempted “to establish the worthwhileness of 
theoretical activities by demonstrating the value of truth” by arguing that “the person
38 The premise of The Eternal Sunshine o f  the Spotless Mind, dir. Michel Gaundry (Focus Features, 2004) 
is that people with traumatic pasts, or obsessions with the past that diminish their happiness do well to 
have their memories erased, and to start afresh.
39 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1906) p. 260.
40 E. Jonathan Lowe, A Survey o f  Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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who seriously asks ‘Why do this rather than that?’ must, in order to answer her 
question,” a) “find out what this and that involve” and b) “have made some preliminary 
assessment of her situation, distinguished this and that as options for herself, and judged 
the choice between them to warrant careful consideration.”41
However, Hand holds that the justificatory problem is merely deferred: “The problem, 
then, is that having shown commitment to truth to be presupposed by serious 
engagement in practical discourse, Peters now needs to justify serious engagement in 
practical discourse.”42 However, denying that we should be committed to tracking the 
truth seems unstable: it seems to require a justification of the sort that it says is not 
required, and would not allow that such justifications are required unless one is 
provided. If it could, that might give us pause for thought, but otherwise it seems 
merely prejudicial. While Peters attempts to say that serious engagement in practical 
discourse in unavoidable, because in failing to engage with it seriously, one would find 
themselves living by “procedures which are inappropriate to demands that are admitted, 
and must be admitted by anyone who takes part in human life.”43 Hand speculates that 
such demands might possibly be ignored; however, anyone who did this would be a 
nihilist, which is surely a rare, if not altogether inconceivable case.44
The Experience M achine
If truth is only instrumentally worthwhile, one ought to plump for a life of good that the 
truth is ultimately instrumental to (perhaps pleasure). Consider the following thought 
experiment presented by Robert Nozick:
Suppose there was an experience machine that would give you any 
experience you desired. Super-duper neuropsychologists could 
stimulate your brain so that you would think and feel you were writing a 
great novel, or making a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the 
time you would be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your 
brain. Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming your 
life experiences? [...] Of course, while in the tank you won’t know that
41 Michael Hand, ‘On the Worthwhileness of Theoretical Activities,’ in Journal o f  Philosophy o f  
Education 43(2) (2010), pp. 113 -114.
42 Ibid,p. 115.
43 R.S. Peters, ‘The Justification of Education,’ in his Education and the Education o f  Teachers (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), pp. 86-118, 253.
44 Hand, ‘On the Worthwhileness of Theoretical Activities,’ p. 115.
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you’re there; you'll think that it's all actually happening [...] Would you 
plug in?45
Intuitively, it seems to me that the answer should be ‘no’. In seeking reasons to value 
truth, one is necessarily subordinating truth to some other value. The question is: as a 
matter of fact, do you appreciate the truth as good in itself? In responding Nozick’s 
thought experiment as I do, it seems that I do appreciate truth as a good in itself, as ah 
anchor which I may or may not be inclined to stray from. Where I respect others 
equally, I will endow them with that truth. Indeed, given my procedure of reflective 
equilibrium, what are important are my own intuitions. In the absence of an error theory 
explaining why my intuition is misleading, and in the absence of any more fundamental 
value with which it conflicts, I must accept its dictates as being rationally compelling.
Duties of Truthfulness
Rational beings, as rational beings, have a duty, it seems, to believe the truth, and to 
disbelieve falsehoods, or, more accurately, to believe and disbelieve only on rationally 
adequate grounds.46 They have a duty to pursue the truth, and correct their false beliefs. 
They have a practical reason to tell others the truth and to correct their false beliefs, 
namely the mutual epistemic benefit gained from this activity. Since pursuit of the truth 
requires sensitivity to the sorts of considerations which render a proposition more likely 
true or more likely false, the further duties to sensitize ourselves to such considerations 
is entailed by the duty to pursue the truth, and a practical reason to sensitize others to 
such considerations. Call these the duties of truthfulness. Children come to recognise 
and observe these duties chiefly through the guidance of their parents or carers and 
those who act in loco parentis. Adults have a duty to promote the duties of truthfulness 
in the children for whose development they are responsible.
It seems that the duties of truthfulness have the following implications for determining 
and teaching propositional content: in the absence of defeating conditions, teachers 
ought to attempt to impart a given belief to children where it is known to be true, and 
ought to make it known to them as possibly true, where it is thought to be a reasonable
45 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 44-45.
46 This claim is denied by David Papineau, who argues that there are no doxastic norms, but he allows 
that we still have moral reasons not to misinform others which seems to create a drip-down moral 
obligation to avoid believing falsely so as to avoid misinforming unknowingly David Papineau, ‘There 
Are No Norms o f Belief,’ in The Aim o f  Belief, ed. by T. Chan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
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possibility. On the question of when beliefs should be taught to be false or unfounded, it 
seems that the educator is only entitled to do this where they know the belief to be false 
or unfounded, but should only bother to do it when it is something that they know the 
child believes.47 Thus, on the assumption that Young Earth Creationism (which takes 
the book of Genesis to be literally true) has been decisively falsified, it may still have a 
place in the science classroom just insofar as its inclusion enables any student adherents 
to come closer to a more scientific understanding, and to leaving behind their false 
beliefs 48 The question ought to be raised as to whether it is particular people’s beliefs 
sets, or something more impersonal and encyclopaedic that we ought to have in mind 
when we speak of imparting beliefs which are known to be true. The question is crucial 
since it will have implications as to the universality or teacher-relativity of the content 
of education. If it is personal belief-sets that we have in mind, then one might wonder 
whose estimation of the truth is to be drawn on, and, very arguably, it is the educator 
who has the responsibility of making the judgement call as to what is known. For an 
educator to teach anybody else’s estimation of the truth would seem to be a dereliction 
of the duties of truthfulness, and inauthentic. Of course, this encumbers them with a 
heightened onus to adopt and revise their beliefs rationally. On the other hand, that onus 
may be too high, and expertise as pedagogue in no way guarantees that subject matter 
expertise is sufficient enough to make robust judgements oneself. Indeed, experts will 
have to be identified by non-experts, and there is no shortage of claimants.
Underlying the above account of the duties of truthfulness, there is one obvious and 
important question for the curriculum which we should address, namely, whether we 
should seek and promote the truth about everything. What is worth correcting people 
on, informing other people about, and testing our own beliefs about? Some things are 
true, but are trivial and not worth knowing. Indeed, there may be some mistakes which 
are not worth correcting. Whether or not I have 73 hairs on my left eyebrow should be 
the least of anybody’s concerns.49 Thus, we need a criterion of importance. In chapter 9, 
I will develop and defend the following criterion: In order to decide how important it is
47 John Tillson, ‘Religious Education and the Floodgates of Impartiality,’ Philosophy o f  Education 
Society Yearbook (Urbana, IL, Philosophy of Education Society, 2011).
48 cf. Michael Reiss, ‘Imagining the World: The Significance of Religious Worldviews for Science 
Education, Science and Education,’ 18(6-7) (2007), pp. 783-796, and ‘Teaching Evolution in a 
Creationist Environment: An Approach Based on Worldviews, not Misconceptions,’ School Science in 
Review 90(331) (2008), pp. 49-56.
49 This is not to deny that my belief about how many hairs constitute the average eyebrow could be so 
wildly off, that the processes, or lack of processes by which this belief was formed, affect the formation 
of beliefs on more serious matters.
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that a particular belief appears on curricula, educators ought to ask: How much of a 
practical difference would it make to the student’s life if they were not correctly 
informed about that beliefs truth (if they were wrong, or had no opinion, for instance)? 
Supposing that Christianity were true, it would obviously make a practical, if 
eschatological, difference to their lives if children are not correctly informed about 
whether Christianity is true, just as much as it makes a practical difference if children 
are not right about how to ensure their physical health. The more ‘foundational’ a piece 
of information is, the more of a practical difference it is likely to make in the following 
ways: to undermine or re-cast much of what is already believed, or to provide a 
platform for the future assimilation and interpretation of further information. In the 
sciences, for instance, evolutionary theory is foundational in just this sense for much of 
biology, zoology and anthropology.
Summary
In this chapter, I contended that, other things being equal, an intrinsically valuable 
object’s coming to harm is a bad thing, while its being benefitted is a good thing. I also 
contended that, the nearer an act brings us towards becoming like God, the better it is 
for us, and the more it keeps us from becoming like God, the more it harms us. The 
content of parental responsibility was contrasted with the content of extra-parental 
responsibility. The parental role is to provide an overview of the care which children 
need, and ensure that they receive it, not to provide it themselves. This role further 
requires a depth of and pervasiveness of concern. It seems that children need stability, 
and strong loving relationships. These are the wellbeing needs, and scope for their best 
satisfaction that generate the parent role, a role which, as I argued in the previous 
chapter, is often (but by no means always) best satisfied by biological parents. There are 
also extra-parental responsibilities generated by the potential harms to which children 
are susceptible: responsibilities that out-strip the abilities of people who play the parent 
role, qua occupants of that role, to minister to. Children are best able to learn while 
young and may reasonably have a paternalistic attitude taken to them to further their 
own benefit, and while adults might benefit from compelled learning, it is especially 
cruel to restrict opportunities into adulthood, with childhood being understood as a 
period of time rather than a physical or mental state. However, since children are more 
impressionable than adults, special concern needs to be paid when exercising influence
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over them. We asked why seek and share truth, looking at a challenge from Nietzsche, 
and responded with arguments from E. Jonathan Lowe, R.S. Peters, and Robert Nozick, 
before outlining the duties of truthfulness. One key import of this conclusion has been 
that, the more rational people are, the better off they are, i.e. the more competent and 
inclined they are to apportion belief to the evidence, and to seek evidence and suspend 
judgement where they lack evidence.50
50 Evidence is not always necessary or relevant to establishing the truth of claims. There are o f some 
things which are (quite properly) immune from evidential refutation: seemingly truths o f maths and logic, 
as these are prior to evidence. Furthermore, it seems that some (defeasible) warrants for belief require no 
further justification, on pain of infinite regress, warrants such as memory and perception.
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Chapter Four
THOSE RESPECTS IN WHICH PEOPLE ARE APT TO BE FORMATIVELY
INFLUENCED
Introd uction
My question is how (if at all) we may ethically influence children, with respect to 
religions. More particularly, we have in mind the ethics of deliberate, formative 
influence. I have distinguished formative influences from behavioural influences in 
Chapter 1, claiming that they are not mutually exclusive, but merely distinct. 
Behavioural influences make a difference to what people do, and formative influences 
make a difference to those of their mental characteristics in virtue of which they are 
what they are: their beliefs and desires for instance, or, more generally, their 
dispositions. Others may like to say that these dispositions constitute our character, our 
identity, or who we are.
We should be clear that the sense of personhood (or of identity) that is of interest here is 
not that which has to do with people’s persistence conditions. We may assume that 
individuals have synchronic and diachronic identities which distinguish them from 
other individuals at any given time, and in virtue of which they are identical with some 
spatiotemporally distinct individual from an earlier time (e.g. those conditions in virtue 
of which Eminem is numerically identical with Slim Shady, but distinct from Dr Dre, 
and again why a contemporary Eminem is numerically identical with a young Marshall 
Mathers). When we speak of identity such as that which is cultivated by formative 
influence, we do not have this in mind at all. Indeed, the same individual might undergo 
a deep and comprehensive transformation, while retaining their diachronic and 
synchronic identity. That is why it is possible to say of an individual that he is a 
changed man or a different person without paradox. Furthermore, an individual could 
have exact clones made who would share all of their attitudes and beliefs and so on, but 
who are yet numerically distinct individuals who must therefore have distinct 
persistence conditions.
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It is obvious that there are limits to what influence we can have over one another. For 
instance, some attempts to influence people to be a certain way are superfluous, as 
people would be thus and so anyway (e.g. encouraging people not to grow wings), 
others attempts are idle because no influence could make them thus and so (e.g. 
encouraging people to grow wings). There may then be some rigid internal conditions 
in virtue of which people do what they do, and in virtue of which they cannot be 
brought to do other things.1 Our interest will be in the malleable internal conditions in 
virtue of which people do what they do, as these are respects in which people can be 
formatively influenced by one another. The point about internal conditions is to 
distinguish them from external conditions in virtue of which people do what they do: 
say, being asked, ordered or coerced into acting, all of which constitute behavioural 
influences.
The malleable internal conditions in virtue of which people do what they do may come 
with default settings which can be altered (e.g. we may naturally feel disgust at some 
things, and come no longer to feel disgust at them), or they may come with no default 
settings, but empty value fields, which may be given some input (e.g. we may have no 
beliefs about whether God exists, and yet come to hold some). Malleability may vary by 
degree in different people, and one may think of one’s plasticity as registering on some 
kind of scale with an inability to change at one end, and an inability to avoid change at 
the other (between maximal and minimal impressionability). However, before one 
thinks of an inability to resist the force of an influence as always being a sign of 
weakness, gullibility, or undisceming, one ought to reflect that a rationally decisive 
argument will compel an agent to accept its conclusion insofar as that agent is rational. 
Any ability to resist such compulsion appears obtuse.
While our particular volitions to act may be affected by what I have termed 
"behavioural influences’, more intimately with our personhood (and hence 
"formatively’), those of our dispositions which incline us towards actions and volitions 
may also be influenced; dispositions being “those properties picked out by predicates 
like "is fragile’ or ‘is soluble’, or perhaps more accurately by sentences of the form ‘x is
1 This may be because either some kind of non-environmental determinism is somewhat true (genetic 
determinism, for example) or libertarianism maybe somewhat true (one may say: I will not try to 
persuade you: you’ll either accept the deal or you will not).
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disposed to break when struck’ or ‘x is disposed to dissolve when placed in water’.” 
Ultimately, we are interested in the ethics of influencing those of our malleable yet 
stable internal conditions which incline us towards our actual volitions and actions. 
What are those conditions (i.e. in which respects can we be formatively influenced)?
Learning versus Formative Influence
The question ‘in what respects can we be formatively influenced?’ is distinct from the 
question, ‘what can be learned?’. It seems that the latter is a subset of the former, for, in 
principle, there could be forms of formative influence in which nothing is learned. 
Perhaps knowledge could imaginably be uploaded or implanted, for instance.3 Short of 
such speculative possibilities, learning and being formatively influenced might seem to 
be coextensive. And even still, the respects of formative influence and the range of the 
leamable might be coextensive still. However, we should reflect that people have often 
been formatively influenced in ways that cannot naturally be classed as teaching, or 
learning. Michael Hand has suggested the examples of foot binding and female genital 
mutilation to me in a private correspondence, remarking that “they are certainly things 
that are done to children that change them, or affect their development, in significant 
ways.” A more positive example might be confidence-building exercises.
Focusing on just the case of what can be learned, Hand has convincingly argued that it 
is broader than “skills and factual knowledge” (contra D.W. Hamlyn), since we can 
learn falsehoods, and truths, but without knowing them to be true. It is also broader than 
propositions (be they true or false, justified or unjustified), skills and “control by paying 
relevant attention” (contra John Wilson), since “learning to be compassionate or just 
does not seem to be a case of coming to know something, nor does it appear to be a 
matter of acquiring self-control.” 4 Ultimately, Hand judges that he knows of no
2
2 John Maier, ‘Abilities,’ The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition), ed. by Edward N. 
Zalta, < http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall201 l/entries/abilities/> [accessed 23 June 2015].
3 For instance, in The Matrix, a character named Neo is plugged into a machine for “combat training” and 
“learns” Jujitsu (or uploads a Jujitsu programme) in just a few seconds. He turns out to be something of 
an upload savant, taking on board several other martial arts shortly thereafter. “I know Kung Fu” he 
announces, “show me” replies his mentor. Sure enough, Neo is able to demonstrate impressive new Kung 
Fu skills that rival his mentor’s. At the same time, it is highly doubtful whether Neo could be said to have 
learned these skills, as opposed to another form of acquisition, The Matrix, dir. by The Wachowski 
Brothers (Warner Bros, 1999).
4 Michael Hand, ‘What could go on the School Curriculum?’ in The Philosophy o f  Education: An 
Introduction, ed. by Richard Bailey (London: Continuum, 2010), p. 51.
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satisfactory answer to the question of what can be learned, and recommends the 
question for further attention. This question is part of our concern insofar as we want to 
identify those things that can be learned, and in virtue of which people do what they do. 
We want to know how we can best characterise and classify the various different kinds 
of malleable internal conditions in virtue of which we do what we do. We are 
attempting to identify discrete respects in which we may be formatively influenced. 
These seem to be somewhat wider than those things which we can Team’, and which 
can be ‘taught’, but they are susceptible to influence.
fn this chapter, we shall critically survey and attempt to synthesize the best parts of 
some notable answers to our question. We will consider potential answers from the 
work of Timothy D. Wilson, E.J. Thiessen, Daniel C. Dennett, Harold Bloom (et al), E. 
Jonathan Lowe, and Herbert Kelman. I will defend a critical synthesis of these 
proposals. Before we begin by discussing the work of Dennett, by way of a brief, 
advance summary, I argue that we regard the following as constituting those respects in 
which we are apt to be formatively influenced:
1. The degrees and kinds of one’s physical and mental abilities
2. One’s stock of concepts
3. Those propositions which one understands
4. One’s cognitive, propositional attitudes, such as belief and disbelief
5. One’s affective attitudes to propositions and objects.
Memes
In his book, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, Daniel C. Dennett defends the idea that human 
beings are (in Suzanne Blackmore’s memorable phrase) ‘meme machines.’5 Although 
definitions vary, a meme is, roughly, “an idea, behaviour, style, or usage that spreads 
from person to person within a culture.”6 The term was coined by Richard Dawkins in 
his book, The Selfish Gene:
We need a name for the new replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of 
a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation. 'Mimeme' comes 
from a suitable Greek root, but I want a monosyllable that sounds a bit
5 Suzanne Blackmore, The Meme Machine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Daniel C. Dennett, 
Da nv in's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings o f  Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995).
6 <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/meme> [accessed 23 June 2015].
like 'gene'. I hope my classicist friends will forgive me if I abbreviate 
mimeme to meme. If it is any consolation, it could alternatively be 
thought of as being related to 'memory', or to the French word même. It 
should be pronounced to rhyme with 'cream'.7
One way to think of this is to conceive of the brain as a piece of biological hardware, 
capable of supporting software, that might be called ideas, beliefs, and so on (although 
the extension of the phrase ‘so o n / is precisely the issue at stake), but that may be 
captured under the general heading, ‘memes’. Memes go beyond this, expanding to any 
respects in which humans are imitable by one another (or indeed any respects in which 
one entity is imitable by another entity). Question: What can go on the curriculum? 
Answer: Memes! Dennett gives a fascinating example of this way of thinking during a 
talk entitled ‘How Did the Humanities Evolve?’8 “Whenever you hear a philosopher use 
the word ‘surely’ a little bell should ring ‘ding’, because you’ve probably just located 
the most weak point in the person’s argument ... he doesn’t want to argue for it, he’s 
trying to nudge you along with a ‘surely’.” Dennett then announces “I have just 
downloaded an app on to your neck top” . Dennett’s ‘application’ is a habit, one that is 
apt to pass through cultural transmission such as conversation.
Dennett observes that “our normal view of ideas is a normative view [...] In brief, we 
ought to accept the true and [admire] the beautiful.” And, says Dennett, it is because a 
claim is thought to be true, and a painting beautiful that they are believed and admired 
respectively. In contrast, for Dennett, the proper explanation of why a claim is believed, 
or why an artwork is approved of, recasts claims and artworks as memes, and says that 
“meme X spread among the people because X is a good replicator.”9 However, we may 
worry that this claim is either rationally self-defeating (if it is thought to explain 
everything), or that it is true but trivial. Memetics (the study of memes) seems to claim 
the following:
1. That the entirety of the intellectual economy is formed of replicable units
2. That the entirety of human behaviour is made up of replicable aspects
3. That the entirety of the explanation as to why they are replicated has to do with 
whether they are suited for replication, and is no different in character to the 
explanation of why some genes are successful in particular environments.
7 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 192.
8 Daniel C. Dennett, ‘How Did the Humanities Evolve?’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
A2er4N5hzKA> @ 44:56 [accessed 23 June 2015].
9 Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, pp. 363-364.
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The question arises as to how anything like rational thought enters into evaluating these 
three claims. If it doesn’t, then it seems that this whole way of talking is itself a meme 
which has no rational foundation and it would be a staggering coincidence if it turned 
out that the flow of memes produced a correct explanation of itself. Indeed, it may seem 
that the very notion of truth drops out of the picture as memes, like genes, become mere 
coping mechanisms to navigate the environment, rather than representations of a mind- 
independent world. However, the question arises as to whether that picture is true, and 
if it is, then it cannot be true after all (its truth is not even possible). As Anthony O ’Hear 
explains: “As with every other belief or theory we should be minded to accept it only if 
we have genuine reasons to think it true -  which is just what the meme analysis leaves 
no room for. So we should reject it.” 10
If a weaker hypothesis is suggested, that while some ideas are rationally spread, others 
are spread in a more gene-like fashion, we could be more sympathetic. These 
evolutionary stories could be mobilised to explain non-rational trends in a rational 
fashion. That much seems trivially true, however. While some philosophers of 
education, such as Smeyers, Smith and Standish might be expected to scorn the very 
notion of memes, declaring “the reconstruction of the pupil or student as a collection of 
programmable skills” to be part of the lamentable condition in which education finds 
itself in valuing “performativity,” an argument is required to say how it is wrong.11 It 
might well be suited to the performativity agenda, but that does not show it to be wrong, 
indeed, it need not be adopted for the performativity agenda. For our purposes however, 
we may say that it leaves the most interesting question open, namely ‘what kinds of 
memes are there?’ Thus, for us, Memetics has little to offer for the moment (indeed, we 
might even hope that we have something to offer it). One other limitation is that memes 
are not co-extensive with those respects in which we can be formatively influenced, 
since while we might become more or less confident, these are not acquired through 
imitation or transmission but through such practices as encouragement, praise and 
deference.
10 Anthony O'Hear, Beyond Evolution: Human Nature and the Limits o f  Evolutionary Explanation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 157-158.
11 Paul Smeyers, Richard Smith, and Paul Standish, The Therapy o f  Education (Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), p. 4.
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Timothy D. Wilson and Narratives
Timothy D. Wilson argues that “in order to understand why people do what they do, we 
have to view the world through their eyes and understand how they make sense of 
things/’12 Wilson cashes out the ideas of how people ‘view the world’ and ‘make sense 
of things’ with the concept of a ‘narrative’. 13 For instance, Wilson contends that 
“people have core narratives about relationships that are rooted in their early 
interactions with their primary care givers,” furthermore “our interpretations are rooted 
in the narratives we construct.” 14 In sum, our interpretations of events are rooted in 
narratives that are constructed from experiences, such as early interactions with 
caregivers. The notion of a narrative emphasizes a certain holism, and structuredness of 
one’s belief set, especially in its suggestion that there might be core, and, by 
implication, peripheral beliefs. There may be two kinds of core beliefs, and these may 
overlap: emotional core beliefs and epistemic core beliefs. Compare my belief that I am 
a good person with my commitment to the law of non-contradiction. One might be 
central to my particular conception of myself, and perhaps to my emotional security, the 
other is a precondition of my ability to make any sense of the world at all. Our 
narratives are essentially first-personal, not third-personal (although, one can attempt to 
be more objective or impersonal in one’s account of the events in which one features).15 
They attempt to show the connectedness, or coherence of the episodes of one’s life. 
One’s narrative is a representation to oneself, of oneself, of one’s past and projections 
into one’s future.
Wilson’s account of narratives raises two questions for us. The first is whether there are 
any explanations of why it is that we do what we do, that go beyond our narratives, 
which still deal in internal malleable dispositions. The second is whether a narrative is a
12 Timothy D. Wilson, Redirect: The Surprising New Science o f  Psychological Change (London: Allen 
Lane, 2011).
13 The term is found in other places also. MacIntyre emphasizes the importance narratives. It is connected 
with the idea of ‘meaning making’, too. Galen Strawson has criticized the idea that all o f us are narrative 
beings with a need to represent our lives to ourselves as stories, saying it is simply empirically false 
“Some o f us don’t naturally cast or construe our lives as a narrative or story of some sort, and we don’t 
experience parts o f our lives in this way either. Nor do we think of ourselves as opposed to our lives in a 
narrative way.” Galen Strawson, ‘We Live Beyond Any Tale That We Happen to Enact,’ The Harvard 
Review o f Philosophy 18(1) (2012), pp. 73-90.
14 Wilson, Redirect, p. 9.
15 According to Wilson, attempting to construct more impersonal narratives of disturbing experiences can 
help to relieve distress. I am here reminded of Thomas Nagel’s contrast o f the internal, subjective point of 
view and accommodating it in a more external, objective account o f the world and one’s place within it 
(cf The View from  Nowhere), and Bernard Williams’ contrast o f more ‘parochial’ and more ‘absolute 
conceptions’ of reality (Descartes and the Project o f  Pure Enquiry).
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simple thing, or whether it admits of analysis into parts in some principled way which 
themselves make up the range of those malleable, yet stable internal conditions which 
incline us towards our actual volitions and actions. By way of caution, we should worry, 
that people’s narratives could prove delusional (a monster may conceive of themselves 
as being fundamentally decent, for instance) and that they may be rationalizing rather 
than rational (someone may have done something quite kind for a selfish reason, and 
convinced themselves that it was because it was kind that they did it).16 If narratives are 
to be causally efficacious in general, then they will need to be more than post-hoc, 
epiphenomena. Consider the following example of the possibly causally redundant role 
of the narratives, with which people understand themselves. ‘Implicit Bias’ is the name 
given to those biases which we do not know ourselves to have, and which we may even 
believe ourselves to not have. According to the Stanford School of Medicine’s website, 
Social Science has shown that, unbeknownst to themselves, people can hold “a positive 
or negative mental attitude towards a person, thing or group.” Furthermore, “our 
implicit and explicit biases often diverge.” 17
Learning Objectives in Schools
Many schools already distinguish leaming-objectives from leaming-outcomes, with 
outcomes cited as evidence of the satisfaction of objectives. It is learning objectives that 
we are primarily interested in here. To focus on learning outcomes is too behaviouristic 
for our purposes; for we are interested in what it is in virtue of which people do what 
they do, not in what they do. The divisions between ‘knowledge, understanding, skills 
and attitudes’ form the usual taxonomy of learning objectives. For instance, a lesson 
might hope to encourage students’ knowing the key people, actions and consequences 
during the holocaust, understanding why the actors did what they did, being able locate 
and interrogate relevant sources, and their being appalled by the concept of mechanised 
genocide. These ways of dividing up the respects in which human beings can be 
formatively influenced are not obviously flawed. They presuppose (and perhaps not 
wrongly) that knowledge is the only kind of belief which it is worthwhile and
16 Delusion can sometimes explain why people do what they do; somebody who is convinced that they 
are made of glass may be very cautious about being struck by anything, and so one’s core narrative 
explains one’s behaviour. Alternatively, it could be a post hoc justification, and so a rationalization rather 
than causal explanation.
17 Stanford School of Medicine, <http://med.stanford.edu/diversity/FAQ_REDE.html> [accessed 23 June 
2015].
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acceptable to promote. If Timothy D. Wilson is right, perhaps one might only add the 
integration of knowledge into stories containing one’s own self as an important aspect 
of formative influence. One might also add the tendency to exercise control by paying 
relevant attention, if John Wilson is right. However, one is not yet inclined to eliminate 
or transmute knowledge, understanding, skills or attitudes. A fuller discussion of these 
prospective respects of formative influence will wait until later.
Benjamin Bloom’s Taxonomy
Benjamin Bloom et al.'s prominent taxonomy of educational objectives divides the 
range of the leamable into three ‘domains’, namely the cognitive, affective, and 
psychomotor. Each domain is made up of hierarchically arranged categories, the more 
sophisticated of which presuppose competence of the less sophisticated parts. The first
1 Q
volume of the taxonomy, on the cognitive domain, was published in 1956, and a 
second volume, on the affective domain, followed in 1965.19 Bloom projected, but 
never produced, a third volume, on the psychomotor domain. Others attempted to fill 
the gap, but we shall look at the original Bloom handbooks here, and also their more 
recent development and defence by Anderson and Krathwhol.20 The original categories 
to be found in the Bloom handbooks were these:
• The categories of the cognitive domain, from least to most sophisticated, are:
1
knowledge, comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation.
• The categories of the affective domain, from least to most sophisticated, are: 
receiving phenomena, responding to phenomena, valuing, organization (or
99prioritization), internalizing values.
18 B.S. Bloom, M.D. Engelhart, E. Jonathan Fürst, W.H. Hill, D.R. Krathwohl, Taxonomy o f  Educational 
Objectives: The Classification o f  Educational Goals. Handbook I: Cognitive Domain (New York: David 
McKay Company, 1956).
19 D.R. Krathwohl, B.S. Bloom, B.B. Masia, Taxonomy o f  Educational Objectives: The Classification o f  
Educational Goals. Handbook II: Affective Domain (New York: David McKay Company, 1964).
20 R.H. Dave, ‘Psychomotor levels in Developing and Writing Behavioral Objectives,’ pp.20-21 in Name 
o f Booked, by R.J. Armstrong (Tucson: Educational Innovators Press, 1970); A. Harrow, A Taxonomy o f  
Psychomotor Domain: A Guide fo r  Developing Behavioral Objectives (New York: David McKay 1972); 
E. Jonathan Simpson, The Classification o f  Educational Objectives in the Psychomotor Domain 
(Washington, DC: Gryphon House 1972).
21 Bloom et al., Handbook I, p. 18.
22 Krathwohl et al., Handbook I f  p. 35.
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The categories of the affective domain are far less plausible than those of the cognitive 
domain. Their proposed progression seems deeply confused. Surely valuing, which is 
apparently a higher order skill, is presupposed in receiving and responding to 
phenomena (which just translate as listening to and engaging with other points of view). 
Furthermore, the idea that organization (or resolving inconsistencies, and tensions, and 
such like) occurs before internalizing values is absurd: the idea here is that one maps 
out the values that one ought to have and then upload the results is manifestly false. It is 
more often the case that one is challenged about one’s behaviour and attitudes, and 
reflects on them after the fact, perhaps modifying them for the future. Ethical reflection 
is more often a matter of bringing one’s existing commitments into reflective 
equilibrium rather than deciding which values to internalize in the first place.
The Bloom Taxonomy of cognitive learning defined knowledge as the ability to 
remember previously learned information. (“Knowledge, as defined here, involves the 
recall of specifics and universals, the recall of methods and processes, or the recall of a 
pattern, structure, or setting”). Bloom took knowledge to be more basic than 
understanding, but, as Bernard Williams puts it, “if you do not know what it is you are 
believing, how can you be sure that you are believing anything at all?” ; that is, belief, 
and thereby knowledge, presupposes understanding.24 Consider the absurdity of the 
following reviewer’s comment (from an otherwise insightful review): “comprehension 
requires students to understand what they know.”25 Clearly one has to comprehend what 
one knows, or one would not know what it is that one apparently knows.
These problems might simply be redressed if we simply recast ‘knowledge’ as 
‘memory’, for surely someone can remember some string of information without 
understanding it. Indeed, this change was made by Anderson and Krathwohl et al. 
Anderson and Krathwohl also argue that “the real nature of a synthesis necessitates 
creating a new product;” consequently rebranding ‘synthesis’ as ‘create’, modifying its
* * 7 7definition, and placing it at the top of the cognitive hierarchy. The list of cognitive
23 Bloom et al., Handbook I, p. 201.
24 Bernard Williams, ‘Tertullian’s Paradox/ in Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 3-21, 17.
25 Jack Conklin, ‘A Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching, and Assessing: A Revision o f Bloom’s Taxonomy 
of Educational Objectives,’ Educational Horizons 83(3) (2005), p. 155.
26 Anderson, L.W., Krathwohl, D.R., (eds) Contributors: Airasian, P.W., Cruikshank, K.A., Mayer, R.E., 
Pintrich, P.R., Raths, J., Wittrock, M.C.. A Taxonomy fo r  Learning, Teaching, and Assessing: A revision 
o f  Bloom's Taxonomy o f  Educational Objectives (New York: Pearson, Allyn & Bacon, 2001).
27 Conklin, p. 157.
79
feats, in order of ascending difficulty, suggested by these authors, is as follows: 
remembering, understanding, applying, analysing, evaluating, and creating. There does 
seem to be something right about the idea that synthesis involves evaluation, and that 
evaluation does not involve synthesis, even though it sets one out on the path to 
synthesis. However, the idea that creation is the most demanding feat seems doubtful. 
One can create a new work of art by splashing a bit of paint about, but it is much harder 
to accurately recreate an old work of art (it may not be worth doing so, but it is a harder 
task). Indeed, creativity is often a matter of noticing the benefit of some mistake, which 
is to say, creativity is often serendipitous, rather than deliberate. The sense of 
‘creativity’ that is more deserving of a top spot would be a critical synthesis of existing 
materials into a coherent whole.
One might say that one need not recollect anything in order to, for instance, be critical 
of it, or be said to understand it. I have understood many more sentences than I can 
recollect. And indeed, I could see a sentence for the first time, which I understand, and 
which I cannot (of course) understand in virtue of recalling it. Indeed, it seems that 
understanding the sentence ‘put the cat on the mat’ requires some analysis. Perhaps one 
might associate it with an action all in one go, without understanding the parts of the 
sentence, but understanding in general requires some level of analysis due to the 
compositionality of meaningful sentences from meaningful part (in this case: ‘put’, ‘the 
cat’, ‘on’, and ‘the mat’).
In general, the Taxonomists want to distinguish between ‘higher order’ and Tower 
order’ thinking, the idea being that the higher order processes presupposes competency 
in lower order processes. We might think of this as being a scale of human cognitive 
flourishing. However, we should just qualify this by saying that mastery of lower levels 
may produce material of greater worth than mere competence of higher levels of 
thought. Or one might reasonably suggest that great mastery of the lower levels is 
redundant (e.g. recalling great sequences of signs, without comprehension, such as 
recalling the whole of the Yellow Pages, without being able to call a single number in 
it). It might outline broad categories of phenomena, but it does not help us assess their 
worthwhileness. Furthermore, it does not help us distinguish between deep and shallow 
degrees of understanding - we will have to go further and work out what a deep and 
worthwhile understanding is. I recall Hubert Dreyfus remarking in a lecture that he had 
taught a course about an aspect of Heidegger’s philosophy, and that one of his students
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had understood it better than he did himself, and, indeed, had understood it better than 
Heidegger did, as he had proposed more defensible revisions. Here, we see 
understanding phasing into evaluation and synthesis. This might be termed "deep 
understanding’, and distinguished from some baser level of comprehension. However, it 
seems that even base level comprehension presupposes something. We also ought to 
hesitate over the notion that evaluation is a high level activity whereby one, who has not 
evaluated, has, in some way, failed relative to someone who has; it might be that 
withholding judgement is sometimes more rational than passing judgement. I was taken 
aback when I asked E. Jonathan Lowe whether he was a theist, agnostic, or atheist, as 
he replied quite pointedly that rather than fitting any of these categories, he simply had 
no opinion. It raised the possibility for me that I had rushed to conclusions, when 
confronted with a much more critically reflective, and informed person who had 
suspended judgment. Obviously enough though, a deep and worthwhile understanding 
of a topic will usually require more than an ability to recall strings of symbols.
The idea that evaluating phenomena is a higher order activity is also highly doubtful; 
people evaluate phenomena instantaneously, and unreflectively. There are more 
conscious processes where one makes oneself aware of their evaluations, perhaps 
suspends and informs their judgement and deliberates further on what judgement is 
best. However, simply feeling one way or another about things is part of the most basic 
processes whereby people are able to survive in hostile environments: infants have pro­
attitudes about being nursed that they surely cannot have deliberated on.
Indeed, one might also reasonably seek to blend affective and cognitive domains; 
Eamonn Callan draws on a distinction between relational and appreciative 
understanding. Relational understanding seems to consist in having a mental 
representation of a thing, and some sense of how it connects with and relates to other 
things (by similarity, causal chains and what not). Appreciative understanding,
J Q
however, involves some sense of whether it is good or bad, desirable or undesirable. 
Michael Hand observes that:
cognition and affect are not at all easy to separate: an integral part of 
coming to understand the facts, theories, texts and narratives that make 
up the cognitive content of the curriculum is coming to feel their
28 Eamonn Callan, ‘Why bring the kids into this?’ Faith in Education: A Tribute to Terence McLaughlin, 
ed. by Graham Haydon (London: IoE Press, 2009), pp. 14-15.
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interest and excitement, their inspiration or disenchantment, their
2 9nobility, injustice, comedy or tragedy.
The sort of understanding that Hand has in mind here is appreciative, which can be 
distinguished from more formal and disinterested forms of understanding. For instance, 
someone may be able to answer questions about the holocaust correctly, to reason well 
about it from the evidence, and yet take a disinterested, merely professional view of it. 
Here, it would seem that there was a major failing in their appreciative understanding, 
even if their more formal understanding was outstanding.
Anderson and Krathwohl et al. depart from the original, where “it was assumed that the 
original Taxonomy represented a cumulative hierarchy; that is, mastery of each simpler 
category was prerequisite to mastery of the next more complex one.”30 In their version, 
some of the skills which exemplify having understood content are considered more 
complex than some of those that exemplify the ability to apply content (e.g. explaining 
content versus executing a task). 31 They also want to distinguish between the 
categories’ applications to what they call factual, conceptual, procedural, and 
metacognitive knowledge. These do not appear to me to be exhaustive and exclusive 
categories. They are not clearly related to one another, and they appear somewhat 
arbitrary. Indeed, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have powerfully challenged 
the idea that examples of ‘knowledge how’ cannot be reduced to examples of 
propositional knowledge.32 Indeed, picking out conceptual knowledge and self- 
knowledge (metacognitive knowledge) from among the contents of things that one can 
know about might be justified for some practical purposes, but they do not seem to be 
ontologically special, for instance, self-knowledge is a species of factual knowledge.
In general, the Bloom taxonomy and its revisions provide us with interesting, 
systematic and recognizable, realist taxonomies of formative influence. The details of 
the taxonomies at which I have looked seem doubtful, but it is always possible that a 
much more defensible version will yet be brought to my attention.
29 Michael Hand, ‘Should We Promote Patriotism in Schools?’ Political Studies 59(2) (2011), pp. 328— 
347.
30 D.R. Krathwohl, ‘A Revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy: An Overview,’ Theory into Practice 41(4)
(2002), pp. 212-218, pp. 212-13.
31 Ibid, p. 215.
32 Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, ‘Knowing How,’ The Journal o f  Philosophy 98(8) (2001), pp. 
411-444.
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E. Jonathan Lowe, Belief + Desire Psychology versus Volitionism
According to E. Jonathan Lowe, our actions are sometimes rational, and sometimes 
non-rational (if still reasonable). Those actions are rational which are performed for a 
reason, and those are non-rational which are caused by psychological forces such as 
combinations of beliefs and desires.33 (At the same time, in Lowe’s own example, 
unreflectively dodging a piece of falling masonry is reasonable, if not, in this sense, 
rational). This view amends the picture of human beings as belief-desire machines, 
mechanistically determined to act by inner psychological forces over which they have 
no control (or which comprise them), to allow them the faculty for genuinely free 
choices, or volitions, which are often (although by no means always) part of the 
explanation of our actions. Indeed, such a psychologically determinist outlook can be 
seen to be implicit in some of the above accounts if they are taken to be exhaustive 
accounts of why it is that we do what we do. It would be fair to add here though, that 
picturing human beings as bystanders to their beliefs and desires, determining their 
actions in concert, has a false ring to it since human beings may be thought to be largely 
constituted by their beliefs and desires.
Herbert Kelman on Personal Identity
Herbert Kelman has written on the extent to which our personal identity can be 
influenced by others. What he has in mind by ‘personal identity’ is made up of:
the enduring aspects of a person’s definition of her-himself, the 
conception of who one is and what one is over time and across 
situations. [Their personal identity] is what individuals bring to the 
many situations and social interactions in which they become involved 
as they go through the life cycle and, at any given period of time.34
However, as we have seen in our discussion of narrativity, people’s self-conceptions are 
apt to be mistaken: how people think they are, and how they are is different; the latter is 
more important, and encompasses the first, anyway. We could amend this to regards 
people’s actual identity as being constituted by those of their behaviours that are
33 E. Jonathan Lowe, Personal Agency: The Metaphysics o f  Mind and Action (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), p. 181.
34 Herbert C. Kelman, ‘The Place of Ethnic Identity in the Development of Personal Identity: A 
Challenge for the Jewish Family,’ in Coping with Life and Death: Jewish Families in the Twentieth 
Century, Studies in Contemporary Jewry: An Annual, Volume XIV, ed. by P.Y. Medding (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 3-26, 3.
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“enduring aspects of a person ... over time and across situations,” that they “bring to 
the many situations and social interactions” in which they become involved. 35 On 
Kelman’s account, those respects in which we are apt to be formatively influenced are 
just our behaviours. However, he makes highly idiosyncratic use of that word (one 
which seems to include almost every explanatory aspect of behaviour to the exclusion 
of behaviour itself): “I use the term behaviour very broadly to include attitudes, 
opinions, beliefs, values, and action preferences. My model is not concerned with the 
motor aspects o f behavior, but with its evaluative components.”36 Kelman’s list of 
internal malleable dispositions then, consists of “attitudes, opinions, beliefs, values, and 
action preferences,” which he terms the “evaluative components” of behaviour. It seems 
that the last four of these are all examples of attitudes.
Elmer Thiessen and Social Grouping
Elmer Thiessen has contributed interestingly (although not explicitly) to this topic in his 
discussion of the ethics of evangelism. Thiessen glossed ‘evangelism’ as any
“deliberate attempt [...] to bring about [...] a change of a person’s belief, behaviour,
_
identity and belonging.” This, it seems, is Thiessen’s analysis of the respects in which 
we might be formatively influenced with respect to religion. Unfortunately, Thiessen’s 
analysis leaves us wanting a fuller account of ‘identity’, and although we can form our 
own plausible conceptions to fit the bill, this does not tell us what Thiessen had in mind. 
Furthermore, his conception of ‘belonging’ seems to oscillate between two different 
senses, namely a “sense of belonging” and, more substantively, “re-socialization into 
an alternative community;”39 elsewhere, Thiessen even implies identity and belonging 
to be the same thing: “a change of identity (belonging).”40 Thiessen glosses ‘a change 
of identity’ as “a change of who you are,”41 which is itself ambiguous. A plausible 
sense could be ‘a significant change of one’s character’. More importantly however,
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid, p. 7.
37 Elmer John Thiessen, The Ethics o f  Evangelism: A Philosophical Defense o f  Proselytizing and 
Persuasion (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2011), p. 11. Evangelism in this sense may be either religious or 
non-religious, depending on whether it is religious beliefs, behaviours and identities that one is 
attempting to inculcate, and religious groups that one is attempting to make people feel part of.
38 Ibid, p. 16.
39 Ibid, p. 10.
40 Ibid, p. 16.
41 Ibid, p. 10.
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and somewhat problematically for me, Thiessen draws attention to influence over social 
grouping; a respect in which we can be influenced, which does not seem to be anything 
like a disposition. Grouping people is to put them into groups: to make them spend time 
together. It could additionally involve giving them roles within that group, and can be 
more or less coercive. It appears to be a form of behavioural influence then, which will 
presumably come to have a formative influence. That said, we might take Thiessen to 
offer the following answers: beliefs, behaviour, character, and sense of belonging.
Proposed Respects of Formative Influence
Informed by the accounts that we have considered, I shall now present my account of 
those respects in which we are apt to be formatively influenced. First though, I want to 
explain why we should not include behaviour among those respects in which we are apt 
to be formatively influenced. It is because if one were interested in behaviour, it seems 
that interest in beliefs, for instance, would be rendered redundant, because it seems that 
behaviour is to be explained partly in terms of beliefs. Indeed, our behaviour does not 
count among those things in virtue of which we do what we do; it just is what we do. 
By way of which sorts of malleable, internal conditions do people do what they do? It is 
the ethics of our effects on these that we are interested in. I shall now sketch what I take 
to be the likeliest candidates.
1. One’s abilities (or powers) in degree, if not always in kind:42 
1.1.One’s Mental Abilities:
This include our abilities to believe certain propositions (via concepts), to perceive 
things (also via concepts), to refrain from action, and to execute an array of mental 
feats (to be impartial, imagine, remember, direct attention and so on). Anderson and 
Krathwohl suggested: recollection, comprehension, application, analysis, evaluation 
and creation, and these are also plausible examples.
42 Arguably, we never truly acquire a new power altogether, but only develop those out o f which we 
construct more kinds of powers: the power to twist and the power to push down, and the power to 
rearrange the order in which we execute actions allows us to remove the lids from medicine bottles.
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For instance, abilities to perform certain actions such as running, jumping, climbing, 
chewing, swallowing, reading and so on. Bloom refers to these as “psychomotor” 
skills. Such actions as making beds, tying threads and running baths would be too 
generous a psychomotor ontology, rather what is important is the fíne and gross 
motor skills which are common across all kinds of social activities.
2. One’s Concepts:43
One would be unable to decide to perform an action that one does not have the 
concept of, for instance, somebody from the distant past could not choose to build a 
nuclear reactor.
3. Those propositions which one understands, and towards which one may have a 
cognitive or affective attitude:
Believing or disbelieving that it is true, and fearing or hoping that it might come 
true. Propositions will presumably be composed of concepts.44 Those propositions, 
which we understand make up the set of those propositions which we may believe, 
for as we have heard Williams say once already, “if you do not know what it is that 
you are believing how can you be sure that you are believing anything?”45 That said, 
it does seem that we can defer to authorities of both understanding and epistemic 
warrant, saying: I neither understand nor (for that very reason) believe this 
proposition, but believe that you both understand it and know it to be true. In this 
way, we might be committed to a proposition without even understanding it.
4. One’s Cognitive Attitudes:
These attitudes include belief, disbelief and doubt. It seems that the beliefs we have 
form the framework within which we decide to do what we do: if  we decide that we 
want a stamp and go to get one, where we go will depend on where we believe we
43 Although, it might be that some concepts are innate, and not open to revision.
44 “The content o f a thought can include only what the content of its constituent concepts (and ‘logical’ 
syntax) contribute” Jerry A. Fodor, ‘Language, Thought and Compositionality,’ Mind & Language 16(1) 
(2001), pp. 1-15, 6.
45 Bernard Williams, ‘Tertullian's Paradox,’ in Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, ed. by A.W. 
Moore (Princeton University Press: Princeton, 2006), p. 19.
1.2 One’s Physical Abilities:
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can get one, and our decision to go and get one will depend on what sort of thing we 
think that a stamp is and how it connects with other things that we want to do, such 
as getting a parcel to a distant friend. Furthermore, in so far as we are rational, our 
beliefs about what reasons we have to act or believe will also affect what we go on 
to do.46
Following Wilson, we might allow the interrelations of these to be a prominent 
feature. However, beliefs have to be interrelated to count as beliefs in the first place 
it seems. Daniel C. Dennett seems to demonstrate this in a discussion of implanted 
beliefs. An interesting question is posed by Dennett: “Suppose we have entered the 
age of neurocryptography,” he says, “and it has become possible for ‘cognitive 
micro-neurosurgeon’ to do a bit of relevant tinkering and insert a belief into a 
person’s brain.”47 Suppose that Tom has the belief: “I have an older brother living 
in Cleveland” inserted, and that it is false. This might play out in two ways, says 
Dennett, one in which Tom’s rationality is intact, and one where it is damaged. 
Were Tom asked whether he has a brother, he would answer that he does, and that 
he lives in Cleveland. Were he asked anything more about his brother, he might 
realise that the belief was false and eliminate it (after all, he also believes that he is 
an only child, and has no recollection of his brother). On the other hand, he might 
maintain that he has an older brother living in Cleveland (“in the nature of a tick”), 
and that he is also an only child, in which case “his frank irrationality would 
disqualify him as a believer.” 48 Worse, perhaps, “pathologically, the brain will 
surround the handiwork with layers of pearly confabulation,” such as a made up 
name and what not. Where Tom is to remain rational, in order for the belief to be 
sustained, it cannot be inserted in isolation, or without simultaneously eradicating 
other beliefs.
5. One’s affective attitudes to propositions and objects:
Fearing that a particular proposition should be true and loving a particular person 
are examples of affective attitudes to a proposition and object respectively. They
46 For any proposition, a person may take one of the following (mutually exclusive) attitudes: belief,
disbelief, or agnosticism. They may also take no attitude at all - at least in that case that they are unaware
of the proposition.
47 Daniel C. Dennett, Intuition Pumps and Other Tools fo r  Thinking (London: Penguin, 2013), p. 65.
48 Dennett (2013), p. 66.
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would include Thiessen’s example of a ‘sense of belonging’ to groups. These may 
be cashed out further, in terms of:
5.1 One’s ‘first order’ wants,49 and their prioritization and
5.2 Which stimuli trigger which attitudes (for instance, Nazi propaganda aimed to 
provoke disgust at the thought of Jews, by associating them with vermin).
Discussion
These might all be described as dispositions, and all perishable dispositions. Indeed, 
some want to account for beliefs50 and powers as dispositions. A dispositional analysis 
of powers might go like this: just in case one wants to do something and wills to do it, 
they are disposed to do it, whereas, those that aren’t able, are not disposed to do it or 
willing to do it (e.g. raising one’s arm when under the influence a powerful sedative). 
We might think of character and other dispositions more generally being formed by 
repeated action, sometimes reflective action, so that actions become less reflective and 
perhaps more sophisticated. We may be reminded of the following warning about 
character formation in this regard:
Mr. Wiseman then cautioned his young friends as to the habits they contracted 
in early life: “Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap.” You sow an 
act, you reap a habit (acts repeated constitute habits); you sow a habit, you reap 
a character; you sow a character, you reap a destiny. Let them, he said, cultivate 
habits of industry, application, and order, and they might rely upon it, with 
God’s blessing, they would succeed in life.51
Here, actions form dispositions, and so it seems that by encouraging one-off actions, we
set off on the journey to forming dispositions.
49 Harry G. Frankfurt, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept o f a Person,’ in The Importance o f  What We 
Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 11-25.
50 Frank Ramsey provides a functionalist account of belief along the following lines. A belief is to be 
individuated by its causal properties: my belief that the wine is not poisonous will have different causal 
consequences, all other things being equal then if  I did not have this belief; Frank P. Ramsey and George 
E. Moore, ‘Symposium: Facts and Propositions,’ Proceedings o f  the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary 
Volumes) 7(1) (1927), pp. 153-206.
51 1856 August 27, The Essex Standard, and General Advertiser for the Eastern Counties, Kelvedon 
School, (Mr Wiseman speaking), Quote Page 2, Column 6, Colchester, England. (19th Century British 
Library Newspapers: Part II).
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Where Have the Other Candidates Gone?
We established that Memetics had little to offer us in failing to divide up the sorts of 
memes. Wilson’s narratives, considered as first personal, holistic structures with cores 
and peripheries that inform our interpretations and actions were in serious danger of 
becoming epiphenomenal, and so causally uninteresting. On the other hand, they also 
had the drawback of failing to discriminate their constituent parts. Their benefit was in 
offering some degree of structure to constituent parts.
We observed that many schools and curricula distinguish between knowledge, 
understanding, skills and attitudes as learning objectives. We allowed that beliefs form 
a broader category than knowledge, without presupposing the value of truth. We 
allowed also that understanding was ambiguous between being able to entertain the 
content of a thought, and having some appreciation for the value of a thing. We held 
that attitudes were a broad enough category to capture belief states. It seemed that 
integration of knowledge and attitudes into coherent stories containing one’s own self 
might be an extension of this list too, and also ‘control by paying relevant attention’, in 
John Wilson’s expression (such as when we learn not to look down while rock 
climbing), that would seem to be an example of developing a habit, or eliminating a 
habit. E. Jonathan Lowe’s volitions may well be parts of our mental landscape, but they 
do not seem to be internally malleable dispositions, or indeed dispositions at all.
Kelman’s categories of attitudes, opinions, beliefs, values, and action preferences, were 
subsumed, it seems. Thiessen’s categories of belief and sense of belonging have been 
accommodated. Behaviour was rejected, as was re-socialization, as not belonging to the 
category of respects of formative influence. The category of ‘identity’ is perhaps 
captured by the taxonomy as a whole. One worry in this line of thinking is that it sets up 
a false opposition, between individuals in isolation on the one hand, and individuals in 
situ on the other. However perhaps there never are thoroughly internal properties that 
people have; perhaps people’s properties are necessarily constituted in part by their 
surroundings.52
Not all of the ethics of influence is captured with this focus. Indeed, we can influence 
people to act via coercion, and even if we did not change them much in the above
52 This is a conclusion which Hilary Putnam’s belief extemalism, Twin Earth considerations motivate, c f  
his seminal paper, ‘Meaning and Reference,’ The Journal o f Philosophy 70( 19) (1973), pp. 699-711.
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respects, it would seem to be an unethical example of influence (simply playing on 
what dispositions were already in place).
Summary
As we have frequently reminded ourselves, it is the ethics of deliberate, formative 
influence that I am interested in here, and I have distinguished formative influences 
from behavioural influences in Chapter 1, claiming that whereas behavioural influences 
make a difference to what people do, and formative influences make a difference to 
those of their internal malleable characteristics in virtue of which they are apt to do 
what they do. In this Chapter, I argued that we are apt to be formatively influenced in 
the following five respects:
1. The degrees and kinds of one’s physical and mental abilities
2. One’s stock of concepts
3. Those propos itions which one unders tands
4. One’s cognitive attitudes, such as belief and disbelief, to those propositions
5. One’s affective attitudes to those propositions and also to objects.
We’ve these respects in mind, we can proceed to ask by what means children can and 
may ethically be formatively influenced, which is the subject of our next chapter.
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C h a p ter  F iv e
WHAT FORMS CAN AND SHOULD INFLUENCE TAKE? 
Introd uction
This chapter discusses means by which children can and may be formatively 
influenced. We begin by trying to make sense of the notion of a ‘means’ or ‘form’ of 
influence by distinguishing between three rival ways of categorizing actions, namely 
by, intentions, processes and outcomes. Three kinds of platforms which influencers can 
use to amplify or enable their communication acts are then discussed, namely, media 
used to communicate, the social status of the communicator relative to those 
communicated with, and the social status of the spaces and occasions in which they 
occur. An explanation of the differences between directed and undirected, systematic 
and ad hoc, and rational and non-rational, potentially influential, acts follow. I then 
develop the notions of rational and non-rational means of influence at length, offering 
examples of each, before arguing that rational means of influence are morally 
preferable to non-rational means of influence.
Forms of Influence
What forms can influence take? We might list all sorts of (potentially or actually) 
influential activities: propagandising, journalism, educating, indoctrinating,
manipulating, informing, persuading, arguing, recommending, demonstrating, 
explaining, inspiring, dissuading, impressing, convincing, lying, enculturating, 
conditioning, training, and on and on. However, this seems to be a mixed list (i.e. some 
actions may be counted twice by satisfying more than one member, since the categories 
cut across each other). For instance, propagandising, journalism, educating, and 
indoctrinating might all involve persuasion, arguing, inspiring, and impressing. Some of 
its members are to be identified by the effect that they have, since they are (to borrow 
Gilbert Ryle’s expression) achievement verbs while other members, namely, task verbs, 
are not to be identified by the effect that they have, but by the effect that they aim to
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have.1 So, while one cannot succeed in impressing without impressing anybody in 
particular, on the other hand, one can succeed in reporting an event without an 
audience; for instance, I might report on an event in a private diary, perhaps in a secret 
cypher. The contents of such a report would remain inert as a potential influence until 
its code is cracked. Importantly, for each success verb, we may be lacking in a 
convenient task verb, but there was no less task conducted to which the success term 
may be applied retrospectively (with certainty), or prospectively (perhaps with some 
confidence), e.g. we may say retrospectively: she has persuaded the audience, or 
prospectively, that she’s persuading the audience as we speak. Alternatively, we might 
want to say that she is trying to persuade the audience, but she might not be trying at all 
and yet still be engaged in a process which might well have that result. Our task is to 
specify those discrete kinds of potentially influential acts which may be used to 
influence people, be they direct or indirect, and which may be employed across various 
media, professions and spaces. We ask: in what principled ways can we distinguish 
between forms of influence, and what taxonomy of influence is available to us?
There are potentially influential activities which may be performed, and it seems that 
these can be performed on different platforms, changing the probable audiences. For 
instance, consider the difference between reporting an incident in a private conversation 
in a private place, and reporting it in private conversation in a public place, or reporting 
it on a popular television show, and reporting in a private diary which someone reads. 
Here, reporting an incident seems to be one sort of communication act, one which may 
be performed on different platforms, changing the probable audiences. But how exactly 
are we to specify potentially influential acts, so to avoid mixed lists? It seems that there 
are three rival ways of categorizing actions, namely, intentions, processes, and 
outcomes.
Intentions, Processes, and Outcomes
We might want to specify potentially influential acts in terms of their intentions, their 
processes or their outcomes. Impressing, and inspiring seem to specify influential acts 
by outcome. ‘What did the actor do?’ one might ask, and an answer might come that 
‘They inspired me’, or ‘They impressed me’. On the other hand, we might want to
1 Gilbert Ryle, The Concept o f  Mind (London: Penguin Book, 2000), pp. 49-53.
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specify potentially influential acts (or activities) in terms of processes; what they 
involve doing on the actor’s part. This allows that outcomes may vary. Talking, for 
instance, seems to be very process specific, and nothing to do with outcomes: one can 
talk without talking to anybody, and without thereby having any particular effect on 
them. Of course, process and outcomes do have some connection: reporting an episode 
to somebody (if they believe you to be accurate and sincere) will have the result that 
they take your word about the episode. Finally, one may intend to affect a certain 
outcome, act in a way that one thinks will affect it, and yet the chosen acts does not 
affect the intended outcome. While some act terms are tightly connected with the 
outcomes, such as making an impression or being inspirational, here it seems that we 
retrospectively characterize the act in terms of the outcome, even though it does not 
seem essential to its nature. Outcomes are what are desired it seems, and processes are 
what may be employed to achieve them. Either or both outcomes and processes may 
form the content of our intentions. We have already argued in Chapter 2 that it is what 
harm we intend or allow, and what harm we risk (either through indifference or 
negligence) for which we are morally culpable.
Platforms of Influence
There seem to be three sorts of platforms that we might identify for potentially 
influential acts: media used to communicate (e.g. television), social status of the 
communicator relative to those communicated with (e.g. a college student’s professor), 
and the social status of the spaces and occasions in which they occur (e.g. during the 
Royal Society’s Christmas lecture).
Media seem to comprise means of recording and/or broadcasting information. Media 
are means of communicating a message, or cultivating a specified outcome (attempting 
to affect an influence that one can specify in advance). It seems that the printed word, 
telephones, television, the internet, radio broadcast, all fit on this list. They are all 
capable of supporting any of the members in the (mixed) opening list of influential 
activities. Media may make use of different forms of information: images, text, audio 
recording, and motion pictures (it is less clear how texture, scent, heat and taste, among 
the forms of data available to other senses may be recorded or broadcast). The internet 
is a medium that can support any of these forms of information; the printing press can
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only support the first two; radio can only support audio. One might suggest that a flick 
book can record motion pictures, and one might admit this (it is not too far  an artefact 
from a film reel, which could be understood as a motion picture file), but insist on its 
limitations. One might ask: what about Twitter, and Facebook, and blogs? These are 
social networks, and, to that extent, they are social spaces comprised of media. They are 
means of inter-personal communication facilitated by the internet. They are means of 
exchanging information of the sort listed above. The information that they share could 
equally not be recorded or broadcast, and they could perhaps find alternative vehicles of 
dissemination. It seems that media are means of influence in one distinct sense.
I have said that media are means of recording or broadcasting information. One might 
wonder whether those things recorded and broadcast can be media as well; whether 
dance, speech, and song might count as media, for instance, or whether a story or play 
might be a medium. Arguably, all communication is dependent on some medium or 
other, if only vibrations in the air and language. Here, then, the modifier ‘mass’ is 
helpful in distinguishing mass media from more circumscribed media. Media might be 
thought of as platforms, but not all platforms are media; one might think of public 
spaces such as soap boxes at Speaker’s Comer in London, theatres, cinemas, schools, or 
universities. Any shared space is a platform for communication. It is any space in which 
one has access to another; one could list shopping malls in general or particular 
shopping malls, or crowded streets, or places of work. One might also think o f social 
positions as being platforms for influence: being a police officer, a teacher, a doctor, a 
prime minister, a journalist, a celebrity, are likely examples of individuals whose social 
status makes a difference to their communicative power. Here, the status of the space 
and the actor are important because they determine the degree of trust that they will 
likely be leant by the audience. When an esteemed professor delivers the Royal 
Society’s Christmas lecture, or when a doctor, or teacher informs their audience of a 
proposition, their audience are often rationally obliged to believe them. (Although 
discovered abuse of trust can undermine the rationality of investing trust in the future.)
Directed versus Undirected Communication
One interesting distinction is between knowing and not knowing whom it is that one is 
addressing. For instance, contrast talking with a dear friend in person with putting a
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message into a bottle, and putting it out to sea. These may be thought of as pure 
examples of directed and undirected communication, each of which occupy opposite 
poles of a continuum. Plato voiced a general concern about undirected communication 
in the Phaedrus:2
Once it has been written down, every discourse rolls about everywhere, 
reaching just as much those with understanding as those who have no 
business with it, and it does not know to whom it should speak and to 
whom not.3
Film certification, by such bodies as the British and Irish Boards of Film Classification 
(the BBFC, and IBFC), the establishment of television watersheds, and creation of 
document passwords somewhat ameliorate this problem. However, no content is like 
Arthur’s sword in the stone, presenting itself only to those for whom it is properly 
suited. I remember admiring the gangsters in Goodfellas as a teenager, and for that 
reason it might have been better if the film had known that I was not ready to see it.4
Systematic versus ad hoc Communication
In conversation, we often tell stories and jokes, to amuse or entertain, or simply to relay 
something of an interesting experience from our day. These are ad hoc, being told to 
friends or strangers as we fancy. By contrast, we may assume a slightly more systematic 
approach: suppose someone says something racist in conversation, we may have 
developed a strategy for responding to such comments: either to ignore them, challenge 
them directly, or drop hints and problems along the way, for instance commenting ‘is it 
not true that Martin Luther King a hero?’ Or ‘would you not say that Morgan Freeman a 
great actor?’ On other hand, as with curricula, we have thoroughly systematic 
approaches to communicating information. Curricula are systematic programmes for 
learning.5
As we have said, our task is to specify those discrete kinds of potentially influential acts 
which may be used to influence people (whatever kind of media they assume, directed 
or undirected, ad-hoc or systematic, in various professions and various spaces). We
2 Cf. Bernard Williams, ‘Plato: The Invention of Philosophy,’ in The Sense o f  the Past: Essays in the 
History o f  Philosophy, ed. by Myles Bumyeat (Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2009), pp. 148- 
186.
3 Plato, Phaedrus, 275d-e, trans. by Williams, ‘The Invention of Philosophy,’ p. 150.
4 Goodfellas, dir. by Martin Scorsese (Warner Bros, 1990)
5 Curricula can be instantiated across our three kinds of platforms: media, social space and social role.
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want to know in what principled ways we can divide forms of influence up, what 
taxonomy of influence is available to us. The contrast between rational versus non- 
rational means of influence is a promising start. What is this rational/non-rational 
distinction? Borrowing from Michael Hand’s usage, “held non-rationally” (when said 
of, for instance, a belief), means held “without regard for the evidence”, thus, “held 
rationally” would mean “held with regard for the evidence”.6
Rational versus Non-Rational Influence 
Rational Influence
One might hope to convince people using rational methods that a proposition is true, 
that an action, attitude, or emotion is good or appropriate, or that a habit would be good 
to cultivate. According to Hand, beliefs can be transmitted in two rational ways. First, 
“where beliefs are known to be true, they can be imparted by means of rational 
demonstration” in which a proposition is proven to enjoy sufficient probative force to 
make non-belief irrational, or at least to make belief rational.7 Second, “other things 
being equal, when a person perceived by others to be an intellectual authority [on a 
relevant matter] asserts that a proposition is true, she places them under a rational 
obligation to accept her assertion, [Insofar as they are rational] she imparts a belief to
8 4  .  •  *  •her listeners, and she does so by appealing to their reason”. This is fairly intuitive: 
belief acquisition can be warranted either by testimony, or by acquaintance with the 
stuff being testified to. Non-rational methods would involve any other means of 
influencing someone. Perhaps Hand would admit one more form of rational influence, 
namely, that of providing the conditions within which students might discover the truth 
of some proposition themselves. This also captures the method of ‘steering’, which 
Hand, in turn, glosses as “guiding participants, by means of strategic prompts, 
questions, and interjections, toward a predetermined conclusion.”9 One might think of
6 Hand, ‘Religious Upbringing Reconsidered,’ pp.545-557, 545.
7 Ibid. Propositions can enjoy sufficient probative force to make belief rational, and they can also enjoy 
sufficient probative force to make denial irrational. Hand thinks that directive education requires the 
latter. In fact, Hand thinks that where the latter is not in evidence, then it must have taken a non-rational 
means of persuasion to convince someone o f the proposition. This is clearly not the case, however; 
indeed, Hand even allows that people can come to religious beliefs rationally, without any lack o f 
available information, or relevant expertise. We will return to this line o f criticism later.
8 Ibid, p. 551.
9 Michael Hand, ‘Framing Classroom Discussion of Same-Sex Marriage,’ Educational Theory 63(5) 
(2013), pp. 497-510.
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such closed-ended exercises as allowing students to conduct experiments to discover 
facts about the world, as not too dissimilar to steering: after all, when the experiments 
do not show what they are supposed to, the teacher says: we did the experiments 
wrongly, not: we have made an important discovery. Are there any other forms of 
rational influence?
Rational Deliberation
In his book, Redirect, psychologist, Timothy D. Wilson, recommends what he calls the 
‘Pennebaker Technique’, in which a writing exercise is set on a topic about which the 
subject is confused and anxious. The task is to write an account, of a traumatic event, 
say, requiring the subject to contemplate the event until they settle on a telling of the 
event with which they are content. To this end, Wilson tells us to “commit to writing 
about your problem for at least 15 minutes a day for three or four consecutive days -  
ideally at the end of each day -  and [to] write without interruption each time”.10 The 
technique is, as attested to by robust empirical warrant, apt to markedly reduce 
confusion and anxiety. The exercise seems somewhat similar to essay writing per se. 
Indeed, we might observe that writing is a sort of technology, a way of making one’s 
thoughts external. In articulating and externalizing one’s thoughts, one is put in a better 
position to sort through them and, for instance, make them self-consistent (to establish 
reflective equilibrium among them). While it is perfectly possible, given the 
unreliability of memory, that one will, in writing about the incident, reimagine and 
falsify it. As such, I suggest that this is a rational exercise. Although no particular 
conclusion is recommended in setting the exercise, it is recommended that people come 
to some self-consistent set of opinions on a given topic (a coherent account of it), and a 
manner of achieving this is recommended also, namely, the writing technique. It is to a 
large extent a non-directive exercise, allowing for a diversity of acceptable accounts, 
they are better to the extent that they are self-consistent, comprehensive, simple, and 
detailed.
10 Wilson, Redirect, p. 72.
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Two Concerns About Rational Persuasion
There are two concerns that we ought to address before moving on to discuss non- 
rational influence. First, the limitations of rational persuasion in affecting change, and, 
second, the problems that are inherent in deferring to intellectual authority.11 Thaler and 
Sunstein note that “the evidence does not suggest that education is, in and of itself, an 
adequate solution” for affecting change; by ‘education’, they have in mind ‘rational 
influence’ in the above sense.12 There seem to be some limits to what rational methods 
can achieve, the most obvious examples being that phobias, addictions and delusions do 
not seem to be shaken by the recognition of good reasons, or prevent them from being 
recognized as such. Timothy D. Wilson gives an example of Kurt Lewin’s finding that: 
“Simply lecturing people about the importance o f ’ eating organ meats during the food 
shortages of Second World War “didn’t work”. However, women who attended 
meetings in which “skilled leaders steered the conversation to the ways in which 
obstacles to serving organ meets could be overcome,” were “much, more likely to serve 
organ meats.” 13 This manner of steering can look somewhat underhanded, and, indeed, 
perhaps we ought to distinguish between rational steering, and non-rational steering, 
which splits in respect of whether or not participants are steered towards influences for 
which they recognize decisive rational grounds. Albeit, David Bridges and David E. 
Cooper might both very well think that any kind of steering represents an abdication of 
truthfulness unless it is admitted upfront that this is what one’s agenda is .14
Michael Hand recommends that we put rationality ahead of autonomy as an educational 
aim on the grounds that merely being the one whose judgement counts is not always 
rational; we often do better in deferring to intellectual and moral authorities (i.e. those 
who are in a proper position to know about something, or tell us what to do).15 We 
should usually believe experts, and should usually obey police; at least in societies with 
laws that are (for the most part) just, and police who (for the most part) enforce them 
justly. Indeed, James Ladyman gives good examples of rational deference to intellectual
11 An intellectual authority is one who is a position to opine on topics in a reliable way. A ‘moral 
authority’ is one to whom we ought to defer on the question of what to do. Sometimes it is proper to defer 
to tour guides, teachers, and police officers about what to do.
12 Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge (Penguin Books: London, 2009), p. 121.
13 Wilson, Redirect, p. 11.
14 David Bridges, Education, Democracy, and Discussion (Slough, UK: National Foundation for 
Educational Research, 1979), p. 114; David E. Cooper, ‘Teaching and Truthfulness,’ Studies in 
Philosophy and Education 27(2-3) (2008), pp. 79-87.
15 Michael Hand, ‘Against Autonomy as an Educational Aim,’ Oxford Review o f  Education 32(4) (2006), 
pp. 535-550.
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authority, emphasizing the sheer diversity of deep and narrow epistemic specializations 
(even within physics) required for undertaking and interpreting data from experiments 
conducted with the Large Hadron Collider.16 The complexities of each specialization 
are such that nobody can be conversant in all forms of expertise, and so not only is the 
epistemic labour split, but so too is any comprehensive and detailed understanding of 
the enterprise. Each contributor is heavily dependent on deference to the judgement of 
other colleagues, whose discipline they can understand only dimly by comparison with 
their own. However, this can sound extremely worrisome in light of reports of German 
soldiers replying “I was just following orders” when asked about their role in the Nazi 
atrocities at concentration camps. In Obedience to Authority, Stanley Milgram, reports a 
now infamous experiment in which people defer worryingly to a perceived intellectual 
cum moral authority. When told by a person in a white lab coat to punish another 
participant with an electric current which was turned up gradually to what they believed 
were fatal levels, most subjects obeyed, though they were distressed by doing so.
There are other examples of similar experiments. For instance, C.K. Hofling found that 
twenty one out of a sample of twenty two nurses would have administered a patient 
with an overdose of medicine when ordered to by unknown doctors in a hospital setting, 
in spite of official guidelines forbidding giving such a dose.17 One point made by 
Ladyman is that where doctors abuse their intellectual authority, this undermines the 
trust people can and should have in their professions. One might suggest that perhaps 
there is often no good ground to determine who we should defer to and who we should 
not: and it is a case of moral luck as to whether we defer for the best. In these cases, it 
seems that the participants had good grounds to resist obedience, and, yet, obeyed. 
Similarly, parents are culpable for any harm that befalls their children when they entrust 
them to ‘quacks’, but not when they entrust them to medical doctors who then abuse 
their power and mistreat their patients (a doctor Harold Shipman type, for instance).
Onora O ’Neill has argued convincingly that trust ought to be retracted in cases of 
breach o f trust:
16 James Ladyman, ‘Pseudoscience and Bullshit,’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=32ZaTKa2IRg> 
[accessed 23 June 2015].
17 C.K. Hofling et al., ‘An Experimental Study of Nurse-Physician Relationships,’ Journal o f  Nervous 
and Mental Disease 143(2) (1966), pp. 171-180. It seems that the nurses were in such a position that they 
had to defer to authority one way or another: either indirect communication through official guidelines, or 
direct communication from a doctor. Either way, they were deferring to an authority.
Trust requires an intelligent judgement of trustworthiness. So those who
want others’ trust have to do two things. First, they have to be
trustworthy, which requires competence, honesty and reliability.
Second, they have to provide intelligible evidence that they are
trustworthy, enabling others to judge intelligently where they should
1 8place or refuse their trust.
If O ’Neill’s criteria have been satisfied, deference seems to be warranted. There also 
seems to be a presumption of trustworthiness for qualified doctors so that we would 
trust them until they prove untrustworthy. However, it would be wrong to trust someone 
who does not have medical training on complex medical matters. In these cases, an 
institution is being entrusted with selecting competent, honest, reliable professionals, 
and their trustworthiness is inherited from the institution, and its proven track record, 
one that can be undermined by malpractice by its members. Deference, it seems, is not 
inherently bad. In some matters, we should not defer to others, with the Milgram 
experiments chief among them. In the case of Nazi obedience, the consideration of 
punishment for disobedience was also an important mitigating factor so that one might 
have known that it is morally best to disobey, and that it might be heroic to do so, but 
heroism might reasonably be thought to be morally supererogatory. However, what is 
worrisome is not rationality here, but deference. Deference is sometimes rational, and 
sometimes not. Contrasting with rational methods of persuasion are non-rational 
methods of persuasion, which we shall discuss now. Rational methods are to be 
preferred to non-rational, since they are truth-sensitive, and being able to track the truth 
seems important to flourishing, as argued in Chapter 2.
Non-Rational Methods
We have said (following Hand) that using anything but the presentation, or testifying to 
their existence of, rationally decisive grounds in order to impart a belief of attitude, 
belief, or policy etc., makes use of non-rational methods of influence. However, we 
have allowed that steering, and framing discussion and experiments, can be utilized as 
forms of rational influence. It seems fair enough to define non-rational methods by 
reference to rational methods, since, after all, the term non-rational is simply the 
negation of ‘rational’. The range of things that belong to this category may be
18 Onora O’Neill, ‘How to Trust Intelligently,’ <http://blog.ted.com/how-to-trust-intelligently/> [accessed 
23 June 2015].
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importantly open ended. Some prominent examples can be found in contributions to 
social psychology. Much social psychology seems to be more focused on behavioural 
influence rather than formative influence. For instance, many of the ‘nudges’ described 
by Thaler and Sunstein in Nudge, and many of Robert Cialdini’s mechanisms of 
persuasion in Influence, are concerned with what it takes to encourage desired 
responses, and actions, on a fairly immediate basis. Nevertheless, there is much which 
is both interesting and relevant.
Pseudo-Rational Methods
Leading off from our discussion of rational methods of influence, let us start our 
discussion of non-rational methods of influence by considering methods of influence 
that play off of the desirability of rational persuasion, and pretend to count, as examples 
of it. These pseudo-rational methods include knowingly presenting fallacious 
arguments, the motivated provision and concealment of relevant information and 
arguments, and lying. Feigning intellectual authority, and stating something as true 
without either argument or any intellectual authority seem to count as examples, and so 
too does reverse psychology. Consider the following illustration of reverse psychology. 
One man who is unable to walk around easily, has a front door that will not close 
properly unless slammed. He falls out with a visitor, who storms out of the apartment. 
The immobile man yells after his visitor “and don’t slam the door.” Sure enough, in a 
bad temper, his visitor slams the door, as per his wishes, but contrary to his request. 
Hand describes as semi-rational, “Galston’s ‘noble, moralizing history’, in which the 
fine deeds of a mythologised ‘pantheon of heroes’ are rehearsed and celebrated,” 
describing it as “at once an exercise in emotional manipulation and an attempt to supply 
pupils with reasons to be patriotic, albeit spurious ones.” 19 ‘Pseudo-rational’, might be a 
more apt description than ‘semi-rational’, but it is not clear -  perhaps aspects of 
Galston’s style of education are genuinely rational, rather than quasi-rational, in that 
they are scattered among non-rational elements. The difference between quasi-rational 
and actually rational education might turn on one of two things: whether the teacher 
offers reasons they believe to be spurious, or which happen to be spurious despite their 
own acceptance. After all, it is important to recognize that even experts can be misled 
by bad arguments, despite paying due diligence.
19 Hand, ‘Should We Promote Patriotism in Schools?’ pp. 328-347, 329.
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Motivated Acceptance
We can be motivated to believe propositions, and it is easier to believe what we want to 
believe (what we want to be true), and harder to believe what we don’t want to believe 
(what we don’t want to be true). Given this, one may appeal to what people want, in
90attempting to persuade them. This phenomenon is more commonly termed ‘wishful 
thinking’.
Re-Socialization and Conformity
It seems that we become more like those around us the longer that we spend with them. 
Eamonn Callan terms this, “the magnetic power of conformity,”21 and Robert Cialdini, 
‘social proof.’ One means we use to determine what is correct is to find out what other 
people think is correct; we view a behaviour as more correct in a given situation to the 
degree that we see others performing it.22
By way of example, using canned laughter causes audiences “to laugh longer and more 
often when humorous material is presented and to rate the material as funnier.”23 In 
another example, the ‘smoke-filled room study’ showed that people were more inclined 
to stay in a room as it filled with smoke, if stooges remained in the room unperturbed 
(although that experiment was designed to test whether there was a ‘by-stander effect’, 
which lessened people’s willingness to raise an alarm than when alone).24 Here, one’s 
judgements are likely conflicted, the judgement ‘I should raise the alarm’ conflicts with 
the judgement ‘nobody else thinks that it is appropriate to raise the alarm, so perhaps I 
am over reacting’. Indeed, the rarity of whistle-blowers may further exemplify this 
phenomenon. In fact, these social processes may, in fact, be different, but closely 
related, kinds of phenomena.
Some influences just ‘rub o ff  on us, like a local accent on an extended holiday. We 
copy one another, and thereby ‘fit in’ with one another, whether in respect of what we
20 On this matter, see Simon Blackburn on ‘Motivated Belief in What Do We Really Know? The Big 
Questions in Philosophy (Quercus, 2012), p. 72.
21 Eamonn Callan, ‘Integration as Stealth Assimilation,’ in Education and Philosophy: New Perspectives 
on the Work o f  John White, ed. by Judith Suissa, Carrie Winstanley and Roger Marples (London: 
Routledge, 2014), p. 160.
22 Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology o f  Persuasion (New York: Morrow, 1993), p. 116.
23 Ibid, p. 115.
24 Bibb Latane and John M. Darley, ‘Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in Emergencies,’ 
Journal o f  Personality and Social Psychology 10(3) (1968), pp 215-21; a video o f the experiment is 
available at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KE5YwN4NW5o> [accessed 23 June 2015],
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wear, how we speak or even what we believe and value (sometimes more consciously, 
sometimes less consciously). Becoming self-aware, we might raise our behaviour to the 
conscious level, and then make a habit of some alternative behaviour in order to have it 
become a second nature. Lou Reed’s lyrics, “anything that you might do, I’m gonna do 
too. You held up a stagecoach in the rain, now I’m doing the same” provide a lively
7 Sexpression of conscious mimicry. One thinks also of a Japanese candid camera show 
in which hundreds of actors lay face down in the street; when passers-by saw this they 
lay down on the street also. It seems that intention and consciousness can vary when it 
comes to conforming with, or mimicking others, just on the grounds of numeracy; one 
might intentionally emulate another, or one might attempt to keep from emulating 
another, and yet still do so through unreflective slippage. Finally, one might have no 
intentions one way or the other, and yet still do so. These are connected with whether or 
not the emulation is conscious, it seems that intentional acts are necessarily conscious 
ones.
It is because of this feature of human nature that it is possible to influence people by re- 
socializing them, and by setting examples. This might not be considered as a kind of 
influential act, but rather as an example of determining what we might call ‘influence
2 7architecture’ (borrowing from Thaler and Sunstein’s expression ‘choice architecture’).
It is not entirely clear if this should be classed as an example of behavioural or 
formative influence. That is because if we are ever-malleable (or plastic), and able to 
adapt to conform to new social environments, then we might be tempted to say that we 
are not formatively influenced but only behaviourally influenced. Even still, we can be 
influenced in those respects in virtue of which we do what we do, even if that is to be 
explained in terms of a circumstantial fact.
Consider some other examples of re-socialization. The architecture of Kilmainham 
Gaol, Dublin City’s historic prison based on Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon design, 
separated inmates into individual cells so as to keep them from spreading anti-social 
behaviours and attitudes.28 Character reform was sought through separation from bad
25 ‘I’m Sticking With You’, performed by the Velvet Underground, lyrics by Lou Reed.
26 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MQMfiOnVeVo> [accessed 23 June 2015].
27 Thaler and Sunstein, Nudge, p. 3
28 Michel Foucault discusses this design at some length, arguing that the same process of separation and 
observation is used by modem States in managing and ‘improving’ their subjects, be they “a madman, a 
patient, a condemned man, a worker or a schoolboy.” Discipline and Punish: The Birth o f  the Prison 
(London: Penguin, 1991); see, Chapter 3, ‘Panopticism ’ for his discussion, and p. 200 for the quotation.
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role models, and being without the privacy to persist in antisocial attitudes and 
behaviours. Indeed, prison may have the function of a criminal university for convicts. 
This is well illustrated by a remark of George, the central character of the film Blow : 
“Danbury wasn’t a prison, it was a crime school. I went in with a Bachelor of marijuana, 
came out with a Doctorate of cocaine.” 29 The same worry is put this way in A 
Clockwork Orange, “cram criminals together and what do you get? Concentrated 
criminality; crime in the midst of punishment.”30 Indeed, separating friends judged to be 
a bad influence on one another into separate school classes is also an example of this 
practice. It is a kind of intervention in people’s location and socialising, and can 
sometimes count as an infringement of their rights to freedom of association, and self- 
determination.
One’s objects of emulation can vary in scope. One can emulate some admired 
individual (as Alexander the Great self-consciously emulated Achilles), some admired 
class of individuals (as a young boy might emulate his footballing heroes), or the people 
by whom one is surrounded just in virtue of their being the majority. We may recall 
Williams’ finding obscure the idea of blaming people who do not accept the values by 
which one judges them wanting, and his interpretation of blame as a pragmatic tool for 
encouraging people to internalize those values, and come to judge themselves by it. For 
Williams, blame is a “proleptic mechanism” which depends on the common 
“disposition that consists in a desire to be respected by people whom in turn one 
respects.”31
Herbert Kelman’s Account of ‘Identification5
Herbert Kelman’s analysis of what he calls ‘identification’ offers an account o f 
emulation of three sorts distinguished above. For Kelman, ‘identification’ is a means by 
which:
an individual accepts influence because he wants to establish or 
maintain a satisfying self-defining relationship to another person or 
group.
29 Blow, dir. by Ted Demine (Apostle, Avery Pix, New Line Cinema, 2001).
30 A Clockwork Orange, dir. by Stanley Kubrick (Warner Bros, 1971).
31 Bernard Williams, ‘Internal Reasons and the Obscurity o f Blame,’ Logos 10 (1989), pp. 1-11,7.
The individual actually believes in the responses which he adopts
through identification, but their specific content is more or less
irrelevant.
He adopts the induced behaviour because it is associated with the 
desired relationship. Thus the satisfaction derived from identification is 
due to the act of conforming as such.32
Kelman wants to argue that this kind of process or incitement to an influence is 
vulnerable to the cessation of the identification. One reservation we might have about 
Kelman’s analysis is that identification might well work the other way around, where 
one is attracted to a relationship in virtue of the content of a person’s memes, and not 
vice versa. Thus they may lose that attraction if the memes change. Somewhat 
differently again, some people have converted to a faith in order to forge a relationship, 
and some have maintained their faith after the relationship has ended. Perhaps this is 
somewhat similar to those who have moved abroad for the sake of a lover, who at the 
end of the affair decide to stay on. “I’m not here for them, I’m here for me”, they say to 
themselves. Kelman identifies ‘believing for extrinsic rewards’ with ‘identification’, but 
presumably belief for extrinsic rewards (we could term this ‘motivated belief) can find 
other motivations than ‘identification’. In connection with this, we might be reminded 
of ‘cults of personality’, which Wittgenstein’s disciples exemplify quite well, as
detailed in Ray Monk’s biography of Wittgenstein, The Duty o f  Genius. 33 There,
students are recounted as having modelled themselves on not just Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical views and methods, but also his aesthetic tastes, his style of dress, and 
mannerisms. It seems that we are impressed by the force o f personality that some 
people have, and may, more or less consciously and more or less comprehensively, 
model ourselves on them.
Timothy D. Wilson’s Story Editing Techniques
Wilson’s ‘Story Editing’ tools are “a set of techniques designed to redirect people’s 
narratives.”34 Wilson counts the ‘Pennebaker Technique’ that we encountered earlier 
among these; although, earlier, I argued that setting writing tasks of that sort ought to be 
classed as an example of rational influence (albeit, non-directive). The other techniques
32 Herbert C. Kelman, ‘Compliance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude 
Change,’ The Journal o f  Conflict Resolution 2(1) (1958), pp. 51-60, 53.
33 Ray Monk, Ludwig Wittgenstein: the Duty o f  Genius (London: Vintage, 1991).
34 Wilson, Redirect, p. 11.
that Wilson prescribes are ‘Story Prompting’, ‘Steering’ and ‘Do Good, Be Good’. 
Story Prompting “involves redirecting people down a particular narrative path with 
subtle prompts.”35 For example, one might narrate people’s actions so that they come to 
internalize that narrative; in Wilson’s example, labelling children as “helpful people” 
encourages them to internalize this view of themselves. According to Wilson, “we have 
to be more subtle with adults; rather than simply giving them a label for their behaviour, 
we need to get them to reach that conclusion themselves”.36 Steering, in Wilson’s sense, 
encourages people to engage in reasoning which presupposes the content that one hopes 
to transmit (a nefarious example of this technique, is the question “how does one kill 
the Jews?”) .37 One might reasonably describe this as often being pseudo-rational 
(although perhaps learning to do maths, or use proper grammar perfectly innocently 
requires this sort of instruction). “Do Good, Be Good” is the name that Wilson uses to 
describe how “our narratives will change to match our behaviour” (which will 
presumably make our behaviour less effortful, or less prompt-dependent, otherwise,
3 8narratives would appear superfluous).
Positive and Negative Reinforcement, and Neither
Positive and negative reinforcement are often employed to exercise formative influence. 
Examples include the following pairings of contrasting concepts: punishment/reward, 
incentive/disincentive, approval/ disapproval, praise/ blame, encouragement/ 
discouragement. For each of these pairs, presumably, it is possible to do neither, and 
take a neutral stance of neither encouraging nor discouraging whatever respect of 
influence is in question (a particular attitude, for instance). Likely, there is nothing 
wrong, per se, with positive and negative reinforcement, but particular examples of it 
are wrong: humiliation, and physical harm (hitting, and starving, for instance). 
Flowever, these look like tools for behavioural influence in the first instance, which 
may thereby wield a formative influence. They may, for instance, habituate one to 
certain behaviours through repeated action. One might say that the internal disposition 
to act in that way is simply the habit (rather than any particular attitudes and beliefs, 
say).
35 Ibid, p. 14.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid, p. 11.
38 Ibid, pp. 17, and 74.
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What Forms Should Influence Take?
We have discussed what forms influence can take. Now, we will discuss what forms 
influence should take. Hand wants to encourage evidence-sensitive belief. This aim 
seems to be concordant with our conception of wellbeing detailed in Chapter 3. Hand 
worries that to influence children by “appeal to anything other than their reason is to 
gain their assent by the exercise of psychological power, to charm or intimidate them 
into belief. It is to implant beliefs in such a way that they are held non-rationally or non- 
evidentially.” 39 This is morally wrong, however, because “Insofar as one’s beliefs are 
held non-evidentially [...] they are highly resistant to rational reassessment. Because 
they are not founded on evidence, the discovery of counter-evidence has little or no 
effect on them.” 40 To the extent that one’s beliefs and judgements have been non- 
rationally imparted in a specific domain, one is prevented from thinking rationally 
about the content of that domain. One’s ability to track the truth is thereby undermined, 
and so the extrinsic goods of rationality are undercut, and so too is the intrinsic good of 
being rational.41
In his book, The War for Children’s Minds, Stephen Law observes that “appealing to 
someone’s power of reason strongly favours beliefs that are true.” He challenges the 
reader “to construct a strong, well-reasoned case capable of withstanding critical 
scrutiny for believing that the Antarctic is populated by crab-people or that the earth’s 
core is made of cheese”, and comments dryly, that “you’re not going to find it easy.”42 
For Law:
reason is a double-edged sword. It cuts both ways. It doesn’t 
automatically favour the teacher’s belief over the pupil’s. It favours 
the truth, and so places the teacher and pupil on a level playing field. If
39 Michael Hand, 'A  Philosophical Objection to Faith Schools,’ Theory and Research in Education 1(1) 
(2003), pp. 89-99,95.
40 Ibid.
41 On Hand’s use o f the word ‘indoctrination’, “to indoctrinate a child ... is precisely to impart beliefs to 
her in such a way that she holds them non-rationally”, Hand, ‘Religious Upbringing Reconsidered,’ 
pp.545-557, 545. However, accusing a teacher of having “Having imparted beliefs to her in such a way 
that they are held non-rationally” may well seem odd. If one did everything one could to ensure that a 
belief came to be held rationally, and yet failed in their task, it would seem unfair to suggest that one had 
done anything wrong. But this is what seems to follows from Hand’s analysis if indoctrination is to be a 
moral wrong. One might just tweak the definition of indoctrination from “imparting beliefs to her in such 
a way that she holds them non-rationally”, to “imparting beliefs in such a way that she will likely hold 
them non-rationally”. Alternatively, one might deny that culpability is part of the concept of 
indoctrination, and that it is necessarily wrong.
42 Stephen Law, The War fo r  Children's Minds (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 32.
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as a teacher, you try to use reason to persuade, you may discover that 
it is actually you, not them, that’s mistaken.43
If one thinks that it is important that children become adults whose beliefs track the
truth, one should agree with Hand that we ought to equip children to rationally form and
revise their judgements, and so worry about anything which damages their ability to do
so.44 According to Hand, using perceived intellectual authority to convey a false belief
“is a lesser crime than indoctrination” (or ‘successful, non-rational influence’) on the
grounds that rationally imparting and importing beliefs does no damage “to the child’s
capacity to make rational judgments [...] [since their] beliefs are held on the basis of
evidence and are open to revision and correction.”45 Jim Mackenzie has pointed out that
it is an empirical question as to whether teaching a given belief in a particular way will
result in the child’s being able or unable to revise beliefs on the basis of further reasons
and argument. He claims also, that it is empirically false. As he sees it, Hand is
committed to “two conditionals: (a) that if a belief is held nonevidentially, then it
cannot be modified in the light of evidence or reasons, and (b) that if a belief is held on
the basis of evidence, then it can be modified in the light of evidence or reasons.”46 As a
counter example to (a), Mackenzie claims that:
we come to beliefs about how to use language (give-gave-given and 
policeman-policewoman) non-evidentially in childhood, but we can 
modify these beliefs using reason as adults, and learn to say she where 
once we said he and police officer unless the officer’s gender is 
relevant. So there are beliefs we came to hold non-evidentially which 
we can modify by new evidence or arguments.47
As a counter example to (b), Mackenzie points out that “Kelvin did not retract his 
calculations of the maximum age of the earth even after the discovery of radioactivity 
invalidated his central assumptions.”48
On the first count however, as we have seen, Hand takes beliefs imparted on the 
strength of perceived intellectual authority to be “held on the basis of evidence” and 
“open to revision and correction,”49 and since children learn the difference between
43 Ibid, p. 33.
44 Michael Hand, ‘What Should We Teach as Controversial? A Defence o f the Epistemic Criterion/ in 
Educational Theory 58(2) (2008), pp. 213-228.
45 Hand, ‘Religious Upbringing Reconsidered,’ pp.545-557, 553.
46 J. Mackenzie, ‘Still Irrelevant to Us,’ Journal o f  Philosophy o f  Education 38(4), pp.639-648, 651.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Hand, ‘Religious Upbringing Reconsidered,’ pp.545-557, p. 553.
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‘give’, "gave5 and ‘given’ from perceived intellectual authorities, this does not seem to 
be a counter example. Furthermore, these are examples of socially constructed truths 
that are (basically) made true by how people use them, and therefore how people use 
them ju st is evidence. On the second count, the Kelvin example cannot undermine the 
belief that ‘if a belief is held on the basis of evidence, then it can be modified in the 
light of evidence or reasons’, for possibility does not entail actuality; that fact that 
something can happen doesn’t entail that it will, so it does not matter that Kelvin 
actually did not revise his view in accordance with the evidence, but merely that he 
could have. Indeed, Kelvin might have been well able to revise his views, but unwilling 
to (and this willingness is something that also ought to be cultivated). Moreover, it 
seems that what ought to be important is that we do our best to ensure that beliefs be 
“open to revision and correction,” so the fact that some people who come to their views 
through the persuasive force of evidence, do not revise their views in the light of 
emergent, contrary evidence at a later time, ought not to persuade against the use of 
evidence to motivate belief. Indeed, it seems that we ought to maximise the probability 
of students’ being able and willing to revise their beliefs on the basis of further reasons 
and argument. While it is an empirical question as to what we must do to maximise the 
chances of this, it does seem likely that presenting reasons or vouching for having seen 
reasons will facilitate this aim. Indeed, it seems simply to be a matter of initiating them 
into that practice, and it is hard to see how else they might come to internalize that 
practice.
Education and Indoctrination
Are education and indoctrination to be identified with specific, potentially influential 
processes? Indoctrination is not to be so identified if it is to be understood as a success 
term for acts which happen to bring about intransigent, or non-evidential commitment 
to beliefs, as Hand would prefer. However, there are surely practices which will 
increase the likelihood of such outcomes which are morally blameworthy (be they 
employed misguidedly, maliciously, negligently, or knowingly but indifferently). These 
practices may reasonably be called indoctrinatory.
Some would prefer to restrict ‘indoctrination’ to cover only the inculcation, intended 
inculcation, or practices likely to inculcate beliefs such that they will be held non-
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rationally. They do not want to extend the term to capture the inculcation, intended 
inculcation, or practices likely to inculcate outcomes in other respects of which we are 
apt to be formatively influenced. For instance, R.S. Peters remarks that “whatever else 
6indoctrination’ means, it obviously has something to do with doctrines.”50 However, it 
seems that whatever is objectionable about the inculcation, intended inculcation, or 
practices likely to inculcate beliefs such that they will be held non-rationally, is equally 
objectionable about the inculcation, intended inculcation, or practices likely to inculcate 
outcomes in other respects of which we are apt to be formatively influenced.
Stephen Law has offered an interesting list of potentially influential acts and influence 
architecture which conduce to non-rational formative influence. A communication 
architect is one who designs the context in which the potentially influential acts take 
place. He might like to call these indoctrinatory practices and do so because it increases 
likelihood of coming to believe X, without having any reason in the normative sense, 
perhaps even being immunized to reason in respect of that belief. Law’s list of 
‘authoritarian’ practices includes the use of punishment, rewards, emotive imagery, 
social pressure, repetition, control and censorship, isolation, uncertainty, and
51  5 2tribalism. He describes these as “essentially manipulative” and observes that 
“whether or not the beliefs in question are actually true is completely irrelevant so far as 
the effectiveness of these methods is concerned.”53
In addition to punishing dissent and rewarding assent, one might stigmatize dissent, 
making it “seem embarrassing or even shameful,” so as to discourage at least overt 
dissent, if not private belief.54 It might be well to say, with John Locke, that punishment 
and such like are hardly likely to encourage internalization of the intended content, but 
rather, public compliance, and indeed, that is a reason not to use such methods if 
formative influence, as distinct from behavioural influence, is truly one’s interest;
Although the magistrate^ opinion in religion be sound [...] if I be not 
thoroughly persuaded thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety 
for me in following it. No way whatsoever that I shall walk in against
50 R.S. Peters, Ethics and Education (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966), p. 41.
51 Law, p. 26-30.
52 Ibid, p. 31.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid, p. 27.
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the dictates of my conscience will ever bring me to the mansions of the 
blessed.55
Effective architecture for non-rational, formative influence includes the use o f ‘control 
and censorship’, such as that exhibited by Totalitarian states which “eliminate 
‘unhealthy’ books from libraries,” which can prevent dissent by starving people of the 
intellectual resources to identify contrary evidence, reasons and arguments. 56 
Concordant with destroying cultural resources for dissent, such as books, isolation from 
dissenting voices can cultivate belief; “Authoritarians often consider it unwise to allow 
their own children to mix with unbelievers, from who they pick up unacceptable
• C 7  9 t
beliefs.” Three additional devices include the use of emotive imagery, such as “iconic 
images of their Authority,” to cultivate devotion,58 “making people feel vulnerable 
without the party, church, person or whatever,” 59 and taking advantage of people’s 
inclinations towards Tribalism: “Human beings are peculiarly attracted to them-and-us 
thinking,” which he calls “the twisted looking-glass of tribalism.” 60 Our tribalistic 
tendencies can be used to secure commitment to content, and not just to one another.
The Limits of Rational Education
Michael Hand tempers his account of the ethics of rational and non-rational influence 
by allowing that there are “important and legitimate forms of non-rational influence -  
the modelling, cajoling and exhorting -  by which teachers begin to shape the emotional 
responses of young children before they are ready to assume responsibility for their 
own emotional lives.”61 Here, though, he adds certain important caveats:
What I think we can say is that, in so far as we have a fundamental 
obligation to respect and to develop the rationality of pupils, we must 
strongly prefer the rational approach to emotional education; and, 
moreover, that we may consider cultivating non-rationally in younger 
pupils only such emotional responses and attachments as we are able 
and entitled to cultivate rationally in older ones. In other words, unless 
it is appropriate for us to promote an emotion by rational means, there is
55 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in The Second Treatise o f  Government and A Letter 
Concerning Toleration, Third Edition, ed. by J.W. Gough (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966), p. 143.
56 Law, p. 29.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid, p. 27.
59 Ibid, p. 30.
60 Ibid.
61 Michael Hand, ‘Should We Promote Patriotism in Schools?’ Political Studies 59(2) (2011), pp. 328— 
347,331.
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certainly no question of it being appropriate to do so by non-rational 
means.62
Indeed, champions of autonomy and reason sound a little unrealistic in the case of (at 
least) small children whom they would prefer to be more obedient at following 
instructions, and complying with set tasks. Before anyone thinks that children are 
naturally good, and are poisoned by a corrupt world, one is again inclined to point to 
website mentioned earlier that chronicles children’s sometimes poor reasons for 
complaint.
Reliability of Influence
Communication acts work on two levels, namely, advocacy and demonstration. For 
instance, one may demonstrate or model some policy, and one may advocate a policy. 
Indeed, one’s demonstration and advocacy may contradict one another. The statement 
‘nobody should speak’, when spoken, would appear to be self-undermining. In this 
case, the prospective subject of influence might wonder whether to do as told (and be 
quiet), or to do as shown (and talk). Even with consistency across the two, there are no 
guarantees of successful formative influence, whether rational or non-rational methods 
are used. 64 Methods of influence are, it should be acknowledged, unreliable. The 
processes that one employs may not affect the desired outcome:
Every historian knows that actions often have unintended and unwanted 
consequences. It would be perfectly ordinary for a move ... to backfire 
disastrously.65
Events can be the causes of outcomes that they were intended to 
prevent, and even trigger outcomes that they would normally prevent,66
62 Ibid.
63 <http://www.sunnyskyz.eom/blog/l 19/36-Reasons-My-Kid-Is-Crying-Temper-Tantrums-You-Can-t- 
Help-But-Laugh-At> [accessed 23 June 2015].
64 A notable example of this is the following. In 1959, W.D. & H.O. Wills launched a tobacco brand with 
a video advertising campaign that featured a man resembling Frank Sinatra walking the streets of London 
alone at night. He wears a long coat, a Trilby hat, and evokes a film noir theme. The man stops and lights 
up a cigarette before turning his back and walking away from the camera. As he does, a voice announces 
that “You’re never alone with a Strand.” Despite the popularity of the adverts, the marketing did not work 
and the brand was withdrawn the next year. According to one commentator, “the unfortunate outcome 
was that consumers, subconsciously associating Strand with loneliness and unsociability, stayed away 
from the brand in their droves.” See ‘Off the back of a Fag Packet: TV Cream’s Guide to Tobacco 
Advertising,’ <http://tv.cream.org/extras/tobacco/index.htm> [accessed 23 June 2015].
65 David Lewis, ‘Causation as Influence,’ Journal o f  Philosophy 97(4) (2000), pp. 182-97, 195.
66 Daniel Nolan, David Lewis (Acumen: Chesham, 2005), p. 92.
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Summary
In this chapter, we discussed the means by which children can and may be formatively 
influenced. We began by trying to make sense of the notion of a ‘means’ or ‘form’ of 
influence by distinguishing between three rival ways of categorizing actions, namely, 
by, intentions, processes, and outcomes. Three kinds of platforms which influencers can 
use to amplify or enable their communication acts were then discussed, namely, media 
used to communicate, the social status of the communicator relative to those 
communicated with, and the social status of the spaces and occasions in which they 
occur. An explanation of the differences between directed and undirected, systematic 
and ad hoc, and rational and non-rational potentially influential acts then followed. I 
then developed the notions of rational and non-rational means of influence at length, 
offering examples of each, before arguing that rational means of influence are morally 
preferable to non-rational means of influence. With the material from Chapters 1 to 5 in 
hand, we may turn to the task of constructing a theory of ethical influence in this next 
chapter.
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Chapter Six
A THEORY OF ETHICAL INFLUENCE 
Introduction
In this chapter, I outline an account of ethical influence quite generally, with little 
specific reference to religion. Applying the theory to religion will wait until Chapter 9, 
and will require both a definition of religion and a judgement about its status (to be 
provided in Chapters 7 and 8, respectively). Following Michael Hand, call the 
encouragement or discouragement of children’s belief of a given proposition ‘directive 
teaching’, and call the facilitation of children’s understanding of that proposition ‘non­
directive teaching.’ The first part of our present chapter addresses two questions. The 
first question is: when ought influencers teach propositions directively and when non­
directi vely? 1 The second question is this: ‘which propositional content should 
influencers address?’ When asked of educators in particular, an answer to these 
questions would amount to what I will call a ‘theory of propositional curricula content’, 
by providing both a means for choosing that content, and a directive for teaching it. 
While the answer that I give to the second question is unlikely to prove exhaustive, I 
still consider that it would form an important part of the answer, bringing us towards a 
theory of propositional curricula content. The next part of this chapter extends this 
approach to encompass the determination of non-propositional content. We finish by 
assessing various objections, including claims that all influence is immoral. But these 
ethical imperatives can generate a raison d'etre for schools as vehicles for delivering 
curricula.
We begin with an outline and discussion of Michael Hand’s ‘Possibility of Truth’ 
argument for compulsory Religious Education (RE), from which the theory of 
propositional curricula content developed here, takes its impetus. We then go on to 
explain how the theory here developed is a natural extension of Hand’s argument. Next, 
a theory of propositional curricula content is outlined via two steps: a) outlining a 
conception of moment that motivates a proposition’s inclusion on the curriculum, b)
1 I borrow the terms ‘directive and non-directive from Michael Hand, see especially his ‘What Should We 
Teach as Controversial? A Defence of the Epistemic Criterion,’ Educational Theory 58(2) (2008), pp. 
213-228. Strictly speaking, non-directive teaching would include acquainting students with, and 
inducting them into assessing the soundness of, arguments for and against propositions, as well as merely 
understanding them.
2 Hand, ‘Religious Education.’
refining the notion of what degrees of rational support are required to decide between 
the directive or non-directive teaching of a momentous proposition. We draw on 
conclusions supported in earlier chapters: a) the duties of truthfulness that motivate 
occasions for directive and non-directive teaching, and b) discussing acceptable means 
of influencing students’ beliefs.
Michael Hand’s ‘Possibility of Truth5 Argument
The theory of propositional curricula content that I want to develop is a natural 
extension of Michael Hand’s ‘possibility of truth’ argument for compulsory RE. Hand 
argues that a discrete, compulsory, non-directive subject focused on the critical 
examination and evaluation of religious beliefs should form part of pupils’ education. 
The argument is this: some religious propositions (about God, salvation, life after death, 
and so on): a) “are sufficiently well supported by evidence and argument, as to merit 
serious consideration by reasonable people,” b) “matter, in the sense of making some 
practical difference to people’s lives,” and c) require “a facility with distinctive kinds of 
evidence and argument” in order to evaluate their plausibility appropriately. Hand 
concludes that children are entitled to an education, enabling them to make rational 
judgments about the truth or falsity of these propositions.3 That is to say, the premises 
motivate a curriculum element whose aim is to enable children to make rational 
judgments about the truth or falsity of religious propositions, a curriculum being “a 
planned programme of learning.”4 It is reasonable to think that a planned programme of 
learning delivered by subject experts is precisely what would be required to enable one 
to make rational judgments about the truth or falsity of religious propositions. Parents 
or, more generally, primary carers could not reasonably be expected to satisfy this 
entitlement qua parents and primary carers. The responsibility would be what I have 
termed extra-parental in an earlier chapter. Hand calls this the ‘possibility of truth
3 Hand, ‘Religious Education.’
4 Michael Hand, ‘What Should Go on the Curriculum?’ The Philosophy o f  Education: An Introduction, 
ed. by Richard Bailey (London: Continuum, 2010), pp. 48-59, 49. This formulation has the benefit o f 
acknowledging the similarity of all courses of learning, and the similarities between the sorts of ethical 
considerations that could motivate their existence, whether they be news programmes, programmes of 
learning for citizenship tests for immigrants, rehabilitation programmes for criminal offenders, or 
educational television series like Planet Earth (BBC, 2006) and The World at War, written by Anthony 
Hughes (1973). It also acknowledges the variety o f vehicles o f provision which programmes of learning 
can be facilitated by.
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argument’. While one might take issue with its premise, I think that the form of the 
argument is valid, and it is this which I want to build on.5
Hand regards this argument as motivating a compulsory, discrete subject for children.6 1 
want to observe that the same entitlement would exist for adults as much as for 
children, but admit further that one might reasonably hope to satisfy each person’s 
entitlement during childhood and early adulthood. It is also worth observing that one’s 
entitlement cannot justify one’s compulsion to receive that entitlement all by itself (we 
saw this point argued in Chapter 3). We allowed that whereas it can be reasonable to 
compel children to undergo formative influence for their own wellbeing on paternalist 
grounds, it is not so easy to argue the same for adults. Even still, it might be reasonable 
to urge that, insofar as adults can be said to have an entitlement, then they may thereby 
have a claim on subsidies in order to avail of it.
Extending Hand’s Argument
It seems to me that the validity of Hand’s possibility of truth argument would imply the 
validity of what I shall call the ‘certainty of truth argument’. Were some religious 
beliefs certain, as opposed to merely plausible, then this, together with their epistemic 
distinctiveness and moment, would motivate a discrete, directive (or confessional), and 
compulsory subject. Let us call propositions that ‘matter, in the sense of making some 
practical difference to people’s lives,’ ‘momentous propositions’. Suppose now that 
some momentous religious propositions were neither plausible nor certain, but 
supported by little to no evidence and argument, or even conflict with such evidence 
and argument that they could not reasonably be believed at all. It seems that educators 
should include the matter of the truth of such propositions on curricula only on an ad 
hoc, as opposed to systematic, basis, when they have reason to think that their students 
believe such propositions, so as to dissuade them -otherwise the curriculum is in danger
5 There are at least two anti-epistemic approaches to challenging Hand’s argument. One is to argue with 
Pascal that we can have non-epistemic motivations to believe that something is true; another is to argue 
that, for instance, religious language is non-propositional. We can leave the second of these to the next 
chapter, although I would refer readers to a persuasive critical discussion of both approaches in J.L. 
Mackie, The Miracle o f  Theism: Arguments fo r  and Against the Existence o f  God (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982).
6 It should be said that Hand is non-committal as to which curriculum organizations would best satisfy the 
educational entitlement, regarding that as a largely contextual matter, but thinks there is as good a case 
for discrete RE as for any other discrete subject.
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of becoming a museum of curiosities, to the exclusion of plausible and certain, 
momentous propositions.7
We should notice that these arguments apply quite generally to any momentous 
propositions that are susceptible of plausibility or certainty, and not just religious 
propositions. We may look on this as the beginnings of a theory of propositional 
curriculum content. It is important to notice that these argumentative mechanisms can 
be accepted without accepting Hand’s judgements on the plausibility of religious 
propositions, or indeed any other judgements about the state of knowledge. This should 
be regarded as one of the strengths of the position. I do not think that if the premises of 
the arguments from certainty and possibility are met, that their conclusions are 
guaranteed. Instead, I think of each as defeasible arguments, since “there is always an 
(open) list of defeating conditions any of which might rule out” their conclusions. 
Instead the premises are sufficient “unless some feature is present which overrides or 
voids them.”9 For instance, one should not equip students with criminal modi operandi 
if the large difference that this information would likely make is the student’s 
committing crimes or bringing harm to others.
The Need for Intervention
As mentioned, Hand thinks of his argument as justifying a compulsory, discrete subject, 
and it seems to be his ‘distinctive kinds of support’ premise which motivates RE being 
a discrete subject. This is not all the work that the ‘distinctiveness’ premise does, 
however. Additionally, it suggests that the intended learning outcome of students being 
able to understand and evaluate the truth of religious propositions would not be 
achieved without this intervention, that is to say, the endeavour is not superfluous to, 
and indeed, is the best method of, satisfying its own aim. To a first approximation, what 
matters for a proposition’s inclusion within curricula is that it satisfies one of the 
following three sets of predicates:
7 Tillson, ‘Religious Education and the Floodgates of Impartiality’.
8 Frank Sibley, ‘Aesthetic Concepts,’ in Approach to Aesthetics: Collected Papers on Philosophical 
Aesthetics, ed. by J. Benson, B. Redfem and J. Roxbee Cox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 
7-8.
9 Ibid
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1. a) That it is momentous; b) that it might well not be believed without 
intervention; c) that it is certain.
2. a) That it is momentous; b) that it might well not be understood and rationally 
evaluated without intervention; c) that it is plausible.
3. a) That it is momentous; b) that it might well be believed without intervention; 
c) that it is false or unfounded.
Where the first set of premises applies to a given proposition, teachers ought to promote 
students’ belief of that proposition. Where the second set of premises applies to a 
proposition, the teacher ought only to facilitate students’ understanding of that 
proposition, and the arguments available for evaluating its truth. Where the third set o f 
premises applies to a proposition, the teacher ought to discourage students’ belief of 
that proposition. It should be noted that a certain value of truthfulness has been 
presupposed in all of the discussion, and it is this that was defended in Chapter 3. We 
are now in a position to critically elaborate the notion of momentousness from Hand’s 
suggestive phrase ‘making some practical difference to people’s lives’.
Moment
For any proposition, a person may take one of the following (mutually exclusive) 
cognitive attitudes: belief, disbelief, or agnosticism. They may also take no cognitive 
attitude at all (at least where they are unaware of the proposition). In what follows, the 
key distinction to bear in mind is that distinction between belief and non-belief, which 
captures all the other attitudes and non-attitudes. To determine a proposition’s moment, 
we ask what difference it would likely make if a person failed to believe the truth.
A paradigm example of a highly momentous proposition is that smoking tobacco 
dramatically increases one’s risk of cancer. Knowing this may not stop everyone from 
starting to smoke, or make all existing smokers give up, but everyone for whom 
smoking is an available option ought to know it all the same, as it is a consideration that 
ought to figure into their decision of whether or not to smoke. Indeed, suppose that it 
were only known by doctors that smoking causes cancer and that a heavy smoker with 
ailing health goes to see one who, after conducting the relevant tests, informs him that 
he has lung cancer. Devastated, but also surprised, the man asks how this could be so. 
In response, the doctor informs him that the cancer is very probably a result of his
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smoking. Again, the man is surprised: ‘but nobody told me smoking causes cancer’; 
‘you never asked’, replies the doctor. The appropriate response is to feel that those in 
the know were guilty of a moral failing in not spreading the word. Moment, in this case, 
has to do with the avoidance of one’s own serious harm, but this is not the only grounds 
on which a proposition, if believed, would likely (or should) make a huge difference to 
the way one will act or live. This example should motivate us to accept that there exists 
an ethical duty to not only share, but to volunteer, and disseminate information or 
‘spread the word’, in the case of momentous propositions, as well as provide a very 
striking illustration of a momentous proposition.
What criteria have we for determining a proposition’s moment? We ought not to say 
that ‘a proposition is momentous if people would change their lives as a result of 
knowing it’, since clearly the fact that smoking causes cancer is something that the 
medical profession, at least, has a duty to raise awareness of, and yet many who are 
made aware, do not even try to give up smoking. Alternatively, I could say ‘a 
proposition is momentous if people should change their lives as a result of knowing it’. 
Alternatively still, I could say that ‘a proposition is momentous if it constitutes a reason 
for people to change their lives’.10 The point is to equip people with information that is 
relevant to making decisions that will affect their lives, information that they would 
likely have wanted to know prior to making decisions. This is likely to include 
information pertaining to their own wellbeing, as well as that of others.
Some would point out that information alone is not enough to motivate people to 
change their lives: meeting people on a cancer ward is more likely to motivate change 
in addition to information, than information alone. Indeed, simply recognising that 
one’s phobia is irrational does not make it go away, hence the existence of various 
kinds of therapies to help do this. This observation should not be seen as an objection to 
the theory advanced here, rather this consideration should at most be seen as leaving the 
door open for supplementary, motivational aspects to curricula.
Moment admits of degrees. Of maximal moment, there are eschatological motivations 
to live in certain ways in the ‘here and now’ (for fear of damnation, for instance); of
I0For a critical discussion of whether reasons for action ought to be characterised by reference to one’s 
motivational set, or by something outside of that, see S. Finlay and M. Schroeder, ‘Reasons for Action: 
Internal vs. External’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), ed. by Edward 
N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/reasons-internal-extemal/> [accessed 23 
June 2015]. Clearly I am committed to the latter position, given the argument of Chapters 2 and 3.
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minimal moment, there are propositions such that it would make little difference to 
anyone whether they believed it, disbelieved it, had no opinion on the matter, or never 
even realised there was a matter to have an opinion about. The relevant question here is 
what difference it would make if someone were not right about a matter, and whether it 
is worth taking some pains to be right about it.11 Additionally, the moment of some 
propositions is local, and the moment of others is more ubiquitous: it is quite local that 
the password to some particular computer network is, say, ‘qwerty’. The moment of 
other propositions is not so local: ‘germs cause human illnesses’; ‘God exists as 
described by the Qur’an’; ‘human beings are invulnerable’. Finally, there is a contrast 
between propositions such that it is momentous for everyone that just someone or just a 
few people should believe them (call this ‘specialist moment’), and propositions such 
that it is momentous for each individual that they should believe them themselves (call 
this ‘general moment’). Consider the proposition that nothing can exceed the speed of 
light. While it might make some difference to me that physicists know it, it doesn’t 
seem to make much difference to me that I know it. This distinction is an arguable basis 
for a contrast between general education and specialised education; whereas general 
curricula would be interested in propositions of momentous importance for each 
individual to know, more specialised curricula would concern themselves with 
propositions which it is of momentous importance to society that at least some people 
know.
In this chapter, I will have in mind propositions of ubiquitous, general moment as a 
factor in determining propositional curriculum content in general, universal education 
(as opposed to specialist education and locally-peculiar education). 12 Some such 
propositions are supported by such evidence and argument that they cannot be 
reasonably denied, and others by such evidence and argument that they can reasonably 
be doubted. Yet others are supported by little to no evidence and argument, or even 
conflict with such evidence and argument that they cannot reasonably be believed at all. 
It is here that the duties of truthfulness, discussed in Chapter 3, play their part in 
determining whether teachers ought to promote students’ belief of that content on the
11 This matter is often not something that we can determine without knowing the answer. For instance, it 
would be worth knowing whether things are carcinogenic if they in fact are carcinogenic, and not nearly 
as worth knowing if they were not. The fact that time and energy invested into some ventures yields 
information o f less value than the resources themselves is a worry faced by researchers and explorers 
alike.
121 will later have in mind propositions of moment which are locally peculiar to religions.
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one hand, or just facilitate their understanding of that content, on the other, or 
discourage students’ belief of that content.
It is not the place of this chapter to argue that any particular propositions satisfy the 
criteria for inclusion within the propositional content addressed by curricula; it is the 
skeletal theory and not any particular application of that theory that this chapter hopes 
to recommend. Certainly, the theory could be combined with judgements about the state 
of knowledge so as to determine propositional content addressed by curricula; indeed, 
that is what I will attempt to do in the course of the last two chapters. That said, it may 
be helpful to give a few suggestive lines of thought along which the theory could be 
applied to contemporary curriculum theory debate, independent to that line of enquiry. 
As I have said, propositions of ubiquitous, general moment are the stuff of propositional 
curriculum content in general, universal education (as opposed to specialist education 
and locally-peculiar education). They would comprise, it would seem, a basic 
curriculum in that they would be propositions which it is everyone’s right to be aware 
of, together, in so far as they are capable of understanding this, with the considerations 
which grant them their degree of plausibility. In liberal democracies, it is of ubiquitous, 
general moment as to what effects politicians’ proposed policies are likely to have if 
adopted. Other likely examples of momentous propositions to constitute a basic 
curriculum involve information that bears on social conscience (about fair trade and 
work conditions), and information that bears on personal health and safety (about 
sexual health, recreational drug and road safety). Clearly, the theory would cash out 
differently when applied to different contexts; for instance in a land without tobacco, it 
would not be a momentous proposition that smoking causes cancer. In the next section, 
I shall attempt to refine the notion of what degrees of rational support are required to 
decide between the directive and non-directive teaching of a momentous proposition.
Certainty and Possibility of Truth
Heeding the work of David Hume, Jim Mackenzie has pointed out that law-like 
statements, such as ‘all men are mortal’, cannot be verified by any number of 
observations, since a counter example could always yet come to light, thus, no amount
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of evidence could possibly decisively determine their truth.13 In the philosophy of 
science, this is known as the problem of induction since it seems to undermine the 
evidential authority of law-like scientific theories. On Karl Popper’s understanding, 
such theories are seen as more or less reliable depending on how often they open 
themselves up to falsification without being falsified.
On Popper’s account scientific theories, since they are not known to be 
true, cannot be imparted by the presentation of proof or decisive 
evidence, but to use a form of leverage other than the force of evidence 
seems to be necessarily indoctrinatory. Perhaps Hand hopes that 
teaching currently accepted scientific theories can also be justified by 
using our perceived intellectual authority.14
It seems that Hand will have to argue that evidence can prove law-like statements (and 
overcome the age old problem of induction), or say that we should not teach law-like 
statements to be true, or argue that they be imparted by perceived intellectual authority. 
It seems to me that admitting that law-like statements cannot be proved true might be 
the best option, but to add the challenge ‘who wants to bet that the sun will not rise 
tomorrow?’ The idea behind explanatory and predictive science (and probability in 
general) is to make the best bet, and some bets are clearly much better than others. 
Thus, we ought to absorb ‘best bets’ into our taxonomy of education. One could 
directively teach that ‘this theory is our best bet’. If one were very worried about 
misleading children about the relative certainty of a proposition, they could build some 
epistemology into the curriculum to discuss the confidence with which different 
statements can reasonably be invested, given their supporting evidence and argument. 
Of course, in many cases, a best bet may still not be a strong enough bet to warrant 
directive teaching, and, in this case, it would instead warrant non-directive teaching. 
While it would be more correct to switch from describing ‘possibility of truth’ and 
‘certainty of truth’ arguments to describing ‘supported by sufficient probative force to 
warrant serious consideration’ and ‘supported by sufficient probative force to make 
denial irrational’ arguments, to avoid clogging my prose with such unwieldy 
formulations, I have elected to use the former terminology as a façon de parler, while 
asking that the reader bear in mind that it is only that.
13 J. Mackenzie, 'Still Irrelevant to Us,’ Journal o f  Philosophy o f  Education 38(4) (2004), pp. 639-648, 
649.
14 Ibid
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The Theory
The notions of truthfulness and moment combined in the ways which we have seen 
above, supply a systematic approach to determining which propositional content 
curricula should contain, and whether teachers ought to promote or demote students’ 
belief of that content on the one hand, or just facilitate students’ understanding o f that 
content, on the other. As we have seen, what matters for a proposition’s inclusion on 
curricula is the applicability of one of the following sets of premises:
1. a) That it is momentous; b) that it might well not be believed without 
intervention; c) that it is certain.
2. a) That it is momentous; b) that it might well not be understood and rationally 
evaluated without intervention; c) that it is plausible.
3. a) That it is momentous; b) that it might well be believed without intervention; 
c) that it is false or unfounded.
Where the first set of premises applies to a given proposition, teachers ought to promote 
students’ belief of that proposition. Where the second set of premises applies to a 
proposition, the teacher ought only to facilitate students’ understanding of that, 
proposition. Where the third set of premises applies to a proposition, the teacher ought 
to discourage students’ belief of that proposition. While it might turn out that this 
theory is incomplete— since my argument fails to motivate the appearance of a 
particular proposition on curricula, while a further argument does motivate it— the 
existence of such arguments will not serve to undermine the theory that I elaborate here, 
but to supplement it.
The Promotional versus Non-Pro motional Distinction
One may contrast the educator’s aiming to impart something to, or promote or 
encourage something in, the student on the one hand (perhaps a belief, a disposition, or 
an understanding, for instance), with their not aiming to impart something on the other. 
This distinction turns on the educator’s intention (rather than their methods, or the 
results of their teaching). As we have seen, Michael Hand tends to talk about directive 
and non-directive teaching. However, the question ‘should one be directive, yes or no?’ 
gives the impression of an exhaustive and exclusive distinction, since it posits and 
negates a predicate (namely, directive). As Hand uses the terms, ‘directive’ means to
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encourage belief or disbelief and ‘non-directive’ means to encourage understanding. Of 
course, as Hand recognizes, they are not exclusive; indeed, he argued in his doctoral 
thesis and first book that belief could not take place without understanding.15
It is better, I submit, to separate out these issues and ask whether we ought to promote 
or ought not to promote particular formative outcomes in students: first, whether they 
understand a proposition, for instance, and, second, whether they believe or disbelieve a 
proposition in addition to understanding it. A given subject matter may be taught with 
promotional aims in some respects, while being taught with non-promotional aims in 
others. Thus, an understanding of political ideologies, and an interest in discussing 
politics might be promoted, while allegiance to a particular ideology is not promoted. 
At least for my purposes, it will make things more perspicuous. Non-directive education 
of the proposition that some political theory (PT) is true can be represented in the 
following table.
-v* Afiitude ;^ ; V
.y.V ,Y Y;;-'. ■’
-  v :Promotional •■'%*? ■: * Non-Promotionár i 2
Interest in truth of PT X
Understanding of PT X
Belief that PT X
Disbelief that PT X
Extending the Theory of Ethical Influence
I said at the outset that an answer to two questions would amount to what I called a 
‘theory of propositional curricula content’, by providing, both a means for choosing 
content, and a directive for teaching that content. The first question was: ‘when ought 
influencers to encourage or discourage children’s belief of a given proposition on the 
one hand (call this ‘directive teaching’), and when ought influencers to simply facilitate 
children’s understanding of that proposition, on the other (call this ‘non-directive 
teaching’)? The second question was: ‘which propositional content should curricula 
address?’ It seems that we can be more comprehensive by asking: ‘When ought
15 Michael Hand, Is Religious Education Possible? (London: Continuum, 2006).
124
teachers to encourage a given formative outcome?’ and ‘Which potential formative 
outcomes should curricula address?’ These are derivative from the question ‘What 
formative influence (if any) ought we ethically to have?’ In Chapter 4, we attempted to 
give substance to the question by providing an account of those respects in which we 
are apt to be formatively influenced. The general respects that I suggested were the 
following:
1. The degrees and kinds of one’s physical and mental abilities
2. One’s stock of concepts
3. Those propositions which one understands
4. One’s cognitive, propositional attitudes, such as belief and disbelief
5. One’s affective attitudes to propositions and objects.
We may ask what considerations preside over whether and how to impart or promote 
each of these kinds of formative outcome. Thus far, our discussion has addressed the 
third and fourth of these formative outcomes, and the first and second in a way that is 
derivative of them. We shall now expand our discussion to take account of the fifth 
formative outcome. I have argued that where being wrong about the rationality of a 
proposition would make a large difference to one’s life, and where one is likely to be 
wrong about its rationality without intervention, that proposition ought to feature on the 
curriculum. I also argued that where denying that proposition is irrational, it ought to be 
encouraged; where affirming it is irrational, it ought to be discouraged; and where 
affirmation and denial are both rational options, it ought to be taught non-directively. 
More than merely helping pupils to understand, and believe or disbelieve momentous 
propositions, I argued that teachers should, in so far as is practicable, aim to acquaint 
students with arguments for and against them and induct pupils into the practice of 
assessing the soundness of those arguments. While this version of the framework 
applies principally to cognitive attitudes, our affective attitudes can be captured by an 
analogous framework.
I agree with Thomas Nagel that “there is such a thing, or category of thought, as reason, 
and that it applies in both theory and practice, in the formation not only of beliefs but of 
desires, intentions, and decisions as we//,” 16 and ask: is it rational that students should 
have certain affective attitudes? Where having or failing to have a certain attitude
16 Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 6.
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makes a significant difference to students’ lives, it ought to be addressed by curricula. 
.Where failing to have the attitude is irrational, this failure ought to be remedied; where 
having the attitude is irrational, that attitude ought to be discouraged; and where neither 
having nor failing to have the attitude is irrational, that attitude ought to be introduced 
and discussed without encouragement or discouragement. Again, teachers should, in so 
far as is practicable, aim to acquaint students with arguments for and against having 
these attitudes and induct them into the practice of assessing the soundness of those 
arguments.
Now it might seem that the question of justification is asymmetrical in the case of 
cognitive propositional attitudes and affective attitudes, and so it is. But perhaps not in 
the way one might expect. In the case of . cognitive propositional attitudes, one might 
ask whether there are good epistemic reasons to believe a proposition. In the case of 
affective attitudes, one might ask whether there are good reasons to have a certain 
attitude or behaviour. However, the question of whether it is good to have a belief is not 
entirely epistemic. There are theoretical and practical reasons, and since believing is an 
activity, it is practical reasons that, properly speaking, warrant belief. In so far as one 
assumes the policy of believing the truth, then theoretical reasons which track the truth 
become important. It is true that having a truth-tracking belief set enables a world- 
navigation by allowing one to know where one is going, and how one is getting there 
(both literally and more figuratively, in the case of career ambitions and plans). Thus, 
one may wonder how the plausibility and mattering clause might be weighed against 
each other if two contradictory propositions each had a greater value in one respect than 
the other had.
Something but the Truth
Strikingly, Hand allows that there are some occasions where parental discretion on 
which being known-to-be-true is not a requirement for promoting beliefs. Young 
children naturally perceive their parents to be intellectual authorities on everything, 
observes Hand. He continues:
insofar as a parent is perceived by her children to be an intellectual 
authority on religious matters, she is in a position to impart religious 
beliefs to them by appealing to their reason [without having to 
demonstrate their truth]. She has no need to resort to indoctrination
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because her children will be rationally obliged to believe whatever she 
tells them about religion.17
One might object that (when done wantonly) this is an abuse of perceived intellectual 
authority, even if the belief is rationally imparted: using that perception to convey a 
false confidence in a proposition. When done inadvertently, a charge of negligence 
might be appropriate, depending on the likelihood and severity of the false
t  Q
impression. Hand pre-empts this, responding that “most of us, while we recognise that 
it is normally wrong for parents to use their perceived intellectual authority to impart 
not-known-to-be-true beliefs, are prepared to grant exceptions to this rule when the 
belief confers a significant benefit on the child”.19 Notice that Hand specifies parents in
2o
the forgoing remarks, and not teachers, or other extra-parental influencers. He gives 
three examples:
1. protecting them from physical harm: all wild berries are poisonous,
2. contributing to their emotional security: bad people always go to prison, and
3. giving them and their parents pleasure: the tooth fairy will come for your tooth 
tonight.
On the first example, we see a simplified version of the truth, or perhaps a stepping 
stone towards the truth. Indeed, one hears it remarked by science university students 
just how crude secondary and primary science education is. Here one might urge that a 
lie is not being told, but the nearest proximity to the truth manageable for one’s 
cognitive ability. One might suggest that “some berries are poisonous, and you don’t 
know which” would have the desired effect, namely, forbearance from eating berries 
that might, for all they know, be poisonous. Here, an elision is being made between 
theoretical reason and practical reason; because their practical reason is limited, a noble
17 Hand, ‘Religious Upbringing Reconsidered,’ pp. 545-557, 552.
18 O f course, many parents will not be presenting a ‘false confidence’, but what Hand must consider a 
misguided confidence, what some might argue to be an immorally unjustified confidence.
19 Hand, ‘Religious Upbringing Reconsidered,’ p. 555.
20 Hand has in mind familial benefits, but the thought can generalize to anyone with perceived intellectual 
authority. Thus one might think of Plato’s noble lie in this connection, a myth which if believed, “would 
have a good effect, [in] making [citizens] more inclined to care for the state and one another,” The 
Republic, trans. by Benjamin Jowett, <http://classics.mit. edu/Plato/republic.html> [accessed 28 June 
2015], Book 3, 415c-d.
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lie is required to help guide their practical decision making. It seems then that these are 
exceptions to the general rule. The second and third are more clearly lies.
Hand then claims that “there is clearly something in the idea that close social ties, such 
as those that bind the family, are strengthened by agreement and threatened by 
disagreement on matters of religion.”21 He says this justifies parents’ giving their child 
a false confidence in the truth of their religion, by using their perceived intellectual 
authority as leverage. It does not justify indoctrination (and thereby damaging students’ 
facility for making rational judgements).22 Schools (unlike parents), thinks Hand, are 
not in a position to impart belief without using non-rational methods, and endangering 
students’ recognition of and responsiveness to good reasons). He argues that “teaching 
for belief in not-known-to-be-true propositions is, when successful, indoctrinatory, 
except where teachers are perceived to be intellectual authorities on those
'J'X •  ■propositions.” He further states that 1) where unsuccessful, that is no vindication, 
“teaching which would constitute indoctrination if it were successful is objectionable 
whether it is successful or not,”24 and 2) that “except perhaps in the earliest years of 
schooling, pupils [...] know that their teachers are in no position to testify to the
2 5existence of decisive evidence for the truth of religious propositions.” Granting that in 
absence of perceived intellectual authority, successfully convincing anybody of the 
truth of a belief that is not known-to-be-true, the “teacher must do more than merely 
present them with the evidence, for the evidence is not decisive,” and “implant beliefs 
in such a way that they are held non-rationally or non-evidentially.” However, this 
view seems incompatible with Hand’s further contention that people may reasonably
21 Hand, ‘Religious Upbringing Reconsidered/ p. 555.
22 For many parents, the perceived intellectual authority and significant benefit clauses are immaterial: 
they believe that their religion is certainly true, and that its value depends on its truth; Hand’s argument 
can only persuade those who believe that the question of religious truth is genuinely open. Indeed, they 
may argue that salvation over damnation is a strong enough reason to warrant indoctrination, assuming of 
course that indoctrination is not incompatible with salvation. In his television movie, The Root o f  all Evil, 
dir. by Russell Barnes (Chanel 4, 2006), Richard Dawkins shows rehearsals of a Christian theatre project 
-  ‘Hell House’ -  which is intended to scare children Christian. Its motivation is to save young people 
from eternal damnation. Dawkins is compelled by the director’s argument that given the reality of Hell, it 
is morally essential to use what he might otherwise term ‘child abuse’, to persuade them of the reality of 
hells and perils or ways of living which court going there. Here we must urge epistemic humility in 
religious belief, so that at the same time as having these beliefs, believers allow that they are not so 
certain as to warrant passing them on.
23 Michael Hand, ‘A Philosophical Objection to Faith Schools,’ Theory and Research in Education 1(1)
(2003), pp. 89-99, 96.
24 Ibid
25 Ibid, p. 98.
26 Ibid, p. 95.
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believe religious propositions: that they have come to believe them without having been 
indoctrinated, but on the strength of some reasonable interpretation of the evidence. In 
the same paper, Hand says:
the truth or falsity of religious propositions is a matter of disagreement 
among reasonable people. The evidence available is ambiguous. Some 
people judge that it points in one direction, others that it points in 
another.27
All the same, one may argue that it is wrong to teach something that is not known to be 
true, as true, without its wrongness depending on having relied on non-rational means 
to impart the belief. It is wrong because tracking the truth is both intrinsically and 
extrinsically valuable and frustrated by false impressions.
Liberalism  versus Education
Hand has rejected what he calls ‘a behavioural criterion’ for teaching controversial 
issues, in favour of an epistemic one.28 There are two senses in which a matter may, in 
ordinary parlance, be called controversial, one corresponding to each criterion 
respectively; a matter may be called controversial in the sense that people disagree 
about it (especially when they disagree about it passionately), or in the sense that the 
matter is left unsettled by rational procedures. It may be that a matter has been settled 
by rational procedures and yet continues to be contested passionately in the public 
square; take, for instance, the issue of whether the earth is flat or whether the holocaust 
happened. Michael Hand argues that we should use the epistemic criterion to determine 
what should be taught as a controversial issue, by which he means ‘what should be 
taught non-directively’.
His answer, as we have seen above, would be that we should only teach those matters 
on which the truth has not been determined by rational procedures in a non-directive 
manner. This leads us directly into the question of whose determination of the truth 
ought to count. Some might worry about whose judgement counts when it comes to 
saying what is known to be true, and what is not. The simple answer would be ‘the 
educator,’ but this gives rise to complications. For instance, the employer of the
27 Ibid, p. 93.
28 Michael Hand, ‘What Should We Teach as Controversial? A Defence of the Epistemic Criterion,’ 
Educational Theory 58(2) (2008), pp. 213-228; ‘Should We Teach Homosexuality as a Controversial 
Issue?’ Theory and Research in Education 5(1) (2007), pp. 69-86.
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educator (either the parent or the school, or the state) may have a contrary opinion about 
the truth. In such a case it would seem as though the educator were being used merely 
as a tool if their judgement were to be side-lined in favour of their employer’s 
judgement, their teaching would become inauthentic, and usually thereby lack integrity. 
Arguably, it is the consensus among intellectual authorities, those familiar with the 
evidence and arguments relevant to determining a given matter, whose determination of 
the truth ought to count. But this answer leads us directly into a tension between 
liberalism and education within Hand’s work.
Let us consider Hand’s possibility of truth argument, with respect to religious belief. 
Let us suppose that Hand is wrong about the plausibility of religious belief. Let us 
suppose that religious beliefs have been shown decisively to be mistaken, and yet (for 
non-rational reasons) they continue to be maintained. On Hand’s argument, the 
educational responsibility of schools is to promote true belief and demote false belief. It 
would then seem that schools ought to build pupils’ resilience to religious belief. 
However, given the increasingly religiously plural context in which, for example, Irish 
schooling takes place, caution may be urged to the atheist head teacher who, in the 
name of education, decides that the role of the school is to build her pupils’ resilience to 
forming religious belief, in case such an enterprise provoked violent reactions from 
faith communities or had other undesirable consequences in practice. One would likely 
be the retreat of parents of strong faith from public schooling into home schooling and 
private schooling in order to protect their faith (a counterproductive outcome for our 
head teacher). Furthermore, in liberal political theory, seriously respecting the right o f 
citizens to form, revise and pursue their own conceptions of the good, including 
religious conceptions, is thought by many liberals to properly imply the right o f parents 
to raise their children in their faith. Thus, liberal state education cannot easily defend 
deliberately eradicating the religious beliefs of children. Considerations such as these 
will likely temper the implications of any purely epistemic, educational considerations. 
In this temperance, a tension can be seen to emerge between the proper role of the 
school, in its educational commitment to promoting truthful belief on the one hand, and 
the proper, role of a liberal democracy, in its commitment to upholding the peace in 
spite of what anyone happens to believe, on the other.
One might exclude the dimension of the possible truth of religious claims from 
schooling altogether by way of compromise (as in France and the United States),
130
instead of building pupils’ resilience to religious beliefs, or disabusing them of such 
religious beliefs as they already have. However, this would not seem to be much of a 
compromise, since the epistemic responsibility of school would seem to have been 
resigned in such a case. Hand could object that this is not a problem for him at all by 
pointing out that on his analysis, many religious propositions are plausible. However, 
he also considers that many religious beliefs are implausible: not least, Seventh Day 
Adventism, and others which take a literal attitude to creation myths, denying 
evolution. Moreover though, the fact that the system which Hand seems committed to 
do, can yield this problem, just by plugging in different judgements about the state of 
knowledge, shows that it is a problem with the system, even if the conclusions he 
derives from it just so happen not to bring this problem to the surface. Indeed, it may be 
that the state of knowledge would shift, while the state of belief does not and these 
problems would emerge.
Religious persecution is indeed a terrible thing. It forced the pilgrims to flee to England, 
where people were killed on account of the beliefs. America set up a strict(ish) 
religion/public affairs divide so that each was able to pursue their conception of the 
good, and not be subject to anybody else’s conception of the good. They would not be 
persecuted for the content of their belief. The idea is that the state ought not to ally itself 
with, or work under the banner of any particular religious conception of the good. 
Perhaps there are some which it can reject, such as those with anti-liberal principles. 
However, the promotion of truth in a non-dogmatic way does not involve persecution, 
or punishment for false or unfounded beliefs. My contention is that, morally, parents 
ought not to raise their children in their faith, not that it should be illegal for them to do 
so, which would be thoroughly illiberal.
Similarly, one might accept that there is a universal educational entitlement to 
momentous truths, and worry that homogeny seems to be a consequence of promoting 
beliefs of universal, ubiquitous moment. Would such a right correspond to our having a 
duty to go and colonize distant countries with our superior knowledge? Doesn’t that 
sound impossibly arrogant and colonial; would it not erode cultures to the extent that it 
was successful? On the other hand, is there something wrong about allowing cultures to 
live in isolation, as museum pieces, and meticulously avoid intervention? Perhaps there 
is a happy medium between two extreme policies about how to interact with the other:
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one that neither aims at intellectual colonization nor forsakes contact altogether, 
perhaps it consists in opening lines of dialogue and cultural exchange.
C om prehensive and Restricted Form ative Influence
At this point, we may introduce the distinction between comprehensive and restricted 
formative influence. Granted that we are able to exercise formative influences over one 
another, the influence that we have may be more or less comprehensive or specific 
depending on just how many respects in which we influence one another. One might 
attempt more or less comprehensive programs of influence, in attempting to change 
more or less about a person. One might on the one hand, simply want to discourage one 
particular habit, but, on the other hand, they might want to re-write someone’s belief set 
and simultaneously rearrange their priorities in life. Attending a one to one language 
lesson, or piano lesson, might constitute an example of a relatively restricted, formative 
influence. What Thiessen had in mind by evangelism was surely comprehensive 
formative influence (+ socialization; a form of behavioural influence, with formative 
upshots]. Another term one might think of is ‘personal transformation’.
An influence is more or less deep depending on what else it ought to effect, if  accepted. 
Changing one’s religious beliefs usually ought to go deep, as it will have implications 
for very many aspects of one’s life. Providing someone with some fundamental 
concepts that affect how they perceive the world sounds about as deep as it gets. In 
connection with this thought, one might bring to mind the notion that two people from 
two entirely different historic-socio-economic places would be endowed with such 
different conceptual frameworks, that they would see the world very differently. It is 
interesting to wonder just how fundamentally people are open to influence, and how far 
their outlooks are intractably hardwired and how universally so, but it is not a question 
to be explored here. The comprehensiveness of set of influences being imparted raises 
the moral stakes, and with it, the level of warrant required to assent to be rational.
Is All Influence Im m oral?
How defensible is the idea that all influence is unethical, and that we ought to avoid 
influencing children (and indeed anyone at all)? There are perhaps more or less
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defensible versions of this doctrine, and we shall attempt to follow some of the strands
2 9of argument that lead to this conclusion that all influence is immoral. First though, we 
will consider whether a policy of non-intervention is coherent.
Is a Policy o f Non-Influence Conceivable?
I do not think that it is at all facetious (as some might) to complain that it is not clear 
what a policy of non-influence would look like. It is fair to say that I, in particular, have 
had no influence on Alexander the Great (although notionally, the concept of how 
subsequent generations might perceive him likely did influence him). The people we 
can claim most safely that we have had, and risked no influence upon, are those we 
have had no possibility of contact with at all (even indirectly). However, we do not 
want to say, in general, that we ought to sacrifice contact with one another in order to 
avoid influencing one another. We may want to say this about some specific cases. For 
instance, some parents might rightly think it best to keep their children from having 
contact with certain people precisely so that they cannot wield any influence over their 
children. Indeed, children would not grow up at all were it not for their being raised by 
adults; at best they would be feral, and at worst they would be dead. Whatever points 
those who oppose influence want to make, they must certainly bear in mind these 
truisms. However, insofar as it is not possible to avoid influence altogether, it need not 
entail that there could or should be no ethical prohibitions on influential activities: it 
might be that we ought to follow the path of minimal influence, for instance. 
Alternatively, it might be that we ought never act so as to influence others, but only 
allow that this is an unfortunate by-product to be tolerated where we act for other 
reasons.
Innate T eleologies
It seems that in maintaining that influence is immoral, one is committed to the notion 
that children have an innate teleology, and that these may be frustrated. To frustrate the
29 The title of this section is taken from a celebrated monologue in Oscar Wilde’s, The Picture o f  Dorian  
Gray (London: Penguin, 2012). Lord Henry Wotton, reflects that there must be “something terribly 
enthralling in the exercise of influence” (p. 51) and undertakes to exercise such an influence over Gray, 
all the while himself denouncing influence as an intrinsic evil. Arguably however, it is not influence p er  
se that is on trial as corruptive, but instead hedonism as a form of influence. Consider for instance how 
Gray’s adoption of Wotton’s hedonism lead to his ultimate undoing.
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child’s innate teleology would be to wrong them. By way of comparison, consider how 
a seed will grow into a tree if allowed to follow its natural path, but how that innate 
teleology can be frustrated, for instance, by falling on a road in the baking sun. Indeed, 
that innate teleology might equally be helped on its path: a seed that falls on a road in 
the baking sun might be moved to more hospitable surroundings and so be helped to 
achieve its natural ends.
Let us call the idea that we have within us a perfect way that we could be, Innate 
Perfectionism. There are two versions of innate perfection, one which allows for 
influence and one that does not. On the first let us say that a designer made each of us 
with a perfect form in mind, and left to unfold without interference, thus allowing us to 
fulfil our purpose. Any interference can only pervert the course of reaching our innate 
perfection. On the second, let us say that a designer made each of us with a form in 
mind, but that we can be helped to reach that perfection, we can facilitate and cultivate 
one another’s perfect form, and indeed, we can frustrate our own fulfilment. Many 
people would dissent from the above stories since they do not believe that human 
beings were designed at all. However, it might be that one can understand the idea of an 
innate teleology without positing a designer. Indeed, one may wonder what the best 
way that they themselves could be is: the strongest, smartest, fastest, most caring, and 
so on. Still others might dissent from the first view since they want to emphasize free 
will, so that while we might have an innate perfection to fulfil, we will not simply fulfil 
it if left to get on with it; we may make bad decisions which prevent the fulfilling of our 
perfect nature. It seems that the second of these ideas is the more plausible, but it 
already makes room for positive influence. Let us now consider whether the idea of an 
innate teleology is coherent at all. We begin our next discussion with a poem o f the 
sculptor, Michelangelo which speaks to innate teleologies.
Can W e M ake Sense of the Idea of an Innate Teleology?
The best of artists has that thought alone
Which is contained within the marble shell;
The sculptor's hand can only break the spell
To free the figures slumbering in the stone30
Michelangelo’s poem expresses the idea that he did not create his sculptures. Instead, 
they resided within the block of marble all along, leaving to him the workman’s task of 
chipping away the marble which obscured them. The thought might bespeak false 
modesty, since there were likely very many other statues equally contained in the 
blocks that he worked; many other ways that they could have been chipped away at to 
produce a quite different statues. Of a less creative activity, one might say, ‘I did not 
complete the Sudoku; the Sudoku was complete all along. I just filled in the missing 
numbers’. Here, the determination of the correct result does nothing to undermine the 
fact that a process is required to realise it. Even if there were veins running through a 
block of marble such that no other statue could be produced from that block, but only 
the David, say, or a broken David, then it would still take serious skill, insight and 
effort to bring out the complete and undamaged David. The question here would be: are 
children somewhat like the David, or the Sudoku, with an innate perfection, that is to be 
revealed? (Here we will take it as read that the undamaged David is better than any of 
the (purportedly) damaged Davids; that the innate teleology does indeed trump its 
perversions).
We should be wary of vacuity in the innate/ acquired distinction, for if we set the 
definition too loose, then, granted felicitous circumstance, every feat or trait a person 
might accomplish or develop would count as innate. For his use of the term, Dylan 
Evans adds the condition of requiring few special circumstances for a person to develop 
some skill or trait. Under this use, first-language acquisition counts as innate:
When I say a trait is ‘innate’, I mean that it needs very few special 
conditions for it to develop. In other words, so long as you give a child 
the basic things it needs to survive such as food, shelter and company, 
that child will develop all the traits that are innate to humans. Language 
is innate in this sense; you do not need to provide lots of special 
instruction materials for a child to acquire a language. All you need to 
do is bring the child up in a group of other humans who can speak.31
Evans suggests that on this model, innateness should be conceived on a continuum:
30 Michelangelo, quoted in René Dubos, A God Within: A Positive Philosophy fo r  a M ore Complete 
Fulfillment o f  Human Potentials (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1972), pp. 10-11.
31 Dylan Evans, Emotion: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 13.
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Innateness is not an all-or-nothing thing, but a question of degree. When 
investigating emotions or any other biological or psychological trait, we 
should not really ask whether it is innate or not, but rather how innate it 
is. The more ‘special conditions’ over and above the basic necessities of 
survival that are required for the development of a trait, the less innate it 
is. Learning language is less innate than growing legs, since growing 
legs requires only a normal genome, basic nutrition, and the luck to 
escape nasty accidents, whereas learning a language requires all these 
things plus interaction with other speaking humans.32
We should contrast suppressing or not suppressing aspects of children on the one hand, 
and encouraging or not encouraging aspects of children on the other. Some 
characteristics might develop with encouragement, and atrophy without it, others might 
develop without encouragement or discouragement, but atrophy with discouragement. 
Some people might think that how a child grows without either encouragement or 
discouragement is a way to understand the natural growth path of the child. However, it 
is not clear that such a path of growth is desirable. Ken Robinson has done well to point 
out that children have a natural ability to become good pickpockets, but that rather than 
being something that we ought to encourage, or ignore, it ought to be discouraged. 
Indeed, natural things are not thereby good things. All sorts of things are natural, but 
not good and ought to be discouraged: it may be more natural to feel jealous of another 
person’s success rather than to take pleasure in it.33
While Plato’s views shifted throughout his life and are not entirely clear given his 
tendency to write in dialogue form, in one of his moods, Plato held that acquiring 
knowledge was a matter or recalling a world which one had previously inhabited, but 
that recollection (or anamnesis) could be brought out through guidance and facilitation 
(such as Socrates’ provocations), as well as through private contemplation. While it is 
surely wrong to speak of the Platonic conception of knowledge, we may construct 
something we could reasonably call a Platonic conception of the person, and their
32 Ibid, p. 15.
33 On the other hand, and to some extant undercutting even this argument, it is hard to see what the word 
‘natural’ covers (even once the words ‘unnatural’, and ‘supernatural’ are on the table since they are 
parasitic on the word ‘natural’), since everything seems to occur within nature. Some may want to say 
that cities, and pollution are unnatural, but the modem world developed by human kind’s activity on top 
of the pre-human world, and alongside the contemporary non-human world, and so are as much a part of 
nature as are the damns of beavers. We may want to say that the human world is changing the world for 
the worse, but that does not mean it is unnatural, it just means that nature contains conflict, and that some 
expressions of nature are ultimately self-destructive, as human-kind may well prove to be. I conclude that 
‘the natural learning process’ is a curiously vacuous expression. ‘Unnatural learning processes’ might at 
best signify processes through which one doesn’t leam at all: human beings do not leam maths by eating 
chalk, qua eating chalk. That would be an unnatural learning process, which is just to say: not a learning 
process.
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accumulation of knowledge. We could draw on The Republic, particularly the analogy 
of the Cave, the Phaedo, and on the Meno. We would see that soul once inhabits a 
world of forms, which it is taken from to be embodied on earth. Knowledge on earth 
consists in the recollection of forms. Here, knowledge is transcendent ally empirical, 
since we learnt about the forms through direct acquaintance as souls, but it is present in 
us from birth in human form and so also innate. In the Meno, Socrates leads a slave boy 
to demonstrate Pythagoras’ theorem by asking a series of questions to tease it out o f 
him, and indeed, Socrates thought of himself as a midwife, teasing knowledge out of 
other people, and this would be a paradigmatic example of him doing so.34
Certain sorts of true beliefs do not fit this form so well; the fact that I am an embodied 
person does not seem as good an example of a form as say, the shape of a triangle. 
However, it is undeniably a fact, and no more illusory than the shape of the perfect 
triangle, and arguably less so. It could have been a form perhaps, but then human 
history would appear to exist predetermined in the realm of the forms. Perhaps we 
could say that the realm of the forms consists of all truths from all time, simultaneously, 
and perhaps that is a coherent idea, but it is a huge departure from common sense and 
under-motivated as a departure from simplicity. Indeed, it seems simpler to suggest that 
human beings perceive their existence, rather than recall it. To the extent that Plato 
insisted knowledge to be only about that which was changeless, such as mathematical 
truths, we may caution that this was also unmotivated. Facts may be states of affairs, or 
true statements about states of affairs. States of affairs themselves can come into 
existence, and make certain statements about them true. Those states of affairs that 
come into existence may be contingent, and so too may be the truth of propositions 
about them, and they may only be true once they have, materialized (if irreversibly so). 
For instance, it may not be true today that Arsenal football club will win tomorrow, 
even if come tomorrow Arsenal really do win. Mathematical ideas are among those 
about which Platonism is most plausible.
Let us accept this for the sake of argument that mathematical advances take place by 
recollection, rather than by discovery. This would be an example of innate 
perfectionism. It does not follow that mathematics is best pursued in isolation. Without
34 That said, often (as in the Euthyphro) Socrates shows people to be ignorant of what they had taken 
themselves to know about, and does more by way of demolition than discovery. Plato, Euthyphro, trans. 
by Benjamin Jowett, <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/ euthyfro.html> [accessed 18 June 2015]
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interventions, people may miss-remember and instead they may be able to help each 
other remember. While one might worry that they will recall a false story between 
them, falsely believing themselves to have remembered something when reminded by 
someone else, it is not quite like this in the case of mathematics, since the beliefs, such 
as 2 + 2 = 4, are supposed to be self-evident. It cannot but be true, and one cannot 
understand that at the same time as not believing it, to entertain it is to be convinced of 
its truth. Indeed, Plato favoured education, as a process which leads people to recollect 
the forms, and live in their light. Let us now consider the case that valuing ‘independent 
mindedness’ conflicts with the exercise of influence.
Independent M indedness as a Virtue
There is a virtue of independent mindedness which is contrasted with being sheep-like, 
following the crowd, and with deference to an authority. Similarly, people are chastised 
for being gullible. At the same time, we should remind ourselves that we do not praise 
people for recalcitrance or excessive scepticism (to believe as little as possible is not the 
best policy); indeed we praise open-mindedness and chastise closed-mindedness. The 
comic, Tim Minchin qualifies this with the warning, “if you open your mind too much,
'j  r
your brain will fall out.” The closed minded person will not admit (even to 
themselves) that they are wrong; they are dyed in the wool and intransigent. The open- 
minded person can entertain doubts, they can assume things for the sake of argument, 
they can be taught new ideas, and let go of old ideas.
Michael Hand has observed that rationality and heteronomy are not proper contrasts. 
Whereas autonomy contrasts with heteronomy, rationality contrasts with irrationality.36 
Autonomy means doing what one thinks is best or believing what one would estimate to 
be true, heteronomy means deferring to some other in this respect. Hand points out that, 
in some circumstances, we might judge something to be best, or true, but be in such a 
weak position to judge, and rationally ought to defer to those better placed to judge; for 
instance, the claims of qualified doctors are often better than those of those without
35 Tim Minchin, ‘If You Open Your Mind Too Much, Your Brain Will Fall Out (Take My Wife)/ 
<https:/7www.youtube.com/watch?v=PkLGMyYbz4I> [accessed 23 June 2015].
36 Michael Hand, ‘Against Autonomy as an Educational Aim/ Oxford Review o f  Education 32(4) (2006), 
pp .535-550.
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medical training. By way of hesitation, we may consider the following entreatment 
from Michael Mann’s film of the eponymous novel, The Last o f  the Mohicans:
Well, then, Cora. In my heart I know, once we're joined [...] we'll be 
the most marvellous couple in London, I'm certain of that. So why not 
let those whom you trust, your father, help settle what's best for you? In 
view of your indecision, you should rely on their judgment. And mine.
Will you consider that? Please consider that.37
The theme of his film and the novel is that Cora ought to have followed her heart rather 
than the reasonable-sounding supplications of someone of whom she was fond, but 
about whom she was not impassioned. It is perhaps not always obvious as to when 
deference or insistence is most rational.
Im partial Surveys o f Possibilities
One (fairly weak) version of the idea that all influence is immoral might be the 
following; that we ought to broaden the possibilities available to those that we 
influence, and not to narrow them. On this understanding, it is acceptable to tell people 
about a range of competing conceptions of the true and good, but never to promote 
anything in particular as true or good. Such an endeavour might be an example of what 
Michael Hand calls non-directive education. An advocate o f such a conception of 
education might deny that directive education is ever acceptable, although they must 
accept that some influence is being sought: at least one’s understanding is being 
adjusted (and some beliefs) in broadening the range of possibilities that one has 
available. Thus, one is brought to understand a proposition, if not to believe or 
disbelieve or suspend judgement over its truth value. Or, one is brought to understand, 
and be capable of an action, practice, or way of life, if not fully initiated into it or 
encouraged to identify with it. The objective would be to inform decisions without 
commending any.
It seems that some values will be in evidence (modelled, and thereby potentially 
transmitted) in what one frames as being a domain of options, and what one offers as 
being a consideration in its favour. Indeed, one might argue that employing the policy 
of global non-direction, amounts to directively recommending it. Where the question of 
how education ought to proceed is discussed (perhaps in teacher training colleges), the
37 The Last o f  the Mohicans, dir. by Michael Mann (Morgan Creek Productions, 1992).
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lecturer might take a non-directive approach again, allowing general directivity to be a 
reasonable option, but in so far as they do not take directivity, one might suggest, again, 
that in employing non-directivity, they are taking a directive attitude about it. This 
seems false. There seems to be scope for commitment without advocacy, even if one’s 
commitment is manifest.
The problem with taking a permissive attitude is not incoherence, but undue reticence. 
Some might accept the theory of formative influence advocated earlier, but claim that 
nothing is so well justified as to be deserving of directive teaching. However, this seems 
much too sceptical. Students ought to be taught directively, because the history of free 
enquiry has accumulated a wealth of wisdom. It seems unduly sceptical that school 
students should start from scratch; that they should have to reinvent wheels, re-falsify 
dead theories, or worse, remain captured by them (one recalls the words of Newton T f I 
have seen further than others, it is because I was standing on the shoulders of giants’). It 
seems unduly sceptical that the four humours theory should be considered as equally 
credible as modem medicine in a science classroom.
Thiessen on Foss and Griffin
By way of defending the possibility of religious evangelism being an ethical endeavour, 
Elmer Thiessen critiques Sonja Foss and Cindy Griffin’s paper, ‘Beyond Persuasion: A 
Proposal for Invitational Rhetoric,’38 in which it is lamented that “most traditional 
rhetorical theories reflect a patriarchal bias in the positive value they accord to changing 
and thus dominating others.”39 Foss and Griffin worry that “embedded in efforts to 
change others is a desire for control and domination, for the act of changing another 
establishes the power of the change agent over that other” which simultaneously 
“devalues the lives and perspectives of these others.”40 Thiessen neglects to allow that 
Foss and Griffin do not rule out the use of persuasion entirely. In their own words, “we 
believe that persuasion is often necessary.”41 Instead, they argue that “an alternative 
exists that may be used in instances when changing and controlling others is not the
38 Sonja K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin, ‘Beyond Persuasion: A Proposal for an Invitational Rhetoric,’ 
Communications Monographs 62(1) (1995), pp. 2-18.
39 Ibid, p. 1.
40 Ibid, p. 2.
41 Ibid, p. 5.
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rhetor’s goal,” calling this an “invitational rhetoric.”42 They conclude that “invitational 
rhetoric is one of many useful and legitimate rhetorics, including persuasion, in which 
rhetors will want to be skilled.”43 Here, rhetors will “recognize situations in which they 
seek not to persuade others but simply to create an environment that facilitates 
understanding, accords value an respects to others’ perspectives, and contributes to the 
development of relationship of equality.”44
It seems that Foss and Griffin provide us with reasons to reject persuasion wholesale, 
and no reason to entertain it as a reasonable endeavour for rhetors. One wonders what it 
is that might ‘necessitate’ persuasion, if it is merely an expression of a will to dominate. 
It is not clear how the will to dominate can legitimate a form of rhetoric; it might be 
desirable by some, but it does not seem to be justified. However, it does not seem at all 
fair to say that the will to persuade is thereby a will to dominate. Indeed, it is not just 
changing others for its own sake that is usually desired, but changing others in desirable 
ways. Indeed, by the same token, those that wield influence ought to accept that they 
too might be improved or benefltted and thereby be open to the prospect without shame. 
Thiessen offers examples of morally unexceptionable persuasion “a mother persuades 
her child to tie her shoe laces. A father his teenage daughter to consider attending 
college.” 45 How about a negotiator persuading a suicidal person not to jump, or a 
terrorist to release the hostages? Thiessen’s cases seem unobjectionable, and in the 
cases that I suggest it seems incumbent on the negotiator to exercise persuasion.
Thiessen objects further that “none of us are quite as independent as we would like to 
think we are,” in particular, many of our beliefs and values are acquired from those 
around us, “most (maybe even 95%) of the beliefs that we hold are a result of 
persuasion.” 46 Thiessen emphasizes “an inescapable degree of human 
interdependence.”47 This might be so, but as we have observed earlier, it might be that 
we ought to follow the path of minimal influence. It might be that we ought never act so 
as to influence others, but only allow that this is an unfortunate by-product to be 
tolerated. Foss and Griffin can reasonably complain that we live in a poor moral
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid, p. 16,
44 Ibid.
45 Elmer John Thiessen, The Ethics o f  Evangelism: A Philosophical Defense o f  Proselytizing and 
Persuasion (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2011), p. 56.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid, p. 57.
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climate. Similar responses can be made to Thiessen’s complaint that “the purpose of 
argumentation, scholarship, and indeed the educational enterprise generally, is precisely 
to persuade and alter beliefs,” since it is not as though this is essential to scholarship: 
one can assert one’s beliefs, and the reasons for them without trying to persuade.48 
Thiessen might then observe believing testimony is desirable, for without it, our 
knowledge base would be much smaller. Foss and Griffin can agree with this, however, 
and advise that we ought not to persuade, but merely share what we take to be the case, 
and often we will do well to learn from one another in doing so.
Thiessen might suggest that Foss and Griffin’s writing amounts to a performative 
contradiction: ‘but look,’ he might say, ‘you yourself are writing to persuade.’ And if 
indeed they are, they are doing wrong on their own account, but that does not mean that 
what they are doing is not wrong 49 A more compelling objection seems to be that Foss 
and Griffin do not seem to be providing an alternative to persuasion in the form of 
invitational rhetoric. It seems as if they are trying to soften persuasion by calling it 
“invitational rhetoric,” but “a rose by any other name is still a rose” , as Thiessen says. 
Does Foss and Griffin’s thesis amount to, in David Lewis’ memorable dismissal of 
rebranding materialism and ‘physicalism,’ “a tacky marketing ploy , akin to British 
Rail's decree that second class passengers shall now be called ‘standard class 
passengers’”?50 Understanding ought not to be the preserve of those who communicate 
for purpose other than persuasion. It seems that persuasion is justified only where one 
understands the position that they are recommending, and the position they are 
criticizing. Indeed, it seems that one ought always to be open to the possibility of being 
proven wrong, if believing the truth, and doing the good really are what one is 
concerned with. One might suggest that the difference turns on the difference between 
invitation and insistence. But Thiessen does not advocate for insistence in evangelism; 
“the requirement that there needs to be an invitation to persuade is too strong [...] It is 
when permission to persuade is denied [...] that it is immoral to continue to try to
48 Ibid, p. 58.
49 One wants to say that that anti-persuasion positions stand to pro-persuasion principles as democracy 
stands to autocracy. Just as Democracy is vulnerable to becoming an autocracy through democratic 
process in a way that autocracy is not vulnerable to becoming a democracy through autocratic process 
(not in practice- dictators don’t decide to relinquish power in favour of democracy unforced), so anti­
persuaders are vulnerable to persuaders, as persuaders are not vulnerable to anti-persuaders (at least not 
to ones who are live up to their ideals).
50 David Lewis, ‘Reduction of Mind,’ In A Companion to the Philosophy o f  M ind, ed. by Samuel D. 
Guttenplan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 41.
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persuade.” 51 However, they might perhaps claim that they are not writing to persuade, 
but merely to record their thoughts. In doing so they would be saying: I think the 
following, because x, y and z -  I might be wrong. In doing so, one wonders where the 
meaningful difference lies between this and persuasion. Perhaps it just amounts to 
fallibilistic, open minded, rational persuasion. It might also simply amount to a 
difference of intention, of whether one speaks in order to persuade, or speaks in order to 
report one’s thought, or perhaps to invite criticism.
Notwithstanding Thiessen’s hesitancy, there are perhaps occasions where insistence 
might be warranted, with the only misgiving being its practicability; intransigence is not 
likely to be swayed with insistence (One may worry that insistence is a symptom of 
intransigence, but it need not be). We might find persuasive consequentialist arguments 
to favour bypassing rationality on some occasions. Consider whether there are any 
conditions under which one ought to slip another human being a conversion pill, a pill 
which will instantaneously change their beliefs, attitudes and projects to what one 
desires. A plausible example might be that the British Special Operations Executive 
would have been justified in slipping such pills to leading Nazis, so as to avert the 
Holocaust or Second World War.52
Not A ll Influence is Immoral
In sum, Foss and Griffin’s alternative to persuasion seems doubtfully genuine, and their 
arguments against persuasion rather weak, too. Bryan R. Wamick recounts Isocrates’ 
letter to King Phillip of Macedonia, “all who are blessed with understanding ought to 
set before themselves the greatest men as their model, and strive to become like him.”53 
As Wamick observes, “for Isocrates, the imitation of exemplars is not opposed to living 
with intelligence; instead, imitating noble exemplars is intelligent living.” 54 Locke 
qualifies this thought somewhat, remarking that where some students “affectation o f all 
kinds, whencesoever it proceeds, is always offensive; because we naturally hate 
whatever is counterfeit, and condemn those who have nothing better to recommend
51 Thiessen, The Ethics o f  Evangelism, p. 59.
52 Tillson, ‘Elmer Thiessen and the Ethics of Evangelism,’ pp. 243-258, 248.
53 Isocrates “To Phillip”, 106-13, quoted at Bryan R. Wamick, Imitation and Education: A Philosophical 
Inquiry into Learning by Example (New York: SUNY Press, 2009), p. 16.
54 Bryan R. Wamick, Imitation and Education: A Philosophical Inquiry into Learning by Example (New 
York: SUNY Press, 2009), p. 16.
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themselves by.”55 That is to say, one may properly model oneself on models that befit 
one. This point seems more aesthetic, or rooted in etiquette, than anything else, in 
Locke’s formulation. On the other hand, it can be given a more statused and a more 
ability-based interpretation. Imagine for instance, an underling carrying oneself with the 
pomp and self-importance over a strong and courageous leader. Or imagine someone 
carrying themselves in imitation of Einstein when they are not capable of simple 
arithmetic. These points carry some individual-sensitive constraints on the selection of 
proper role models.
However, children’s ideal futures are under-determined by their genetic endowment: 
one cannot read off from their genome, how things ought to go for them ideally. While I 
am happy enough to defend a conception of wellbeing as approximation of Godliness 
(as I have in Chapter 2), I do not think that there is one goal towards which we should 
bring children which is their fullest and most ideal development, or that we could easily 
imagine what that would be. Thus, different upbringings and different goals can be of 
equal worth within this conception. Furthermore, even if there were some latent 
perfection, it is far from obvious that scrupulously avoiding both encouragement and 
discouragement of those things which we admire and disapprove respectively is apt to 
lead them there. It seems that we often have good reason to encourage certain formative 
outcomes and discourage others.
Sum m ary
In this chapter, we have seen that for each prospective formative influence, which a 
child could adopt, influencers may ignore it, promote it, demote it, or draw attention to 
it as something worthy of consideration to adopt. The theory of ethical influence that I 
developed was the following; that for each prospective formative influence, it ought to 
be promoted, floated or demoted respectively according to the following three sets of 
criteria, and where none of these apply, it might be fairly ignored:
1. a) That it is momentous; b) that it might well not be adopted without 
intervention; c) failing to have it is irrational.
55 John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, §66, §99, <http://www.bartleby.eom/37/l/> 
[accessed 23 June 2015].
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2. a) That it is momentous; b) that it might well not be understood and rationally 
evaluated without intervention; c) neither having it nor not having it is irrational
3. a) That it is momentous; b) that it might well be adopted without intervention; 
c) having it is irrational.
We have also seen that the influences which may be had may be more or less 
comprehensive or specific depending on just how many, and how fundamental, the 
respects in which we manage to influence one another are. We argued that the 
comprehensiveness of a set of influences being imparted raises the moral stakes. 
Furthermore, while it might be alright morally on some occasions to favour the practical 
rationality of the beliefs that one imparts over their theoretical rationality, in so far as 
those beliefs are highly comprehensive, it becomes significantly immoral to sacrifice 
theoretical rationality in formative influence. Later in this chapter, we shall consider 
how comprehensive religious belief is.
These same considerations were seen to preside over both formal educators and 
informal educators such as caregivers. Furthermore, it was shown how the above theory 
of ethical influence could be used to select curricula content, where a planned 
programme of learning delivered by subject experts is the sort of intervention that 
would be required to rationally encourage and discourage them in children, or to enable 
children to better judge their rationality. Since parents or, more generally, primary 
carers, could not reasonably be expected to satisfy this entitlement qua parents and 
primary carers, the responsibility would be what I termed ‘extra-parental’ in Chapter 3. 
However, we admitted that even to the extent that we are equipped with such evidence 
to warrant being directive, we ought still to emphasize fallibility and deference to 
reasons rather than commitment to conclusions, and to the extent that we are not so 
equipped, we ought to encourage interest, and rational deliberation, but stop short of 
promoting or undermining particular views.
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Chapter Seven
THE NATURE OF R ELIG IO N  
Introduction
We want to know how (if at all) children may be ethically influenced with respect to 
religions. To reach that point, we will have to try to answer the prior question ‘what is it 
that we mean by ‘religions’? ’ Some objects of study routinely appear in religious 
studies courses and books: the Abrahamic faiths, Judaism, Christianity and Islam (from 
oldest to youngest); and the non-Abrahamic faiths, such as Buddhism, Hinduism, and 
Sikhism. Other objects of study, such as Scientology, Marxism and Secular Humanism, 
have appeared less routinely, alternatively referred to as cults, ideologies, and 
worldviews. But how are we to discern between religion and non-religion? A good 
illustration of the problem is given by Timothy Fitzgerald, who points out that in:
denying the legitimacy of an overall theoretical structure [of religion], 
on the grounds that the ‘conceptual geography’ of the concept is too 
rich and complex, the editor [of a book on religion] seems to have 
deprived himself of any principles for controlling what does and what 
does not get included in the book.1
After sketching a number of ways of approaching this question, including, by 
stipulation, identifying family resemblance, and proceeding with examples in mind, I 
defend taking an essentialist approach. Ultimately, I defend an essentialist definition of 
religion, namely, that a religion, is anything which essentially requires a) belief in 
super-beings and b) and submission to them as having rightful dominion.
Essentialism
Jonathan Lowe distinguishes between two kinds of essences: those conditions in virtue 
of which something qualifies as a particular kind of thing, and those (identity) 
conditions in virtue of which something at T1 and, again at T2 qualifies, as one and the 
same thing.2 The kind of essence that we are interested in here is the essence of kinds,
1 Timothy Fitzgerald, ‘Philosophy and Family Resemblances,’ Religion 26(3) (1996), p. 215-236, 226.
2 E. Jonathan Lowe, ‘Essentialism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Errors of Conceptualism,’ Philosophia 
Scientice 12(1) (2008), pp. 9-33.
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rather than the essence of individuals. Essentialists venture to identify criteria which are 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient for something to count as an instance of a 
kind. They interpret the question ‘what is it that we mean by ‘religion5?’ in the 
following way: what are the constitutive features of religions, those features of a 
phenomenon in virtue of which it is a religion? Some concepts are seemingly 
exceptions in that they seem to be incapable of such analysis: we might call these 
atomic, or basic concepts, in that they are too basic to be so analysed, but may be drawn 
on in other such analyses: arguably the notions of substance, cause, person, truth, time, 
belief and action, are such concepts. Indeed, analysis works by way of cashing out some 
concept in terms of others, and analysis has to stop somewhere if it is not to be circular.
Consider the matter of what is to count as breaking the 100 metre world record, a feat 
accomplished by Usain Bolt. To achieve this, it is necessary to run 100 metres, but not 
sufficient. Conversely, it is sufficient to run that distance a whole second faster than 
anyone previously, but not necessary. It is both necessary and sufficient for breaking 
the 100 metre world record that one run that distance faster than anyone has done 
previously.3 This is an essentialist definition of that phenomenon.
We ought to distinguish now between words and their objects, between signifiers and 
things signified. So we can ask both whether some things in themselves have essences, 
and whether words that used to refer to them have essences of application. It is at the 
level o f  objects that I am looking for an essence of religion. But this is to be found by 
starting at the linguistic level, with common usage: by picking paradigmatic examples 
of religion, and seeking an essence which they share. That said, we should be wary of 
undue deference to common usage, since it may create false or otherwise bad nominal 
unities: “We cannot ignore everyday usage in trying to analyse such a concept [as 
seeing], but we must be ready to criticise and refine that usage where it is confused or 
vague/’4 We must not be afraid of revision at the linguistic and conceptual level if we 
care about tracking truths about phenomena.
We also ought to acknowledge that words can have distinct senses. Consider the 
homonyms in the sentences ‘hear the dog’s bark’, and ‘feel the tree’s bark’. We would
3 This is probably not quite precise; it will likely also be necessary to run that distance in gravitationally 
similar conditions to those that we currently enjoy on Earth, on a straight course with a 0° gradient.
4 E. Jonathan Lowe, An Introduction to the Philosophy o f  Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000), p. 3.
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be foolish to seek a single set of necessary and sufficient conditions in the application 
of the word ‘bark’; given the differences of sense, it is more reasonable to seek them for 
each case. It is less obvious that words such as ‘meaning’, ‘health’, ‘art’ and ‘religion’ 
might be such cases, but we should be prepared to allow that they are.
Another possibility is that there are separate senses of ‘religion’, which have common
core. Christopher Shields refers to this as ‘core-dependent homonymy’; it is used by
Aristotle to explain the relationship between the senses of the word ‘healthy’ in the 
expressions ‘Socrates is healthy’, ‘Socrates’ exercise regimen is healthy’, and 
‘Socrates’ complexion is healthy’.
First, they are non-univocal, since the second is paraphraseable roughly 
as promotes health and the third as is indicative o f  health, whereas the
first means, rather, something more fundamental, like is sound o f  body
or is functioning well. Hence, healthy is non-univocal. Second, even so, 
the last two predications rely upon the first for their elucidations: each 
appeals to health in its core sense in an asymmetrical way. That is, any 
account of each of the latter two predications must allude to the first, 
whereas an account of the first makes no reference to the second or 
third in its account. So, suggests Aristotle, health is not only a 
homonym, but a core-dependent homonym: while not univocal neither 
is it a case of rank multivocity.5
The natural kinds of the mind-independent world are perhaps more likely to be defined 
by necessary and sufficient features, that is, by essences, than as cultural concepts. To 
put it differently, the mind-independent world of such things as the periodic table 
elements, species and natural laws, rather than the social or mind-dependent and 
culturally constructed world, consisting of artefacts and institutions, seems more likely 
to consist in essences. We could think of ‘water is H20 ’ as being a paradigm example 
of a natural kind having an (identifiable) essence. But while we might seek necessary 
sufficient conditions, they may not be available for mind-dependent concepts. On the 
other hand, some sort of public consistency, and correctabihty seems to be required for 
words to have a shared meaning. Words cannot mean whatever we want them to mean, 
as Humpty Dumpty wanted in Lewis Carol’s Alice in Wonderland, otherwise they 
would mean nothing at all, since they would fail to communicate anything. On the other 
hand, perhaps this consistency need not consist in necessary and sufficient conditions.
5 Christopher Shields, ‘Aristotle,’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), ed. 
by Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/aristotle/> [accessed 23 June 
2015].
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Functional Analyses
Brian and Beverly Clack suggest that substantive and functionalist approaches have 
been the .two main ways of defining religion.6 While E.B. Taylor’s “belief in spiritual 
beings,”7 and “super-empirical beings” are offered as examples of substantive analyses, 
the functionalist, we are told, “lays stress on the functions rather than the content of 
religion.” 8 However, I want to suggest that these are less fundamental than the 
distinction between essential and non-essential analyses, since one might say that the 
sort of essence we should be looking for, with respect to religion, is a functional one. 
There is a large body of literature in the sociology of religion from Durkheim to 
present, both defending and criticizing functionalist definitions of religion (Durkheim; 
reinforces social norms; Marx: the opiate of the masses; Freud: a crutch for the weak in 
the face of death). The functional analyses above will likely be disputed by religious 
people, but we should not class any of these functions as the essence of religions, even 
if they were true. Even if they were all true -  and all religions fitted them -  they would 
still hardly be sufficient. Other things might satisfy those functions also. Consider the 
following example of a non-religious opiate provided by comedian, Bill Hicks:
Go back to bed America, your government is in control. Here, here’s 
American Gladiators. Watch this, shut up, go back to bed America, 
here is American Gladiators, here is 56 channels of it! Watch these 
pituitary retards bang their fucking skulls together and congratulate 
you on living in the land of freedom. Here you go America - you are 
free to do what we tell you! You are free to do what we tell you!
What alternatives are there to essentialist analyses of religion (whether substantive or 
non-substantive, or some combination)?
Five A lternatives to Essentialism
One might abandon looking for an essentialist definition of religion, either because it is 
too difficult to do, or because it is not, in principle, possible, or because it is both 
unnecessary and undesirable. A range of alternatives may be available: one might
6 Beverley Clack and Brian R. Clack, The Philosophy o f  Religion: A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1998), p. 2; Eshleman emphasizes the same distinction and offers a composite, essentialist 
definition of religion in Andrew Eshleman, Reading in Philosophy o f  Religion: East Meets West 
(Singapore: Blackwell, 2008), p. 4. His definition admits of many counterexamples, and the one that I 
shall offer is to be preferred both in respect of simplicity and explanatory power.
7 E.B. Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development o f  Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, 
Art, and Custom, Volume One (London: John Murray, 1871), p. 424.
8 Clack and Clack, p. 4.
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stipulate a definition; one might appeal to sufficient, but not necessary conditions; 
following Wittgenstein, one might appeal to a loose unity of family resemblances; one 
might simply proceed with ‘excellent examples’. In the next five sections, I shall 
explain and evaluate each of these strategies in turn.
Stipulation
“A stipulative definition imparts a meaning to the defined term, and involves no 
commitment that the assigned meaning agrees with prior uses (if any) of the term,” says 
Anil Gupta.9 Stipulation usually dictates a definition for a word in terms of necessary 
and sufficient conditions. While one might quite innocuously baptise a previously 
unnamed concept, used as an alternative to analysing some prior use of a word, 
stipulation looks suspect. It becomes a blatant misappropriation of word and multiplies 
senses beyond necessity. One concept becomes proxy for another under the name of the 
original, risking intellectual oscillation between them, total conflation or substitution to 
the neglect of the concept originally of interest. One does better to invent a term, rather 
than arrogate it from common usage, but then it is plain that one has neglected the 
concept that had originally been of interest. While we might provide an essentialist 
analysis of some concept which does act well as proxy for religion in one or other of its 
senses, it is more appropriate not to call it religion. Besides, we cannot be sure just how 
far it does become proxy for religion without an essential characterization of that 
concept.10 It seems to me, then, that stipulation is not a promising alternative to seeking 
out an essence of an interesting concept.
M erely Sufficient Conditions
Despairing of finding “a single principle or essence,” 11 one might produce a definition 
of how they shall use the term that is rightly, but not exclusively deserving of it; 
something that is religious i f  anything is. That is, they might offer some conditions
9 Anil Gupta, ‘Definitions,’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), ed. by 
Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/definitions/> [accessed 23 June 
2015].
101 want to clarify now that by the ‘concept of religion’, I have in mind more a term, which may act as an 
umbrella for manifold concepts; one corresponding to each sense of the term religion should there be 
more than one sense of the term.
11 In William James’ expression, The Varieties o f  Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2008), p. 23.
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sufficient for religion, but not essential to it. This seems to be essentialist in its 
commitments, but to take the essentialist’s task to be practically overambitious and 
unnecessary for its purposes. Should they be available while necessary and sufficient 
conditions are not, that may be the best that we can do, and represent an acceptable fall­
back position.
One Sense Am ong M any
In The Varieties o f  Religious Experience, William James seems to suggest that an 
essentialist definition cannot, in principle, be provided to capture the range of 
phenomena that are claimed to be religious:
the very fact that there are so many [definitions] and [that they are] so 
different from one another is enough to prove that the word ‘religion’ 
cannot stand for any single principle or essence, but is rather a 
collective name [...] Let us not fall immediately into a one-sided view 
of our subject, but let us rather admit freely at the outset that we may
very likely find no one essence, but many characters which may
12alternately be equally important in religion.
It is not clear what he can mean by ‘collective name’. ‘Triangle’ might constitute a 
collective name, in that it names a kind to which many instances belong. Here however, 
an essentialist analysis is obviously forthcoming for its members. Alternatively, James 
might be taken to anticipate the existence of a plethora of homonyms, but in that case 
his collapsing them together in the expression ‘equally important in religion’ is clearly 
illicit. Indeed, as we have seen above, it is no skin off of the essentialist’s nose to say 
that religion is one word with many meanings: the essentialist can readily admit that 
homonyms exist. If that is the case with ‘religion’, one should begin to differentiate 
them and specify the sense at issue.13 Indeed, the various senses of ‘religion’ could 
prove to be core-dependent homonyms.
12 James, p. 23.
13 Are Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, Judaism and Sikhism religious in the same sense? That might 
depend on whether there is an analysis which can capture these words. Michael Hand points out that there 
are metaphorical uses of the term religion, whereby if something is a religion or religious, then it is in a 
different sense than those things which are literally religions. But metaphors may be made of each literal 
sense of the word religion.
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James gives “a narrow view” “for the purpose of these lectures”, “out of the many 
meanings of the word [...] choosing one meaning in which I wish to interest you 
particularly.” 14 The single sense that James delineates is this:
Religion, therefore, as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean 
for us the feelings, acts and experiences o f  individual men [sic] in their 
solitude, so fa r  as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to 
whatever they consider to be the divine}5
The expression “arbitrarily to take it,” suggests that James’ use is stipulative, with no 
reference to common usage. On the other hand, “choosing one meaning” from “the 
many meanings of the word” suggests the contrary. I suggest that James is best read as 
delineating a single sense, which has no natural priority (for instance, it is not the core 
on which its homonyms are dependent). It will be well now to evaluate this definition.
The word ‘divine’ is cashed out as “denoting any object that is godlike, whether it be a 
concrete deity or not.” 16 ‘Godlike’ is glossed in turn as what is “most primal and 
enveloping and deeply true,” and, in particular, only “such a primal reality as the 
individual feels impelled to respond to solemnly and gravely, and neither by curse or 
jest.”17 Ironically, this understanding of ‘godlike’ does not seem to capture gods. Gods 
are (as we shall argue later) super-powerful rational agents; they are not propositions 
and so cannot be true. He also says (which sounds different again) that “a man’s 
religion might thus be identified with- his attitude, whatever it might be, towards what
I Q
he felt to be primal truth.” This would seem to suggest that to believe that there is a 
‘primal truth’ is to have a religion, namely whatever one takes to be primal truth, and 
would abandon James’ stipulation that one’s response to it need be solemn.19 I would 
suggest that people would have an easier time saying whether they were religious 
(perhaps confusedly) than whether they took anything to be primally true. I would also 
suggest that, to the extent that I can make sense of it, nihilists would then count as being 
religious in saying that the universe is basically meaningless, as would materialists in
14 James, p. 25.
15 James, p. 26.
16 James, p. 28.
17 James, p. 31.
18 James, pp. 28-9.
19 If a God were taken to be primal reality, then surely one's religion would not be identified with what 
one took to be primal reality -  since nobody says that gods are religions. Rather gods are the subject of 
religions, while religions themselves are taken to offer, to borrow Eshleman’s phrase, “an appropriate 
way of being related" to gods.
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saying that nothing exists but matter and its relations. These both seem to be putative 
examples of primal truths about the universe if  anything does.
It is interesting as to why James mentions “individual men in their s o l i tu d e Arguably 
it is to isolate belief from social reinforcement to the furthest extent possible so that it is 
what one thinks really, rather than what one merely ‘goes along with’. Contra James, 
Durkheim has argued that religion is essentially social. But while religion can be
onlearned from others, one could subsequently become a Robinson Crusoe, who retains 
his or her religion. Moreover, it seems that a Robinson Crusoe might invent a religion, 
or a religious ceremony. It might be thought unlikely, but Durkheim’s intuition is not 
one that I want to preserve or dismiss in advance of presenting a definition. I want to 
say that since human beings are social creatures, it is not surprising that their beliefs 
spread and are reinforced and developed and acted upon in a social way. Indeed, one 
cannot understand religion as it actually exists without employing social concepts. 
However, it does not follow from religion’s being social in practice, that religion must 
be social in essence.
In sum, James offers a single sense which is not so promising and an essentialist 
analysis of religion tout court, which is. Identifying a single sense of the word ‘religion’ 
is, indeed, a possible strategy, but one of limited interest, especially if an essential 
analysis is forthcoming.
Excellent Examples
Alvin Plantinga suggests that while it is “extremely difficult to give (informative) 
necessary and sufficient conditions for either science or religion”, “we do have many 
excellent examples of each” and suggests tentatively that “perhaps that will suffice for 
our inquiry.”21 (His inquiry is not ours, but is to determine whether the relation between 
religion and science is “characterized by conflict or by concord”. Even still, our projects 
share a concern with the demarcation of religion). Scott Davison seems to concur with 
Plantinga’s approach; “in general,” says Davison, “it seems doubtful whether we need
20 Indeed, it is oft remarked how religious beliefs conglomerate around geographical locations, or did 
until mass migration.
21 Alvin Plantinga, ‘Religion and Science,' in The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy (Spring 2014 
Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta, forthcoming <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/ 
religion-science/> [accessed 23 June 2015].
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criteria to decide whether or not something falls under a given concept. We may be
00aware of paradigm cases, for instance, without being aware of criteria.”
Sven Hansson dissents from this view:
It is in a sense paradoxical that so much agreement has been reached in 
particular issues in spite of almost complete disagreement on the 
general criteria that these judgments should presumably be based upon.
This puzzle is a sure indication that there is still much important 
philosophical work to be done on the demarcation between science and 
pseudoscience.23
Indeed, one may know the paradigm examples, but one cannot read off from these what 
else falls under the concepts; to see whether some other thing is a religion, you have to 
ask how similar is it to our excellent examples (paradigm cases), which would require 
specifying which aspects of the examples they ought to be similar to, which is the same 
thing as to determine criteria. Bearing in mind these misgivings, we shall now evaluate 
Wittgenstein’s contention that excellent examples are not only enough to get by with, 
but that they are sometimes (perhaps often) all that are available.
Fam ily R esem blance Analyses
In his later work, Wittgenstein was to deny that there must be an essential feature 
common to all the correct uses of a given word. In the Philosophical Investigations, 
Wittgenstein maintains that there need be no essence to any common noun, not even 
core-dependent homonymy.24 To elucidate how we apply words without their objects 
sharing an essence, Wittgenstein discusses the concept of games. An imaginary 
interlocutor suggests that “a game consists in moving objects about on a board 
according to certain rules,” but is corrected “you seem to be thinking o f board games, 
but there are others.”25 Wittgenstein suggests that we should not assume that there are
Ofxnecessary and sufficient criteria available at the outset of our task. He then reminds us 
of the variety of things that we call games, and suggests that while many may share all 
sorts of similarities, no combination of these are common and exclusive to all. He
22 Scott A. Davison, On the Intrinsic Value o f  Everything (London: Continuum, 2012).
23 Sven Ove Hansson, ‘Science and Pseudo-Science,’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy (Fall 
2008 Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/pseudo- 
science/> [accessed 23 June 2015].
24 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 2010).
25 Ibid, §3.
26 Ibid, §66.
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suggests that in the case of ‘games’, the best that our actual investigations can afford are 
what he calls “family resemblances”; 27 “a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of 
detail.”28 This is so much as to say that concepts do not need necessary and sufficient 
concepts to be applied. Religion may prove to be a family resemblance kind, what 
Christopher Shields, amusingly, calls a ‘motley kind’.
Given Wittgenstein’s account of ‘games’, how, then, we might challenge him on the 
question of whether games are distinguishable from things which are not games? What 
is it that makes the concept of a game usable? Wittgenstein’s response comes in two 
parts. He first characterizes the various similarities as ‘family resemblances’: “[...] for 
the resemblances between members of a family [...] overlap and criss-cross in exactly 
the same way,” and games, he says, “form a family.”29 It is these resemblances that 
distinguish the word’s correct application. Wittgenstein then further justifies his idea by 
saying a concept does not need to have distinct frontiers in order to function. “What still 
counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No. You can 
draw one for none has been drawn. (But that never bothered you before when you used 
the word ‘game’).” 30 That is, common nouns like ‘game’ do not suddenly become 
unusable simply because we do not like what constrains their proper use. Perhaps more 
likely we could say that the word ‘game’ is applicable in virtue of sharing some (but not 
complete) similarity with one species or sense of ‘game’, and then we have a sort of 
initially loose or metaphorical application, which comes to forge a new literal 
application, and thereby a new sense.
Indeed, the Philosophical Investigations convinced many people that ‘game’ failed to 
have necessary and sufficient conditions. Applying this Wittgensteinian understanding, 
Peter Byrne, Benson Saler and Ninian Smart have all attempted to give family 
resemblance analyses of ‘religion’.31 Timothy Fitzgerald acknowledges that while any
27 Ibid, §67.
28 Ibid, §66.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid, §68.
31 The following examples are found in Timothy Fitzgerald, ‘Religion, Philosophy and Family 
Resemblances,’ Religion 26(3) (1996), pp. 215-236, 234, endnote 2; Ninian Smart, The Science o f  
Religion and the Sociology o f  Knowledge (Princeton: Princeton, 1973); Benson Saler, Conceptualizing 
Religion: Immanent Anthropologists, Transcendent Natives, and Unbounded Categories (Leiden: E. J. 
Brill, 1993); Peter Byrne, ‘Religion and the Religions’, in The World's Religions, ed. by Stewart 
Sutherland et al. (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 3-28; Peter Byrne, Natural Religion and the Nature o f  
Religion: The Legacy o f  Deism (London: Routledge, 1989).
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“essentialist definition of religion such as “belief in God or gods” must be “too 
parochially tied to Judaeo-Christian theistic origins of the word;” a Wittgensteinian 
family resemblance analysis promises “a distinctive role for religion as a universally 
applicable analytical concept.” 32 However, he objects that on such an analysis, “the 
‘religion’ family and other neighbouring families such as ideologies, worldviews, 
values or symbolic systems [...] becomes so indefinite that the word ceases to pick out 
any distinctive aspect of human culture.”33 He recommends that we do away with the 
term religion, and look to other, more universal anthropological categories. The term 
while perhaps alright for everyday purposes, is no good for academic uses, and 
according to him, it is too imprecise, and confused. It seems to me however, that a 
decent essentialist definition may still be forthcoming. Which essentialist definition 
shall we accept, or which back up shall we revert to? It is ultimately Michael Hand’s 
that I shall employ, amend and defend.
Before discussing Hand’s essentialism, I want quickly to make a comment about the 
importance (or unimportance) of self-identification in identifying religious people. 
There is a difference between self-identification, and identification. That an insane 
person might not self-identify as insane does nothing to imply that they are sane. 
Sometimes, self-identification is a necessary condition, of belonging to a category, but 
not always. It is never sufficient however; indeed, it makes little sense to think of the set 
which that would imply: the set of all people who claim to be part of that set.
H and’s Essentialism
I want to defend a slightly modified version of Michael Hand’s essentialist definition. 
Hand does not investigate the word ‘religion’, but the word ‘religious’, and claims that 
to be religious one must believe that there exists at least one god who makes a positive 
difference to one’s life. Granting this, perhaps a religion would be, in essence, a body 
of beliefs central among which is a belief in the existence of at least one god who 
makes a positive difference to the lives of at least some believers. Additional aspects of 
particular religions, such as institutional form, rituals and what not, would be incidental 
at least qua religion, if not qua the particular religion that they are.
32 Fitzgerald, p. 215.
33 Ibid.
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For Hand, to be religious, one must hold “beliefs about a god or gods”; in particular, 
presumably, one must most fundamentally believe that they exist.34 Immediately, we 
think of the common objection raised, for instance, by Clack and Clack: “to deny that 
Buddhism counts as a religion [...] would surely be a bizarre consequence.”35 However, 
if Buddhism is presented as a counter example, Hand is prepared to respond, 
convincingly, that firstly, “it is not unusual to hear people deny that Buddhism is a 
religion and describe it instead as a philosophy or a way of life, precisely because they 
take the crucial element of belief in a divine being to be missing” and secondly:
a great many Buddhists manifestly do believe in gods or something 
very like them. For schools of Buddhism in the Mahayana tradition, 
the heavens are richly populated with Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, 
ready to help human beings along the Eightfold Path to 
Enlightenment. 6
He concludes that “Buddhism is a philosophy in some of its forms, and a religion in 
others.” 37 While I should not like to drive a wedge between ‘religions’ and 
‘philosophy’, for it seems reasonable that something could be a religious philosophy, I 
would accept that Buddhism is a religion in some of its form and not a religion in other 
of its forms, while perhaps being a philosophy in all of its forms.
Clacks, Hand and Plantinga all agree that belief in god(s) alone is insufficient. Clack 
and Clack state: “Religion is certainly more than cool adherence to a rather bizarre 
belief or system of beliefs.”38 Hand observes: “A person may hold beliefs about gods 
and yet be utterly indifferent to them. She may regard the existence as one more fact 
about the world which has no relevance to her life.” Plantinga conjectures:
The truth here, perhaps, is that a belief isn’t religious just in itself. The 
property of being religious isn't intrinsic to a belief; it is rather one a 
belief acquires when it functions in a certain way in the life of a given 
person or community. To be a religious belief, the belief in question 
would have to be appropriately connected with characteristically 
religious attitudes on the part of the believer, such attitudes as 
worship, love, commitment, awe, and the like.40
34 Hand, Is Religious Education Possible? p. 95.
35 Clack and Clack, p. 3.
36 Hand, Is Religious Education Possible? p. 96.
37 Ibid.
38 Clack and Clack, p. 3.
39 Hand, Is Religious Education Possible? pp. 96-7.
40 Plantinga.
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Indeed, “For Kierkegaard Christian faith is not a matter of regurgitating church dogma. 
It is a matter of individual subjective passion.”41
While John Wilson suggested that, additionally, a person “must adopt a moral code for 
reasons connected with her beliefs about gods,” Hand suggests, instead, that though 
sufficient, this would not be necessary: “since people who worship and revere the gods 
they believe in, or supplicate their gods for assistance in times of need, certainly have a 
religion, even if their religious beliefs have no influence on their moral principles and 
judgements.”42 Instead, Hand suggests that “a person must hold the gods she believes in 
to have some positive relevance to her life” (e.g. “Worthy of worship”, “receptive to 
supplication” or “moral authorities”), “any of them is sufficient.”43
This has the benefit of leaving out those whose attitudes to gods that seem unreligious. 
Hand’s example is of Ivan, in The Brothers Karamazov, who is contemptuous of God, 
who he regards as morally repugnant on account of the suffering he allows.44 Plantinga 
has added that devils believe in God, and yet, in their antipathy to God, are not 
religious: “According to the New Testament book of James, ‘the devils believe [that 
God exists] and tremble’; the devils' beliefs, presumably, aren't religious.” 45 Perhaps 
devils should regard God as having some positive relevance to their lives -  perhaps 
their souls can be redeemed -  but the crucial point is whether or not they do regard God 
as having some positive relevance. Furthermore, perhaps this positive relevance should 
not just be seen as some sort of silver lining to an otherwise grey cloud, where one 
makes the best of a generally bad thing (e.g. finding solidarity in opposition to the bad 
thing; perhaps as opponents of animal cruelty, or torture do). 46
Instead of Hand’s criterion of ‘holding gods to have some positive relevance to her life/  
I would suggest that Plantinga’s understanding of religion requiring certain attitudes 
would be better; having some positive and invitational attitudes to the god, or gods,
41 William McDonald, ‘Soren Kierkegaard/ in The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy (Fall 2012 
Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/kierkegaard/> 
[accessed 23 June 2015].
42 Hand, Is Religious Education Possible? p. 97.
43 Ibid, pp. 98-99.
44 Ibid, p. 98.
45 Plantinga.
46 While the devils and Ivan Karamazov might admit that gods exists, they do not admit that gods have 
rightful dominion, which they submit to in a way they consider proper and are thereby not religious. 
However, both must be able to recognize that other people are religious by doing so, and also need to 
recognize that religions exist. What are religions? They are perhaps a combination of other people’s 
attitudes to entities posited in doctrines, which they regard as existing.
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rather than merely a belief that they have some positive relevance (that one benefits 
from their existence). Christians might petition God through prayer for intervention in 
worldly matters, but they additionally defer to God as being the authority on moral 
matters; both in respect of knowledge and motivation, they defer to Him willingly. On 
the other hand, one might petition some god without thinking that they are a rightful 
ruler, and yet believe the god to have some positive bearing on their lives. One might 
like to construct the counterexample of an individual being specially favoured by a god 
who they regard as a fool, and so take to be a positive relevance without having the 
slightest respect for them, but on the definition of ‘god’ that I shall defend, this will not 
be possible; a god is one who excels us in every respect, and with whom we have no 
chance of competing successfully. A demi-god is one who we may have some (however 
small) chance of beating (more on gods later). Despite having this counterexample 
unavailable, I hope that I have said enough to convince that ‘positive relevance’ is 
insufficient as a necessary condition. One could anyway, imagine a case of someone 
who (wrongly) believed that they could ‘get one over’ on a god, perhaps planning to 
deceive their way into paradise. They might then regard the god as having some 
positive relevance to their life, but would not thereby be religious.
I would suggest that the characteristic attitude is one of willing deference. Possible 
attitudes to gods include contented, and discontented subordination, and (futile) overt 
dissent.47 Discontented subordination includes resentfully placating powerful gods. 
Overt dissent is exemplified by Ivan, in Dostoyevsky’s The Brother Karamazov. One 
thinks of the remark that “They may torture my body; break my bones; even kill me. 
Then they will have my dead body, but not my obedience” as political equivalent of 
Ivan’s attitude.48 It is interesting to think of dissent and discontented subordination in 
relation to gods’ powers and desires, since the dynamic is like that of an omnipotent 
Orwellian Thought Police. Of course, George Orwell’s Thought Police (from his novel, 
1984) attempted to engineer willing subordination, not being satisfied with discontented 
subordination, and hoping to undermine the possibility of dissent in the style of Ivan. I 
will suggest that willing, as opposed to engineered, subordination is the religious 
attitude. The criterion of regarding gods to have rightful dominion may exclude those
47 Perhaps, to be precise, we would want to distinguish between two forms of contentedness: not minding, 
and being positive about the status quo, and actively supporting it. It is the latter which I take to be the 
religious attitude.
48 This line is said by Ghandi in the eponymous film, dir. by Richard Attenborough (Columbia Pictures, 
1982).
that worshipped the gods of the Parthenon as people who deferred to the gods more 
through expedience than through what they considered rightful (where what is 
considered right is not constituted by the arbitrary or self-interested preferences of the 
mighty, which is anyway just to erode the concept of right), but I do not take this to be 
problematic.
Gods
For Hand, a “god is a transcendent or superhuman person, a person who transcends or 
exceeds the ordinary limits of human personhood.”491 take it that Hand offers two ways 
of characterizing an identical property, that a transcendent person and a superhuman 
person are the same thing. D.C. Comics’ Superman is a superhuman or transcendent 
person, in the sense that he is much like ordinary people except that his powers far 
exceed those of humans in degree, and also in kind.
It is interesting to wonder whether the degree of super-ability necessary to qualify a 
being for godhood is absolute or indexical. Is there some absolute standard which 
constitutes godly levels of superhuman power, or is it that having greater powers than 
some group make one a god relative to them? One may think of a group of aliens 
having regular powers relative to one another, but much greater powers than human 
beings (the species of which Superman was a member, for instance), and, so, be gods 
relative to us. Alternatively, Anselm’s monotheistic definition of a god as “that than 
which nothing greater can be conceived” might help us anchor an absolute notion of a 
god as having maximal powers.50
However, I think that an indexical concept of gods is all that we require: a god is one 
who excels us in every respect, and with whom we have no chance of competing 
successfully. A demigod on the other hand, is one who we may have some (small) a 
chance of beating. For instance, Hector was a powerful man, but not sufficiently 
powerful to be a demigod and Achilles was also a powerful man, but not powerful
49 Hand, Is Religious Education Possible? p. 107.
50 This definition is arguably monotheistic in essence, in that there could only exist one being 
corresponding to Anselm’s definition: those than which none greater can be conceived might all be 
identical on the grounds that having no equals is parts of the conception of maximal perfection. Against 
this, it may be urged that excellence is not relative but absolute as there being a thousand runners could 
be just as fast as each other (and none possibly faster than any of them). There being a thousand of them 
in no way undermines their excellence as runners, however.
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enough to be considered a god; Achilles’ half human and half god parentage explains 
his limitations rather than defines them.
It is interesting to consider how Jesus maps onto our definition of a god. Jesus’ 
Incarnation, it is said “does not mean that Jesus Christ is part God and part man, nor 
does it imply that he is the result of a confused mixture of the divine and the human. He 
became truly man while remaining truly God. Jesus Christ is true God and true man.”51 
It is regarded as something of a mystery or paradox as to how this is conceivable, and, 
so, if Jesus fails to fit our definition of a god it may do little damage to our definition. It 
was thought to be a paradox that Jesus could both have died on the cross, and been a 
god. It was thought by some to be an outright incoherence.52 It was also thought to be a 
paradox or outright incoherence that a god could have been bom to a human being. 
However, our definition has not committed itself to whether gods must be immortal, 
uncreated or world-creators. This openness allows that a god could perhaps come into, 
and go out of, existence, could have been created, and could fail to have created 
anything. I have said that one is only a god relative to another being, where their powers 
exceed the possibility of being beaten at any task. It seems that Jesus could be beaten, 
since he was crucified, and so was not a god, but it seems that he allowed himself to be 
beaten. It was not against his will, and perhaps he could not be willingly beaten. Indeed, 
it also seems logically if not empirically possible that a human being could be a god 
relative to other humans in that they belong to the species, but are endowed with such 
incredible powers that they cannot be beaten by other human beings. It will be well now 
to see whether the definitions can withstand objections that I myself have not suggested.
S.J. M cK inney’s Critique
Hand’s definition has been critiqued in a review by S.J. McKinney.53 In this section, I 
shall quote five challenges made by McKinney, and defend Hand’s thesis against them.
1. [I]t is questionable whether his [Hand’s] sketchy account of the concept of god 
... adequately reflects the centuries of scholarly debate on this concept.54
51 Catechism o f  the Catholic Church, <http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/ _INDEX.HTM> §464, 
[accessed 28 June 2015]
52 Tertullian, D e C am e Christi, “Et mortuus est dei filius; credibile prorsus est, quia ineptum e s t . f  “The 
Son of God died: it is immediately credible-because it is silly,” silly in the sense of the ridiculous which 
is properly contrasted with the sublime. Tertullian, Treatise on the Incarnation, ed. and trans. by Ernest 
Evans (London: S.P.C.K., 1956), ch5. v4.
53 S. J. McKinney, Ts Religious Education Possible? By Michael Hand,’ Journal o f  Philosophy o f  
Education 45(1) (2011), pp. 163-165.
54 McKinney, p. 164.
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The term ‘sketchy account’, seems more name-calling than critique. In providing 
analyses, simplicity is desirable (although, not to the point of oversimplification: while 
there is sometimes a trade-off between explanatory power and simplicity, other things 
being equal, simplicity is in itself a theoretical virtue). Furthermore, “an adequate 
reflection of the centuries of scholarly debate on this concept” is not required for a 
satisfactory definition; that would rather be a historical project (and history before it 
was philosophy, to play on Bernard Williams’ distinction between the History of Ideas 
and the History of Philosophy).55 Indeed, it is only those considerations which threaten 
to undercut Hand’s definition which are relevant to his project. Should we know of any, 
we ought then to challenge Hand with them rather than chide him for failing to scour 
centuries’ worth of texts to find them; it is quite enough to pick up on the key 
discussions in contemporary texts.
2. It is further questionable if he really acknowledges, never mind addresses, the 
tension that arises for contemporary philosophy from the obfuscation of the 
delineation of the relationship between the god of philosophy and the god of 
revealed religion as exemplified in the sourcing of texts (e.g. scripture) from 
revealed religion as evidence of the nature of this god.56
It is hard to know what the accusation is here. If  it is that there is a difference between 
the god of philosophers and the god of revealed religion, and that Hand neglects the 
latter, I want to say that that is a poor objection. There is no such thing as ‘the god of 
philosophers’; either philosophers want to characterize something more general than the 
god of revelation (if indeed there is just one god of revelation at all), or they do not. If 
they do, then it is not a problem that they do not refer to just the god of revelation. If 
they want to characterize the god of revelation in particular, they can. Richard 
Swinburne wants to do so when he talks of “a person without a body (i.e. a spirit) who 
is eternal, free, able to do anything, knows everything, is perfectly good, is the proper
57object of human worship and obedience, the creator and sustainer of the universe.” 
Hand’s definition does capture the god of revelation, if that means “the god, gods who 
appear in the Abrahamic scriptures,” but aims to capture, and quite rightly, more than
55 Bernard Williams describes his book, Descartes: the Project o f  Pure Enquiry, as “a study in the history 
of philosophy rather than in the history of ideas. I use these labels to mark the distinction that the history 
of ideas is history before it is philosophy, while with the history of philosophy it is the other way round” 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978), p. 9.
56 McKinney, p. 164.
57 Richard Swinburne, The Coherence o f  Theism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 1.
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just the god of revelation. On the other hand, if the accusation is that the bible cannot be 
used to provide evidence for a definition of the god of philosophers, then again this 
seems to be mistaken. Again, while there is no god of the philosophers, one may define 
a more general concept of god which contains the god o f revelation, but other gods also. 
In this case, it is perfectly proper to use the god of revelation as a constraint on one’s 
definition of gods; if a paradigmatic example of a god (namely, ‘the god of revealed 
religion’) does not fit within one’s definition, then so much the worse for one’s 
definition.
3. Is it not problematic for the philosopher to be building logical structures 
connected to inexact concepts?58
McKinney makes a good point here. Indeed, Aristotle makes a similar point apparently 
about ethics along these lines: we want exactness and clarity in our thought, but not 
more exactness and clarity than the phenomenon allows. Aristotle claims that “it is the 
mark o f an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the 
nature o f the subject admits.”59 “Now fine and just actions, which political science 
investigates, admit of much variety and fluctuation of opinion, so that they may be 
thought to exist only by convention, and not by nature” says Aristotle.60Admitting 
‘ambiguous cases’ is even among the desiderata that Eshleman places on an adequate 
definition of religion.61
Timothy Fitzgerald complains that “Analysis of ‘religion’ texts shows that the word is 
used in such a large range of contexts that it is devoid of analytical value.” The 
pendulum might seem to have swung too far in the opposite direction with too precise a 
definition. If the term is inherently vague, though, it may be so vague as to be useless in 
this context. Neither of the problems appear to me to be material however. It seems to 
me that Hand makes the concept no more definite than it already is; he just makes it
58 McKinney, p. 164.
59 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by W.D. Ross, <http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/ 
nicomachaen.html> [accessed 18 June 2015]
Book I Section III.
60 Here Aristotle appears to point to the distinction raised earlier: that mind independent substances may 
admit of essence and social constructs not (we may safely here ignore the fascinating topics of the matter 
of whether the Just is a mere matter on convention is immaterial, as is the relation between convergence/ 
divergence and stability/instability of opinion, and mind dependence/ mind-independence of phenomena.
61 Eshleman, p. 4.
62 Fitzgerald, p. 215.
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clear to us where its exactnesses and vaguenesses lie, or, rather, our modification of 
Hand does that. One question will be whether the concept is too narrow, whether it 
presides over the range of phenomena that we might want it to in order to keep it from 
being too parochial (the second prong of the dilemma which Fitzgerald uses to 
challenge the efficacy of the academic usefulness of the term ‘religion’). This concern 
will be addressed in the next chapter.
4. Is religion necessarily some form of collective enterprise? If the person is part of 
a collective enterprise, she would believe that her gods have some relevance for 
the lives of others within her group. Further, it could be argued that the 
collective enterprise believes that it contributes positively to society. This may, 
of course, take the form of the religion being critical of society and the values of 
society. If it is the case that religion is a form of collective enterprise and 
believes it contributes positively to society, perhaps a third point can be added: 
(3) she believes this religion will have a positive influence on others in her 
group and on society. Clearly this argument rests on the idea that religion is a 
collective enterprise and others may quibble with, or refute, this phraseology 
and statement, but this example is used to illustrate the complexity of this 
inexact concept of religion and suggest that perhaps philosophers such as Hand 
need to explore this concept more deeply and draw on a greater range of sources 
to inform their thinking.63
McKinney asks whether religion is essentially social in nature, and suggests that if it 
were, a further constraint on the definition of religion ought to be that any putative 
religion should regard itself as being a good for society.64 I do not think that that 
conclusion follows: one could conceivably have a corporate religion which was ego­
centric, so that a society considered that it ought to sacrifice its own good for someone 
they considered to be divine, or divinely favoured (one may think of the Egyptian 
pharaohs as being in this vein). Even still, I do not think that religion is essentially 
social in nature; instead, it seems that a person could have a private religion (or to the 
extent that they could not, it is no different from any other aspect of human belief, 
understanding and activity, and so a trivial thesis).
I want to suggest that it is not at all surprising that ‘religions’, in a derivative sense of 
the word, have social structures; religions in one sense of the word are social structures, 
but they are social structures constructed around religion in a primary sense. A religion
63 McKinney, pp. 163-4.
64 Supposing that a putative religion promised only to be a good for one’s own society, as Judaism had 
done would it then be a religion on McKinney’s suggestion? Or, if it were to be a social good, need it be 
a good for all people (and perhaps animals as well)? The nature of McKinney’s suggestion is a little 
ambiguous, but I think that it is not worth exploring.
is: anything which essentially requires a) belief in super-beings and b) and submission 
to them as having rightful dominion. There exist social structures which may be called 
‘religions’, in a derivative sense, in that they are built around this primary sense of the 
word. A person is religious if and only if they believe in super powerful beings that they 
submit to, regarding them to have rightful dominion. A social group is religious if and 
only if they share a belief in super powerful beings that they submit to, regarding them 
to have rightful dominion.
There is an interesting relationship between societies, or clubs and doctrines. A cycling 
club usually will not consist of people who believe a certain set of propositions; they 
will consist of people that want to ride bicycles together. Here, there is an emphasis on 
belonging, rather than believing (although obviously some, rather common beliefs will 
need to be shared for that to be possible). A political society will on the other hand be a 
group of people who gather, perhaps to advance certain causes in light of certain shared 
beliefs, and perhaps to debate the finer points and applications of their basic, shared 
beliefs. Here, there is a case of belonging and believing -  indeed, it is belief that 
motivates belonging. Grace Davie has argued that in the later part of the twentieth 
Century, Britain became a more privately religious society (which is not to say that 
beliefs could not be expressed, or acted on in the public space, but to say that people did 
not form congregations on the basis of their beliefs, but maintained them 
individualistically).65
5. How are philosophers, for example, to respond to the contemporary reshaping of 
the landscape of religion? The nomenclature can be a little confusing but ‘new 
age religions’ and ‘new age spiritualities’, so easily dismissed and ridiculed, 
have, in fact, been the subject of serious academic study and debate and, 
crucially, have proved to be the catalyst for a revision of the (always porous) 
boundaries of the sociological concept of religion. What are the implications of 
this for the philosophical concept of religion? What are the implications for the 
distinction between religious and non-religious people? This is a new challenge 
for the philosophers who engage in discussion of religion (possibly the result of 
the insufficient philosophical focus on this inexact concept) and philosophers 
have an important role in the contemporary clarification of the concept of 
religion.66
65 Grace Davie, Religion in Britain Since 1945: Believing Without Belonging (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).
66 McKinney, p. 164.
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Philosophers ought to respond to the new, putative cases of religion by seeing whether 
they fit with a definition; this would seem to be Hand’s ready response. Being a subject 
of serious academic study is no criterion of religion, and indeed something need not be 
the least bit plausible to reward study in a sociological sense. Indeed, mental illness is 
worthy of study without being desirable, in part to help cure it.
McKinney claims that the so called new-religions “have proved to be the catalyst for a 
revision of the (always porous) boundaries of the sociological concept of religion.” One 
may worry with Fitzgerald that the boundaries are so vague that the concept does not 
reveal enough determinations as to whether something is or is not a religion; it is quiet 
on too many cases, and is thence useless or useless for some practical purposes (such as 
an academic field of study with a specific remit).
R eligions and Propositlonal Content (or Truth-Claim s)
One of the biggest questions that we face in trying to understand what a religion is, that 
we face in the light of the discussions of Wittgensteinians (such as D.Z. Philips), is: 
how important are doctrines for religions (sufficient, necessary, necessary and 
sufficient, irrelevant, or incompatible)? It seems that religious people express 
propositional attitudes or make truth-claims; the propositions asserted are commonly 
called ‘doctrines’. Indeed, the first of the five pillars of Islam (found in the Hadith of 
Gabriel) focuses on belief content: Shahadah, the declaration that there is no god except 
Allah, and that Muhammad is his Messenger. The Nicene Creed, professed in mass by 
Christians of several churches, appears to consist of a set of propositions, which are 
asserted to be true in the profession. Indeed, St. Paul writes to the Corinthians that “if 
Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain.” However, 
Paul does not say that Christ’s having risen is to be taken literally, and if he did, he may 
still have been speaking non-literally (e.g. metaphorically, ironically, or 
exaggeratingly).
On my own definition of religion (namely ‘a doctrine which claims the existence and 
rightful dominion of one or more gods, and requires submission to them’), doctrines 
(namely ‘there exist one or more gods, who have rightful dominion’) are essential. 
However, the aforementioned Wittgensteinians deny that religious claims are meant
67 1 Corinthians 15:14, King James Version.
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literally (or at least claim that many are not). They have one of two options open to 
them: global and local non-literalism. The global non-literalist says that not only are 
religious propositions not meant literally, but there is no such thing as literal language
/TO
for them to be contrasted with. The local non-literalist says that religious propositions 
are not meant literally, that they might be meant as exaggerations, or metaphors, or 
some other non-literal thing. J.L. Mackie suggests that Philips was hoping to carve out 
an understanding of religious claims such that they would fall somewhere between 
literal statements and non-literal statements (a clearly impossible task).69 Certainly, 
Jesus is reported in the Gospels as making frequent use o f non-literal language, like 
allegorical tales. But it seems that he literally made frequent use of them.
There is a large literature on what can be meant by religious language. Proponents of 
the via negativa seem to deny that it has any meaning to humans. It is possible for 
sentences to have meaning that is not appreciated by the speaker, as when I phonetically 
pass on a message sent by someone else in a language that I do not understand. On the 
other hand, it must mean something to someone to be meaningful, and, if it means 
nothing to me, it is hard to see how I could believe it since, as Bernard Williams puts it, 
“if you do not know what it is you are believing on faith, how can you be sure that you 
are believing anything?”70
We may ask, are propositions involved, and what would these matter? What are their 
truth conditions? Are they the same as the truth conditions of their statements literally 
construed, and what literal sentences would share their truth conditions? Is there 
anything that secularists could reject?
Tim Crane suggests that “a lot of humanists treat religion as if it were simply a kind of 
rival cosmological hypothesis, and that this is all it is. My view is that to the extent that
68 A colourful expression of global non-literalism (which may not be one which its author was 
consistently committed to), is seen in this passage from Nietzsche’s essay, ‘Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral 
Sense’: “What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms — in short, 
a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and 
rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions 
about which one has forgotten that is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous 
power; coins which have lost their pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins,” in 
Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's Notebooks o f  the early 1870s, ed. and trans. by Daniel 
Breazeale (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1979), p. 84.
69 J.L. Mackie, The Miracle o f  Theism: Arguments fo r  and Against the Existence o f  God  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), Chapter 12.'
70 Bernard Williams, ‘Tertullian’s Paradox’ in Philosophy as A Humanistic Discipline, ed. by A.W. 
Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 19.
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religions are cosmological hypotheses, this is not the only important thing about 
them.”71 What if they all turned out to be false, would this matter? Wittgenstein wants 
to say ‘no’:
Queer as it sounds: The historical accounts in the Gospels might, 
historically speaking, be demonstrably false and yet belief would lose 
nothing by this: not, however because it concerns ‘universal truths of 
reason’! Rather because historical proof (the historical proof-game) is 
irrelevant to belief. This message (the Gospels) is seized on by men 
believingly (i.e. lovingly). That is the certainty characterizing this 
particular acceptance-as-true, not something else.
A believer's relation to these narratives is neither the relation to 
historical truth (probability), nor yet that to a theory consisting of 
‘truths of reason’. 2
It would be not only conceivable, but amusing to think that the utterance of people who 
regarded them as in some way less than literal, turned out to be literally true, as many 
regard them to be (many philosophers of religion at least; Alvin Plantinga, Richard 
Swinburne, William Lane Craig and others give impressive defences of literal belief). 
Non-literalists should not be regarded as being religious in my view, but as quasi­
religious at most.
As we have seen, Jonathan Lowe distinguishes between two kinds of essences; those 
conditions in virtue of which something qualifies as a particular kind of thing, and 
identity conditions in virtue of which something at T1 and again at T2 qualifies as one 
and the same thing. In connection with this, Lowe considers that “it is metaphysically 
possible — even if not biologically or physically possible — for any individual cat to 
survive ‘radical’ metamorphosis, by becoming a member of another natural kind of 
living organism.”73 In connection with Lowe’s suggestion, it might be possible for an 
individual tradition to pass between being a religion, and no longer being a religion. 
Suppose that a tradition needs to affirm belief in a god to be a religion, and that a 
tradition used to do so in its past but does not any longer, it may be that an individual 
tradition has passed from the kind of religion into another kind, a non-religious 
ideology, or society, perhaps.
71 Tim Crane ‘Mindful/ interview for 3:AM Magazine by Richard Marshall, <http://www.3ammagazine. 
com/3am/mindful/2/> [accessed 23 June 2015].
72 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Culture and Value, ed. by G. H. Von Wright in collaboration with Heikki 
Nymam, Trans, by Peter Winch (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), pp. 37e-38e.
73 Lowe, ‘Essentialism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Errors of Conceptualism,’ pp. 9-33.
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I do not want to say that religions consist of truth claims that have no evaluative 
dimensions, and that have no social dimension of membership. The Nicene Creed opens 
(in English) with the words ‘we believe in one God’. That utterance may be 
distinguished from ‘we believe that there exists only one God’, meaning instead that 
they obey, or trust one particular god. It seems to mean a combination of these 
interpretations: that 1) there is only one god, and 2) they obey and trust in Him. 
Professing ‘belief in’ a subject or ideal is additionally relational, and may contribute to 
one’s being so related to that subject or ideal. As J.L. Austin famously noted in his 
William James lectures, words can be deeds, as when one says ‘I do’ at a wedding 
service, or signs a name on a contract. While one I do not wish to deny that there are 
important, performative dimensions to professing the Nicene Creed, they should not be 
seen as ruling out the presence of propositional content; content which is required for 
their identification as religions.74
Is Faith A ccidental or Essential to Religion?
Suppose that a group of scientists working on the Large Hadron Collider discovered, 
(however that might be) that God existed, and that historians converged on the 
consensus of the historical veracity of the Bible, or something near enough to it, and 
that they did so because it was supported by, among other things, archaeological 
discoveries. Would these scholars have faith and would, what they have, be a religion? 
It is fair to say though, that one’s attitudes to the impersonal discoveries of history and 
science are not dictated by those disciplines, so that one could perhaps find the truth of 
some doctrines about God to be true, and yet not be inclined to willing subordination, 
and so not be religious. Suppose also that they regarded God to be worthy of worship, 
due to sound arguments and submitted themselves to his will accordingly. Again, would 
these scholars have faith and would what they have be a religion? They would have 
reasonable belief and not faith in the sense “belief without evidential or argumentative 
grounds.”75 Admittedly, it has been that the best justified theories have turned out false 
(Newtonian physics being the paradigm example), and so it might turn out that
74 J.L. Austen, How To Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard  
University in 1955, ed. by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
75 This distinction is a bit quick: there are very arguably ‘properly basic beliefs’, to use Alvin Plantinga’s 
expression; beliefs which are not based on evidence and argument, but that are still reasonable, and 
indeed, that are presupposed in other arguments.
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orthodox learned opinion could yet be false, and reason could yet emerge for people to 
reject it. So too, it seems that these scientists, unless they had discovered some logically 
incontrovertible evidence, might too have to abandon their beliefs, even still, it seems to 
me that faith is accidental rather than essential to religion and that while these scientists 
and historians do believe in the existence and rightful dominion of God, and 
accordingly submit to Him, they are thereby religious.
In opposition, one might urge that the nature of true faith is that one never gives up
76one’s beliefs (and holds their beliefs independently of the shifting sands of evidence). 
Certainly, Kierkegaard emphasized leaps of faith: “without risk there is no fa ith . Faith 
is precisely the contradiction between the infinite passion of the individual's inwardness 
and the objective uncertainty.”77 It might seem to the extent that a religion’s doctrines 
constitute a compel lingly supported hypothesis (so that nobody could reasonably deny 
it), what we have is no longer a religion.
Certainly, never gives up one’s faith seems too strong a criterion for religion: people 
have converted from one religion to another, part of which involved a change of beliefs. 
While it might seem strange to think that a phenomenon depends for its nature on how 
it was arrived at, the notion of a scientific view certainly has that built into it. Newton’s 
ideas would not have been scientific if a) they were not reasoned towards and b) they 
were not applied at the risk of falsification. A definition of science is at least as difficult 
as a definition of religion (I would suggest even more difficult), but we can have a 
sense that how an idea is reached (via a scientific method, perhaps), and how it is 
treated subsequently (through experimentation) makes it scientific rather than some 
intrinsic property of the idea.78
Arguments for the existence of God, for the coherence of theism, and more generally 
for the reasonableness of religious doctrines have existed for a very long time. 
Certainly, Thomas Aquinas offered a very sophisticated defence of Christian Theism, 
and more recently, so too has Richard Swinburne. It would seem bizarre to deny that
76 Alternatively, it could be that private revelation cuts decisively through the public evidential record.
77 Soren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. by David F. 
Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1941), p. 182.
781 do not want to contrast science and religion in the abstract, just in their nature (irrespective of how 
particular well supported scientific hypothesis may differ from particular religious doctrines in fact), but 
certainly if the difference were that one was rational, and the other was immune to rationality that would 
be deep cleavage between the two, and where they were to overlap in content it would not matter at all to 
the religious person any more than if there were to be no overlap at all.
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these were religious thinkers. Indeed, the tradition known as fideism, which this thought 
dovetails with, has consistently been rejected by the Catholic Church, which is surely a
79paradigm example of a religious institution.
Sum m ary
We want to know how (if at all) children may be ethically influenced with respect to 
religions. To reach that point, we sought to answer the prior question ‘what is it that we 
mean by ‘religions’?’ As we have seen, there are a number of ways of approaching the 
question. We have explored the available options, starting with essentialism, and 
moving on to a few alternatives to the essentialist’s project. Having criticised these or 
attempted to go one better, I ultimately came to employ and defend a slightly amended 
version of Michael Hand’s essentialist definition of religion.
A religion, I said, is anything which essentially requires a) belief in super-beings and b) 
submission to them as having rightful dominion. There exist social structures which 
may be called ‘religions’ in a derivative sense, in that they are built around this primary 
sense of the word. A person is religious if they believe in super powerful beings that 
they submit to, regarding them to have rightful dominion. A social group is religious if 
they share a belief in super powerful beings that they submit to, regarding them to have 
rightful dominion.
79 <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/06068b.htm> [accessed 23 June 2015].
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Chapter Eight
THE STATUS O F R ELIG IO N
Introduction
We want to know how children ought to be formatively influenced with respect to 
religions (to religious beliefs and attitudes, and to beliefs about and attitudes to 
religion). With a definition of religion in hand, we now ask what the value (or 
normative status) of religion is. Religion has at least two kinds of status: a social status 
and a normative status. Its social status consists in whether people think it is true or 
good, and its normative status consists in whether it is in fact true or good. It is the 
latter, and whether this can be established well enough to justify either discouraging 
religion, or encouraging religion, that is important for answering our overall question.
As we saw in Chapter 6, ethically speaking, whether a given formative property should 
be encouraged turns (in part) on its theoretical and practical rationality, on whether it is 
rational to have that formative property. Where the having or not having of a certain 
attitude makes a significant difference to students’ lives, and requires some systematic, 
professionally-led education for its effective encouragement or discouragement, it ought 
to be addressed by curricula. Where that attitude requires only informal, minimally 
systematic encouragement or discouragement, the educative role falls to parents. Where 
not having that attitude is irrational, it ought to be encouraged; where having it is 
irrational, it ought to be discouraged; where having or not having it are both rational 
options, it ought to be taught non-directively. Again, teachers, and parents should, in so 
far as it is practicable, aim to acquaint children with arguments for and against having 
these attitudes and initiate them into the practice of assessing the soundness of those 
arguments.
Notice that we have been discussing religion in essence, and not any one in particular. It 
could well be that religion in essence is true, because some particular manifestation is 
correct; perhaps Roman Catholicism, for instance, is broadly correct about what is true, 
and good. Just because religion, in essence is true, it would not follow that every 
religion is true in essence, since the essence of each particular religion may be more 
expansive than the essence of religion per se . For instance, the figures of Jesus and 
Muhammed play no role in the essence o f religion, but are plausibly essential to the
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essence of Christianity and Islam respectively. That said, establishing just that religion 
is true in essence can lend support to every particular religion. Indeed, for religious 
pluralists establishing such a conclusion would do rather more. Religious pluralists 
(notably John Hick) argue that there are no fundamentally important differences 
between religions, and so to establish religion in essence is to establish all that is most 
important about all the particular religions. However, I take it that pluralism is one more 
form of exciusivism alongside all the others. Indeed, the truth of religious pluralism 
entails the falsehood of any other claim to exclusive truth.1
This thesis cannot attempt detailed treatment of the rich and multifarious defences of 
particular religions (e.g. via evaluating the historical credibility of particular religious 
texts). Such texts are too numerous, are open to diverse interpretations, and leave ample 
room for what is sometimes, unfairly, called ‘cherry-picking’, in so far as adherents do 
not accept texts to be inerrant, but instead to be variously flawed relayed messages from 
a divine source. Given these complexities, what can we reasonably hope to achieve in 
this chapter? One thing we might do is look at arguments that could be used in support 
of any of the various particular super-beings that people think it proper to submit 
themselves to. We could look at the kinds of arguments as to whether or not a super­
being worthy of deference exists, or ones that establish at least part of that claim. 
Additionally, we could consider some arguments to the effect that religion is inherently 
good, or inherently bad, and then consider that the problem of evil gives a significant 
problem to theists, and that in the absence of a critical, open institutional network such 
as to warrant scientific theories, which then subject beliefs to systematic scrutiny in the 
pursuit of rational consensus, religious belief is not rationally compelling.
1 There are more and less strong forms of exciusivism. A weak form is sometimes called ‘inclusivism’ 
which allows that one religion best captures ultimate reality, but allows that other religions contain much 
that is true and of value. Inclusivism even allows that other religions have much to teach it, but it must 
maintain that it itself captures much which is indispensable if it is not to collapse into pluralism.
2 The various arguments for the existence of a god are just such arguments, employed equally by 
Muslims, Christians and Jews. Some might like to urge the identity of these three gods, but this seems a 
dubious move. That is because we need to fix a referent of which the various accounts are supposed to be 
accounts. Thus, various biographers might write radically different accounts of Tony Blair, but we can fix 
the referent of the biographies independently of the accounts (it is not just whatever the account is an 
account of). In the case of God, three people who accept each of the rival accounts would need to have 
another way of fixing the referent than their accounts, perhaps a shared revelation, or mystical 
experience.
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Religion is not Inherently Good or Bad
We ought to distinguish between religions as practised, and religions as prescribed by 
their own canonical texts. Arguments can be made that various religions are more 
objectionable if taken at a textual level than they are as practised, and vice versa, that 
religion would be better if the texts were more closely observed than those who profess 
to follow in its footsteps. So, for instance, if Christians stoned people, for the various 
reasons they are told to in Leviticus, morally, they would be the worse for doing so. On 
the other hand, if Christians really all did love others as they love themselves, morally, 
they would be the better for doing so. Concordantly, there are two modes of defence 
(tending in different directions) available to the religious apologist:
1. It is not the religion in essence that is at fault when people enact perversions of 
the text, since the real religion is that prescribed by its canonical texts.
2. It is not the religion that is at fault when the texts make immoral and unjust 
pronouncements, since the real religion is the lived religion.
It seems that religion has scope to be horrendous if, for instance, people believe a super­
being exists, whose word ought to be deferred to, and take that being to require things 
which are in fact deeply unjust and immoral. Examples abound through history, with 
human sacrifice being common. The recent examples of 9/11, the Charlie Hebdo 
massacre and the atrocities of the Islamic State in some countries help illustrate the 
point.3
In a public debate on the question of whether the world would be better or worse 
without religion, Tony Blair has attempted to answer the criticism of textual religious 
evil, admitting that it is a hard criticism to answer. His response comes in two parts. 
First, that the spirit of the text is different from the prima-facie literal readings, and that 
spirit is not one which recommends evil acts.4 Second, believers must interpret scripture 
in a way that makes sense to people in the modem world. Seemingly suggesting that, 
seen in their contexts, the (by modem lights) horrendous prescriptions of ancient texts
3 One point I want to make is that it is logically possible that there should exist a wicked super-being: 
indeed, perhaps there does exist a super being that wants us to do wicked things, and it may be in our 
interest to defer to that being, and follow her wicked commands. One may in this case think it morally 
better to refuse deference, and rebel (however fruitlessly) -  that is the attitude of Ivan in Dostoyevsky’s 
The Brothers Karamazov. As I have said however, a belief of this nature is not a religious belief, 
although it might reasonably be described as quasi-religious.
4 Tony Blair and Christopher Hitchens, Ts Religion a Force for Good in the World?’ 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ddsz9XBhrYA> @ 1:17:53 [accessed 23 June 2015].
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are less horrendous, and even thoroughly admirable.5 It might be that it is our modem 
liberal standards that are at fault if these views do come into conflict (and that we are 
misled by our bias of presentism -  that the most recent developments are just fashions 
and not improvements), or it might be that moral truth changes over time. Neither 
seems plausible. Instead, it is better to suggest that religious texts are fallible.
Indeed, the idea that revelation is inerrant, un-updatable, and entirely perspicuous is 
unsustainable given developments in scientific understanding. Furthermore, there is 
something odd about the notion that there exists a text in which nothing is certain 
except that it is correct so that, if what we took it to mean, turns out to be false, we must 
simply have misread it. There is more integrity in the approach of geologist, Kurt Wise, 
who found that the bible would be revised beyond recognition if updated by modem 
science, and so rejected modem science; “if all the evidence in the universe turns 
against creationism, I would be the first to admit it, but I would still be a creationist 
because that is what the Word of God seems to indicate.”6
To the extent that religious people object by denying that religion really is represented 
in these examples, one must reply that such denial amounts to whitewashing religion, 
by sweeping any inconvenient examples under the carpet. Attempts to do so merely 
exemplify what Anthony Flew has termed the ‘no true Scotsman fallacy,’ an 
(underhanded or misguided) argumentative manoeuvre in which one denies that bad 
examples of a phenomenon are really examples at all, so as to insulate it from criticism. 
Consider the following example from Flew:
Imagine Hamish McDonald, a Scotsman, sitting down with his Glasgow 
Morning Herald and seeing an article about how the “Brighton 
(England) Sex Maniac Strikes Again”. Hamish is shocked and declares 
that “No Scotsman would do such a thing”. The next day he sits down 
to read his Glasgow Morning Herald again; and, this time, finds an 
article about an Aberdeen (Scotland) man whose brutal actions make 
the Brighton sex maniac seem almost gentlemanly. This fact shows that 
Hamish was wrong in his opinion, but is he going to admit this? Not 
likely. This time he says: “No true Scotsman would do such a thing” .7
5 Ibid, @ 1:20:35 [accessed 23 June 2015].
6 Kurt Wise, In ‘Six Days: Why 50 Scientists Choose to Believe in Creation,’ ed. by John Ashton, 
<http://creation.com/kurt-p-wise-geology-in-six-days> [accessed 23 June 2015].
7 Antony Flew, Thinking About Thinking: or, Do I  Sincerely Want to be Right? (London: Collins Fontana, 
1975), p. 47.
Lest we make a similar mistake, bearing in mind our definition of religion, it seems 
amply possible that religions may be both false and harmful. Whether one is religious in 
a good way seems somewhat hostage to the fortune of what they take the content of 
their god’s edicts to be. It can be that what one takes to be the possible range of god’s 
edicts can be limited by what they take to be the content of morality. As an illustration 
of this case, take Kant’s assessment of the situation in which Abraham found himself 
when God purportedly asked him to sacrifice Isaac:
For if God should really speak to a human being, the latter could still 
never know that it was God speaking. It is quite impossible for a human 
being to apprehend the infinite by his senses, distinguish it from 
sensible beings, and be acquainted with it as such.—But in some cases 
the human being can be sure that the voice he hears is not God’s; for if 
the voice commands him to do something contrary to moral law, then 
no matter how majestic the apparition may be, and no matter how it 
may seem to surpass the whole of nature, he must consider it an 
illusion.8
However, our discussion ought to focus on religion at its best, as much as on religion at 
its worst. If we are to encourage belief of the true, and emulation of the good, it might 
be that acceptance of some particular religion ought to be encouraged, while some 
others ought to be discouraged. All the same, it may be that the essence of religion is 
true; that there really is a super-being to whom we ought to defer, and that we ought to 
orientate ourselves accordingly, irrespective of how much wrong is falsely done in their 
name.
The N orm ative Status o f Religion
Is religion, at its best, true or good? It might be that one religion or another is actually 
true and, perhaps unsurprisingly, cultivates goodness and gives purpose (perhaps it is 
more surprising that other religions might do so as well) and it might be that religion is 
in some way good without being true. Consider two ways in which this could be so:
1. Religion (at its best) is a scaffold that cultivates goodness better than its 
absence; for instance, religion is a noble lie, a necessary tool for paternalist 
elites to manipulate ignorant masses for their own good.
8 Immanuel Kant, The Conflict o f  the Faculties in Religion and Rational Theology, ed. by Allen W. Wood 
and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 7:63.
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2. There are no atheists in fox holes, as they say, because a life without religion is 
impossibly bleak and death terrifying.
We shall consider whether these two considerations bear critical scrutiny before 
considering whether there is good reason to think that religion is in essence true (that 
there exists a super being to whom we ought to defer).
Practical R eason and the Utility of Religion
In this section, we shall consider the utility of religion, apart from the question of 
whether it is true, whether practical reason decides in its favour, irrespective of 
theoretical reason. We will discuss whether Religion (at its best) is a scaffold that 
cultivates goodness or whether life without religion is impossibly bleak and death 
terrifying. I argue that the existence of God is tangential to both the content and 
existence of morality and also the objective meaning of our lives.
Religion and M oral Goodness
Some say that religion is of negative value, some that it is worthless, others say that it is 
highly valuable, and yet others say that it is a mixed bag. Sam Harris thinks that religion 
is very bad indeed:
If I could wave a magic wand and get rid of either rape or religion, I 
would not hesitate to get rid of religion. I think, more people are dying 
as a result of our religious myths than as a result of any other ideology.
I would not say that all human conflict is bom of religion or religious 
differences, but for the human community to be fractured on the basis 
of religious doctrines that are fundamentally incompatible, in an age 
when nuclear weapons are proliferating, is a terrifying scenario.9
There is a case to be made (and it frequently is) that religion is a terrible affliction on 
human beings; much evil has been, and still is done in the name of religion. However, 
one might just as well run a parallel case with an assessment of the value of science, 
which more obviously shows the inadequacy of the argument:
At a 2011 conference, another colleague summed up what she thought 
was the mixed legacy of science: the eradication of smallpox on the one
9 Bethany Saltman, The Temple Of Reason: Sam Harris on How Religion Puts the World at Risk,’ The 
Sun <http://thesunmagazine.org/issues/369/the_temple_of_reason?page=l> [accessed 23 June 2015].
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hand; the Tuskegee syphilis study on the other. (In that study, another 
bloody shirt in the standard narrative about the evils of science, public- 
health researchers beginning in 1932 tracked the progression of 
untreated, latent syphilis in a sample of impoverished African 
Americans.) The comparison is obtuse. It assumes that the study was 
the unavoidable dark side of scientific progress as opposed to a 
universally deplored breach, and it compares a one-time failure to 
prevent harm to a few dozen people with the prevention of hundreds of 
millions of deaths per century, in perpetuity.10
Atrocity seems to be an accidental property of religion. It is not religion per se that is at 
fault when people commit atrocities on religious grounds. If Harris were to have his 
wand and wave it, we might reasonably worry that a baby would be thrown out with the 
bath water here. Daniel C. Dennett’s more sympathetic account of religion is that it has 
good aspects and bad aspects, but that what is essential to religion is false, and we can 
salvage the good parts in other ways, that religion is not essential to them.11 Indeed, 
Dennett has presented an interesting case in which he hopes to ‘salvage’ the good of 
religions from the bad. What he takes to be the bad is basically that all religions are 
false: that no super beings exist, and therefore no super beings exist that deserve our 
deference. All the same, religions do have much positive value when considered in 
terms of their utility, but that a noble lie is not necessary for accessing those incidental 
goods. Christopher Hitchens asks what good can a religious person do that a non­
religious person cannot, or would not. This challenge, if  it cannot be met, suggests that 
religion is incidental to doing the good.12
One may think that our question is whether the world would be the worse, the better or 
much the same for lacking religion to be relevant, that whether getting rid of religion 
would mean getting rid of evil or whether getting rid of religion would mean getting rid 
of good are the questions on which our decision must turn. Perhaps they are, but neither 
answer seems plausible. Weakened versions of those contentions would also seem 
relevant, namely, that to promote religion is in effect to promote evil, or to decrease 
religion, is in effect to undermine the good. It seems that religions, qua religion 
(identified on our rationale from Chapter 6) may just as likely promote evil as it does
10 Steven Pinker ‘Science is Not Your Enemy,’ The New Republic (2013), <http://www.newrepublic.com/ 
article/114127/science-not-enemy-humanities> [accessed 23 June 2015].
11 Daniel C. Dennett, ‘On What Should Replace Religion,’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch? 
v=m5tGpMcFF7U> [accessed 23 June 2015].
12 Hitchens can be seen posing this challenge at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch7vMTnA3b8MhD0> 
[accessed 23 June 2015].
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good. ‘Religion’ is not an unqualified force for good, or an unqualified force for evil. 
People may want to distinguish between good and bad religion.
It seems that there is no necessary connection between being religious and valuing the 
good and the just. The eponymous character of Plato’s dialogue, Euthyphro, suggested 
that piety is what is pleasing to the gods.13 But, as Socrates presses, there exists a 
question as to whether it is pious just because it pleases the gods, or whether it pleases 
the gods because it is pious. In the first case, the pious is arbitrary, in the second the 
pious is quite independent of the gods. It is a (partly empirical question) as to whether 
what particular religions encourage are good works. One needs a conception of the 
good, and to compare this to what it is that particular religions promote. The concept of 
the good that I am working with has been elaborated and defended earlier in the thesis 
(Chapter 3). On that conception of the good, it is evident that much that is unethical and 
much that is ethical have at different times and places been encouraged by religions. 
There is no scope for this thesis to attempt to weigh up the good and the bad 
encouraged by each, or indeed, any particular religion (indeed, ring fencing a particular 
religion for such an assessment might prove enough of a challenge).14 And indeed, such 
analyses may be relevant to judging the ethical utility of particular religions.
It does not seem, then, that religion is a necessary tool for paternalist elites to 
manipulate ignorant masses for their own good. Is it (at its best) a scaffold that 
cultivates goodness better than its absence? In the absence of evidence either way, it is 
best to suspend judgement on this point. However, one practical reason can be given for 
not connecting the teaching of morality with religion, and that is that (even putting the 
Euthyphro considerations aside) there is a danger that where children lose their 
religious faith, they may also lose their moral commitments if they consider the latter to 
be dependent on the former.
Having discussed whether Religion (at its best) is a scaffold that cultivates goodness, 
we now move on to consider whether life without religion is impossibly bleak. I argue
13 Plato, Euthyphro trans. by Benjamin Jowett, <http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/ euthyfro.html> [accessed 18 
June 2015], 6e-7a.
14 Perhaps Catholicism would be the most obvious example of a discrete religion. One might say in 
connection with Catholicism: retarding scientific development by the punishment of heresy, the 
Crusades, and the Spanish inquisitions are among the more obvious ethical abominations in its name. On 
the other hand, one might point to a great deal positive charity work done in its name, and much scientific 
progress made in the name of uncovering and understanding the majesty of God’s creation.
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that just as the existence of God is tangential to the content and existence of morality, 
so it is also to the objective meaning of our lives.
Religion and Lives W orth Living
Timothy D. Wilson has argued that people benefit from having a strong sense of 
purpose, and that this purpose is often religious.15 Some may take false comfort from 
such passages as Psalm 23, false that is, if Christianity were not true. It is not obvious 
however, that false comfort is undesirable, or less desirable than, say, a properly 
appreciative terror at death or a sense of emptiness in a world without meaning. In so 
far as life does not seem impossibly bleak to unbelievers, this might be because they are 
not honestly confronting the prospect, but deluding themselves. This is the worry that in 
the absence of religion, nihilism must be true.
Psalm 23 A psalm of David
Even though I walk 
through the darkest valley,
I will fear no evil, 
for you are with me; 
your rod and your staff, 
they comfort me.
One metric of meaningfulness, might be whether one’s beliefs are capable of inspiring 
great art. It might be worried that there is little of inspiration in a godless world and that 
atheism is incapable of inspiring art worth seeing or music worth hearing. 
Disenchantment is all that is left. There is nothing to marvel at, or glory to reflect 
without god. There indeed a preponderance of religious art works, but there are non­
religious ones too. It might reasonably be expected that there would be, since religion 
has been around for a very long time, and atheism seems to have been a rather more 
marginal position throughout history. Furthermore, the explanation for why there are 
such wonderful religious works of art is not that religion is necessary for the production 
of great art, but that religious institutions had the money to commission it. We do not 
need to be religious to benefit from religious works of art, but we will not benefit from
15 Timothy D. Wilson, Redirect; The Surprising New Science o f  Psychological Change (London: Allen 
Lane, 2011), p. 40.
them in the same way that a religious person will take themselves to benefit from it, by, 
for instance, coming to better appreciate the person of god, or the sacrifice of Jesus.
With or without God, the level of objective meaning in our lives seems the same. The 
question is sometimes put to atheists, as to what the meaning o f life would be without a 
God. The question is usually put on the assumption that either God gives us our 
meaning, or else we have no meaning at all. Atheists might hope to correct this 
assumption, arguing instead that either God gives us our purpose, or else we have only 
whatever meaning we make for ourselves. William Lane Craig argues that “whatever 
meaning we make for ourselves” boils down to “no meaning at all”, and while one 
might construct some sort of meaning as an atheist, it will be merely an illusory, 
subjective meaning. Meaning in theism, by contrast, is objective, in deriving from God. 
One may live one’s life with meaning “as an illusion” in the absence of absolute value, 
but it is still ultimately meaningless.16 Interestingly, contra Craig, Bernard Williams 
points out that if there is no perspective from which one can identify absolute 
importance or meaning (as Craig claims of the atheist world view), then there is no 
perspective which can deny our importance or meaning: “If there is no such thing as the 
cosmic point of view, if the idea of absolute importance in the scheme of things is an 
illusion [.,.] then there is no other point of view except ours in which our activities can
1 7have or lack significance.”
I side with neither Williams, nor with Craig; contra Williams, there are facts of value 
(both of goodness and meaning), and, contra Craig, whether or not God exists makes no 
difference to whether or not there are facts of value. The import of Euthyphro’s 
dilemma (“is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is 
loved by the gods?”) can be made relevant just by swapping ‘pious’ for ‘meaningful’. 
God doesn’t add anything ‘objective’ to the picture: either God’s judgements about how 
we are to live, what counts as valuable and what the best investment o f our time is are 
just one more opinion or they defer to a standard that we would have anyway. Now, if 
God exists, it might be true that he created us with a specific purpose in mind. This 
purpose does not limit our meaningful possibilities however. Even if this were
16 William Lane Craig in discussion with Christopher Hitchens, <http://www.youtube.com/watch7v 
=x9MRKJBKt4> [accessed 23 June 2015].
17 Bernard Williams (2006) ‘The Human Prejudice,' in Philosophy as a Humanistic D iscipline, ed. by 
A.W. Moore (Princeton, Princeton University Press), pp. 135-152, 137.
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determinate as the purpose of a knife is fairly determinate, we could still find other 
remarkable employments; the given one is not the only one (consider using the knife as 
a screw driver or lever). Some people suppose that life without an eternal afterlife is 
meaningless, and that life with such an afterlife is, for that very reason, meaningful. 
Wittgenstein points out that the problem is not resolved; it just applies for longer.
It is true however, that we may have to count God into our practical deliberations if he
does exist. But that does not affect the point that God makes no difference to the
objectivity of meaning. For instance, in our practical deliberations, we may have to
factor in that God can totally satisfy all of the people all of the time, and we might want
to commit ourselves to this satisfaction. Craig says that the point of life is to “give glory
to God and enjoy him,” and this might prove satisfying. On the other hand, while a
world with God might be preferable to one without, in being more godlike, we ought to
acknowledge and make the best of the world we have, rather than live with the illusion
of greater meaning. Alex Miller tells us that for Brian Leiter:
The central features of religious practice and belief [...] are that 
religious obligations are experienced as trumping all other
considerations, that religious beliefs don’t aspire to answer to empirical 
evidence and that religious beliefs provide ‘existential consolation’ in 
that they ‘render intelligible and tolerable the basic existential facts 
about human life, such as suffering and death’.18
Miller demurs, “In one respect Leiter is perhaps over-generous to religion” he says, for 
“while he agrees that many fundamental religious beliefs are false, his talk of religion 
as ‘rendering intelligible’ important facets of existence should perhaps be replaced by 
talk o f its apparently rendering such facets intelligible.” Miller observes that “given the 
falsity of fundamental religious beliefs, the ‘existential consolation’ it provides is akin 
to consolation provided by a drug, which is why Marx described it as the ‘opium of the 
people’ ” 19 Richard Dawkins refers to this sort of view as patronizing and
condescending, that while intellectuals might do alright without religion, “you hoi
20 * *polloi, you ordinary people down there, you need religion.” Dawkins is more
18 Alex Miller, ‘Beyond Belief Review of Brian Leiter Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton University 
Press 2013),’ Morning Star, 11 March 2013, p. 11.
19 Ibid.
20 Richard Dawkins, ‘Q&A with Richard Dawkins: ‘I guess I’m a cultural Christian,’ interviewed by Paul 
Bowers for Charleston City Paper (2013), <http://www.charlestoncitypaper.com/charleston/qanda-with- 
richard'dawkins-i-guess-im-a-cuhural-christian/Content?oid=4581071> [accessed 23 June 2015].
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optimistic about the prospects of people to reconciling themselves to living in a 
universe without God.
How R ational is Religious B elief (at best)?
We now turn to assessing the theoretical rationality of religions. We have two questions 
to answer here. First, should we assess religious belief by the standards of theoretical 
reason? Second, if we should assess religious belief by the standards of theoretical 
rationality, how do they fare by those standards (i.e. what is the state of religious 
apology, and natural theology)? There are at least three strands of argument suggesting 
that we need not to assess religious beliefs by the standards of theoretical rationality: 
Pascal’s Wager, Alvin Plantinga’s instance on ‘properly basic belief, and various 
versions of Wittgensteinian Fideism.
Pascal’s W ager
Pascal argues that where theoretical reason cannot decide the matter of whether or not
21God exists, practical considerations give us reason to cultivate belief in God. He 
reasons that rationally, we ought to minimize our potential loses, and in deciding 
whether or not to believe in god. If we believe in God where he does not exist, we lose 
relatively little, whereas if we fail to believe in God where he does exist, we lose out on 
eternal bliss, to eternal damnation. This argument only gets off the ground if  theoretical 
reason is, in fact, unable to determine whether or not to believe in God, which is what is 
in question. Moreover though, Pascal only addresses his considerations to deciding 
between the existence and non-existence of one particular god (one who punishes 
disbelief with torment, and rewards belief with paradise). But the range of options is not 
so narrow, “Another possibility is that there might be a god who looked with more 
favour on honest doubters or atheists [...] than on mercenary manipulators of their own 
understandings.” 22 But deciding between which of these two gods, with their 
contradictory attitudes to your potential decision, cuts away any practical reason to 
believe in one rather than the other, since the odds of benefitting or suffering from 
either decision are equal.
21 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, in Œuvres, ed. by L. Brunschvigg (Paris: Hatchette, 1925), Section III, §233.
22 John L. Mackie, The Miracle o f  Theism: Arguments For and Against the Existence o f  God (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 203.
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Properly Basic B elief
According to Alvin Plantinga, it is “entirely right, rational, reasonable, and proper to
^■5 t
believe in God without any evidence or argument at all.” All arguments require 
premises, and some premises are “properly basic”, requiring no further validation. 
Among those beliefs which require no further validation is belief in God. The warrant 
for our beliefs may properly be provided by perception or memory for instance, and 
neither perception nor memory need further support, otherwise justification would set 
out on an infinite regress. Belief in god is properly basic, Plantinga says, requiring no 
further argument. Some human beings, he contends, have been graced with a sensus 
divinitatis which equips them with knowledge of God just as perception equips us with 
knowledge of our environment.24 Thomas Nagel responds to this contention by 
remarking that:
if I ever found myself flooded with the conviction that what the Nicene 
Creed says is true, the most likely explanation would be that I was 
losing my mind, not that I was being granted the gift of faith. From 
Plantinga’s point of view, by contrast, I suffer from a kind of spiritual 
blindness from which I am unwilling to be cured.25
Plantinga and Nagel need not reach an impasse, however. Each properly basic kind of 
warrant is defeasible and can be proven unreliable by further investigation; perceptual 
delusions are possible after all. Perhaps Nagel has scope to persuade Plantinga by 
pointing out the inconsistencies of the import of Plantinga’s sensus divinitatis with the 
deliverances of his other senses. One method by which this could be done is by appeal 
to the problem of evil.
K inds o f F ideism  W hich M ay C all Them selves W ittgensteinian
Ludwig Wittgenstein never advocated a position which he called ‘fideism’, but the 
following are four positions drawing inspiration from his writing which may be so 
called (although the second pair may have a low fidelity):
23 Alvin Plantinga, ‘Reason and Belief in God,’ in Faith and Rationality, Third Edition (Paris: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1991), pp. 16-93, 17.
24 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian B elief {Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 214.
25 Thomas Nagel, ‘A Philosopher Defends Religion,’ in The New York Review o f  Books (2012), 
<http://www.nybooks.eom/articles/archives/2012/sep/27/philosopher-defends-religion/#fnr-2> [accessed 
23 June 2015].
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1. In Lectures and Conversations, Wittgenstein seemed to regard religious claims as 
different in kind from historical and scientific claims:
Suppose, for instance,[he says], that we knew people who foresaw the 
future; make forecasts for years and years ahead; and they described 
some sort of Judgement Day. Queerly enough, even if there were such 
a thing, and even if it were more convincing than I have described, 
belief in this happening wouldn’t be at all religious belief.26
Wittgenstein suggests that such a forecast would not make us change the way we live, 
but this is doubtful, as people adjust their lives to all sorts of new information in so far 
as they are rational. Wittgenstein then offers an example of something that he does take 
to be a religious forecast: whereas some particular individual would not be foolish 
enough to say ‘I had a dream that it will rain tomorrow, therefore it will’, they would 
say 'I  had a dream of the last judgement coming, therefore we can expect that’. These 
sorts of things can change the way you live, he suggests. So the sort of fideism which 
may be encouraged here is a sort of antirealism, to be contrasted to the realism of 
science and history; religious statements don’t say things which have much to do with 
science or history.
2. Wittgenstein observes in the Philosophical Investigations that explanations, reasons 
and justifications must come to an end somewhere: “explanations come to an end 
somewhere,” 27 “the chain of reasons has an end,” 28 and “justification comes to an 
end.”29 One stops somewhere and cannot go on defending their views ad infinitum. One 
might be inclined to suggest that it is the language community that cooperatively (and 
perhaps unconsciously) decide where justifications are to come to an end. This could 
allow for some religious beliefs being incorporated at that level.
3. Also, in the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein comments that “the meaning 
of a word is its use in the language” (though he goes on to say that this is only of “a 
large class of cases”).30 Richard Rorty takes this to mean that “no linguistic items
26 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, ed. 
by Cyril Barret (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2010), p. 56.
27 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2010), §1.
28 Ibid, §326.
29 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty, ed. by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright Trans, by Denis 
Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1969), §192.
30 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §4.
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represent any non-linguistic items.”31 This creates a sort of parity between science, 
religion, mathematics, psychoanalysis and so on: none can be said to be ‘picturing’, 
‘mirroring’ or ‘capturing’, the world, so none can be said to be the way the world is 
really. Language is kept ‘in touch’ with reality by being a useful tool: like saying ‘ouch’ 
when our feet hurt, or expressing disapproval with rude gestures (although, even the 
ideas ‘reality’ and ‘language’ are meant to be linguistic constructions). One then need 
only say that people speak in religious ways as one form of world-coping, which is no 
more accurate or inaccurate than any other. One might attempt to insulate it from 
external criticism by saying that it shares nothing with other ways of speaking, such as 
scientific ways. This sort of story requires that I do not say: all religious remarks are 
ethical and aesthetic ones, because that would mean they are not logically unique. 
Instead one would have to insist that they are without non-religious synonyms.
4. John McDowell uses a kind of parity argument to defend ethical realism: the idea that 
ethics is just as much part of the world as scientific laws.32 This argument can be used 
for apologetics. McDowell say that there is no objective way of seeing the world from 
which point of view we can say what is and is not a part of the world really. This seems 
to be the sort of argument one can use to defend religious beliefs: there’s no way of 
seeing what the world contains really, we have only the things we say about the world 
to go on and so long as religion is not just bad science, the things it describes are as 
much a part of the world as ethics and the laws of physics.
These forms are not satisfying however. In the first position, it sounds like Wittgenstein 
is employing a principle of charity as if to say: this is so absurd, it cannot be of the same 
kind as sober science and history, or no sane person could possibly believe it; but this is 
exactly what is in question and cannot count as a reason. Indeed, if Jesus were to return, 
this would have nothing to do with Christianity as Wittgenstein understands it and this 
is too counter intuitive a result; that it would both surprise Christians if this were to 
happen and that it would have nothing to do with the Christian faith. One might deny 
that this objection could not sensibly be raised since there is no difference between 
‘Jesus will return to judge us’ and ‘Jesus will really return to judge us,’ since they are
31 Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume One (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 2.
32 John McDowell, 4Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric o f  the World in Pleasure, Preference 
and Value, ed. by Eva Schaper (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 1-16.
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both a part of the religious language game. However we clearly can make sense of them 
as having cognitive and non-cognitive senses (e.g. one being a prediction and one being 
a false story that one acts ‘as i f  true in order to regulate their behaviour).
Against the second and third strand, there are two arguments I’d raise. The first is due 
to Bernard Williams: if we take religion to be true in a non-universal way and not true 
in the way that science is true, then the claims of religions are weakened to mean 
something other than intended.33 This applies also to the first form. The second is that 
conceptualism (the idea that reality is in some-way dependent on the concepts that we 
use) is self-defeating, since it fails to:
accommodate thinkers, their thoughts, and the concepts that they deploy 
[...] because concepts themselves are either something or else nothing - 
they either exist or they do not. If they don’t, then conceptualism is out 
of business. But if they do, then they themselves have an essence 
[which cannot itself be constituted by concepts].34
Against the fourth variant, I would defend the possibility of an absolute conception, and 
have done elsewhere.35 Indeed, denying the existence o f such a conception undermines 
itself by denying that we can describe mind-independent reality at all:
[Since] if nothing about the structure of mind independent reality is 
accessible to us then, by the same token, nothing about the structure of 
our own thought is accessible to us either - for in the relevant sense of 
‘mind-independent’, our thought itself is nothing if not part of mind- 
independent reality.36
The State o f Religious Apology and Natural Theology
Michael Hand comments on the state of religious apology, that:
The most even-handed view of the arguments [in support of religious 
propositions] is that they have some, but not decisive, rational force.
They do not place one under a rational obligation to accept their
33 Bernard Williams and Bryan Magee, ‘The Spell of Linguistic Philosophy,’ in Bryan Magee, Talking 
Philosophy: Dialogues with Fifteen Leading Philosophers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
34 E. J. Lowe, ‘How are Identity Conditions Grounded?’ in Persistence, ed. by C. Kanzian (Frankfurt: 
Ontos, 2008), p. 84.
35 John Tillson, ‘Is Knowledge What It Claims to Be? Bernard Williams and the Absolute Conception,’ 
Educational Philosophy and Theory 45(8) (2013), pp. 860-873.
36 E. Jonathan Lowe, A Survey o f  Metaphysics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 8-9.
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conclusions, but they carry enough weight to make those conclusions 
rationally credible.37
Michael Hand then answers ‘no’ to both of our questions: failing to believe in and 
submit to a super-being is not irrational, and belief in and submission to a super-being is 
not irrational. To assess this view, we must have a notion of what constitutes a rational 
belief, and what constitutes an irrational belief. We will then want to ask whether belief 
in super-beings to whom one submits on account of their rightful dominion is rational. 
Rational belief, at a minimum, requires that the content of one’s belief is coherent i.e. 
that it has content, and is not self-defeating. More than that, though, it requires that one 
have reasons for one’s belief that show it to be more probable than not, and more 
probable than alternative explanations. With Karl Popper, we may also require that they 
be capable of falsification. For, if they are consistent with all the possible data, they 
seem not to be genuinely contentful at all. To be a genuinely reasonable hypothesis they 
will need to generate predictions that might turn out to conflict with contingent data, but 
happen to be confirmed by it, and will need to be the simplest explanation of the data 
that we have. It ought to be acknowledged that these standards cannot apply to all 
beliefs, and some, as Plantinga has convincingly argued, must be properly basic, 
requiring no further justification. However, even beliefs such as these are not thereby 
infallible.
Roughly though, there are two main kinds of arguments which can be appealed to: a 
priori arguments, and a posteriori arguments; the former hope to be true without the 
need to consult evidence, and the latter hope to be true given the available evidence. It 
is only the ontological arguments which claim to be the former, the others all claim to 
be the latter.38 The ontological argument claims that God’s existence is necessary, since 
existence is built into the very concept of God. In the simplest version of the argument, 
you are asked to imagine something than which nothing greater can be conceived. What 
you are imagining must have every kind of perfection, otherwise something yet greater 
could be conceived in having one extra kind of perfection, and that would mean that 
you were not thinking of that than which nothing greater can be conceived. Existence, it
37 Hand, ‘Religious Education.’
38 Three notable version of the argument were developed by St Anselm, Descartes and Plantinga. St. 
Anselm, Proslogion, in S t Anselm's Proslogion, trans. by Clement C.J. Webb, <https://en.wikisource. 
org/wiki/Proslogion> [accessed 18 June 2015]; René Descartes, Discourse on M ethod and The 
M editations, trans. with an introduction by F. Sutcliffe (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968); Alvin 
Plantinga, The Nature o f  Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974).
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is said, is more perfect than non-existence, and thus the greatest conceivable thing must 
also exist. However, it was convincingly objected by Immanuel Kant, that existence is 
not a property that something can have or lack.39 As Peter Hacker has pointed out, “the 
verb ‘to exist’ looks no different from such verbs as ‘to eat’ or ‘to drink’,” but while “it 
makes sense to ask how many people in College don’t eat meat or drink wine, it makes 
no sense to ask how many people in College don’t exist.”40
The arguments a posteriori are arguments to the best explanation of some contingent 
facts about the world. Wherefore life on earth, wherefore rationality, wherefore the 
character of human consciousness, what best explains these? Richard Swinburne 
suggests that we would expect these features of the universe if God existed, and would 
not expect them if God did not exist. Since they exist, it is more likely that God exists 
than does not.41 They also include arguments from some basic principles of rationality 
plus general features of experience, such as the arguments from contingency to 
necessity, arguments from motion, and causation, for instance: explanation has to 
terminate somewhere and cannot go on ad infinitum , there exist contingent beings, 
objects in motion and events which are caused, these must terminate in a necessary 
being, an unmoved mover, and an uncaused causer, respectively. All of the arguments 
from contingency to necessity, from motion, and causation could go through and 
converge on a single, necessary unmoved and uncaused causer, but they would not 
establish the existence of an agent, let alone a super-agent, or one to whom we should 
defer.
Moreover, though, the argument to necessity from contingency does not go through. 
The principle of sufficient reason suggests that for each contingent being, there must be 
a sufficient explanation for its existence, and then again it must be asked what the 
explanation for the existence of that contingent being is. Such a regress can only 
terminate in a necessary being, it is thought. But it seems that the principle of sufficient 
reason is not a principle that we may fairy apply in this way. It is a prejudice to expect 
that there is a sufficient reason for everything; it seems just as likely that some 
contingent aspects of reality are inexplicable.
39 Immanuel Kant, Critique o f  Pure Reason, Second Edition, trans. by N. Kemp-Smith (London: 
Macmillan, 1933).
40 P.M.S. Hacker, Wittgenstein (London: Hachette, 2011), p. 8.
41 Richard G. Swinburne, The Existence o f God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).
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Some insist that the principle of sufficient reason demands that there be some sufficient 
cause for the world’s existence. Some (notably William Lane Craig) suggest that God is 
the most parsimonious explanation that we have. A God being a simple entity made of 
no parts, but capable of acting and creating is the simplest explanation for the existence 
of something rather than nothing, and god being necessary (and ontologically simple, 
made of no parts) requires no explanation himself. Apart from this use of the principle 
of sufficient reason, we should respond with Dennett by asking “How could postulating 
something supernatural and incomprehensible be parsimonious? It strikes me as the 
height of extravagance.”42
According to Alvin Plantinga, evolution and naturalism are an unstable combination of 
beliefs, and rationally one has to reject one or the other.43 However, since it seems that 
we have good reason to believe that evolution is true, then rationally, for this to be 
possible, we must reject naturalism. Indeed, atheist, Thomas Nagel has even expressed 
some sympathy for this view in his book, The Last Word: “Without something more, 
the idea that our rational capacity was the product of natural selection [...] there would 
be no reason to trust its results in mathematics and science, for example.” 44 (And in so 
far as the evolutionary hypothesis itself depends on reason, it would be self- 
undermining.) The evolutionary hypothesis is acceptable only if reason does not need 
its support. At most, it may show that reason need not be biologically mysterious.451 
too do not think that evolutionary development shows that we have reason to trust out 
faculties of reason; it does not obviously vindicate rationality. However, it again seems 
precipitous to terminate explanation in God.
The Problem  of Evil
As we have already noted in Chapter 2, the problem of evil challenges theists by asking 
why it is, if God is able to prevent suffering, knows about the existence of suffering, 
and is morally good, that suffering persists then. Anselm’s definition casts God as that 
than which no greater can be conceived, others as an omniscient, omnipotent and 
omnibenevolent, agent composed of no parts. Obviously such beings would qualify as
42 Daniel C. Dennett, Intuition Pumps and Other Tools fo r  Thinking (London: Penguin, 2014), p. 39.
43 Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), Chapter 12.
44 Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 135.
45 Ibid, p. 136.
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gods, and ones to whom it is right to defer, but suppose a being existed except that it did 
not know exactly one thing, and that no other similar being existed. It would seem odd 
to deny their being God, especially if that being played the role that is traditionally 
thought to have been played by Yahweh or Allah. In Chapter 6 , 1 defended the view that 
a god is one who excels us in every respect, and with whom we have no chance of 
competing successfully. This allows that for us, mortal, fallible and flawed, human 
beings, God need not be that than which no greater can be conceived, and so the 
problem of evil poses less of a threat to religion. The sort of god required for religion is 
one to whom we ought to defer. We ought to defer to such beings that know the good, 
and recommend the good to us. Even still all that is required for the problem is that god 
is supposed to know about human suffering, care about it, and be able to stop it, while, 
as a matter of fact, suffering persists.
Again, as noted in Chapter 2, the apologist’s usual responses that 1) suffering is a 
consequence of allowing free will, and 2) suffering allows for moral growth. These 
arguments are vulnerable to very reasonable counterarguments: namely that free will 
does not account for natural evil, and natural evil can do as much to diminish moral 
growth, and makes unfair use of some people for the moral growth of others. We might 
add another theodicy: God is knowledgeable, powerful and good enough to be beyond 
human rivalry, but not knowledgeable, powerful and good enough to prevent human 
suffering. Indeed, they may know and recommend the good to us, but be weak willed 
themselves (if less so than we human beings), and sometimes fail to live up to it. Even 
still, the problem poses enough of a threat to suggest that denying religious belief is not 
irrational. It seems to be a discussion on which reasonable arguments and 
interpretations can be made by both sides.
Socially Em bodied Rationality
We can, each of us, evaluate arguments for ourselves, but it may be well to defer in part ' 
to the judgement of others, for unless we can convince others that we are right, we may 
have reason for hesitancy. It is possible to be the lone bastion of truth in a population of 
ignorance, but if one seems unable to persuade others who patiently listen to our 
arguments, we may suspect that we may not have certain knowledge. Let us say, with 
James Ladyman, that science progresses with the benefit of argument and evidence
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(they are what it is hoped will persuade people), but also relies on certain features of 
social organization.46 Certain social organizations allow open minded people to come 
together and present possibly true claims. They then attempt to offer evidence and 
argument in support of these claims. Others are then able to look for evidence that 
would be consistent or inconsistent with it. Those which are best supported will, by and 
large, be accepted by the group. The group’s aggregate belief set is more likely to track 
the truth than is the belief set of any particular member. It would have to be those that 
are familiar with the relevant arguments, and have some talent at assessing them, whose 
opinions would be of interest, and not just anybody’s.
Have we any such social organization in academic philosophy? The survey of 
philosophers’ opinions conducted by Bourget and Chalmers show 72.8% of respondents 
embrace atheism, 14.6% embrace theism and 12.6% embrace neither.47 The clear 
majority of respondents then, consider themselves to be atheists. However, it might not 
be in their professional capacity that they hold this view; it might not be that those 
asked were expert enough to have a properly informed view; not being philosophers of 
religion, but, for instance, ethicists. There might be a selection bias in asking 
philosophers of religion or theologians for their opinions; they might have gotten into 
philosophy of religion in order to justify their views, and so not be good, impartial 
judges of the success of failure of their arguments. On the other hand, those outside of 
these fields might be insufficiently familiar with the arguments to have given them a 
fair hearing.
It is highly doubtful that the survey should be taken as an indicative that denying 
atheism is irrational, and indeed it was not intended to show any such thing, but merely 
to give philosophers some basis for making statements of the form; such that a form is 
so common as to warrant being called The orthodox view’, or The official doctrine’. 
There may be ways to systematize academic philosophy such that the majority opinion 
among experts cannot rationally be rejected by non-experts. However, unlike science, it 
seems that it is in no such state at present. Still, perhaps in the absence of a critical, 
open institutional network such as to warrant scientific theories, which subject beliefs to
46 James Ladyman, ‘Pseudoscience and Bullshit,’ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=32ZaT Ka2IRg> 
[accessed 23 June 2015].
47 David Bourget and David J. Chalmers, ‘What do Philosophers Believe?’ Philosophical Studies 170(3) 
(2013), pp. 1-36.
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systematic scrutiny in the pursuit of rational consensus, religious belief is not rationally 
compelling.
Summary
Is failure to believe in and submit to a super-being irrational? Is belief in and 
submission to a super-being irrational? Or are neither irrational? From this necessarily 
brief overview of the relevant arguments, it seems that I must agree with Hand that 
failing to believe in and submit to a super-being is not irrational, and belief in and 
submission to a super-being is not irrational. We discussed whether religion, in essence, 
was inherently good or bad, and it seemed to be neither. We then discussed whether two 
utilitarian arguments to encourage religious belief, namely that Religion (at its best) is a 
scaffold that cultivates goodness or whether life without religion is impossibly bleak 
and deathly terrifying. I argued that the existence of God is tangential to both the 
content and existence of morality and also the objective meaning of our lives. We 
addressed three arguments to the effect that theoretical reason was irrelevant to 
determination of whether it is rational or irrational to believe in God. Finally, we 
discussed whether there were good theoretical reasons, and found, from the arguments 
looked at, that there may be scope for not believing irrationally in so far as one already 
takes God to exist as a simple fact, for which one’s intuition is not susceptible to an 
error theory which one is committed to by other basic beliefs, and finally in so far as 
other basic beliefs do not conflict with it. The problem of evil poses enough of a threat 
to the existence of God that one cannot think it unreasonable to deny religious belief.
C h a p ter  N in e
H O W  C H ILDREN OUGHT TO BE FO R M A T IV E L Y  INFLUEN C ED  W ITH
RESPECT TO R ELIG IO N (S) 
Introduction
As explained in Chapter 1, my research has been concerned with how (if at all) we may 
ethically influence children, with respect to religion(s), or, equivalently, what ethical 
claims (if any) children have over us when it comes to our influencing them, with 
respect to religion(s), and what ethical claims (if any) we have over them. I said there 
that it is formative influence that I would be interested in particular. In our first chapter, 
we identified seven sub-questions, the answers to which put us in a position to answer 
the overall question. These seven questions were:
1. What are the sources of responsibility? (Chapter 2)
2. What is the content of responsibility? (Chapter 3)
3. In what respects are we apt to be formatively influenced? (Chapter 4)
4. What means of formative influence are available? (Chapter 5)
5. What ethical obligations and restrictions are there on the means by which and 
the ends towards which we formatively influence children? (Chapter 6)
6. What is a religion? (Chapter 7)
7. How rational is religious belief? (Chapter 8)
In this concluding chapter we summarise the findings of our research so far, and explain 
what import, taken together, they have for answering our overarching question that we 
set out in our first chapter.
Ethical Foundations
Over Chapters 2 and 3 ,1 unfolded what I took to be the ethical foundations pre-requisite 
for any answer to our primary question. That involved answering the following 
questions:
1. What sorts of beneficiaries can we be morally responsible for?
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2, In virtue of what is it that people are responsible for averting harms to and 
ensuring benefits for anything?
3. What counts as a harm or benefit for human beings?
In answer to the first, I argued that what we can be morally responsible for is those of 
our actions and omissions which bear on the wellbeing of intrinsically valuable objects, 
such as human beings. In answer to the second, I concluded that the best person for the 
(ethical) job is responsible for making sure that it is done, and argued that this principle 
is able to ground both parental and extra-parental responsibility to children. From this, 
I concluded that, ethically speaking, some primary care giver (usually a biological
parent or biological parents, in virtue of their usually being best able to satisfy the role)
is responsible for ensuring basic benefits for children, and averting harms to them. 
Additionally, we saw that some extra-parental responsibilities are generated by 
children’s welfare needs (by their harm benefit profiles) which out-strips what parents 
are able to provide (at least qua parents). In answer to the third question, I defended the 
view that the nearer an act brings us towards becoming like God, the better it is for us, 
and the more it keeps us from becoming like God, the more it harms us.
Respects in W hich W e are A pt To Be Form atively Influence
As we have frequently reminded ourselves, it is the ethics of deliberate, formative 
influence that I am interested in here, and I have distinguished formative influences 
from behavioural influences in Chapter 1, claiming that whereas behavioural influences 
make a difference to what people do, and formative influences make a difference to 
those of their internal malleable characteristics in virtue of which they are apt to do 
what they do. But in virtue of which characteristics is it that people are apt to do what 
they do? In Chapter 4, I argued that we are apt to be formatively influenced in the 
following five respects:
1. The degrees and kinds of one’s physical and mental abilities
2. One’s stock of concepts
3. Those propos itions which one unders tands
4. One’s cognitive attitudes, such as belief and disbelief, to those propositions
5. One’s affective attitudes to those propositions and also to objects
Ethical M eans and Ends of Form ative Influence
In Chapter 5, I argued that, morally, influence should take a basically rational form so 
far as that is practicable, but that non-rational means could be used where people, such 
as small children, are insufficiently rational to benefit from rational influence. The 
import of Chapter 3 was that the more rational people are, the better off they are (i.e. the 
more competent and inclined they are to apportion belief to the evidence, to seek 
evidence, and to suspend judgement where they lack evidence).1 In particular, I agreed 
with Michael Hand that we should equip children to be in a position to rationally form 
and revise opinions about those matters which are momentous to their lives. In Chapter 
6, we saw that for each prospective formative influence which a child could adopt, 
influencers may ignore it, promote it, demote it, or draw attention to it as something 
worthy of consideration to adopt. The theory of ethical influence that I developed was 
the following, that for each prospective formative influence, it ought to be promoted, 
floated or demoted respectively, according to the following three sets of criteria, and 
where none of these apply, it might be fairly ignored:
1. a) That it is momentous; b) that it might well not be adopted without 
intervention; c) failing to have it is irrational.
2. a) That it is momentous; b) that it might well not be understood and rationally 
evaluated without intervention; c) neither having it nor not having it is irrational
3. a) That it is momentous; b) that it might well be adopted without intervention; 
c) having it is irrational.
In Chapter 6, we also saw how the influences which may be had may be more or less 
comprehensive or specific depending on just how many respects it is in which we 
influence one another. We argued that the greater comprehensiveness of a set of 
influences being imparted, the more the moral stakes are raised. Furthermore, while it 
might be alright morally, on some occasions, to favour the practical rationality of the 
beliefs that one imparts over their theoretical rationality, in so far as those beliefs are 
highly comprehensive, it becomes significantly immoral to sacrifice theoretical 
rationality in formative influence.
1 Evidence is not always necessary or relevant to establishing the truth of claims. There are some claims 
which are (quite properly) immune from evidential refutation: seemingly truths of maths and logic, as 
these are prior to evidence. Furthermore, it seems that some (defeasible) warrants for belief require no 
further justification, on pain of infinite regress, warrants such as memory and perception.
These same considerations were seen to preside over both formal educators, and 
informal educator, such as caregivers. Also, in Chapter 6, it was shown how the above 
theory of ethical influence could be used to select curricula content where a planned 
programme of learning delivered by subject experts is the sort of intervention that 
would be required to rationally encourage and discourage them in children, or to enable 
children to better judge their rationality. Since parents or, more generally, primary 
carers could not reasonably be expected to satisfy this entitlement qua parents and 
primary carers, the responsibility would be what I termed ‘extra-parental’ in Chapter 3. 
However, we admitted that even to the extent that we are equipped with such evidence 
to warrant being directive, we ought still to emphasize fallibility and deference to 
reasons rather than commitment to conclusions, and to the extent that we are not so 
equipped, we ought to encourage interest, and rational deliberation but stop short of 
promoting or undermining particular views. This then, amounted to our theory of 
ethical influence. Chapters 7 and 8 began to lay the foundations to apply this theory of 
ethical influence to religion.
A pplication to Religion
To give content to the question of how children ought to be influenced with respect to 
religions, we have had to explain what sorts of things religions are. Our answer was that 
religions are those things that essentially require a) belief in super-beings and b) and 
submission to them as having rightful dominion. As became apparent in Chapter 6, the 
key questions for whether religious initiation is ethically acceptable were these:
1. Are the content of one’s beliefs about and attitudes to religion momentous?
2. How rational is religious belief?
2.1. Is failing to believe in and submit to a super-being irrational?
2.2. Is belief in and submission to a super-being irrational?
3. Does correct belief require intervention, or is it likely to occur without 
intervention?
4. Is religious belief more comprehensive or more restricted in its effects on those 
respects in which we are apt to be formative of influenced?
Both by providing some fresh considerations, and by drawing on the import of Chapter 
8, we shall turn now to answering these questions.
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Does is it M atter W hether One is Religious?
Some might like to suggest that religion is essentially idle, an epiphenomenon that is 
causally impotent. Arguing along those lines, they may suggest that the world would be 
much the same with or without religion. However, it seems that religious beliefs and 
beliefs about religions do motivate actions, and so this is not true.
It is instructive to consider Pascal’s Wager here.2 Either there is a super-being to which 
one should be orientated in a certain way or there is no such being, and no such 
orientation is possible. As we have seen, Pascal observes that there is less of a cost in 
living as though there is such a being when there is not than in living as though there is 
not such a being when there is. Whether one is religious matters more if religion is true 
than if it is false then, but it does still matter. Non-religious people would be less 
inclined to evangelize against religion if being religious was only significant for 
religious people. To the extent that being religious is of public significance in what they 
consider to be bad ways (to take an extreme example, bombing abortion clinics), they 
will be inclined to evangelize against it. While I accept that Socrates’ response to 
Euthyphro’s dilemma rules out the possibility of super-beings’ judgements about 
goodness being moral truth-makers, others do not. Furthermore, one may allow that 
super-beings are better placed to track moral truths, even if they do not invent them. 
And so the believer will defer to that being about what they ought to do, what is good, 
what is important and what is best, all of which makes a convincing case that it matters 
whether one is religious or not. Without knowing in advance whether or not it is true 
that a god exists and we should defer to them, it is at least pragmatically significant 
whether or not there is such a being.
H ow Rational is Religious Belief?
Is failing to believe in and submit to a super-being irrational? Is belief in and 
submission to a super-being irrational? Or are neither irrational? In Chapter 8, we 
discussed whether religion, in essence, was inherently good or bad, and it seemed to be 
neither. We then evaluated two utilitarian arguments to encourage religious belief, 
namely that Religion (at its best) is a scaffold that cultivates goodness or whether life 
without religion is impossibly bleak and deathly terrifying. I argued that the existence
2 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, in Œuvres, ed. by L. Brunschvigg (Paris: Hatchette, 1925) Section III, §233.
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of God is tangential to both the content and existence of morality and also to the 
objective meaning of our lives. Finally, we discussed whether there were good 
theoretical reasons for religious belief. We found that there may be scope for some 
people to believe rationally, in so far as a) they already take god to exist as basic datum 
and b) other basic beliefs do not conflict with it. However, the problem of evil poses 
enough of a threat to the existence of god, that one cannot think it unreasonable to deny 
religious belief From this necessarily brief overview of the relevant arguments, it 
seems that I must agree with Hand that failing to believe in and submit to a super-being 
is not (always) irrational, and neither is a belief in and submission to a super-being 
(always) irrational.
Does Rational Evaluation of Religion R equire Intervention?
An intervention is an action which aims to make a difference to a state of affairs, so that 
a different outcome obtains than would in its absence. It seems that interventions are 
required to cultivate rationality, with respect to religious beliefs and attitudes, and 
beliefs and attitudes about religions. Whereas many things come naturally to most 
children, such as swallowing, speaking, walking and playing, it seems that critical 
reflection on prospective respects of formative influence does not. Furthermore, a 
planned programme of learning delivered by subject experts is precisely what would be 
required to enable one to make rational judgments about the truth or falsity of religious 
propositions. Parents or, more generally, primary carers could not reasonably be 
expected to satisfy this entitlement qua parents and primary carers.
Does R eligious Initiation Am ount to A C om prehensive Set o f Form ative  
Influences?
Michael Hand observes that “most of us, while we recognise that it is normally wrong 
for parents to use their perceived intellectual authority to impart not-known-to-be-true 
beliefs, are prepared to grant exceptions to this rule when the belief confers a significant 
benefit on the child.”3 He gives as an example, telling one’s children that “the tooth 
fairy will come for your tooth tonight.” However, there seems to be a significant 
difference between this belief and religious belief, namely that the latter is very much
3 Hand, ‘Religious Upbringing Reconsidered,’ pp.545-557, 555.
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more comprehensive. The enabling reasons as to why it might be alright to tell children 
to believe in Tooth Fairies and Santa Claus are that the falsehoods propagated are a) 
fairly narrow and b) come with a somewhat limited life span. All the same, it still 
carries underappreciated moral costs.
Some might like to say that children do not really believe in Santa, or that it would 
merely count as make-believe to pretend that he exists, and not as lying. However, I 
think that these claims are both false: children do believe in Santa, and to the extent that 
we sustain their belief in Santa, we often lie, conceal information, and otherwise 
mislead them. Belief is to be distinguished from make-believe (certainly on their part). 
Make-believe involves at once being aware of the falsehood of propositions, and yet 
playing along ‘as i f  they were true; when children act in plays, they do not confuse 
their part for real life. Allow me to cite two personal experiences by way of illustration. 
As I saw it, my toy was delivered down the wrong chimney by Santa, and the 
neighbouring family unjustly kept it from me, which was as good as stealing, for I had 
requested that very toy of Santa, while my neighbour had not. Indeed, when I 
mentioned the problem to my neighbour’s parents, they laughed about it.
How far does one go in sustaining the belief if it is questioned? One might have to 
make fake reports. Sometime later, I tried to disabuse another child of her belief in 
Santa, and she was, in the moment, at least, devastated. Streaming with tears, she listed 
her evidence for her belief in Santa: she had written letters to him, and had received 
replies, had heard sleigh bells, and her parents had testified to his existence. I told her 
that the evidence was easily faked, and that her parents could well be lying. She insisted 
that she would have recognized her parents’ and neighbour’s handwriting, and that her 
parents would not lie to her. Loss of trust is one reason why you would want to avoid 
being caught out as a liar. However, most parent-child relationships are not too 
damaged by children realizing that their parents lied to them about Santa. Indeed, 
coming to see through the lie can be seen as a positive experience of coming of age, o f 
leaving one’s childish state. To the extent that this girl had been initiated into a 
comprehensive set of false beliefs there was more chance of residual damage, once she 
had been disabused of the central beliefs. As I have emphasized, truth is unitary, and to 
the extent that one successfully and comprehensively integrates false belief into one’s
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belief set, residual damage can be left when the central beliefs are eliminated.4 The 
worry is that a narrow set of beliefs (about Santa) may sprawl to affect other beliefs, in 
light of the unity of truth. Consider the following questions that might be posed, and to 
which answers would further elaborate and damage the accuracy of one’s belief set, and 
perhaps even one’s ability to form and rationally revise beliefs. What has Jesus to do 
with Santa? How can Santa do the things he does? How old is Santa and can he die? 
Where does he live? Can we visit him? The more inquisitive the child is, the more 
elaborate the stories have to become and the more danger there is that they will 
cultivate a systematically false belief set, leaving residual damage when the principle 
beliefs are gone. John Broome gives an example of this working at a simple level: “I 
look out of the window and see that it is raining, and immediately believe it is raining. 
Sometime later I look up and see that it has stopped raining, and no longer believe that 
it is raining. The initial belief is immediately erased” .5
However, it is not at all likely that all beliefs will be amended to fit together and less 
likely the more comprehensive and fundamental the beliefs are. In contrast to a belief in 
Santa and the tooth fairy, it seems that religions are comprehensive, and it is their very 
comprehensiveness that makes them morally special: “Religious traditions are so 
comprehensive and all-encompassing in their claims that almost every domain of 
philosophy may be drawn upon in the philosophical investigation of their coherence, 
justification, and value.”6
Religions are doctrinally totalizing, that is to say that they are often close to a theory of 
everything. The same might be said of some scientific theories; however, religions are 
usually more comprehensive in this way than is any single theory in, say, physics, and 
with far less warrant than, say, Einstein’s theories of general and special relativity. 
Religions often have cosmological hypotheses, but they also make prescriptions, and 
evaluations (they, in Hand’s phrase, “recommend patterns of life”). They have 
readymade answers to lots of questions that are to be accepted wholesale. That would 
be fine if they were so well justified to make denial irrational, but as we saw in Chapter
4 At best, one might compartmentalize their belief sets, giving truth a duality, as in George Orwell’s 
novel, 1984 , in which it is allowed that two and two always makes a four in weapons development, but 
makes a five in politics.
5 John Broome, ‘Rationality,’ <http://podcasts.ox.ac.uk/john-broome-rationality> @38:00, [accessed 23 
June 2015].
6 Charles Taliaferro, ‘Philosophy of Religion,’ in The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy (Fall 2013 
Edition), ed. by Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/philosophy- 
religion/> [accessed 23 June 2015],
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8, it seems that they are not. It is not just religions that have this feature, indeed, Daniel
C. Dennett’s physicalism, is similarly comprehensive, as is Humanism, and Dialectical 
Materialism. In Chapter 8 ,1 argued that no religion has sufficient support to warrant its 
directive teaching to young people, that is, to warrant religious initiation. At the same 
time, it seems entirely possible that some children do already believe rationally, and 
while, promoting rational belief is a desirable aim, and thereby promoting critical 
scrutiny, going further and making it an aim to disabuse children of their religious 
beliefs carte blanche is also not acceptable, for they are not all obviously irrational in 
their beliefs.
Should Religious Initiation be O ptional for Children?
What is the range of choices possible regarding one’s potential initiation? One may, by 
default, have been either ‘opted in’, or ‘opted out’ of some initiatory process. One may 
have been opted in, with the option to leave, or opted in with no option to leave. 
Alternatively, one may have been opted out with the option to enter, or without the 
option to enter. These four options can be represented in the following figure:
Originally Opted In
Subsequently Able to Opt out 1
Not Subsequently Able to Opt Out 2
Originally Opted Out
Subsequently Able to Opt In 3
Not Subsequently Able to Opt In 4
From our discussion of basic goods and paternalist duties to ensure that they be satisfied 
in Chapter 3, it seems that if a child would like to start riding horses at no particular 
cost (e.g. financial), that would be alright, and if a child wanted to stop riding horses at 
no particular cost (e.g. being a worse huntsman in a hunting community), that too 
would be alright. Neither a system in which children were initiated into horse riding, 
with the option to stop doing so, or one in which they were initiated into riding horses, 
only if they opted in, is objectionable. In the absence of any significant drawbacks to
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those that cannot ride horses (or to others dependent on their being so able), a system 
which insisted on children’s learning to ride horses (opting them in without the choice 
to opt out) would seem unduly coercive. It would then seem appropriate to say that 
horse riding was being unfairly forced on children. On the other hand, there are some 
activities that we do not think we ought to initiate children into at all. Gambling, 
drinking alcohol, sexual intercourse, and blood sport are perhaps strong examples. 
Here, neither do we opt children in, nor do we allow children to opt in. Conversely, 
there are some forms of initiation which we do not think that children ought to be able 
to opt out of, and which they ought to be opted into by default. Moral development, 
numeracy, literacy, language development, and leading a healthy life style, are perhaps 
strong examples here.
Where should the various ways in which one can be formatively influenced with respect 
to religion, fit on this fourfold array of choices? It seems that being initiated into a 
religion should be a matter of total option for adults; where one must opt in, and where 
one has the ability to opt out at any point, but what about children? At what age should 
people be allowed to ‘opt in’ to religion? Should, for example, the Catholic Church 
address children as potential converts? I argue not. Instead, the Catholic Church ought 
to recognize that even though it takes faith to be true and of maximal significance, there 
is a plurality of other options which are at least as reasonable, and that it is not so well 
supported by evidence and argument to make its denial irrational, which, as we saw in 
Chapter 6, is what is required for the encouragement of a formative influence in 
children to be warranted, this is all the more important when the set of formative 
influences in question is so comprehensive as religious belief. Equally however, we saw 
in Chapter 8 that religious belief can be rational and so it is not thereby irrational to 
deny that atheism is true, and so morally wrong to encourage atheism, even if children 
ought to be encouraged to reflect critically on religious doctrines and practices.
None of this is to urge that students ought to be insulated from religious belief and 
beliefs about religion, or that they should not be able to discuss any that they 
themselves may have acquired or developed. Instead, in due course, I will argue, in line 
with Chapter 6, that we should inform children about religions, and facilitate their
7 Actually a more nuanced position might think that forms of initiation into safe forms of alcohol 
consumption, and harmless gambling, or even sexuality (cf. John Wilson on sexual initiation among 
children, who emphasizes role play and fiction) might be reasonable. John Wilson, 'Can Sex Education 
be Practical?’ Sex Education: Sexuality, Society and Learning 3(1) (2003), pp. 23-32.
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ability to evaluate religious claims and attitudes, and attitudes and claims about religion. 
Indeed, it seems that learning about religions (among other forms of diversity, and 
theories of meaning, and ethical systems) is neither a matter for opting in or out where 
children are concerned. First, though, I shall consider an objection to what has been 
argued so far.
Some are wont to respond that there are no neutral forms of initiation (e.g. Trevor 
Cooling, Anne Hession, and Elmer J. Thiessen).8 Instead, they regard the failure to 
initiate children into a religious perspective as initiating them into a substantive, non­
religious perspective. I want now to discuss some terms that are often used as if they 
were interchangeable, but which ought to be distinguished. I have in mind the concepts 
of neutrality, impartiality, objectivity, unbiasedness, and balance. What have these 
concepts to do with one another? First, we should distinguish between their being used 
to characterize a) methods of inquiry, b) the presentation of issues, and c) the state of 
one’s opinions or allegiances. Methods of inquiry are procedures which one uses to 
come to one’s decisions. The presentation of issues is to be understood as, for instance, 
how journalists report on, or how teachers teach, topics, events, and disputes (in 
particular, whether they are taught directively or non-directively). The state of one’s 
opinions or allegiances is made up of one’s propositional and relational attitudes. Let us 
start by discussing the term ‘neutrality’, and which terms are in fact interchangeable 
with it.
The Nature o f N eutrality
The word ‘neutrality’ (as distinct from siding with a disputant or deciding on an issue) 
may be used to characterize one’s opinions and allegiances, but also how issues are 
presented -  that is as to whether issues are taught ‘directively’ or ‘non-directively’.9 It 
is better, I think, to use the terms ‘directive’ and ‘non-directive’, to refer to how topics 
are taught than the term ‘neutral’, since those terms can only apply to how topics are 
taught. It is better, too, to reserve the term ‘neutral’ for characterizing the state of one’s
8 Trevor Cooling, ‘Contestable Beliefs in Education: Fairness and/or Neutrality?’ Oxford Review o f  
Education 38(5) (2012), pp. 551-566; Anne Hession, Catholic Primary Religious Education in a Pluralist 
Environment (Dublin: Veritas, 2015); Elmer John Thiessen, Teaching fo r  Commitment: Liberal 
Education, Indoctrination, and Christian Nurture (MQUP: McGill-Queen's Press, 1993).
9 Cf. Michael Hand, ‘Should We Teach Homosexuality as a Controversial Issue?’ Theory and Research 
in Education 5(1) (2007), pp. 69-86; ‘What Should We Teach as Controversial? A Defence of the 
Epistemic Criterion,’ Educational Theory 58(2) (2008), pp. 213-228.
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opinions, and that is the sense in which I shall discuss it beneath. The sense of term is 
interchangeable with ‘non-partisan’, which is to be contrasted with ‘partisan’. It is also 
interchangeable with ‘uncommitted’, which is to be contrasted with ‘committed’.
Some people claim that neutrality is impossible. However, I take neutrality to be a state 
of indecision between options, and it would be absurd to say that indecision were a 
decisive state. Hess and McAvoy claim that “[educational] aims are never neutral.”10 
While it is true that aims, and people, cannot be neutral tout court, or neutral about 
everything, they can be neutral on particular matters, or neutral between other states. 
And, once this is admitted, it must be acknowledged that questions, aims and people 
can be neutral on some matters (even while they cannot be neutral on all matters).11
Why might neutrality be unattainable? One might say ‘whoever is not for us is against 
us’, and conclude that someone neutral between, say, the allied and the axis forces, such 
as Switzerland, was thereby an enemy. This result is also absurd, though: an enemy 
opposes one’s ends, rather than simply fails to support them. One might suggest that 
neutrality is a commitment in itself, that it is a position (that neutrality is itself not 
neutral, and so is a self-defeating concept). In the case of Switzerland’s role in the 
Second World War (or lack of it), we can reasonably say that Swiss State took a policy: 
that of refusing to take sides. In this case, there were committed to non-commitment to 
both the allied and axis forces. That is to say, their commitment was a of second order 
kind. While this preserves the notion of neutrality, second order of commitment is not 
required to understand the notion of neutrality. As an illustration of this, we may regard 
Burden’s ass as being neutral on which bale of hay to eat from first, on account of 
simple indecision between those options, not because it prefers not to commit to either 
option. Whether due to a decisive refusal, or a state of indecision, neutrality is clearly 
possible, meaning either a failure or refusal to take sides. We might thus say that there 
are two kinds of neutrality: decisive and indecisive neutrality. A refusal to take sides 
seems more specific to practical courses of action, or siding with disputants, than to 
resolving theoretical questions about whether or not a proposition is true. Indecisive
10 Hess and McAvoy, p. 76.
11 Consider the question ‘in what sense, if any, does music have meaning?’ That question itself is decided 
(or committed, or partisan) on the following matters, that there is a fact of the matter, that it is worthwhile 
to know, that music exists, and that meaning can be had in more than one sense.
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neutrality seems equally applicable to siding with one or another disputant, and coming 
to an intellectual decision.
Bearing these distinctions in mind, let us consider the question of the existence of God. 
The attitudinal options are often presented as being just three: God exists; God does not 
exist; I am unsure whether or not God exists.12 One might allow that degrees of 
confidence can be had, but basically one must be a little inclined to bet for or against 
the existence of God, and where they are unable to decide which of the ontological 
options (namely of God’s existence of non-existence) to bet on, they can be said to be 
neutral, non-committal, or non-partisan, between those options.
The N ature o f Im partiality
I take it that the following contrasts are identical in meaning: Impartial/partial, 
unbiased/biased, unprejudiced/prejudiced, and disinterested/interested. These concepts 
(and their various markers) apply in the first instance to methods of inquiry and 
decision-making procedures. Only in the second instance do they characterize states of 
opinions which were formed in these ways. How are we to understand ‘impartiality’ in 
this sense? In Kant’s aesthetics, the distinction between interestedness and 
disinterestedness plays the following role: One is a better judge of an object’s aesthetic 
value insofar as one has no irrelevant interest in the object being appraised. For 
instance, an art auctioneer interested in selling a painting of two young sweethearts for 
the highest amount possible may judge it mainly in terms of its monetary value, the 
father of the painter may be unduly proud of the work, and perhaps a bitter, aged 
bachelor may be unable to appreciate its value: e.g. some facts about our experience, 
character and desires may be irrelevant to making aesthetic judgements, and ought to be 
bracketed in making them. But what are we describing here if not biases, or prejudices 
that warp one’s judgement? So too may we describe one’s partiality as a factor which 
warps one’s judgement beyond the domain of aesthetics; for instance, one may be less
12 Actually there are other possibilities: on doesn’t know that it is even an issue, or one fails to understand 
what the issue is that one might have an opinion about. Indeed, one might hold that question does not 
make sense. For instance, in any dispute about whether square circles might exist, I am tempted to say: 
the proposition is incoherent, and could not be the sort of thing which could have evidence in favour of or 
against. These possibilities come one stage before neutrality.
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capable of adjudicating well between two disputants if one of the disputants is one’s 
own child, and the other is a stranger, perhaps with an annoying voice.13
W hat Has Neutrality to Do W ith Im partiality?
As we have said, one use of the term ‘impartiality’ characterizes a method of inquiry; 
other than that, the term may be used to characterize the state of one’s opinions or 
attitudes, and here it can have two distinct senses: one in which it means those attitudes 
or opinions were arrived at through an impartial process, and one in which it means that 
one’s attitudes or opinions are neutral. To save confusion, I think that it is best to use 
the terms impartial and partial to characterize methods of enquiry and decision-making 
procedures, and to talk about the opinions arrived at as being neutral, or non-neutral in 
some regard.
Thus, the question of whether one is neutral about some matter is quite distinct from the 
question of whether one got there impartially.14 For instance, one could come to take a 
neutral stance because of a bias (that is, due to their partiality). Imagine someone who 
regards both the potential existence of God, and the potential non-existence of God as 
being decisively unattractive because of, say, the prospect of no afterlife, and the 
prospect of being judged respectively. Because of these biases, they may irrationally be 
neutral between these options as to which of them is true. Indeed, impartial inquiry 
often leads to substantive conclusions and not neutrality: perhaps impartial inquiry 
might lead to neutrality about the cause of the extinction of the dinosaurs, but it does 
not lead to neutrality on the question of whether the earth is only thousands of years 
old.
131 want to sound a note of caution: It might be thought that in bracketing out irrelevant factors about our 
experience in forming judgements, that there is danger of bracketing out too much. Perhaps we ought not 
to bracket out certain features of our character, or our valuations will not matter to us in the end. Bernard 
Williams has pressed this point in respect of ethics, and it is perhaps even easier to press a similar line of 
thought in the case of aesthetics. Indeed, one might go so far as to say that there is a world of subjective 
truth: this seems to be the contention of Thomas Nagel in The View from  Nowhere. Pursuing that 
intriguing idea is not one that can be done in this thesis.
14 It is perhaps true that Switzerland in its neutral stance might have been well placed to adjudicate 
between the Allies and Axis forces; at least, both would have reason to prefer them to adjudicate instead 
of an adjudicator who sympathised with the other side.
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Tw o C onceptions o f Balance
The concept of balance applies to the presentation of issues (e.g. by journalists and 
teachers in reports and lessons). While the BBC makes it policy to frame the arguments 
of disputants without taking sides, and calls this impartiality, actually it is neutral 
presentation, and may not be the result of impartial methods of investigation.15 The 
BBC might have a fair claim to offer ‘balanced’ reporting, but ‘balanced’ is too vague 
to be a worthy value. It is important to ask: how do they balance their reporting? If they 
balance it in such a way that each disputant or opinion is given equal coverage, then 
that is balance in a certain sense, but it is unbalanced in another; sometimes such 
coverage gives credence to the incredible, whereas it ought to correspond to credibility. 
On the question of whether or not the earth is flat, it would seem absurd to favour a 
neutral report. Indeed, it is sometimes held that in forming a more defensible opinion, 
one does well to take a thesis, consider its antithesis, and somehow merge the two to 
form a third view which is more defensible than either of the others. But we should not 
assume that such a procedure is rational; one position may have an outright victory over 
the other, with no room for rational synthesis.
According to Michael Hand, one can be directive, or be non-directive. I have already 
said that I think this terminology can be improved on; we should distinguish each of 
those things that one hopes to promote, demote, or neither to promote or demote but 
merely introduce, rather than collapse them together. However, let us use it for the 
moment for the sake of convenience. One might think of directive teaching as being 
unbalanced, and non-directive teaching as being balanced. However, that is only so in 
the sense of balance which considers that equal time for each disputant is required, no 
matter what the deliverances of impartial inquiry. If  one thinks that the presentation of 
topics ought to be balanced according to the deliverances of impartial inquiry, it might 
be that directive teaching is balanced and that non-directive teaching unbalanced; 
teaching creationism versus evolution as an open ended debate (non-directively), say, is 
unbalanced, in failing to reflect the actual weight of evidence. I think that we do well to 
stop talking about ‘balance’ and talk instead about justification of steering, and 
relatedly of disclosing one’s own views. Even still, some might doubt the coherence or
15 They are not neutral on the value of the royal family, at least in so far as they honour them at national 
celebrations such as Queen Elizabeth IPs Diamond Jubilee.
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practicality of non-directive teaching, especially if the teacher is not neutral between 
options themselves.
The Possibility Non-Prom otional Com m itm ent
I contend that teachers (and parents) can have an opinion about something without 
either wanting or trying to steer their pupils (or children) towards sharing that opinion. 
Indeed, one might even think that they ought not to steer children towards that opinion. 
Some people contend that this is either impossible in practice because one cannot 
bracket all of one’s opinions away (especially in framing issues for discussion), or they 
believe that it is undesirable to do so. These are the sorts of considerations cited in its 
favour. For instance, it might be thought that an educator cannot guard against steering 
pupils towards such an opinion.
As argued above, we ought to concede that global neutrality is indeed impossible for 
rational agents. It is almost inconceivable that there should be a conscious person with 
no attitudes, or beliefs. Nor do I think it is desirable that there should be. There are 
many beliefs and other kinds of attitudes which it is rational, and entirely proper, to 
have. However, it does not follow from having an attitude or belief that one should 
systematically promote it in others. It does not follow from having a belief that one 
must either withhold or disclose it. Indeed, it is often hard for pupils to tell where 
teachers sit on certain issues, partly because teachers are capable of playing roles, such 
as devil’s advocate; they can simulate having certain views for pedagogical purposes.
A quite different worry is whether disclosure of this kind is even compatible with non­
directive teaching, for, arguably, announcing one’s views just is a form of steering. 
Sometimes, the teacher’s disclosure seems equivalent to directive education; consider 
the teacher’s endorsing views, or consider their asserting those views. In particular, 
consider their using universal and prescriptive language, such as ‘we believe that’ and 
‘it is true that’ or ‘certainly,’ or failing to qualify assertions, e.g. by not adding 
‘Catholics, like me, believe that’ to the claims like, ‘Jesus died for our sins’. 
Alternatively, however, they could stress their own subjectivity in confessing/disclosing 
their personal views, namely by stating: I believe that, or it seems to me that. One can 
also use less emphatic language: it seems that, or arguably, or one reason to think x is
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that. On topics that one aims to teach non-directively, when, if ever, should teachers 
withhold or disclose their views? At first blush, there is a tension between saying on the 
one hand: I don’t want to steer belief, and on the other: I believe this. However, while 
disclosing one’s beliefs is a form of promotion (namely endorsement), there is a 
difference between disclosing one’s beliefs and promoting them. 16 Consider the 
difference between these expressions: ‘I believe Jesus Christ is the son of God’, and 
‘we believe that Jesus Christ is the son of God’ (where the ‘we’ captures the children in 
the class). One looks to be more of an assertion about the teacher’s own belief set, 
another to be an assertion about the world (thereby putting an onus on the listener to 
accept their testimony), the latter makes a statement about the students’ belief set, and 
presumably more of a normative one, that this is what you should believe (perhaps in 
virtue of your parentage, or where you go to school).
I agree that one’s actions will sometimes reveal one’s attitudes; training children to 
swim shows at least that I think it worth my while teaching swimming to children, and 
doing so unenthusiastically may reveal the opposite. It may also indicate that I value 
swimming itself, and think that it is worth the children’s time. However, it is often 
possible and desirable to withhold one’s views, and often possible and desirable to 
reveal one’s views. Disclosing one’s views need not entail any more than that; by 
simply disclosing them, for instance, one need not state one’s reasons for belief and one 
need not defend one’s view against objections, and certainly one need not allow one’s 
view to become the focus of the class. To the extent that children neither opted in, nor 
can opt out of such a class, this could be reasonably described as forcing one’s private 
views on pupils, especially to the extent that one denies children scope for dissent. 
Indeed, the privileged position of the teacher can in itself make dissent less easily 
voiced anyway. In the case of spending time doing something, it must be admitted that 
one cannot live and yet not spend time doing anything. And in the case of doing 
worthwhile things, religiously committed educators must promote activities which are 
considered worthwhile within one’s religious outlook, but not for religious reasons per 
se, nor as a form of initiation into their religion. In the case of belief about whether or 
not a proposition is true, one can be neutral; one can genuinely not have an opinion on 
the matter. That may amount to living as though there were a negative answer to the
16 I borrow the terms ‘withholding’ and ‘disclosing’ from Diana E. Hess and Paula McAvoy, The 
Political Classroom: Evidence and Ethics in Democratic Education (New York: Routledge, 2014).
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question, but c'est la vie, that’s the way the cookie crumbles, rather than a reason to 
initiate children into a faith. There is still room for commitment without advocacy. I 
now propose to critically discuss the aim of Teaming from  religion’, much emphasized 
in religious education literature, policy documents and teaching materials.
A gainst L earning from^ in Favour of Learning about R eligion
How can we make sense of the expressions Teaming about’ and Teaming from’? We 
can learn from (among other things) our mistakes, the past, and other people. It seems 
that to learn ‘from X ’ is to identify X as the source of our learning. We can learn about 
(among other things) books, other people, and the past. It seems that to Team about X ’ 
is to identify X as the object of our learning. It seems clear however, that in religious 
education, it would be important to learn about religion; in fact, it would seem to be the 
very raison d'etre of such a subject. It can comprehensibly be urged that to deserve the 
name of ‘religious education’, religion might not be the object of understanding at all, 
but perhaps the student, or the world in general should be. Instead, religion would be 
the source of knowledge, shedding light on the student, and upon the world in general. 
However, that presupposes religions to be a source of knowledge on these things, but 
that seems too epistemically contentious to presuppose in a learning objective (as the 
combination of our findings in Chapters 6 and 8 has shown above). As to which sources 
we should learn about religion from, that seems to be a further (albeit very important 
matter), that in no way conflicts with what the subject matter of religious education is. 
One might reasonably suggest that children should learn about religion(s), from 
religion(s), on the grounds that each religion is an authority on itself. There is no 
guarantee that religions are the best authorities on themselves, but it seems reasonable 
to suggest that particular religions should be able to speak for themselves where they 
are the object of learning (even if they are not presumed to have the final word on 
themselves).17
17 Caution might sometimes be in order here: careful consideration would be required to decide whether it 
would be appropriate to allow violent, extremist religious outlooks to speak for themselves, since one 
may legitimately worry about the possibility of their having a corrupting influence. On the other hand, if 
it is important to understand those outlooks it seems that hearing what they have to say for themselves is 
an important part of that. Furthermore, if one were reasonably confident that these views would be heard 
anyway, it might be well to subject them to critical scrutiny in the controlled environment of the 
classroom.
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When we speak of learning from religion in the sense of learning from a religious 
source, we still need to specify what lessons should be taught. It is not enough to say 
that children should learn from religion. It is important to specify what it is that children 
should learn from religion. Should the various religions teach children about the world 
as they see it, or should they merely teach children about how they see the world 
(together, perhaps, with what are their aspirations and practices)? For instance, should 
children learn from Christians that Christ died for their sins, or should they learn that 
Christians think that someone special was bom (whom they call the Christ) who died 
for mankind’s sins? This latter option seems less contentious where it is admitted that 
the epistemic credentials of religion are less than intellectually compelling (as Chapter 8 
argued). During a public panel discussion entitled ‘What is the Place of Faith in 
Schools?’, 18 Richard Dawkins contended that people have nothing to leam from 
religion(s). That is to say, according to Dawkins, any uniquely religious content is false. 
While you can leam kindness from religious sources, you can leam kindness from non­
religious sources. While you can leam what Christians believe from Christians, you can 
leam this from non-Christian sources. While it is admitted that good and true things can 
be learned from religions, Dawkins contends that all of the teachings specific to each 
religion are false. If Jesus did in fact rise from the dead on the third day subsequent to 
his execution, you could learn this from Christianity, but (again, according to Dawkins) 
he did not, and so you cannot. On this view, it is a mistake to suppose that religions are 
to be learned from in the respects that they are unique. One need not hold that every 
religion’s teachings are demonstrably false to share Dawkins’ reservations. Instead, it is 
enough to hold that none of that content which is specific to religions is so well 
demonstrated that we may presume to promote its belief among children. It ought not to 
be an educational aim that children should come to assent to any specifically religious 
content (even if it may not be an educational failure if they did come to do so).
H ow to Understand Religion
If the import of Chapters 6 and eight is correct, then it seems that Michael Hand is right 
in arguing that children have the right to an education enabling to make rational
18 22 February 2012, ‘What’s the Place of Faith in Schools?’ Westminster Faith Debates, featuring James 
Conway, John Pritchard, Richard Dawkins and Robert Jackson. AHRC/ESRC Religion & Society 
Programme
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judgments about the truth or falsity of religious propositions.19 Furthermore, if the
arguments in favour of paternalism in Chapter 3 are correct, it ought to be compulsory
for children. Simply being able to recall information about religions is of course
hopelessly superficial for this purpose (not least since one may not have even
understood it at all). Furthermore, learning about religions in a deep way involves not
just being presented with information and being able to recall it, but understanding that
information through having it explained. Moreover, in addition to explanation,
existential engagement and imaginative identification might well be required, but again
this is not best termed ‘learning from’ religion. Instead, it is better marked out with the
terms ‘personal’ and ‘impersonal’ understanding. John Lippitt explains the role that
Kierkegaard gives to the terms ‘objective’, and ‘subjective’ understanding well: “To
relate oneself appropriately to certain ideas means to relate to them in the first person .
Ethical and religious concerns, Kierkegaard insists, fall into this category.” Again;
To certain ideas -  a mathematical proof for instance -  I can relate 
myself, entirely appropriately, in a disengaged, impersonal manner.
But to certain other ideas -  such as what kind of person I ought to 
become, or the fact that I will shortly die -  such a disengaged reaction 
would be entirely inappropriate [...] [perhaps] a way of evading the 
significance my death has for m e.21
I would recommend the use of the terms ‘impersonal’ and ‘personal’ over ‘objective 
and ‘subjective’, since that latter pair is already quite equivocal enough.
A Political R ather Than M oral Right to R eligious U pbringing
Many defend religious initiation according to parental preferences (through 
denominational schooling). It is important to make clear that a political liberty right is 
not a moral claim right; just because, politically speaking, nobody should stop you from 
doing something, that is not enough to say that it is morally incumbent upon you to do 
it, or even morally alright for you to do it, and certainly not that anybody ought to 
facilitate you in doing it.22 However, as I have emphasized throughout, my question is 
how children ought morally to be influenced with respect to religions. In this particular
19 Hand, ‘Religious Education1.
20 John Lippitt, Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 8.
21 Ibid.
22 It is not clear that denominational schooling as a legal option is incompatible with my thesis (even 
while I think that religious initiation of children happens to be morally wrong). It might more likely be 
the case that state-funded religious initiation is incompatible with it, or at least that a legitimate demand 
for state funded religious initiation is incompatible with it.
213
case, it takes the form of whether it matters morally if we initiate children into religious 
beliefs, or refrain from doing so. It is true that children benefit from feeling a sense of 
belonging, indeed, think of the converse: exclusion, isolation and its high risk of 
loneliness and alienation. However, being a member of a community (belonging) does 
not presuppose being initiated into a set of beliefs (believing). We must be careful to 
say that we can agree that belonging is important, without thinking that believing is 
necessary. Indeed, if rejecting those beliefs is not irrational, it is important to forebear 
inculcating them. Of course, it would be wrong to insist that parents refrain from 
worship themselves, but they should not make a concerted attempt to initiate children 
into the doctrinal fold, and indeed into the practices which presuppose those doctrines, 
(e.g. worship).
Some authors, such as, Gareth Byrne, have wanted to advocate children’s religious 
initiation within “their own faith community.” Providing an aspirational description of 
denominational schools, he says: “as well as learning about and from religion, these 
schools encourage their Christian young people to draw close to God in Jesus Christ” 
and acknowledges that “other faith schools will form pupils of their religion within their 
faith tradition.” 23 He has in mind that children have a natural or default religion 
(namely, that of their parents or community), and that this is what it is right to initiate 
them into. However, it follows from this that a mere accident of birth dictates how it is 
proper to influence someone, with respect to religion(s), even where the state of 
knowledge is universal. However, the idea that children ought to be opted into religious 
initiation by default because they have a religion in the sense of doctrinal commitments 
just by birth is to be resisted, even though it is to be admitted that they may well belong 
to some community or crisscrossing communities by birth. Clearly, children are not 
religious until you initiate them into religion, any more than they are mathematicians, 
carpenters or competitive swimmers until initiated into those practices. Nobody is of a 
religion, unless they accept at least its key doctrinal elements (or something close 
enough to them). Children do not, from birth, accept those doctrinal elements (they do 
not come innately packaged), and so are not of any religion. If children are only to be 
initiated into a faith which is already theirs, and yet do not have a faith (by virtue of
23 Gareth Byrne, ‘Encountering and Engaging with Religion and Belief: The Contemporary Contribution 
of Religious Education in Schools/ in Toward Mutual Ground: Pluralism, Religious Education and 
Diversity in Irish Schools, ed. by Gareth Byrne, and Patricia Kieran (Dublin: Columba Press, 2013), p. 
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lacking even the most basic belief), it follows that children ought not to be initiated into 
a faith.
Supposing that all religious initiation in schools were voluntary in the sense that any 
and all students could if they wish (and are aware that they could) decline to accept 
such instruction at any time, and indeed, had to opt in to it in the first place, that would 
make it less morally objectionable it seems. However, even if less than literally captive, 
it still seems that initiating children into beliefs which it is not irrational to deny, 
especially ones so comprehensive in scope, is not a moral educational aim. Where 
religious education does not attempt religious initiation (but instead hopes to promote 
deep understanding through explanation, existential engagement, and critical 
reflection), there seems to be scant reason why children should have scope to exempt 
themselves from religious education any more than they should have scope to be 
exempt from history, maths or science. Indeed, it seems that they ought initially to be 
opted in to such an education on the grounds of the momentousness of religious beliefs, 
their degree of rationality and the requirement of intervention to promote rational 
deliberation on their truth or falsity. It seems to betray insecurities about the ability of 
one’s faith to survive a critical scrutiny, or investigation of alternative to it in so far as 
parents do.
Sum m ary o f Conclusions and Scope for Further Research
My research question has been how (if at all) we may ethically influence children, with 
respect to religion(s). One possible answer to my question is that we can do no wrong 
when it comes to influencing children, with respect to religion, that whatever we do will 
be alright. In this case, children would have no ethical claims over us when it comes to 
our influencing them, with respect to religion. Another answer is that children have a 
claim to be left to develop according to their un-perverted nature, and even a duty to 
insist on being so left. As argued in Chapter 6, neither these, the maximally permissive 
or impermissive views, are correct. The primary focus of this research has been 
whether, morally, children should be initiated into faith at all, and our finding has been 
that, children should not be, irrespective of whether it might be attempted in the context 
of the home or the school. It is debatable as to whether a school could be distinctively
religious without attempting to initiate children.24 To the extent that it could not, then 
there should not be any religiously distinctive schooling while the epistemic picture is 
such as it is. I have also argued that children should not be dissuaded from religious 
belief tout court, even if they ought to be encouraged to assess religious propositions 
rationally, since it seems that it need not be irrational to deny atheism.
However, there are many other respects in which children might be influenced with 
respect to religions. There is much that is beyond the scope of this thesis to comment 
on. It seems that the program of research developed through this PhD can be extended 
to address other questions. I have discussed how children ought to be influenced with 
respect to religions (albeit with a fairly narrow focus on the rights and wrongs of 
religious initiation in the home and in schools). However, it is an interesting question as 
to whether there exists any non-religions which are apt for similar moral consideration 
in how children ought to be influenced with respect to them (similar perhaps because of 
their comprehensive, formative role, and epistemic credentials). If this were the case, it 
would seem that we would not be interested in religion qua religion, but in religion qua
9 Ssome other phenomenon (e.g. worldviews, or comprehensive doctrines). Additionally, 
it would be interesting to apply the theory of ethical influence, here applied to religion, 
to other domains, including, for instance, how children ought to be influenced with 
respect to sex and sexuality; gender identity, status and relations; science; the natural 
world; the economy; morality; governance and many other domains of momentous 
import for their lives.
Our concern has been with deliberate formative influence, however, we could discuss 
the ethics of non-deliberate formative influence, of morally culpable non-intentional 
actions (i.e. negligence), just to better understand the scope of moral innocence and 
blameworthiness in this domain. We might also discuss the ethics of behavioural 
influence as well; that is no small part of formative influence, it seems; furthermore, it
■■ ■ ■    #
24 Michael Hand, ‘A New Dawn for Faith-based Education? Opportunities for Religious Organisations in 
the UK's New School System,’ Journal o f Philosophy o f  Education 46(4) (2012), pp. 546-559; Peter 
Gardner, ‘Hand's Academy Challenge: Some Starter Questions,’ Journal o f  Philosophy o f  Education 
48(4) (2014), pp. 637-645.
25 There is a strain of thought which claims that non-religious objects might be appropriate in religious 
education classes (The British Humanist Association for instance argues that Humanism ought to be 
studied in RE, and for RE to have its name changed; I take it that this is essentially to push for a whole 
new subject). Ninian Smart, ‘Secular Ideologies: How do they Figure in Religious Studies Courses?’ in 
Teaching The Introductory Course in Religious Studies: A Sourcebook, ed. by M. Juergensmeyer 
(Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1991).
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is also very interesting in its own right. Also of interest, is developing a deeper 
understanding of the different sorts of ethical claims adults and children may be said to 
have, with respect to how they are influenced. For instance, our research has suggested 
that entitlement, plus being a child, justifies both the compulsion and facilitation of that 
entitlement. But the same entitlement would seem to exist as much for adults, and while 
paternalism is usually not appropriate for adults (as argued in Chapter 3), it would seem 
that this entitlement ought to be facilitated also.
So too am I interested in how these considerations might map onto considerations 
relevant to formatively influential practices. As we observed previously, having a 
considered understanding of and approach to the ethics of formative influence is 
fundamental to having a considered and consistent approach to ethical schooling and 
upbringing, amongst other things including (but not limited to) therapy, immigrant 
assimilation, journalism, offender reform, and advertising standards. Qua activities of 
formative influence, it is important that we approach these areas with a consistent 
understanding of what kinds of influence are and are not acceptable.
Also of interest is how the findings of this research ought to relate to legal and political 
rights. The relation between proper moral and legal expectations is complex and was 
beyond the reasonable scope of our already large topic. Briefly though, saying that 
people have an ethical entitlement not to be harmed, or to be benefitted, does not 
obviously translate into a legal entitlement (e.g. making romantic scoundrelism illegal).
One final and significant issue left unaddressed by our research is this. It might 
reasonably be thought that teachers ought to be authentic to their views, and indeed that 
they ought to promote those statements that they believe to be the truth in the interests 
of integrity and truthfulness. While I have read and written about this issue, it was 
beyond the scope of this project to discuss fully, and so I plan to conduct further 
research in that area in the future. Indeed, it might reasonably be hoped that others will 
take up some of these directions of thought, drawing on the arguments and distinctions 
presented in this work.
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ABSTRACT
Sony Sebastian
This research examines the effectiveness of the Internet as a means of youth evangelisation. 
The project is divided into two main parts: (i) The establishment of a theoretical base relating 
to the concept of evangelisation, the Internet as a means of social communication and youth 
culture, (ii) The design, implementation and analysis of a cohort of case studies to test a 
research question based on the theoretical perspectives.
Following a general introduction (Ch. 1), the chapter on evangelisation (Ch. 2) defines the 
concept and examines its development. The Internet as a means of social communication is 
considered in chapter 3, preceded by an overview of broader models of communication of 
relevance to web 2.0. In chapter 4 various aspects of contemporary global youth culture are 
considered in the context of web 2.0. The second part of the study -  the fieldwork, covered in 
Chapters 5-7, is based on the design and activation of an online portal (Cybersouls). The 
main research question was to test the efficacy of the online mentoring of young people by 
Faith Friends (FFs) intended to deepen their understanding, appreciation and appropriation of 
their faith tradition. This was facilitated through mutual online interaction in the context of 
religious education material presented in digital Scrolls.
Mixed methods were adopted in the analytical process. In-depth qualitative analysis of data 
(using NVivo) was undertaken relating to a sample of cases selected by survey sampling and 
usage sampling techniques.
The key research findings are: (i). Effective mentoring by a Faithfriend enhances the potential 
of the web 2.0 environment for youth evangelisation. Such effective mentoring depends on 
careful selection and training of Faithfriends, particularly their proficiency in: ICT skills; 
youth culture and knowledge of the faith tradition, (ii). A collaborative and constructivist 
model of using the Internet underpins an effective approach to evangelisation with young 
people, (iii). Making use of the full potential of web 2.0, the proficiency of multimedia and 
social networking enhances the effectiveness of evangelisation, (iv). The efficacy of an online 
environment of evangelisation is dependent on the calibre of the offline resources and 
organisational capacities that are utilised.
A Qualitative Study of Youth Evangelisation using the Internet
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
The research presented in this dissertation is centered on an exploratory study which 
investigates how the Internet could be used by the Catholic Church as a means of progressing 
the evangelisation of young people.
The aim of this opening chapter is to introduce the project and present an overview of the 
complete study. It commences by providing a brief backdrop in sequence to the Church, the 
Internet and young people in the context of evangelisation. Next, the primary objective of the 
study is set out. Finally, the structure of the entire thesis is delineated.
1.1 The Church, the Internet and Young People: An Overview
The accumulated wisdom of the Catholic Church has evolved over a period of 2000 years. 
During this time, its continuity has depended on the handing down of faith from one 
generation to the next. Therefore, the faith development of young people has always been a 
priority in the mission of the Church as they constitute the link to the following generation. 
The message of Jesus Christ is at its core. His experience, emanating from His life on the 
Earth, His death on the cross followed by His resurrection, underpins the messages to be 
conveyed. The Church’s ideas and doctrines grew and expanded as it encountered numerous 
cultures which enriched its teachings and existence over the years.
Taking.into account the constantly changing environment in which it exists, the Church has 
to renew its own ministries. Regarding evangelisation, which is a core mission of the Church,
it has to read the signs of the time, as Vatican II (1965) invited it to do. In the current climate, 
part of the Church’s response involves taking an active and positive interest in Information 
Technology which has such a dominant role in the contemporary world.
The introduction of the Internet has transformed society faster than any other modem 
invention and this revolution is sweeping across the globe at a tremendous pace. Primarily, 
the Internet and its surrounding communication technology appear to have accelerated the 
speed of the distribution of knowledge and revolutionised methods of learning worldwide. 
Young people adapt to this mode of learning with such a natural ease that they often leave 
older generations in awe. The acquisition and formatting of ideas that took perhaps 
generations to put in place now seems instantly accessible to them, being available at the tips 
of their fingers.
As Sherry Turkle (1996) explains, for young people, this form of learning is not new because 
they are surrounded by technology from their birth. For their parents, the change is so rapid 
that they find it difficult to catch up. In contrast, young people are bom into a fast pace of life 
and therefore it becomes the norm for them. While older people may find some of the 
material on the Internet disturbing, young people perceive it as being attractive and exciting. 
This electronic wave has had a significant impact in society over the last three decades, 
inducing swift changes in many spheres of human existence. These changes have spawned a 
raft of new technology. ‘E-mail’ was one of the initial terms the Internet introduced into the 
technological lexicon. This was followed by e-leaming, e-business, e-books, e-cash, e- 
commerce, e-joumal, e-ticket, emoticons, e-dating etc. Facilities such as Facebook, Bebo, 
YouTube, and Twitter are now common currency. The rise in Internet use by age (Lenhart et 
al., 2010) is captured in Fig 1.1 below. It shows that usage is highest in the 12-29 year age
group, reaching 93% in the US by 2009. This endorses the popularity of the medium for the 
young generation in the US.
Fig 1.1 The Rise in Internet Use by Age
Change in internet use by age.
u x m
% 50%
a
?
25%
Teens 12-17
.AlladUlts 
18 ànfròlder
Adults 18-29 
Adults 30-49
Adults 5Q.64
Adults 65 
and older
Dtjcem&or;
'ssm
93%
74%
93%
81%
70%
38%
o%
2000
|fp  Pew Internet
tii.
2 0 0 9
Source: Lenhart et al. (2010)
Elliot (2010) reports that thefcusers of Facebook, a favourite of the younger generation, grew 
from 1 million in 2004 to 500 million by 2010. This phenomenal growth is just one 
endorsement of the popularity of the Internet among young people.
1.2 Net Driven Church?
Regarding the impact of the Internet on the spiritual realm, a general observation suggests 
that the Catholic Church considers the paradigm as an innovative prospect. It is appropriate 
therefore that the Church should consider the possibility of the Internet in the spiritual sphere 
(Foley, 2002a). However it does not seem to have emulated the pace of the ‘dotcom’ 
companies in adapting to this new medium. The Church does not appear to have taken
advantage of the openings which other institutions and individuals have grasped and used to 
great affect. It seems unable to identify the opportunities which other institutions and 
individuals have recognised in this technology. This suggests that the Church may be 
somewhat removed from this technologically dominated world and hesitant to interact with it.
Although Jesus ordered the disciples to take nothing except a staff for their journey, when He 
sent out the twelve in pairs 2000 years ago (Mk 6: 7-9), it is now considered necessary to 
equip ministers with the appropriate modem tools in their core mission of evangelisation 
(Foley, 2002a). It is argued that the Internet is a powerful medium which can be utilised 
effectively by the Catholic Church, especially for the faith development of young people. The 
following sections support the rationale of this stance.
1.3 Youth: Excitement of Today and Promise of Tomorrow
Taking a long-term view, it is evident that the destiny of mankind lies in its young people. 
Therefore if the Church does not seek them out, it is putting its own future at risk. While 
many traditional forms of worship do not seem to be attractive to young people today, they 
still yearn for a spiritual fulfilment, having an inner yearning for God. Beaudoin (1998) 
argues that signs of their unfulfilled spiritual hunger can always be identified in their 
behaviour. According to Careaga (2001), from an early age they have an innate curiosity 
which compels them to pick and choose and be in control, rather than being told what to do. 
As the Internet, with its vast and varied forms of information, caters well for this curiosity in 
young people, it is widely used by them on a regular basis. It is considered that the Church, 
by providing its presence effectively on the Internet, can respond to the yearning of young 
people for God.
The Internet, with its global reach, is the medium of the future. It receives life from the 
human presence at each node; vice versa, going online gives life to the head, heart and hands. 
In particular, it is consonant with the thinking of young minds. The philosophy of the 
medium, its values, culture, etiquette, language (smilies, avatars, lingos etc.) etc are easily 
absorbed by young minds. Thus the Internet seems to be close to their cognitive patterns. 
Therefore it is submitted that an in-depth understanding of the organisation and modus 
operandi of the Internet can provide the Church with promising opportunities for 
evangelisation.
This involves the Church taking a retrospective look at its own ministries. Evangelisation 
being the term encompassing the ministries of the Church, a question arises, regarding which 
form of evangelisation is to be initiated by the Church online? Any apprehension to enter into 
this medium, if it exists, needs to be set aside. It is submitted that reading the signs of the 
time, as Vatican II invited the Church to do, involves taking an active and positive interest in 
Information and Communication Technology.
In conclusion it can be said that adapting to the modalities of the Internet calls for 
considerable research and reflection. Creative and imaginative design will be required from 
the Church leadership in order to implement new ways of being the Church, This study 
provides hands-on experience in relation to the use of the Internet by the Church to further 
youth evangelisation. It is hoped that the insights gleaned from it will make a modest 
contribution to the development of the Church’s youth ministries in the technological era of 
the 21st century and beyond.
1.4 The Internet: Powered by Youth
1.5 Primary Objective of the Study
The primary objective of the research is to establish the potential role of the Internet as an 
instrument in the evangelisation of young people. More specific objectives are given in 
chapter 5.
1.6 Structure of the Thesis
This opening chapter provides an introduction to the research. Then the thesis is divided into 
two main parts: Part I - Theoretical Concerns and Part II - the fieldwork. A review of the 
relevant literature is presented in Part I (chapters 2, 3 and 4). Chapter 2 explores 
evangelisation, clarifying various aspects of the concept and identifying its relevance in the 
contemporary world. In addition, the contributions of Popes Paul VI and John Paul II to the 
process of evangelisation, particularly in relation to young people, are described. 
Communication is considered in chapter 3 which also includes a review of the Internet, 
Having identified web 2.0 as a space with potential for the evangelisation of young people, 
the discussion in chapter 4 provides an in-depth review of youth.
Part II deals with the fieldwork in the following three chapters (5, 6 and 7), which was 
centred on designing and activating an online site -  www.cybersouls.ie -  for the faith 
development of young people. In chapter 5 the research questions are reviewed and 
objectives are clarified. Also, the piloting and implementation of this project are described. 
The opinion of the participants regarding this online initiative are presented in the 
questionnaire findings in chapter 6 together with details of the selection of 13 cases for more 
in-depth analysis. Then the qualitative analysis of the interactions of these selected cases, 
using NVivo, follows in chapter 7.
The concluding chapter (chapter. 8) draws together the main strands of the study. A brief 
review of the project is provided, followed by a synthesis of the main findings addressing the 
research questions in relation to the three main areas of the research. In addition, suggestions 
for expanding this exploratory study are identified together with areas for future research.
“The Church is bom of the evangelising activity of Jesus and the Twelve. She is the normal, 
desired, most immediate and most visible fruit of this activity: “Go, therefore, make disciples 
of all the nations” (Mt 28:19)” (Paul VI, 1975b, para. 15). As evangelisation is at the core of 
this study, it is analysed in detail in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2 
EVANGELISATION: 
A FUNDAMENTAL MISSION OF THE CHURCH TODAY
This chapter explores various aspects of the theme of evangelisation. The opening section 
presents the background and context of the study. This is followed by an account of various 
aspects of evangelisation. Finally, the contributions of Paul VI and John Paul II, both 
pioneers of modem evangelisation, are considered.
2.1 Context and Main Topics
Context: And the one who was seated on the throne said, ‘See, I am making all things new’ 
(Rev 21:5). The Greek philosopher Heraclitus observed that “no man ever steps in the same 
river twice, for it is not the same river and he is not the same man” (cited in Graham, 2002, 
Section 3). He held that an explanation of change was fundamental to any theory of nature. 
More recently, Vatican II testified that “Today, the human race is involved in a new stage of 
history. Profound and rapid changes are spreading by degrees around the whole world which 
has repercussions on man's religious life as well” (Vatican II, (1965f, para. 4). In the 
contemporary world, the fast pace of change is affecting both the Church, as well as the wider 
world. Pope Paul VI (1964) captured this reality in the document Ecclesiam Suam observing 
that this all pervading change also impacts on the Church.
Not so long ago, churches used to be packed with worshippers. All the different age cohorts 
in the human spectrum thronged into the temples of eternal wisdom. This was true in the case
of the Catholic Church as well. However, things have changed considerably in recent years. 
Regarding the different age groups, there seems to be a black hole in the Church through 
which young people disappear, particularly those between the ages of 15-35 (Briggs, 2008). 
This study sets out to address this challenge by exploring the opportunities afforded 
particularly by the Internet for the development of youth evangelisation.
Three spheres are involved in this study: the sphere of the Church, youth culture and the 
space of the Internet. This is depicted graphically in Fig 2.1 below. The possibility of the 
convergence of these three spheres is a fundamental issue in this thesis. In this chapter, they 
are looked at from the point of view of the Church.
Fig 2.1 The Three Spheres of the Study
Referring to the Internet, Gibson (1984) observes:
Cyberspace, A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of 
legitimate operators, in every nation, by children being taught mathematical 
concepts. . . .  A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every
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computer in the human system. Unthinkable complexity. Lines of light ranged in 
the nonspace of the mind, clusters and constellations of data. (p. 104)
The spreading of the word of God reached new dimensions in the last four decades due to the 
fast growth of media technology, whereas evangelisation achieved a new spirit, with 
unprecedented youth participation. A detailed study of evangelisation, which is a 
fundamental activity of the Church, is provided in the literature review below. The Church’s 
stance regarding the internet and young people are explored later in the chapter imbibing 
from the life and teachings of Popes Paul VI and John Paul H
2.2 Evangelisation: The Universal Mission of the Church
Evangelisation is the fundamental driving force in this research. At this theory development 
stage of the study, the essence of evangelisation is explored first of all, considering its 
ontological aspects.
Evangélisation: Ontological Aspects
The etymology, definition and other related concepts regarding evangelisation are discussed 
below.
Evangelisation
Literally the word ‘evangelisation’ means ‘bringing good news’ (Dorr, 2000, p. 76). Bosch 
(1991) analyses the Greek words ‘evangelion (gospel), evangelizesthai/ evangelizein (preach 
the gospel) which contributed two words to the English language with similar meanings - 
‘evangelism’ and ‘evangelisation’. Dorr (2000) says that, of the two words, ‘evangelism’ has 
a much longer history in English. It is favoured by the evangelical wing of Protestantism,
putting a great deal of emphasis on getting people to listen to and read the Bible. Thus 
‘evangelism' was more associated with the great preaching crusades of evangelists such as 
Billy Graham.
Bosch (1991) states that ‘evangelisation' came to be widely used by 1975 in the Catholic 
Church, with the publication of Evangelii Nuntiandi (EN), when it supplanted the word 
‘mission'. He says that this document shuns the word ‘mission’ and uses ‘evangelisation’ and 
its cognates more than 214 times. “Evangelisation is understood here as an umbrella concept 
embracing the whole activity of the Church sent into the world: “One single term - 
evangelisation - defines Christ’s office and mandate” (Bosch, 1991, p. 411). He continues by 
saying that the activities of the Church such as proclamation, translation, dialogue, service 
and presence and goals such as human development, liberation, justice and peace are integral 
parts of the ministry of evangelisation. In his apostolic exhortation Christifideles Laid , John 
Paul II (1988) stated that “The entire mission of the Church, then, is concentrated and 
manifested in evangelisation” (para. 33). His predecessor, Pope Paul VI, in EN, observed that 
“Evangelising is in fact the grace and vocation proper to the Church, her deepest identity” 
(Paul VI, 1975b, para. 14). He defined the mission and identity of the Church more 
comprehensively and methodically than in the past: “She exists in order to evangelise, that is 
to say in order to preach and teach, to be the channel of the gift of grace” (para. 14). Next the 
term ‘mission’, which was used instead of ‘evangelisation’ until almost thirty years ago 
(Dorr, 2000), is analysed.
Mission
‘Mission’ is derived from the Latin word missio as an expression employed in the doctrine of 
the Trinity to denote the sending of the Son by the Father (Vatican II, 1964a) and of the Holy
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Spirit by the Father and the Son (Bosch, 1991). (The theological discourse of the east and 
west regarding ihcfilioque is not discussed here as it is not considered appropriate.) The term 
‘mission’ was first used by Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556) (365 Saints, 1995), the founder of 
the Society of Jesus (Jesuits) in the sense of ‘sending’ ecclesiastical agents to distant colonies 
(Bosch, 1991). Thus the word ‘mission’ is also historically linked with the colonial era and 
with the idea of magisterial commissioning. The term presupposed an established church in 
Europe which dispatched delegates to convert overseas peoples and was, as such, an 
attendant phenomenon of European expansion. Mission encompassed activities by which the 
Western ecclesiastical system was extended to the rest of the world (Bosch, 1991).
This initial meaning of ‘mission’ as working in foreign non Christian areas and its association 
with colonialism were considered by theologians and consequently Vatican II broadened the 
meaning of ‘mission’ to cover the whole work of the Church (Dorr, 2000). It is similar to the 
term ‘evangelisation’. As Bosch (1991) explains it:
By the sixth decade of this century, however, it was generally accepted in all 
confessional families that mission belongs to the essence of the church. Mission 
was no longer merely an activity of the Church, but an expression of the very 
being of the church, (p. 493)
Soon the scriptural word ‘evangelisation’, which was more fresh without any associated 
image of working in foreign non-Christian areas, began to be used to describe the 
fundamental work of the Church in any situation. Furthermore, in the words of Dorr (2000), 
the text from Luke’s Gospel 4:18-21, which links the ‘good news’ with the liberation of 
captives, meant that the word ‘evangelisation’ could be used to convey a sense of the 
comprehensiveness and integral quality of Christianity, i.e., it is not just a message about
‘spiritual’ affairs or about the next life, but also involves a commitment to transform this 
present world (Dorr, 2000).
The origin and purpose of mission are clearly expressed in the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church (CCC, 1994):
The Lord’s missionary mandate is ultimately grounded in the eternal love of the 
Most Holy Trinity: ‘The Church on Earth is by her nature missionary, since 
according to the plan of the Father, she has as her origin the mission of the Son 
and the Holy Spirit.’ The ultimate purpose of mission is none other than to make 
men share in the communion between the Father and the Son in the Spirit of love.
(para. 850)
The discussion of the terms ‘evangelisation’ and ‘mission’ endorses Bosch’s (1991) 
observation that “Mission, evangelisation and witness are nowadays often used by Catholics 
as synonymous” (p. 411). The same writer notes that, for the previous fifteen centuries of the 
missionary history of the Church, other terms were used in place of mission such as: 
propagation of the faith, preaching of the gospel, apostolic proclamation, promulgation of the 
gospel, augmenting the faith, expanding the Church, planting the church, illuminating the 
nations etc. (Bosch, 1991).
Evangelisation is the fundamental duty of the Church. Inherited from Jesus Christ, the first 
evangeliser, it stands as its primary aim. Here the evolution of the term evangelisation and 
similar terms were analysed, capturing a historical perspective on evangelisation. Some 
important aspects of evangelisation are next for discussion.
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“I must preach the Good News of the Kingdom of God ...; for I was sent for this purpose,” 
(Lk 4: 43). A mission is a duty entrusted to a person to achieve a particular task. According to 
Dorr (2000), the mission of the Catholic Church is evangelisation itself. He says that 
‘bringing good news’ is the meaning of evangelisation, which is repeated 24 times in the 
synoptic gospels (Dorr, 2000, p. 76). This expression of ‘good news’ is summed up in the 
classical text from Luke’s Gospel:
The spirit of the Lord is upon me because he has anointed me to bring the good 
news to the poor. He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovery 
of sight to the blind, to let the oppressed to go free, to proclaim the year of the 
Lord’s favour.’ . . . Then he began to say to them, Today this scripture has been 
fulfilled in your hearing’. (Lk 4: 18-21)
Dorr (2000) highlights three aspects of this text. First there is the ‘Good News’ of liberation 
for people who are poor, oppressed or disadvantaged. Jesus began his mission preaching 
liberation for people. Therefore his mission was anthropological. Secondly, this liberation 
being brought by Jesus is something new. It is Christo-centric. Thirdly, it takes place through 
the power of the Holy Spirit, i.e., it is pneumatic - spirit centred. All these aspects reflect the 
personal love of God for his people, through the person of Jesus Christ. It continues through 
the Holy Spirit, even after the death and resurrection of Jesus. It is understood that 
evangelisation, or ‘bringing of good news’, is achieved through the friendship of God for 
human beings by the incarnation of Jesus Christ. Therefore, evangelisation, as lived by Jesus 
Christ, is anthropological, Christo-centric and pneumatic.
Evangelisation as fundamental mission of the Church
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The apostolic exhortation Evangelii Nuntiandi (EN) (Paul VI, 1975b) on Evangelisation in 
the Modem World is considered to be the ‘Roman Catholic Magna Carta of the mission of 
the Church’ (Luzbetak, 1988, p .lll) . It says that “Jesus himself, the Good News of God, was 
the very first and great evangeliser; he was so through and through: to perfection and to the 
point of sacrifice of his earthly life” (Paul VI, 1975b, para. 7). Evangelii Nuntiandi 
comprehends the meaning, the content and the modes of evangelisation conceived and put 
into practice by Jesus in the following themes: Proclamation of the Kingdom of God; 
Proclamation of liberating salvation; Total interior conversion which the Gospel calls 
metanoia; Tireless preaching of the Word of God with authority; Proclamation through 
evangelical signs and Proclamation for an evangelised and evangelising community (para. 7- 
13). In order to continue his ministry of Proclamation of the Kingdom of God, liberating 
salvation and metanoia, in the Acts of the Apostles we see Jesus commissioning his disciples: 
“But you shall receive power when the Holy Spirit will come upon you; and you shall be my 
witnesses in Jerusalem and in Judea and Samaria and to the ends of the earth” (Acts 1:8)..In 
Acts 2 we read about the preaching of the Apostles with evangelical signs.
The incarnation of Jesus Christ and his preaching of liberation to the people provided the 
initial foundation for evangelisation in this world. This human centred mission of God was 
fulfilled in Christ and it became spirit centred or pneumatic in the first Christian 
communities.
In the debate which follows about evangelisation in the Catholic Church, teachings and 
traditions about ‘mission’ and other terms used previously with a similar meaning to
Jesus the First Evangeliser
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‘evangelisation’, are used as appropriate. A coherent concept of ‘evangelisation’, as 
understood by the Catholic Church, now follows.
Evangelisation has a Trinitarian origin
The constitution Dei Verbum of the Vatican II (1965d) describes Revelation as that act by 
which God manifests himself personally to man (para. 3). This personal love and the resulting 
communication of God with humanity are beautifully presented in the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church (CCC, 1994):
God who ‘dwells in unapproachable light’ wants to communicate his own divine 
life to the men he freely created, in order to adopt them as his sons in his only 
begotten Son. By revealing himself God wishes to make them capable of 
responding to him and of knowing him and of loving him far beyond their own 
natural capacity, (para. 52)
This intimate communication between God and human beings, culminating in the person of 
Jesus Christ, is reiterated in the CCC by quoting St. Ireneus of Lyons, “The Word of God 
dwelt in man and became the Son of man in order to accustom man to perceive God and to 
accustom God to dwell in man, according to the Father’s pleasure” (CCC, para. 53). Thus by 
divine ordination this communication is intended to be mutual and interactive because it is a 
process of God and man becoming accustomed to one another. The General Directory for 
Catechesis, (GDC, 1998) says that ‘God, in his greatness, uses a pedagogy to reveal himself 
to the human person; he uses human events and words to communicate his plan’ (para. 38). 
This approach to communicate God’s Good News is the pedagogy which God employed to 
communicate with humans.
Evangelisation is the process of transmitting Revelation to the world. It is accomplished 
through words and deeds. The GDC (1998) says that it is at once both testimony and 
proclamation, word and sacrament, teaching and task. Evangelisation transmits the words and 
deeds of Revelation; it is obliged to proclaim and narrate them and at the same time to make 
clear the profound mysteries they contain (para. 39). “The Church, the universal sacrament of 
salvation” (Vatican II, 1964a, para. 48; Vatican n, 1965a, para. 1), bom of the Holy Spirit, 
transmits Revelation through evangelisation; she announces the Good News of the salvific 
plan of the father and, in the sacraments, communicates his Divine Gifts (GDC, 1998, para.
45). According to Gaudium et Spes (Vatican II, 1965f), this is achieved by the witnessing of 
the Church serving as a leaven and as a kind of soul for human society as it is to be renewed 
in Christ and transformed into God’s family (para. 40). As stated in Lumen Gentium (Vatican 
II, 1964a): “By an utterly free and mysterious decree of His own wisdom and goodness, the 
eternal Father created the whole world. His plan was to dignify persons with a participation in ,
His own divine life” (para. 2). By participating in the communication of the Internet, the 
Church also has to act as a leaven, transforming cultures and, consequently, people belonging *
to these cultures, as children of God. The pedagogy that the Church adopts in this 
participation has to make use of the language of the cultures it encounters. These include the 
culture of youth and the seemingly ephemeral but boundless culture of the Internet.
Purpose of Evangelisation
Evangelii Nuntiandi (EN, Paul VI, 1975b) says that evangelisation is bringing the Good 
News to all strata of humanity and through its influence transforming humanity from within 
and making it new, according to the promise of the Father in the Revelations: “Now I am 
making the whole of creation new” (Rev 21:5). Evangelising the cyberspace, which is a new 
stratum of human existence, is considered here. The Church makes use of the Internet in
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various ways. However, the Internet seems to be a new stratum of human existence where the 
Good News has not yet been incarnated in a profound way. “The purpose of evangelisation is 
the interior conversion of the personal and collective conscience of people, the activities in 
which they engage and the lives and milieux which are theirs” (Paul VI, 1975b, para. 18). It is 
a vital and in-depth transformation, reaching to the very roots of culture, taking the person as 
the starting point and coming back to the relationships of people among themselves and with 
God (para. 20). This requires knowing the particular culture which is being evangelised. 
Evangelisation, by its divine origin as well as its divine purpose, is closely related to culture: 
With the help of the Holy Spirit, it is the task of the entire People of God . . .  to 
hear, distinguish and interpret the many voices of our age, and to judge them in 
the light of the divine word. (Vatican II, 1965f, para. 44)
Therefore it is vital for the Church to understand the Internet and the culture of youth which 
are explored in Chapters 3 and 4. Various elements of the process of evangelisation are next 
for consideration.
Essential Elements o f Evangelisation
In his apostolic exhortation Catechesi Tradendae, Pope John Paul II (1979) explained that 
evangelisation is a rich, complex and dynamic process, made up of elements or moments that 
are essential and different from each other. This reiterates what Pope Paul VI (1975b) wrote 
in EN, following Vatican II. The corresponding evangelical foundations of these aspects are 
listed in the General Catechetical Directory (GDC, 1998): “proclaim” (Mk 16:15), “make 
disciples and teach” (Mt 28: 19-20), “be my witness” (Acts 1:8), “baptize” (Mt 28:19), “Do 
this in memory of me” (Lk 22:19), “love one another” (Jn 15:12).
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More concretely, Initial Proclamation, Christian Initiation, Catechesis, Religious Education, 
New Evangelisation and Theological Reflection are identified as the essential moments of 
evangelisation in the of the National Directory for Catechesis of Ireland (Irish Episcopal 
Conference, 2010, p. 51-62). All of these elements can be categorised in two modes: (a) 
sacramental (b) non-sacramental. For example, initial proclamation can happen anywhere 
during a Church homily to a congregation or in a one-to-one conversation. Reading the Holy 
Bible and any written article can also provide moments of initial proclamation. Even if 
Christian initiation into the Church community is accomplished through the sacraments of 
Baptism, Confirmation and the Eucharist, this process is not completely sacramental in the 
case of the Rite of Christian Initiation of Adults (RCIA). The preparation for the sacraments 
need not necessarily be in a community. Thus some dimensions of the moments of 
evangelisation can be performed in spaces other than actual corporeal human communities. In 
other words, the word of God can be encountered by the human soul in circumstances other 
than sacramental presence. Weigel (2005) cites an instance from the life of John Paul II who 
testified that “the overcrowded Paris Metro was a “superb” place for contemplation” (p. 83). 
Therefore, cyberspace, where people congregate electronically, may be a place of encounter 
of the Word of God. Consequently, it can create a new space of actualising these moments of 
evangelisation. (The characteristics of cyberspace which can substantially help the 
evangelisation of young people are discussed later in chapter 3 on Internet Communication.)
These elements of evangelisation are intended for those who choose the Gospel for the first 
time and those who need to complete or modify their initiation. The Christian faithful of 
mature faith in the bosom of the Christian community are also the beneficiaries of this 
process (Paul VI, 1975b, para. 49-57). The GDC stresses the importance of repeating these 
moments, if necessary, as they give evangelical nourishment in proportion to the spiritual
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growth of each person or of the entire community (GDC, 1998, para. 49). These moments are 
complementary and mutually enriching, according to EN (Paul VI, 1975b, para. 24). If the 
Church is targeting young people on the Internet, the ways of initiating dialogue with those 
young people to deepen their journey of faith need to be identified. This shows that there are 
sub-categories within the broad umbrella of young people which need to be identified and 
dealt with according to their religiosity and religious adherence. These sub-categories are 
examined in the next section.
Evangelisation in the Church
This section explores aspects of evangelisation in the Church community. Then existing 
modes of evangelisation are considered. Proclamation of the Gospel always begins with the 
Christian community and invites the people to conversion and the following of Christ. This 
community welcomes those who wish to know the Lord better and permeate themselves with 
a new life. Those who are initiated into faith and those deepening their faith are accompanied 
by the community with maternal solicitude, helping them participate in her own experience of 
faith and the Church incorporates them to herself (GDC, 1998, para. 254).
The communion and communities within family, the baptismal catechumenate of adults, the 
parish, Catholic schools, associations, movements and groups of faithful and basic ecclesial 
communities are some of the fundamental loci of evangelisation which the GDC (1998) 
addresses directly (Renewing the Vision, 1997). Investigating whether there can be an online 
counterpart of these real life communities is a major research question.
Also, traditionally, communities were the loci of evangelisation of young people. The GDC 
(1998) recognises the family as such a community and as the primary locus of evangelisation
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of its young members, and parents as the primary educators. The family is defined as a 
domestic Church where various aspects of evangelisation or functions of the life of the 
Church may be reflected. Christian education takes place here more by witnessing than 
teaching. It is more ongoing and daily, than structured formally. The question arises, can the 
faith formation of young people be initiated and enhanced within online communities? Of the 
communities listed earlier, attention is given here to evangelisation in the last two, i.e., 
associations, movements and groups of the faithful, as well as basic ecclesial communities. 
Finally, new movements in the Church which act as agents of evangelisation today are 
discussed briefly. The essential elements of evangelisation in these non-traditional 
communities are reviewed below.
Basic Ecclesial Communities
It would be beneficial for the Church to consider new movements such as basic ecclesial 
communities which are included as part of its network for evangelisation. Basic Ecclesial 
Communities (BECs) are small groups of Catholics who meet regularly for services of 
prayer, worship and communal reflection on both their religious and secular lives (Sweetland, 
2004, p. 68). They spring from the need to live the Church’s life more intensely. EN states 
that the big cities lend themselves to life in the mass and to anonymity, consequently making 
people unable to fulfil the desire and quest for a more human dimension (Paul VI, 1975b, 
para. 58). New movements and basic ecclesial communities are a response to this feeling of 
alienation. These are the new forms of being the Church. According to the General Directory 
for Catechesis (1998), BECs are a sign of the Church’s vitality. The GDC explains that “the 
disciples of Christ gather together in them so as to hear the word of God, to develop fraternal 
bonds, to celebrate the Christian mysteries in their lives and to assume responsibility for 
transforming society” (GDC, 1998, para. 263). In this way BECs are new attempts at
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evangelisation ‘under the movement of the Holy Spirit’ within the communion of the Church 
(John Paul II, 1988, para. 31).
The human values which emerge in the BECs are friendship, personal recognition, a spirit of 
co-responsibility, creativity, vocational response together with concern for the problems of 
the world and the Church. The GDC asserts that an enriched community experience can 
result from BECs which are true expressions of communion and a means of forming a more 
profound communion. It is considered that the characteristics of these communities may be 
adapted to the online communities proposed in this research. The following characteristics of 
BECs are identified in the GDC as being conducive to the process of evangelisation:
- the fraternal climate, in which it lives, is an environment suitable for integral 
catechetical activity, providing that the proper nature and character of catechesis is 
respected;
catechesis must strive to deepen community life so as to ensure a basis for the 
Christian life of the faithful, without which basic Christian communities lack stability; 
the small community is always a suitable place to receive those who have concluded a 
catechetical journey (GDC, 1998, para. 264).
Catechesi Tradendae considered the content of catechesis to be the same as the content of 
evangelisation (John Paul II, 1979, para. 26). Fuellenbach (2002) argues that BECs address 
two needs of the Church in the context of the globalisation process. These are the need for 
inculturation of faith and the need to create a community in which justice and compassion are 
the basic principles of action. In this new ecclesial climate of BECs, he argues that there are 
two ecclesiologies or images of the Church involved. One is the hierarchical model and the 
other is the communion model. The hierarchical model promises continuity while the
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communion model, with the origin of BECs, appeals particularly to new experiences. The old 
model is viewed by Fuellenbach as being organised around the axis of clergy-sacraments 
with the new model being organised around the axis of gospel-laity. With a blend of these 
two models, the participative hierarchical organisation of the Church can effectively take up 
the task of evangelisation with unity and singleness of heart, like one body. BECs are 
examples of contrast societies, stemming from the need for the Church to be sustained in 
adverse situations. Souls coming together in cyberspace to share the Good News can 
constitute another new way of evangelisation.
The GDC (1998) maintains that participation and partnership can increase the responsibility 
of an individual in living the very existence of the Church: “The Church exists in order to 
evangelize” (Paul VI, 1975b, para. 14). Three major modes through which every member of 
the Church can carry out evangelisation are identified and set out below.
Modes of Evangelisation
According to Westerhoff (1981), evangelisation refers to encounters through deeds and words 
which aid conversions or human transformations in the realms of thought, feeling and 
behaviour (p. 303). The whole process of evangelisation is accomplished, through three 
modes of encounter - personal, communitarian and technical. There are various specific 
instances of encounters where evangelisation takes place and these can be categorised under 
these three inodes.
Personal Mode: EN argues that personal contact is indispensable for evangelisation. Jesus’ 
personal encounter with Nocodemus, Zacchaeus, the Samaritan woman and Simon the 
Pharisee, together with the personal encounters of the apostles, are given as examples of this
mode in EN. Person-to person transmission of the experience of the Gospel is identified as a 
valid, important and even primary mode of evangelisation (Paul VI, 1975b, para. 46), Cases 
of personal encounter are numerous. They range in various degrees from the handing on of 
faith in families by parents, life witnesses of Christian values in society, exhortation, 
celebration of the sacraments, to the catechesis happening in Sunday schools or in new 
communities of catechumens. An encounter at a one-to-one level is the main characteristic of 
this mode which also includes friendship, respect for the other individual, witnessing and 
personal transformation.
Community Mode: This operates more on a one-to-many basis. Jesus proclaiming the good 
news to the crowds (Mt 4: 25; Mk 8: 2) and the apostles preaching to the multitudes on the 
day of the Pentecost are examples of this mode of encounter. In modem times, retreats, youth 
groups, Eucharistic celebrations and Gospel choirs are examples of this togetherness for 
evangelisation. At a global level, World Youth Day stands out as an instance where these 
encounters happen at both vertical and horizontal levels. At a vertical level, the love of Jesus 
and the invitation of the Pope influence young people to come together. At a horizontal level, 
fellowship, personal recognition and a spirit of co-responsibility mutually inspire them to 
come together. The role of the media is emerging as being important in this encounter. Music, 
drama and other literary forms may be used as catalysts in this mode of evangelisation 
(Wyckoff and Richter, 1982).
Technological/professional Mode: A third mode of evangelisation, which can be considered 
comparatively distant, relates to the use of the media. EN (Paul VI, 1975b) says that these 
times are characterised by the mass media as a means of social communication, which is 
elementary for both the initial proclamation of the Good News and further deepening of faith.
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Written communication, printed communication and electronic communication are the modes 
included here where the ‘presence’ of a person is comparatively virtual. This technical mode 
can incorporate eLements of the two other modes described above. This arises because, on the 
Internet, a personal presence can be simulated, using electronic symbols. While this presence 
is not corporeal, people still consider online presence to be very intimate and personal. 
(Details of this online presence are dealt with in chapter 3 on Internet Communication.)
EN says that the means of social communications indefinitely increase the area in which the 
Word of God can be heard. The media is recognised as a powerful means of proclaiming 
“from the housetops” (Mt 10: 27). The challenge is ever present or ever increasing, according 
to the newness of the media: through them the evangelical message should reach vast 
numbers of people but with the capacity of piercing the conscience of each individual (Paul 
VI, 1975b, para. 45). This topic, being related more to the technicalities of communication, is 
probed more deeply in the next chapter. “You too, dear young people, are the receivers and 
the trustees of this heritage” (John Paul II, 1999b). The relationship of the Church with youth 
is considered in the context of evangelisation and this new medium of the Internet, in the next 
section, by reviewing relevant experiences and teachings of two recent Popes, Paul VI and 
John Paul H
2.3 Pioneers of Modern Evangelisation: Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul II
Pope Paul VI gave a new momentum in the life of the Church by introducing the term 
evangelisation and Pope John Paul II developed it further in his teachings and practices. 
Various events in the life of these Popes have been identified as instances of evangelisation in 
modem times. First of all their teachings concerning the media and youth are considered. The
aim is to identify the development of concepts related to the media and youth during these two 
papacies in the context of evangelisation.
Pope Paul VI
Various teachings and instances from the life of Pope Paul VI are directly relevant to this 
research. Practical dimensions of Pope Paul VPs relationship with youth and the media are 
considered below in the light of teachings of the Church during his tenure of office.
Enkindle the light of Youth with the Light of Christ
The message of Pope Paul VI to Youth in Vatican II recognised its essential goodness and the 
necessity to enkindle it with the light of Christ. He spoke as if the whole council reformation 
was intended for the youth of the world: “It is for you, youth, especially for you that the 
Church now comes through her council to enkindle your light, the light which illuminates the 
future, your future” (Vatican II, 1965g). This Pope’s commitment to youth can be traced back 
to his priestly life as a spiritual advisor to the students of the University of Rome in 1931 
(Clancy, 1963). Later, as chaplain of the Federation of Italian Catholic Students (FUCI), he 
was able to translate the message of the Church in a language intelligible to young people, 
ensuring that they were open to the intellectual and spiritual discourse of the Church 
(Hebblethwaite, 1993).
Vatican II appealed to youth to look upon the Church and find the face of Christ, the genuine, 
humble and wise hero, the prophet of truth and love and the companion and friend of youth 
(Vatican II, 1965g). This appeal addresses the genuine need of young people for a model and 
a hero to follow, and the deep longing of youth for friendship.
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Paul VI (1975a) also makes a direct address to young people in the Apostolic Exhortation 
Gaudete in Domino on Christian Joy. In the sixth section entitled ‘Joy and Hope in the Hearts 
of the Young’ the Church adopts an optimistic approach in trying to understand youth. 
Although youth is seen as a short-lived period for individuals, it is a permanently recurring 
period, over generations, being replicated continuously over time. The document identifies ‘a 
correspondence between the soaring impulse of a young person, being young, and the 
dynamism of the Holy Spirit’ (Paul VI, 1975a, para. VI).
The same document claims that there is great confusion among many young people arising 
from materialism trying to present itself as the gateway to the future. This may be true also in 
relation to contemporary youth. The Church is encouraged to initiate spaces of encounter 
“between the human being which, for a few decisive years, has youth at his command, and 
the Church in her permanent spiritual youthfulness” (Paul VI, 1975a, para. VI).
This Pope’s optimism for youth also rests on the older generation: “Youth will not fail the 
Church if within the Church there are enough older people able to understand it, to love it, to 
guide it and to open up to it a future, by passing on to it with complete fidelity the Truth 
which endures” (Paul VI, 1975a, para. VI). This document maintains that ‘this generation is 
waiting for something else’, the joy of divine truth. The Church believes that it has the 
responsibility to make use of the opportunities available through the media of communication 
to share this joy (Paul VI, 1970). (A more detailed analysis of youth and youth initiatives 
taken by the Church follows in the next chapter.)
The Desire o f the Church's to Journey with Youth
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While various pronouncements on the media were made by some of Pope Paul VFs 
predecessors, the Catholic Church’s interest in communication rose to a new level during 
Vatican II when the council issued a separate decree, Inter Mirifica (Vatican II, 1963). This 
interest of the Church was progressed further in the detailed analysis of the process of 
communication in Communio et Progressio (1971). These two documents begin by 
identifying the media as ‘means of social communications’. In contrast to earlier times, in 
Communio et Progressio, communication was seen as an instrument of evangelisation:
Christ commanded the Apostles and their successors to “teach all nations” to be 
“the light of the world” and to announce the Good News in all places at all times.
It is now necessary that the same message be carried by the means of social 
communication that are available today. (1971, para. 126)
The Pope’s experience and the Church’s faith in the possibilities of the ‘marvellous technical 
inventions’ (Vatican II, 1963, para. 1) are obvious also in this document:
The modem media offer new ways of confronting people with the message of 
the Gospel, of allowing Christians even when they are far away to share in 
sacred rites, worship and ecclesiastical functions. In this way they can bind the 
Christian community closer together and invite everyone to participate in the 
intimate life of the Church. (Communio et Progresio 1971, para. 128)
The Pope identified Christ as the perfect communicator and incarnation as the perfect form of 
communication (Communio et Progresio, 1971, para. 11).
Instruments of Social Communications and Young People
The process of communication and its nuances are discussed in detail in the next chapter (3). 
The instruments of Social Communication seem to have an important role to play in the 
process of evangelisation, especially in relation to youth. The institution of World 
Communications Day (WCD) by Pope Paul VI in 1967 underlines his lifelong trust in 
modem technologies and the media of communication. The importance of the evangelisation 
of young people, which was highlighted repeatedly by this Pope in various WCD speeches, is 
equally significant. During eight of the eleven consecutive years of WCD, from its start in 
1967, he made direct mention of young people. In the 1967, 1969, 1970, 1972, 1973, 1975, 
1976 and 1978 WCD messages, he used the words ‘young people’, ‘youth’ and ‘new 
generations’ (Drumm, 2006). This shows that the Church views the media as a significant 
influence on the development of young people a point worth noting in the context of the 
present study. Moreover, a better use of the media can bring significant change in the 
development of young people. “Young people who have received a solid moral and religious 
formation and who are inspired by a genuine ideal are therefore to be encouraged to engage 
in the different activities of social communication” (Paul VI, 1969). According to Pope. Paul 
VI, the Church needs to use the media for evangelisation. He identified dialogue as the 
method to be adopted by the Church to foster this participation.
Dialogue as a Method of Evangelisation
Gaudium et Spes (Vatican II, 1965f) states that humanity, as well as the Church, by its very 
origin and foundation, is communitarian. At the same time, unity among members of the 
human community, as well as the Church, is a key factor for development and salvation. The 
communitarian character of humanity and its necessity for unity is made possible through 
interaction which involves an exchange of ideas. Therefore communication is fundamental to 
achieve interaction between the members of a community. This communitarian aspect of the
30
Church, which is also an inherent necessity for unity among humanity, as described in 
Vatican II, is actualised through dialogue among and between human beings and dialogue 
between them and God. According to Gaudium et Spes: “This communitarian character is 
developed and consummated in the work of Jesus Christ. For the very Word made flesh 
willed to share in the human fellowship” (Vatican II, 1965f, para. 32). Jesus Christ is the 
zenith of this communication, as discussed earlier, and incarnation is the perfect model of 
communication (Communio et Progressio, 1971, para. 11).
Consequently, “the very nature of the gifts which Christ has given the Church demands that 
they be extended to others and shared with others. This must be obvious from the words: ‘Go, 
therefore, teach you all nations’ (Mt 28: 19)” (Paul VI, 1964, para. 64). A sincere desire to 
share spiritual patrimony also motivates the Church to have dialogue with the world. 
Evangelisation motivates the Church to begin dialogue.
Pope Paul’s first encyclical, Ecclesiam Suam (Paul VI, 1964), as its title indicates, informs 
the evangelist about the path the Church can take in the modem world. Here the path 
mentioned by the Pope is one of dialogue. If the main theme of Eccleisam Suam is dialogue, 
it can be seen also as a recurring theme running through almost all the documents issued 
during the reign of Pope Paul VI. For example, the documents of Vatican n, Gaudium et Spes 
(Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modem World, 1965f), Gravissimum Educationis 
(Declaration on Christian Education, 1965b), Dignitatis Humane (Declaration on Religious 
Freedom, I965e), Nostra Aetate (Declaration on The Relation of The Church to Non- 
Christian Religions, 1965c), Ad Gentes (Decree on The Mission Activity of The Church, 
1965a), directly speak about dialogue, (e.g., Gaudium et Spes, para. 21, 23, 25, 28, 40, 43, 56,
68, 90, 92; Gravissimum Educationis, para. 8, 11; Dignitatis Humane, para. 3; Nostra Aetate 
para. 2,4; Ad Gentes para. 11, 16, 20, 34, 41)
Another important document dealing with dialogue in communication is Communio et 
Progressio (1971), which was discussed earlier. These documents deal with the concept of 
communication and dialogue as a method for reaching out to the world, as well as an 
indispensable means of strengthening the bond between her members (Communio et 
Progressio, 1971, para. 114, 122). (Further discussion on dialogue is included in chapter 3.)
Evangelisation and Evangelii Nuntiandi (EN)
“Our century is characterised by the mass media or means of social communication, and the 
first proclamation, catechesis or the further deepening of faith cannot do without these 
means” (Paul VI, 1975b, para. 45). As an encyclical from the Vatican which gave new 
dynamism and momentum to the fundamental duty of the Church, EN deserves a special 
mention with regard to media as well as young people:
Circumstances invite us to make special mention of the young. Their increasing 
number and growing presence in society and likewise the problems assailing 
them should awaken in every one the desire to offer them with zeal and 
intelligence the Gospel ideal as something to be known and lived.
(Paul VI, 1975b, para. 72)
Evangelii Nuntiandi was published by Pope Paul VI (1975b) on the tenth anniversary of the 
closing of the Vatican Council H The objective of the last encyclical of Pope Paul VI, as 
described in EN itself, was to make the Church of the twentieth century ever better equipped 
to proclaim the Gospel. It urged the Church to revise methods of evangelisation by studying
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how the Christian message can be brought to the modem generation. His previous experience 
in 1955 when, as Archbishop of Milan, he proclaimed the Good News to the modem world 
during the great mission of Milan, may have motivated him to formulate this document 
(Clancy, 1963, p. 102). Fidelity to both the message of the Good News and to modem men 
and women, to whom the message is to be transmitted, is the central axis of evangelisation 
(Paul VI, 1975b, para. 2-4).
According to EN the presentation of the Gospel is not optional but rather a duty incumbent on 
the Church by the command of the Lord Jesus (Paul VI, 1975b, para.5).
The document identifies ecclesial communion of churches and hierarchy as being responsible 
for evangelisation (Paul VI, 1975b, para. 60-71). Article 72 is about young people, as their 
growing presence in society and associated problems compels the Church to evangelise them. 
The necessity of serious preparation for evangelisation is endorsed (para. 73-74), while the 
role of the Holy Spirit as the primary agent of evangelisation is emphasised: “Techniques of 
evangelisation are good, but even the most advanced ones could not replace the gentle action 
of the Holy Spirit” (para. 75). Evangelisation was inaugurated at Pentecost, under the 
inspiration of the Spirit (para. 75). Article 76 speaks about the need for authenticity among 
those engaged in evangelisation. The necessity for reform and an invitation for a renewed 
fervour in the process of evangelisation are detailed in later Articles.
The foregoing discussion has touched on some of the themes in EN which are relevant to this 
study. However, there are a few important issues still to be considered in the context of online 
evangelisation of youth.
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It is true that EN endorses the necessity of using the means of social communication for 
evangelisation: “The Church would feel guilty before the Lord if She did not utilise these 
powerful means that human skill is daily rendering more perfect. It is through them that She 
proclaims ‘from the housetops’” (Paul VI, 1975b, para. 45). As the area in which the word of 
God is spread increases horizontally, there should also be a vertical increase in the depth of 
the spreading, “piercing the conscience of each individual, of implanting itself in his heart as 
though he were the only person being addressed, with all his individual and personal 
qualities, and evoke an entirely personal adherence and commitment” (para. 45). 
Communicating the Good News calls for quantitative as well as qualitative courses of action. 
It cannot be claimed that Pope Paul VI had the Internet in mind when he mentioned the 
challenge of using various means of social communications, as it had not been developed for 
general use at that time. Even if it seems that a strong, sustained and continuous personal 
contact can be achieved online, concern about presenting the message of conversion with the 
vigour of ‘piercing the conscience’ would not be inappropriate. (This issue is discussed in 
more depth in chapter 3.)
In considering the qualitative aspect of evangelisation, another question arises regarding 
evangelisation and sacramental presence. According to Article 47: “Evangelisation thus 
exercises its full capacity when it achieves the most intimate relationship, or better still, a 
permanent and unbroken intercommunion, between the Word and the sacraments”. It 
continues by explaining that “the role of evangelisation is precisely to educate people in the 
faith in such a way as to lead each individual Christian to live the sacraments as true 
sacraments of faith”. The embodied sacramentality of evangelisation in contrast to the 
disembodied virtual relationship on the Internet invites serious consideration. These issues
Quantitative and Qualitative Dimensions of Evangelisation
are explored later in chapter 3. Also three questions posed by the Pope in Article 4 of EN 
seem to be valid in the case of online evangelisation:
In our day, what has happened to that hidden energy of the Good News, which is
able to have a powerful effect on man’s conscience?
To what extent and in what way is that evangelical force capable of really
transforming the people of this century?
What methods should be followed in order that the power of the Gospel may have 
its effect? (Paul VI, 1975b, para. 4)
The Church’s concern about evangelisation is not a decorative one, as EN comments in 
Article 20. It is not achieved by applying a thin veneer, but must be undertaken in a vital way, 
in depth and right to the very core. Christian culture should encounter, enter into dialogue 
with and evangelise other cultures, which is the deep vision of the Church. (A detailed 
analysis of youth culture from a post modem and contemporary perspective is presented in 
chapter 4 on youth.)
Hebblethwaite (1993) describes Pope Paul VI as the first modem Pope. This designation is 
appropriate to him, given his unprecedented approach in addressing the world, its modernity 
and related issues for the Church. His interest in the media of communication, the 
proclamation of Christian and human values against opposing cultural tides and his sincere 
concern about the integral development of young people, were three main interests of his life. 
This trio of interests, together with his teachings inform this research more than any other 
events in his eventful life. His method of dialogue opened new paths of evangelisation. 
During the last decade of the papacy of Paul VI, the Internet, an innovative way of 
communication, was evolving towards its present shape and revolutionising communications.
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By the end of the same decade, Karol Wojtyla was elected Pope to continue the mission of 
Paul VI with whom he was associated during Vatican II.
John Paul II
In one of the longest papacies ever, Pope John Paul II led the Church into the new 
millennium with realism and confidence. Much of the writings of John Paul II are relevant to 
young people and the media. For example, his Apostolic Letter The Rapid Development 
states: “This is especially true for young people, who show a natural propensity towards 
technological innovations, and as such are in even greater need of education in the 
responsible and critical use of the media” (John Paul II, 2005, para. 11). A collaborative 
participation of youth in the management and administration of the media was suggested by 
the Pope in promoting dialogue to bring reciprocal knowledge, peace and solidarity in the 
world. Major themes identified in the teachings and life of Pope John Paul II are now 
considered.
Evangelisation of Youth
The pontificate of John Paul II tells the entire Church that the future of evangelisation is 
centred on young people. That is why he wrote in The Threshold of Hope: “The Church looks 
to the youth with particular hope for a new evangelisation” (John Paul n, 1994a, p. 118). This 
is because young people are the future of the Church, as well as of the world. As this Pope 
has identified the goodness of youth at a profound level, he invests his hope for the future of 
the Church in the treasure of youth. He exhorts the whole Church to be aware of this 
discovery: “The Church and its each member should strive for a discovery, a discovery of the 
fundamental importance of youth” (John Paul II, 1994a, p. 119). His own discovery of youth 
made him look at it from the following perspectives.
Youth as Treasure: The importance of youth, together with its social and psychological 
implications, in the theology and ministry in the Church, was highlighted in the apostolic 
letter of Pope John Paul II on the occasion of International Youth Year in 1985. In this letter 
the Pope describes Youth as a special treasure in discovering the human “I” with its 
unrepeatable and concrete properties and capacities inscribed with the whole plan of future 
life (John Paul II, 1985b, para. 7-9).
Youth as Growth: In the same letter, Dilecti Amici, the Pope describes the process of growth 
and its potential, recalling the youthful years of Jesus of Nazareth (John Paul II, 1985b, para. 
7-9). He views this as the growth of all the energies through which normal human 
individuality is built. It is at an upward stage, unlike the downward stage of the growth of 
adults whose youth is already behind them. He affirms that contact with the visible world and 
nature is a necessary factor for this growth to bring with it the gradual accumulation of all 
that is true, good and beautiful (John Paul n, 1985b, para. 51). For young people in the 
contemporary world, growth and development seem to be strongly intertwined with the 
virtual reality of the Internet, whereas the older generation grew up dealing with nature and 
modes of its physical existence. In his letter, he invites the pastors of the Church to show 
young people the path of “growth”. In order to achieve this, it can be said that pastors need to 
understand the Internet, enabling them to engage with young people online. This could be as 
an implicit invitation for Youth Ministry to be undertaken on the Internet even though it was 
only in the initial stages at that time. (John Paul II, 1985b, para. 55).
Based on his personal experience of youthfulness and his role as a pastor in Poland in the 
early years of his priestly life, he acquired a very deep understanding of young people. 
Having a deep love for them, he came across the paradox that “Young people are the same
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ever” (John Paul II, 1994a, p. 118). However they grow up in different contexts. He stressed 
the difference in their current context which again reveals his understanding of the universal 
reality of contemporary youth. A theology of youth ministry also needs to consider youth 
historically, identifying its historical constants and variants. A study of youth in the context 
of various cultural realities across the globe is also required, as explained in the next chapter.
As the future of evangelisation is centred on young people, he urges the Church to discover 
the treasures of youth. This suggests that he has identified these treasures, having studied 
them very closely in anthropological, psychological, historical and sociological perspectives 
and interpreted the findings in the light of the Gospel. The findings of his analysis of youth 
are reflected in his teachings. Youth evangelisation is a rich seam that runs through all the 
activities of Pope John Paul II.
Youth as Leading Characters o f Evangelisation
John Paul’s wisdom and understanding of young people is indicative of a deeper vision when 
he says; “Youth must not simply be considered as an object of pastoral concern for the 
Church but as ‘leading characters in evangelisation and participants in the renewal of 
society’” (John Paul n, 1988, para. 46). The possibility of a dialogue between youth culture 
and the Church is opened up in the same document:
The Church has so much to talk about with youth, and youth have so much to 
share with the Church. This mutual dialogue, by taking place with great 
cordiality, clarity and courage, will provide a favourable setting for the meeting 
and exchange between generations, and will be a source of richness and 
youthfulness for the Church and civil society. (John Paul n, 1988, para. 46)
Is it possible to have a favourable setting where the Church and youth can have a mutual 
dialogue ‘with great cordiality, clarity and courage’? In the Apostolic Constitution on 
Catholic Universities, Pope John Paul H, in a series of seven articles, proposing cultural 
dialogue and evangelisation in universities, observes that, “By its very nature, each Catholic 
University makes an important contribution to the Church's work of evangelisation” (John 
Paul II, 1990a, para. 49).
“Then I saw them swarming through the city, happy as young people should be, but also 
thoughtful, eager to pray, seeking “meaning” and true friendship,” (John Paul n, 2001a, para. 
9). The Pope’s optimism regarding young people was clearly expressed in the Apostolic 
Letter Novo Millennio Ine unie, promulgated at the closing of the Great Jubilee. In young 
people, ‘whatever their possible ambiguities’, the Pope identified a ‘profound longing for 
genuine values which find their fullness in Christ’. In his commitment to young people, John 
Paul U offered Jesus Christ, as their supreme friend and teacher of all genuine friendship, to 
accompany them in their life (John Paul II, 2001a, para. 9).
John Paul II viewed youth as ‘leading characters’ in the process of evangelisation and 
participants in the renewal of society. Dialogue, which is a form of communication, can be 
used by the Church to initiate and deepen this partnership. Thus communication becomes 
vital for both the Church and for youth. In documents such as Ecclesia in Asia (John Paul H, 
1999c), Ecclesia in Europa (John Paul II, 2003), Ecclesia in Oceania (John Paul II, 2001d) 
and Ecclesia in Africa (John Paul H, 1995) the Pope envisioned the settings where youth 
evangelisation could be accomplished. He chose these Apostolic Exhortations to speak about 
the differences in the context of the Church in these changing geographical and cultural 
realities. Details of these changes are discussed in chapter 4 on Youth.
On the day he inaugurated his pontificate, Pope John Paul II began his dialogue with youth 
saying, “You are the hope of the Church! You are my hope!” (cited in Rylko, 1998, p. 170). 
The evangelisation of young people was a mission personally taken up by Pope John Paul H 
In the Apostolic Letter to the Youth of the World on the Occasion of International Youth 
Year, the Pope wrote:
You are the youth of nations and societies, the youth of every family and of all 
humanity; you are the youth of the Church . . .  so your youth is not just your own 
property. It is possession of humanity itself. (John Paul n, 1985b, para. 1)
Bishop Stanislaw Rylko (1998), then Secretary of the Pontifical Council for the Laity, says 
that the Pope challenges the results of sociological research and surveys which paint a dark 
picture of contemporary youth. In Crossing the Threshold o f Hope, the Pope observed that 
“in youth . . . there is an enormous potential for good and creative ability” (cited in Rylko, 
1998, p. 171). In them he saw a great prophetic force. The Pope wants to involve young 
people, with their prophetic dynamism, in the great work of new evangelisation in the world 
today. Rylko views this as the vision of a father and a friend who looks into the depths of the 
hearts of young people today and who is able to go beyond appearances, even when these are 
negative (Rylko, 1998, p. 171). On the occasion of the institution of World Youth Day 
(WYD) in 1985, the Pope explained the reason for his decision: “Every young person must 
feel accompanied by the Church: this is why the whole Church, united with the Successor of 
Peter, must feel more deeply committed at the global level to youth” (cited in Rylko, 1998, p. 
172).
Called To Behold the Young (World Youth Day)
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This is a key theme of this whole study. The Pope wants young people to be accompanied by 
the Church. He envisages this accompaniment as a commitment by the members of the 
Church on a global level to journey with young people in a genuine way. The global presence 
of the Catholic Church and the global reality of the medium of the Internet seem to 
complement the ministry of accompaniment envisioned by this Pope. John Paul IPs vision of 
accompaniment is evidenced in WYDs where, since their inception, anywhere between three 
million and five million young people gather in one place and at one time to see and hear the 
Pope (Trigilio et al. 2006, p. 276). One clear setting of youth evangelisation identified by the 
Pope merits particular mention here: the media of communication, considered briefly in the 
next section.
Media as a Virtual Areopagus
Like his predecessor Paul VI, John Paul II was acutely aware of the enormous possibilities of 
the media as a means of presenting the Word of God. Throughout his life, he was like a 
medium transmitting the Good News to millions, especially to young people. The relationship 
between the innovative global network of the Internet and the 2000 year old history of the 
Church is next for consideration.
As a child, John Paul II had such a strong experience of a cultural centre at the town square 
that later, when he became Pope, he referred to the modem media as the first areopagus of 
the modem age:
After preaching in a number of places, St. Paul arrived in Athens, where he went 
to the areopagus and proclaimed the Gospel. The first areopagus of the modem 
age is the world of communications, which is unifying humanity and turning it 
into what is known as a ‘global village’. (John Paul H, 1990b, para. 37(c)
Just as the first cultural interaction between Christianity and stoicism occurred, in the space 
of areopagus, cyberspace can be seen as the space for cultural interaction to occur in the 
present day. This is evident from his references to areopagus in the encyclicals Fides et Ratio 
(John Paul II, 1998a), Redemptoris Missio (John Paul II, 1990b), Apostolic Letter Tertio 
Millennio Adveniente (John Paul II, 1994b), Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia in Africa, (John 
Paul II, 1995) and the Apostolic Letter Rapid Development (John Paul II, 2005). The 
importance of this concept was reiterated in the Pope’s use of the term in his messages on the 
occasion of various communication days (1998, 2000, 2005).
When John Paul II was elected Pope in 1978, the Internet itself was in its infancy. From the 
sending of the first e-mail in the early 1970s, this concept developed and spread (Peter, 
2004). ‘The Internet’ was discussed by Pope John Paul II for the first time at a public meeting 
in a homily given on World Communications Day, 2001. Almost two months before that, in a 
homily at a meeting of the conferees of Social Communications, the Pope addressed them 
about the emerging media culture and the preparation of the document Ethics in Internet: “I 
am pleased that in these days you have been considering a similar document on the theme of 
Ethics in Internet, which would indeed be very timely, given the rapid spread of cyber­
communications and the many moral questions involved” (John Paul II, 2001b). This is the 
first time in the history of the Church that a Pope used the word ‘cyber-communications’ at 
an official meeting.
John Paul II was the first Pope to have an e-mail address: John_paul_ii@vatican.va 
(Tschabitscher, 2007). It was significant that he was the Pope of the Millennium, when the 
Internet and communications technology were changing the whole concept of 
communication. The Pope’s understanding of this development seems to be reflected in the
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publication of two documents from the Pontifical Council for Social Communications: Ethics 
in Internet (Foley, 2002b) and The Church and Internet (Foley, 2002a). The Apostolic Letter 
of John Paul II Rapid Development (John Paul II, 2005) is another important document 
addressed to those who are responsible for the media.
Virtuous and the Virtual - The Church and the Internet: “Christ is both the content and 
the dynamic source of the Church's communications in proclaiming the Gospel” (John Paul 
II, 1992, para 6). John Paul II traces the history of communication to the day of Pentecost 
when the Holy Spirit came upon the apostles and, with the gift of tongues, restored the 
communication which had collapsed at Babel. “Pentecost is only the beginning. Even when 
threatened with reprisals, the Apostles are not deterred from proclaiming the Lord: ‘We 
cannot keep from speaking about what we have seen and heard (Acts 4:20)’” (John Paul n, 
2000a).
As an institution with a 2000 year history during which communication played an integral 
part, the question facing the Church in relation to the latest development in the world of 
communication, the Internet, is explored in this research. The document of Pontifical Council 
for Social Communications Aetatis Novae (John Paul II, 1992) identified five constructive 
ways in which the Church can avail of the media to present Christ as ‘the content and 
dynamic source’: (1) At the service of persons and cultures; (2) At the service of dialogue 
with the world; (3) At the service of human community and progress; (4) At the service of 
ecclesial communion and (5) At the service of a new evangelisation (para. 6-11). These five 
dynamic ways can be captured in the two phrases, the Church ad intra (the Church in itself) 
and the Church ad extra (the Church in relation to the world) (Hebblethwaite, 1993, p. 311). 
The Catholic Church is a communion of persons, families, parishes, dioceses, and churches.
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Again the Pastoral Instruction Aetatis Novae teaches that “communication mirrors the 
Church’s own communion and is capable of contributing to it” (John Paul II, 1992, para. 6). 
The existence of the Church ad intra as well as ad extra shares one common purpose, namely 
evangelisation.
In relation to the document of the Council for Social Communications, issued ten years after 
Aetatis Novae, Foley (2002a) observed that: “The Church has a twofold aim in regard to the 
media” (para. 3), in relation to the world outside the Church, as well as in relation to the 
communication in and by the Church herself. “ . . . how is the Church to adapt its mission to 
the particular age, environment, educational and social conditions of men’s lives?” as Pope 
Paul VI (1964) asked much earlier in Ecclesiam Suam (Paul VI, 1964, para. 86). Dialogue 
seems to be the appropriate method to be adopted here. It is essential that “new pathways of 
dialogue between the Church and the cultures of our period be forged. This dialogue is „ 
absolutely indispensable for the Church, because otherwise evangelisation will remain a dead 
letter” (John Paul II, 1983a, para. 4). The Church and the Internet seem to possess some 
similar characteristics. Both exist on a global level; both have human participation as their 
source of strength; communication is a vital element of both of these global entities. Some 
questions still remain: Is the Internet a space for dialogue? Can dialogue be initiated and 
sustained fruitfully on the Internet? Can friendship be initiated and sustained in virtual space?
Before concluding this review of the teachings of John Paul II two other issues need to be 
considered in relation to evangelisation- language and culture.
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Pope John PauL II has observed that “the human capacity for language made the human 
world, including the world of literature, possible” (cited in Weigel, 2005, p. 40). 
Evangelisation as ‘transmitting revelation’ (GDC, 1998, para. 39) can be considered as a 
continuation of Revelation. In this New Heaven and New Earth of the Information Age, is 
there any change in the basic formula for revelation? The culmination of God’s self 
communication is in Jesus (Vatican II, 1965d, para. 2). Evangelisation, as the continuation of 
revelation, is the same yesterday, today and tomorrow - sharing the Good News. The 
primordial substance of evangelisation is the same. It is the Son of Man, the Saviour, the 
Good News, the Logos, the Messiah, the redeemer. What is different in the process of 
evangelisation as signified by these various titles for the one Son of Man? While the 
difference in language is obvious, the difference in meaning is subtle, depending on the 
context in which these names evolved.
John Paul II (2001a) refers to Jesus Christ as the supreme friend of youth (para. 9). Whilerthe 
Logos from Greek philosophy assumes yet another name, the substance is the same: Jesus 
Christ. The language is different; as the language of proclamation varies according to time 
and space. As Christological, anthropological as well as cultural dimensions of evangelisation 
emerge at this juncture, Cardinal Avery Dulles advices that, “evangelisation must be heralded 
with new energy and in a style and language adapted to the people of our day” (Dulles, 2006, 
P- 5).
The Problem of Language in Evangelisation
In order to carry out its task of evangelisation, the Church has to go through a process in two 
steps: (a) reading the signs of the time and (b) interpreting them in the light of the Gospel in a 
language which is intelligible to each generation.
These two activities do not exhaust the process of evangelisation, as will be seen in later 
sections. Rather they constitute its initial stages. The task of the Church is to bring good news 
or, in one word, ‘evangelise’. The signs of the times can be read in many ways. By observing 
young people, interacting with them and through friendship, an evangeliser can get to know 
their yearnings and aspirations:
Your role is great, because you must help the Church to become a creator of 
culture in its relationship with the modem world. We would be unfaithful to our 
mission to evangelise the present generations, if we left Christians without an 
understanding of new cultures. (John Paul n, 1983a, para. 10)
Young people are like the fig tree in the Gospel of Mark, “From the fig tree learn its lesson: 
as soon as its branch becomes tender and puts forth its leaves, you know the summer is near” 
(Mk 13:28). At a different level, in order to understand ‘the dramatic features of the world in 
which we live’ (Vatican II, 1965f, para. 4), one has to understand the culture of young people 
and traverse the path they travel. Also learning about the media and taking part in it can be a 
way of becoming familiar with the salient features of our time.
The second task in the process of evangelisation is interpreting the observations made from 
reading the signs. This interpretation happens both through the light of the Gospel and the 
teachings and traditions of the Church. Its purpose is to answer the ever recurring questions
Reading the Signs of the Time and the Problem of Culture in Evangelisation:
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of: the meaning of this present life; the meaning of the life to come; and the relationship 
between them. Pope John Paul II has addressed these perennial questions in his conference 
with young people. If the evangelisation is aimed at young people, the answers need to be 
intelligible to them. A major issue for this research centres on how to reformulate the 
message of the Good News, which the Church wishes to convey, in a language that is 
intelligible to contemporary youth.
John Paul II brought new zeal and energy to evangelisation by re-interpreting it in the context 
of contemporary culture. The term ‘new evangelisation’ itself signifies the need for renewal 
of the methods used in evangelisation: “Look to the future with commitment to a New 
Evangelisation, one that is new in its fervour, new in its methods, and new in its expression” 
(John Paul n, 1983b). Since the concept of new evangelisation involves dealing with the new 
culture, it is discussed in the chapters on the Internet and on youth.
In his work, Witness to Hope, George Weigel (2005, p. 18) quotes the motto “Veni, vidi, Deus 
vicit (I came, I saw, God conquered)” used by Polish troops in 1683. The same slogan can be 
attributed to the papacy of the first Polish Pope. Wojtyla came, he saw, God conquered young 
people through him. John Paul II (1988) exhorted young people to ‘go into the vineyard too’ 
(Mt 20:4) (Christifideles Laid , para. 2). More recently, he asked the Church to ‘put out into 
the deep’ (Lk 5:4) of cyberspace, endorsing the objective of this study (John Paul II, 2002, 
para. 2).
2.4 Summary and Conclusions
Evangelisation was the theme of this chapter. The first section put the research in context 
identifying evangelisation, youth and the Internet as its main three spheres of interest.
Accordingly the study of evangelisation presented here is primarily in the context of how it 
relates to youth and communication, including the Internet. Following on from this, a 
comprehensive examination of evangelisation was presented. The final section focussed on 
the life and work of two modem Church leaders, Pope Paul VI and Pope John Paul n. Their 
teachings in relation to the media and youth were explored in detail.
In the course of the discussion, the etymology and various definitions of evangelisation were 
explored. Ontological aspects of evangelisation were considered, together with some of its 
essential elements. As it was established that it has both a sacramental and a non-sacramental 
dimension, this means that cyber-space can be a medium for evangelisation.
The next part of the debate focussed on ecclesial aspects of evangelisation. The Internet, with 
its global reach and capacity for interactivity, could enable a more participative mode of 
communication. The operation of Basic Ecclesial Communities (BECs) was reviewed. 
Essentially they are new ways of helping people to grow in their faith. It is submitted that 
cyberspace provides another new path for evangelisation.
Three major modes of evangelisation -  personal (one-to-one); communitarian (preaching to 
groups) and technological (use of the media) were explored. While the latter technological 
mode may not be as personal as the other two, it has the capacity to reach vast numbers of 
people. In addition, it can facilitate smaller groups, interacting in a more intimate manner.
The review of life and works of Pope Paul VI established his deep interest in the media and in 
youth, both in his earlier life and in his teachings during his papacy. His successor, John Paul 
II, shared his commitment to young people. His inauguration of an annual World Youth Day
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in 1985 endorsed his particular emphasis on youth and evangelisation. The review of this 
Pope’s teachings also highlighted his great interest in the world of communications. His 
writings endorsed his deep appreciation of the enormous possibilities of the modem media as 
a means of presenting the word of God. He was the first pope to encounter the world of 
cyberspace.
In sum, the fundamental importance of evangelisation in the Church has been established in 
this chapter. This research is a journey to bring the mystery of the Incarnate Word into the 
cultural matrix of the Internet in order to reach the world of youth. The findings on 
evangelisation, particularly as it relates to youth and the media, seem consonant with this 
goal. This forward journey is depicted in Fig.2.2 below.
Fig 2.2 Various Currents Involved in the Onward Journey of the Church
Participation in the Internet may open dynamic spaces facilitating intellectual and spiritual 
encounters between the Church and young people. The global presence of the Catholic 
Church and the global reality of the medium of the Internet seem to be complementary to the 
ministry of accompaniment envisioned by Pope John Paul H Communication is also a 
common denominator between the Church and youth as participants in the common goal of 
renewal of society. Therefore this is an instance where the spheres of the Church, youth and 
the Internet can come together in sharing the common pursuits of human existence.
Evangelisation is the purpose of both the internal and external communication of the Church. 
Dialogue founded on friendship can be a vehicle of evangelisation in this age of Information 
and Communication Technology (ICT). Souls coming together in cyberspace to share the 
Good News may open innovative ways of evangelisation.
In order to get a fuller appreciation of the opportunities for evangelisation afforded by the 
internet, this modem medium of communication is explored in depth in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 3 
THE CHARACTERISTICS AND POTENTIAL OF THE INTERNET 
AS A MEANS OF SOCIAL COMMUNICATION
In the previous chapter communication was shown to be essential to the Church, arising from 
this vital role in evangelisation. An analysis of the concept of communication is the focus in 
this chapter. The first part deals with communication at a general level while the second part 
explores communication on the Internet. This is followed by a review of some online 
religious initiatives.
3.1 Communication
Beginning with a broad review of communication, the concept is explored in detail in this 
section. Then various theories on the topic are set. Other aspects considered are: mechanical 
approaches to communication; multimedia communication and models of communication.
Communication: An Overview
McClave (1997) defines communication as the process by which ideas, information, 
opinions, attitudes and feelings are conveyed from one person to another. In daily life, a 
person uses different ways of communication as a means of expression. Ideas and events can 
be expressed through verbal language and sound. Also they can be in written codified 
symbols of a language. In addition there is non-verbal communication which uses human 
senses, signs, symbols and sounds. Ideas can be encapsulated in pictures and drawings, 
diagrams and other symbols. Methods of communication involving technology are used by 
both institutions and individuals. Overall, these are the forms of communication used to
express ideas (Pearson and Nelson, 2000, p. 76). Fig 3.1 below shows a simple model of 
communication where the sender is a person who initiates communication by sending a 
message (Gray and Starke, 1988, p. 387). The receiver is a person who completes the process 
by receiving the message.
Fig 3.1 Simple Form of Communication
According to Pearson and Nelson (2000), communication can be classified in five categories:
a) Inirapersonal: This refers to communication happening within the self;
b) Interpersonal: The communicative exchange which occurs when two people engage in 
communication is called an interpersonal communication;
c) Group: This is the communication involved with a collection of individuals who share 
some common attributes;
d) Mass: This form of communication refers primarily to the scale of communication arising 
from the institutional practices of the mass media engaged in the industrial production and 
circulation of meaning;
e) Extrapersonal: This category covers communication between machines, with little human 
intervention (p. 76-77).
Turning to the Internet, an analysis of communication in relation to this medium shows that it 
includes elements of the above categories. Online communication involves both the 
interpersonal and group categories and it can include some elements of mass communication. 
Also, since there is a subjective element in Internet communication, it can help intrapersonal 
communication. As we are considering communication which occurs between human beings,
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machine assisted extrapersonal communication is not discussed here. Before moving on to 
the new form of communication online, some theories of communication are considered next.
Theories o f  Communication
There are various definitions of communication. For the School of Mass Communication, it is 
the act of imparting, conferring or delivering messages, such as words or ideas, within or 
between groups of people (Demers, 2005, p. 57). According to this school, the most popular 
statement about the process of communication comes from political scientist Lass well (1948) 
who said that the best way to study communication was to answer five questions, as set out 
below.
Lasswell Model of Communication'.
A simple model of communication, involving the message, sender and receiver, was studied 
and graphically represented by Harold Lasswell in 1948. It is known as the Lasswell formula: 
Who says what to whom in which channel and with what effect? The act of communication is 
considered comprehensively in this model. As the Lasswell model seems to represent a basic 
and common form of human communication, the questions raised by him are applicable to 
any communication. In A Social History of the Media: from Gutenberg to the Internet, Briggs 
and Burke (2005) refer to the influence of the Lasswell formula when forming their social 
concept of communication:
We have been influenced at the outset by the simple but deservedly famous 
classical formula of the American political scientist Harold Lasswell (1902-78), 
describing communication in terms of who says what to whom in which channel 
and with what effect (p. 4).
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In the context of this research, the answer, based on the Lasswell model, is: The Church 
wants to convey the message of the Good News to the young through the channel of the 
Internet, with the effect of deepening faith. Although there is some criticism1 of these linear 
models which represent a one-way process, the elements included in the process need to be 
considered as they identify the fundamental features involved in any communication.
Another study by Danesi (2000) captures communication according to the mode of delivery. 
According to this observer, in the human species, communication can include the following 
modes of delivery: gesture, i.e., the use of hands; vocal, i.e., the use of vocal organs; writing, 
i.e., the use of pictures or graphic symbols; visual, i.e., painting, sculpting etc.; mechanical, 
i.e., radio, computers, television etc.; signalling, i.e., body signal emission (natural or 
intentional) (p. 58). This brief overview of new theories on communication highlights the 
complexity of the topic. Further insights into communication are now considered.
Mechanical Approaches to Communication
Communication happening on the Internet can be defined as Computer Mediated 
Communication (CMC). Among the six modes of communications identified by Danesi 
(2000), where would CMC occur? It is not wrong to say that the communication happening 
on the Internet is mechanical, at least in part. The mechanical or technical features of 
communication were studied for the first time by Claude E. Shannon (cited in Guizzo, 2003). 
Warren Weaver developed the mathematical laws governing the transmission, reception and 
processing of information. Another linear model of communication, which is similar to the 
Lasswell formula, was developed by Shannon and Weaver a year after Lasswell’s. It is
1 ‘Communication is not a unilateral transfer of information from person to another, from sender to receiver, as 
if it were a monologue. That understanding sometimes called the transportation model -  is too linear and implies 
that the receiver is passive and not involved in the process beyond simply receiving what is sent’ (Granfield, P. 
1994, p. 3).
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intended to be a scientific guide to the possibilities of sending a message. This model (Fig 
3.2) is considered to be the most influential of all the early transmission or mechanical 
models:
Fig 3.2 Shannon & Weaver Model of Communication
/  Information 
[ Source V
Source: Pearson and Nelson, 2000, p. 79
In any communication, the communicator or source of information is important. In the same 
way the message, channel of communication, external or internal interruption of any kind 
which hinders the intended message reaching the target, e.g., noise, as in the above model, 
must be taken in account. The receiver of the message also plays an important role in the 
process of communication. The Shannon and Weaver model adds more elements to the 
Lasswell model. One is the importance of the ‘transmitter’. In online communication, a 
personal web page where the message of the Good News appears is the transmitter. Next is 
the ‘noise’. This represents the adverse factors or challenges that need to be considered in 
formulating the message in a manner which is comprehensible to young people. A 
postmodern youth is continuously bombarded with all kinds of information from the world of 
technology. New gadgets such as ipods, mobile phones, palm tops with the Internet etc., 
create a virtual world around them, ready to impart information and provide them with 
various forms of entertainment.
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Communication on the Internet is not just a mechanical one, as mentioned above. It is a 
combination of various modes. Computer Mediated Communication (CMC) is a multi-media 
communication. The term multimedia is derived from two Latin words, multum, meaning 
multiple and medius meaning middle. The Medium has three modes: Artifactual media 
(books, paintings, sculptures and letters) -  artif actual mode of encoding and decoding a 
message; mechanical media (telephones, radios, television sets, computers and videos) -  
mechanical means of transmitting a message; natural media (the voice - speech, the face - 
expressions and the body - gesture, posture, etc.) -  the natural means of encoding and 
decoding a message (Danesi, 2000, p. 142).
When it is said that the Internet can support multimedia, it means that it uses multiple forms 
of information content and information processing (e.g., text, audio, graphics, animation, 
video, interactivity) to inform or entertain the (user) audience (Castells, 2000, p. 394). 
Therefore the scientific model of communication, as proposed by Shannon and Weaver, is 
not sufficient to explain fully all of the nuances of communication occurring online, since 
online communication covers a combination of various modes of communication. An 
amalgam of all these models is required to explain various aspects of the medium of the 
Internet. This suggests that the Internet is not just a medium but rather a collection of media. 
Its enormity and capacity to hold vast amounts of data and information, as well as its capacity 
for retrieval of instances of interaction, makes it a unique ‘medium*.
Models o f  Communication
Early models of communication have evolved over time. This can be seen from the works of 
Pearson and Nelson (2000) who identify four models. They are:
Multimedia Communication
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a) The Action Model: This model reflects a notion that communication happens when one 
person sends a message and another person or group of persons receive it without giving any 
feedback.
b) The Interaction Model: Here the sender sends a message and the receiver receives it and 
responds with another message.
c) The Transaction Model: In the transaction model, communicators simultaneously send and 
receive messages.
d) The Constructivist Model: This model posits that receivers create their own reality in their 
minds. The sender sends symbols to be interpreted and the receiver constructs his or her own 
meaning. According to Pearson and Nelson (2000), this model significantly reframes the 
communication process.
For the purpose of this research, the last model seems to be more relevant, considering the v 
parties involved with perhaps cultural differences, their freedom of interpretation and their 
ability to negotiate. This appears to capture what occurs during a communication between 
two parties who are involved in important communication. The forum model proposed by 
Granfield (1994) shares similar concepts as it holds that there is a dynamic relationship 
between the sender and the receiver. The receiver actively participates in this dialogic 
exchange on the basis of experience, understanding and interpretation.
The discussion now moves on to a more detailed explanation of the Internet, providing a 
clearer understanding of online communication
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An overview of the Internet is presented in this section. It commences with a definition of the 
Internet. This is followed by an explanation of its origin and development, how it works and 
its major uses. Then, various other aspects of the net are delineated. Next, interactivity and 
relationship in CMC are examined together with some concerns about cyber communication.
The Internet
The word ‘Internet’ is the abbreviated form of ‘International Network’. There are numerous 
definitions of the Internet. The conventional definition describes it as the global network of 
computer networks (Martin, 1997, p. 295) where a network is a group of connected 
computers that exchange information and share equipment. The following description, which 
reflects the technical and scientific definition of the term “Internet”, is given by The Federal 
Networking Council (FNC). “Internet” refers to the global information system that:
(i) is logically linked together by a globally unique address space based on the 
Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent extensions/follow-ons;
(ii) is able to support communications using the Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent extensions/follow- 
ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and
(iii) provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level 
services layered on the communications and related infrastructure described 
herein (Federal networking Council (FNC), 1995) .
In his book A Brief History of the Future, Naughton (1999) provides an interesting 
perspective on the Internet:
2 Many of the functions of the FNC were transferred in the year 1997 to the Large Scale Networking (LSN) 
group and other Interagency Working Groups (TWG) and the website of FNC has been changed to www.itrd.gov 
(Federal Networking Council, 1995).
3 .2  U n w eavin g the W eb
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The Net is really a system which links together a vast number of computers and 
the people who use them. It is the phenomenon of hundreds of millions of people 
freely communicating via such an efficient and uncensored medium that gives 
the Net its special character, and its extraordinary power, (p. 40)
An overview of the history and development of the Internet now follows.
Origin and Development of the Internet
The seeds of the Internet were planted in 1969 when the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(ARPA) of the U.S. Department of Defence began connecting computers at different 
universities and defence contractors. The creation of a large computer network was 
undertaken in order to survive a nuclear attack or other disaster (Naughton, 1999).
The invention of packet switching in the year 1964 by the RAND corporation in U.S. led to 
the formation of the first wide area network (WAN) in 1968. Later, the Pentagon funded the 
connection of a four-node network called ARPANET (Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Network). The network grew slowly and the first public demonstration took place in 1972, 
linking forty machines. In 1973, the network crossed the Atlantic to Norway and England 
(Martin, 1997, p. 294). The growth of the Internet has been a continuous and rapid process 
from 1973 onwards with the development of TCP/IP-the specifications of its working and 
features such as E-mail, Usenet, Telnet, FTP etc. in due course. Next a short description is 
given of how the Internet works.
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Technically, the Internet works like a pipeline that exchanges text, data files, and 
programmes from one user to another. It uses a set of rules and procedures known as 
protocols to control timing and data format. The set of commands and timing specifications 
used by the Internet is called Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol, usually 
abbreviated as TCP/IP. Internet activity can be defined as computers communicating with 
other computers, using TCP/IP. It works by converting the messages into small data packets 
when they are sent and reassembling them at their destination (Cowpertwait and Flynn, 2002, 
p. 423.)
The basic architecture of the Internet is what is known as a client/server model. A server, a 
computer running special software capable of sharing files with other systems, hosts a range 
of services such as e-mail and web pages that are accessed by client software running on a 
remote computer. An Internet Service Provider (ISP) is required to access these services and 
files. It operates a network using common software rules, or protocols, and this is linked to 
other networks and agreements to pass traffic between them. This combination of networks 
comprises the Internet which consists of two main parts, the hardware or communications 
network and the protocols governing data transfer across that network (Whittaker, 2002). 
Next the main uses of the Internet are described.
Major Uses of the Internet
Email as a new means of communicating around the world, File Transfer Protocol (FTP) and 
Usenet, as new forms of acquiring information for educational development, and Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC) as a popular real-time and interactive communication tool among 
teenagers, make the Internet a very innovative communication medium. Thus this research
How the Internet Works
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study sets out to show that this new age technology can become an effective tool for the 
Church, enabling Her to play a significant role in the development of young people.
As cyberspace becomes part of daily life for more and more computer users, the uses of the 
Internet are on the increase. These include online services of many companies for e- 
tcommerce, electronic banking and, obviously, ministry in the Church. In other words, as 
Michael Heim describes it, “computers stick the windows of the soul behind monitors, 
headsets and datasuits” (Heim, 1993, p. 101). According to Naughton (1994), “The Net is 
i already changing the way we communicate. . . .  It challenges traditional notions of 
sovereignty. . . . Like all powerful technologies it has an immense capacity for both good and 
evil” (p. 44-45).
Characteristics of the Medium of the Internet
Seamlessness describes the facility in the Internet to link related concepts infinitely. This 
facility to move users from one document to another, following highlighted sub-topics,; of 
their choice, is one of the defining characteristics of the Internet. It is known as hyperlinking 
or hypertext linking and provides a top class cross-referencing service. The links may be 
within the same page, on the same site or anywhere in the world (Williams and Nicholas, 
2001). Talbott (1995) captures the nature of hypertext linking: “Clearly, a generation raised 
on adventure and video games-where every door conceals a treasure or a monster worth 
pursuing in frenetic style has its own way of appreciating the hypertext interface” (p. 13).
Issues of authenticating data and information overload, together with difficulties in 
navigation due to opening up new windows, come into play when using hypertext. The vast
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amounts of knowledge and its seamless nature, with an unprecedented association of related 
topics, make the Internet an immense space providing new venues to explore each moment.
Other important attractions of the Internet are currency and speed of delivery. Anything 
which is posted on the Internet reaches the end user more quickly than all the traditional news 
wires. Currency is a highly rated information need. The global reach of the Internet has had 
its greatest impact. Accessing documents located on the other side of the planet is as easy as 
it is for those on a web server in the same building. The development of audio and video, 
enabling users to tune in to what were previously local radio and TV stations, has added 
enormously to the global nature of the Internet. A negative result of the global reach of the 
Net is the facility to disseminate racist, sexist and other extremist information to the world. 
Some other features of the Internet now follow.
Egalitarianism: In their book, The Internet and the changing Information Environment, 
researchers Williams and Nicholas (2001) report that some people champion the Internet for 
its egalitarianism. According to this view, on the web, everybody is equal.
Comprehensiveness: The Web is considered to be a Pandora’s box. Many factors contribute 
to the Internet’s growing subject and topic inclusivity. They are: (a) Growth of organisational 
web sites of all kinds, including governmental, commercial, academic and non-profit making; 
(b) Migration of information from one format to another such as pamphlet or other printed 
copy, .to an electronic format; (c) Growth of personal information and communication and its 
embrace of academic, professional, personal and leisure sources (Williams and Nicholas, 
2001, p. 23-28).
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Two-way Interactivity of the Internet: Manuel Castels (2000) states that the Internet, in its 
different incarnations and unfolding manifestations, is already the universal, interactive 
computer communication medium of the information age. The interactive aspects of the 
Internet have enhanced its appeal as a truly different and alternative phenomenon from other 
media. Types of interactivity include bulletin boards hosting readers’ fora on various subjects 
and chat rooms. Here, a user is able to engage in dialogue with another user, generally by 
means of a text-based or image-based interface. When we consider the current young 
generation, this interactivity is of great importance.
While the communication that can take place through letters, e-mail, etc. lacks the quality of 
face-to-face communication, it is not quantitatively as large as that in mass communication. 
Therefore it is labelled Medio Communication coming between direct, face-to-face address 
and mass communication (Watson and Hill, 2006). In this study, the terms ‘cyberspace 
communication’ or ‘online communication’ will be used as appropriate, rather than the term 
‘Medio’. Some characteristics of the Internet of particular relevance to this research are 
considered now.
The Internet as Convergence
In Neuman’s view, “the argument that the media are converging and linking to comprise an 
all-encompassing network has considerable force and implications” (cited in McQuail, 2000, 
p. 87). The integration of text, numbers, images and sound, the different elements of the 
media which have developed separately over centuries, is a convergence occurring in 
cyberspace arising from the invention of the computer. The concept of convergence has a 
broader sense - convergence of different communication media such as mailing facilities 
(substitute for surface mail), radio, telephone and television, happening through the one
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medium of the Internet. Briggs and Burke (2005) refer to convergence in a different sense, 
identifying a convergence of cultures and societies. “Different societies and cultures which 
started their historical journeys separately were now said to be traveling together on the same 
‘information super-highway’ ” (p. 216). (This concept is discussed later in more detail.)
Religions also co-exist in this new medium. Digital convergence is an important process 
happening on the Internet, with unexpected implications. Howard Rheingold (2000) confirms 
this idea: “In research-and-development laboratories, today, one popular buzz-phrase is 
‘digital convergence’, which means that a lot more than virtual communities and libraries of 
text are going to live on the net in the near future” (p. 68).
Packet switching, which is a basic element of Internet technology, is the first step  ^of 
convergence. It does not need a central control system because each packet and the entire 
network routers know how to get information around. Packets contain digitised information, 
voice, sound, text, graphics, computer programs, etc. and can be sent over the airwaves 
(Rheingold, 2000).
This is one of the first requirements of ‘going online’. Any individual, or organisation 
wishing to migrate to cyberspace, first of all, has to digitize the data. Digitization is the 
process of translating the data into a form of discrete symbols. The basic form of these 
discrete symbols consists of electromagnetic symbols in binary zeros and ones (Whittaker, 
2002, p. 193). Any information that can be digitized can be presented online by the respective 
interested parties. If we examine the history of the Internet, we see that educational and 
research institutes were the first to go online. “The first node was delivered to UCLA in 1969, 
and the network expanded to four nodes by the end of the year. In 1970, Harvard and MIT
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came online” (Rheingold, 2000, p. 68). This may be because education is mainly dealing with 
information. Other institutions closely related to daily life rather than just dealing with 
information, soon followed.
Convergence and Cornucopia
Abundance ensues from convergence. “New technologies should make possible greater 
individual choice of what to see and hear -  and of when to see and hear it” (Briggs and 
Burke, 2005, p. 217). The power of choice or opportunity to choose is a sign of abundance. 
Thus, convergence in the Internet makes more opportunities available and gives more power 
to individuals to choose the best of what is available.
The invention of the computer was a turning point, accelerating the convergence of the 
communication media. The computer, in its present form, is the result of the collaborative 
efforts of a considerable number of researchers over decades. Microcomputers integrated 
various methods of communication: “Hundreds of thousands of components could be carried 
on a microprocessor, and as their versatility became recognised a stimulus was given to 
digital over analog technology in all the media which were soon to become their main users” 
(Briggs and Burke, 2005, p. 224).
Like a magnet attracts particles of steel, the Internet brought together a number of spheres of 
human living to the information super highway. The title given ‘Mosaic’ given to the first 
ever browsing software, infers an assortment. It was described in the New York Times in 
December 1993 as ‘the first window into cyberspace’ (Briggs and Burke, 2005, p. 244). 
Convergence on the information super highway brought together a complex mixture of 
various areas of human existence. When human minds began to express themselves in this
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new space, ‘cyberspace’ emerged as a new dimension of human existence, addressing the 
need of human beings for the information superhighway and the making use of it for 
individual human needs by becoming part of it. In the contemporary world cyberspace has 
become part and parcel of human living for many. It is an embedded media. Also it has 
created an opportunity for human beings to exist online creating a mutual ‘embeddedness’. 
This makes cyberspace a human space, unlike other media in the past.
Virtual space/cyberspace
The convergence of individual human beings is the ultimate aim of any communication 
medium. The Internet has made this convergence possible. Technically, the Internet is just a 
collection of personal computers connected via fiber optics. As a communication medium, it 
does not resemble a space conducive to human existence like other spaces of human 
interaction. Yet the Internet, when understood as ‘virtual space’, transforms the idea of ‘space 
away from the three dimensional reality to the poly-dimensional interior world of the self’ 
(Mirzoeff, 1999, p. 92).
Spiller (2002) traces the origin of the word ‘cyberspace’ to the Greek term kubernetes 
meaning steersman, as used originally by Plotinus in the third century BC. Cybernetics also 
traces its origin to the same Greek word, indicating how systems work and respond to outside 
stimuli. ‘Cyberspace’ was a word used for the first time by science fiction writer William 
vGibson. As Spiller observes, Gibson added a spatial metaphor to the concept of the coining of 
the word ‘cybernetics’ (Spiller, 2002, p. 7). He envisaged a ‘cyberworld’ created by the 
matrix of the interconnected sum of all the world’s computer networks (Briggs and Burke, 
2005, p. 252). ‘Virtual space’ was not the same as ‘cyberspace’. The word ‘virtual’ means the 
‘simulation of a real thing’ (Cowpertwait and Flynn, 2002, p. 438). All the simulated 
\
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experiences are collectively called virtual reality. There are writers who equate the virtual 
spaces of the experience of the Internet to medieval soul spaces with some spiritual 
connotation (Spiller, 2002, p. 18).
In more recent times, the Internet is seen by many as a virtual or simulated world 
(Cowpertwait and Flynn, 2002). In this discussion ‘cyberspace’ and ‘virtual space’ are used 
interchangeably, even if they are viewed differently by various writers. They connote a world 
of infinite possibilities. For some, cyberspace is where you are when you are on the 
telephone; for others, it is a world of computer simulation; it is a computer-science concept of 
place; it is the agent of technological disappearance; it is forever dissolving, reconstituting, 
cyclically distilling and recombining. For some, it augments empirical scientific space with 
another space with different rules; for others it is a space that has inspired some to imbue it 
with a spiritual, dimension -  a technological gnosis, as put forward by Spiller (2002). Spiller’s 
view is compelling where he states: “to provide a definitive description of the phenomenon 
that is cyberspace is an impossible task” (Spiller, 2002, p. 8). With its paradoxical entities 
already present and increasing at each moment, cyberspace cannot be given a definitive 
description, because it alters constantly. However, even if it is difficult to give an agreed 
description of cyberspace, its capacity to allow people to create a new and versatile social 
space in which they can ‘meet and interact’ with one another needs to be highlighted.
Also, people view this human interaction online in different ways. Some people find various 
landscapes in cyberspace in which different human needs can be met. Knowledge landscapes, 
homesteading on the electronic frontier, the Information Superhighway, the matrix of 
computer networks, the virtual public sphere, the Net and the Web are some of the terms that 
signify these different perspectives. ‘Cyberspace’, as a human space, functions at different
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levels in its technical viability to make it an interactive space. In other words, human beings 
use it for their own purposes.
Interactivity and Relationship in CMC
In their book Computer Mediated Communication (CMC), Thurlow, Lengel and Tomic
(2004) quote Swedish Computer Scientist Jacob Palme who lists a number of reasons why 
people enjoy CMC genres such as Internet forums: (a) Status and self esteem, e.g., being able 
to communicate with experts; (b) Confidence, e.g., being able to keep up with your area of 
expertise; (c) Comradeship, e.g., being able to counter loneliness through interaction with 
people sharing your interests (d) Inspiration, e.g., being able to exchange ideas; (e) 
Generosity, e.g., being able to get and give advice and support. These indicate that online 
relationships can be similar to those which are enjoyed in a face-to-face encounter and that 
the qualities of human interaction in cyberspace may be similar to those in the real world.
Similar arguments are made by McQuail (2000) in relation to mediation. It is a process with 
several elements which occurs through the mass media. He details three of these elements. 
The first part of the process is the relaying of second hand (or third party) versions of events. 
Secondly, he refers to the efforts of actors and institutions in society to contact people for 
their own purposes and also for the supposed good of the public. Thirdly, mediation 
accomplished through the media implies some form of relationship.
Thurlow et al (2004) report that, in a survey of 176 relatively long-term newsgroup users, 
researchers Parks and Flyod found that personal relationships were indeed common and 
sometimes even romantic. Friends communicated with each other on a weekly basis and, 
perhaps not surprisingly, the more frequently people interacted online the deeper the
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relationship became. Relationships in MOOs are discussed also by Thurlow et al (MOO: an 
acronym for MUD - Multi User Dungeons, is a text-based online virtual reality system to 
which multiple users are connected at the same time (Castells, 2000, p. 387 and Turbee, 
1997). In a survey of 235 regular users of MOOs, Parks and Roberts found that nearly all 
respondents had formed ongoing personal relationships: friends, close friends or romantic 
partners. Levels of relational developments were typically high and marked by depth, 
interdependence and commitment (cited in Thurlow et al. 2004).
In contrast, McQuail (2000) offers more cautious comments regarding cyber relationships, 
noting that they “are likely to be more distant, more impersonal and weaker than direct 
personal rites”. He observes that a much larger share of communication and our contact with 
others and our environmental reality is mediated via information and communication 
technology these days, on an individual and private basis. In exploring the typology of 
interaction in these new kinds of media, he quotes Thompson who notes that ‘it has become 
possible for more and more individuals to acquire information and symbolic content through 
mediated forms of interaction’ (cited in McQuail, 2000, p. 65). Thompson distinguishes two 
kinds of interaction besides face-to-face contact. First there is mediated interaction through 
some technical medium such as paper, electric wires etc., enabling information to be 
transmitted to individuals who are remote in space or time, or both. In this interaction the 
participants do not share the same spatio-temporal references systems and have to consider 
the need to supply contextual information and make do with fewer symbolic cues than in 
face-to-face contact. Mediation of quasi-interaction is another type of interaction which refers 
to relations established through the media of mass communication (cited in McQuail, 2000, p. 
65).
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There is evidence to suggest that, a sense of deep commitment can emerge in CMC. Some 
people even say that they value their online relationships more than those offline. When 
people start to get close like this, it is only natural that they also start forming themselves into 
groups. ‘The extent to which messages in sequence relate to each other and especially the 
extent to which later messages recount details of earlier messages’ is the definition of 
interactivity on the Internet, provided by Thurlow et al (2004, p. 156). They say that the focus 
should be on the ‘glue’ that keeps message threads and their authors together. These authors 
term this a communication imperative. As human beings, we are bom to communicate. This 
means that we invariably circumvent any practical or technological obstacles which might 
otherwise prevent us from having the kind of relational fulfilment we desire. Therefore it is 
not a matter of what technology affords or permits us to do but of how we appropriate the 
technology and make it do what we want it to do.
An observation by Gallagher (2003) is pertinent here: “The new culture is fascinated with 
interconnections and with personal interiority. It values diversity and convergence in 
thinking. This will be one of the many strands of postmodemity and of its possible greater 
openness to the religious dimension” (p. 36).
McQuail (2000) identifies the following dimensions that are relevant and help differentiate 
‘new’ from ‘old’ media: the degree of interactivity, social presence, autonomy, playfulness 
and the degree of privacy. These can be considered as some essential elements to be taken 
into consideration by the Church in order to present itself effectively in the mosaic of the 
Internet.
This culture of virtual reality accelerates or can pose many threats. In other words, there are 
some ethical issues to be considered when exploring the multi-faceted culture of the Internet. 
The ‘Digital Divide’ is a term used to describe a form of discrimination dividing the rich 
from the poor, both within and among nations, on the basis of access or lack of access to the 
new information technology (Foley, 2002b, para. 10, John Paul n, 2002). Ward (2006) 
clarifies this issue in his writings on The Post-Modern God, “cyber space is yours only at a 
price. The cost begins with purchasing the computer and its software. . . . And not having
i
access to this announces poverty, intellectual and material” (p. xvi).
I;
The document issued during the reign of Pope John Paul II on Ethics in the Internet states 
that the Internet, along with the other media of social communications, is transmitting the 
value-laden message of Western secular culture to people and societies which, in many cases 
are ill-prepared to evaluate and cope with it (Foley, 2002b, para. 10). The same Pope raises 
an important issue regarding the ephemeral nature of the Internet. He argues that it offers 
extensive knowledge and no values, favouring a relativistic way of thinking and sometimes 
feeding the flight from personal responsibility and commitment developing a way of leading 
the contact made in the virtual world into the real world, and building on the first contact 
made through the Internet, are some other issues that arise regarding evangelisation.
i
The question of identity also raises serious issues about cyberspace where any user who has 
knowledge of the technology can get access to the Internet with a computer and modem 
(Whittaker, 2002, p. 166). Since the face and biological features of a person are not present 
on the Net, a user does not have to reveal his/her identity in order to be present on it. Turkle
(1996) observes that the Internet is an element of computer culture that has contributed to
Major Concerns around Cyber Communication
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thinking about identity as multiplicity; people are able to build a ‘self* on it by cycling 
through many selves. Also he raises another area of concern with this new technology 
relating to the use of this new medium for sex, pornography and obscenity. McQuail (2000) 
also express some reservations, nothing that “the relationships established or mediated by the 
new communicating machines are often transient, shallow and without commitment, forms of 
social interaction that can be achieved to order, as it were” (McQuail, 2000, p. 129).
Having explained various aspects of the Internet, the next section considers online initiatives 
in the religious sphere.
3.3 Sacred Space and Cyberspace
This section commences with an analysis of online initiatives which come under the broad 
umbrella of religion. Then the discussion becomes more focused, exploring Christian 
initiatives online. Next, regarding young people as ‘cybersouls’, the possibility of presenting 
Jesus Christ online is explored. Communication is presented as a core activity of ? the 
communal existence of the Church. Finally, an analysis of Catholic cyber culture is 
undertaken.
Online Initiatives in the Religious Sphere
Many writers have contributed to the debate about religion online. For instance, in her book 
Give Me that Online Religion, Brasher (2004) argues that online religion is a very positive 
development and is crucial to the future of religion. She presents cyberspace as a vital 
cultural vehicle for the emergence of religious experience and expression in future society (p. 
11). The ability to provide the spiritual sphere in a tangible way through the Internet creates 
opportunities for a new incarnation -  new evangelisation.
72
For Cobb, cyberspace has an “intrinsic value that ties it irretrievably to the larger sacred 
fabric of the uni verse” (cited in Campbell, 2005, p. 55):
The divine expresses itself in the digital terrain through the vast global computer 
networks that are now beginning to display rudimentary self organising 
properties. If we can allow ourselves to understand the deeper, sacred 
mechanisms of cyberspace, we can begin to experience it as a medium for grace.
(cited in Campbell, 2005, p. 55)
This can be considered as a rather extreme view. Brasher also has reservations about Cobb’s 
theory, commenting that “it is a fascinating, if unprovable, theory” (Brasher, 2004, p. 11).
Margaret Wertheim puts forward the argument that the Internet allows people to reconnect 
with ideas of the spiritual, immaterial world that have been silenced by the dualistic 
cosmology of Western science. Her historical examination of public notions of space argues 
that cyberspace is a non-physical space, “outside the physical space that science., has 
articulated”. Cyberspace provides a viable way to re-introduce the spiritual world into the 
postmodern context (cited in Campbell, 2005, p. 54).
In his collection of essays entitled Cyber_Reader, Spiller (2002) considers that Wertheim is 
comparing the medieval spiritual soul-space with cyberspace. Campbell (2005) also depicts 
cyberspace as a sacred space, allowing individuals to consider the influence of the Internet at 
many levels, including a spiritual dimension. Here, according to Campbell, the spiritual 
appeal of cyberspace lies in the paradox that it is a repackaging of the old idea of Heaven, but 
in a secular, technologically sanctioned format. She comments: “The perfect realm awaits us, 
we are told, not behind the pearly gates but the electronic gateways labelled .com and .net
V
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and .edu” (Campbell, 2005, p. 54). This represents the awaiting of millions of people who are 
estranged from the experience of the spiritual in the postmodern era. While the reasons of this 
estrangement are not detailed here, it can be noted that a distancing has occurred whereby the 
present young generation is unable to connect to the old ways of worship. This is a form of 
digital divide between the Church, with almost 2000 years of tradition, and the present 
generation, which surpasses the Church in its expertise of the digital. The Internet can address 
this by acting as a connecting space between traditional spiritual practices and the 
postmodern generation. A comment by Brasher is pertinent:
Examining the evolution of online religion in cyberspace gives some intimation 
of the direction human spirituality may take in the third millennium. Some people 
already navigate the virtual world with grace and ease; others are hard at work 
constructing their first virtual surfboard. Whether you choose to surf or run, the 
tidal wave of computer inspired spiritual change is coming. (Brasher, 2004, p. 43)
Technology as God project or Electric Gaia
Campbell (2005) asserts that no unified overarching spiritual narrative exists in cyberspace. 
Rather, “like the world beyond the screen, the Internet exists as a marketplace of spiritual 
pptions” (Campbell, 2005, p. 57). This makes the Internet a hallmark of postmodern culture. 
The consideration of Technology as God project is one of the theories put forward by 
Campbell (2005). Technopaganism or neo-paganism is a religious practice that seeks to 
consciously ritualise cyberspace. The purpose of technopaganism is to bring magical space 
and cyberspace together. This allows individuals to practice ancient pagan rituals online. It 
illustrates how individuals can use technology not just as a tool or space for worship, but to 
adapt beliefs so that engaging with the technology becomes an act of worship. Wertheim
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offer another view, opining that cyberspace invokes a collective immaterial arena here on 
earth (cited in Spiller, 2002, p. 302).
A similar ‘quasi-mystical’ concept of the Internet lies in comparing the online presence to 
eternal time. Brasher* s (2004, p. 52) view is in keeping with this approach: “It is always 
present. Whatever exists within it never decays. Whatever is expressed in cyberspace, as long 
as it remains in cyberspace, is perpetually expressed”. The quasi-mystical appeal is that
, cyberspace exudes a taste of eternity to those who interact with it.
>
This corresponds to the idea of post-modem life put forward by Ward (2001) in the The Post 
Modern God. He argues that surfing the net is the ultimate post-modem experience:
Time and space collapse into omnipresence and multi-locality. . . . The electronic K 
tide maintains you on the crest of impending satisfaction fast-forwarding to the 
endless pleasures yet to be located and book marked. Time disappears; boredom 
is deflated. (Ward, 2001, p. xv)
Pope John Paul II (2002) raises some concerns about this radical difference in the experience 
of reality and the human response to it. Regarding the experience of the concept of online 
time, Pope John Paul II refers to the post-modem life of the new generation as follows:
T. The Internet radically redefines a person’s psychological relationship to time and 
space. Attention is riveted on what is tangible, useful, instantly available; the 
stimulus for deeper thought and reflection may be lacking. Yet human beings 
have a vital need for time and inner quiet to ponder and examine life and its 
mysteries, (para. 4)
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The quest for a virtual experience may be interpreted as a sign of the quest for the spiritual. 
However, more research is required in order to comprehend the impact of the experience of 
online eternity. This is outside the scope of the present study.
In Campbell’s (2005) view, another concept of Electric Gaia is revealed when she refers to 
the work of Jesuit theologian and anthropologist Pierre Tailhard de Chardin who is referred to 
as the patron saint of Cyberspace. In his theological writings, de Chardin (1881-1955) 
envisioned an evolutionary space called the noosphere: “the earth’s thinking envelope” (cited 
in Campbell, 2005, p. 31).
The Noosphere and the Internet
“The purpose of evangelisation is the interior conversion of the personal and collective 
consciousness of people, the activities in which they engage and the lives and the milieu 
which are theirs” (Paul VI, 1975b, para. 18). Regarding young people as ‘cybersouls’, this 
section explores the possibility of presenting Jesus Christ online. To begin, it takes .the 
concept of the noosphere, developed by Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955), and applies it to 
the Internet. Drawing on de Chardin’s work, the Internet is considered as a space which 
connects human consciousness in a way that leads to a collective reflection.
Defined as the sphere of the mind, de Chardin envisioned the noosphere as a global 
consciousness that can bring harmony to humankind. Cobb (1998) draws on de Chardin’s 
idea in attempting to create a ‘theology of cyberspace’. Barlow (1997) also equates the 
present Internet with the noosphere (cited in Campbell, 2005, p. 58). This entails looking at 
the Internet as a means of bringing humans together to form a unified community.
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De Chardin (1978) envisioned three stages of development in the universe: the biosphere; the 
noosphere and the Christosphere or Theosphere. The biosphere is the earth’s living envelope 
whereas the noosphere is its thinking envelope. De Chardin’s description of the noosphere 
suggests a prototype of the present Internet:
There was something more: around this sentient protoplasmic layer [around the 
biosphere or physical world], an ultimate envelope was beginning to become 
apparent to me, taking on its own individuality and gradually detaching itself like 
aduminous aura. This envelope was not only conscious but thinking . . .  in an ever 
more dazzling and consistent form, the essence or rather the very soul of the 
Earth, (cited in Campbell 2005, p. 32)
As it is very pertinent to this study, a deeper understanding of this concept is considered 
important.
De Chardin's Vision: A Prototype of Evangelisation Online:
In de Chardin’s vision, noosphere emerged after the biosphere through ‘increasing technical 
efficiency’ (Aykara, 1997, p. 33) to totalise mankind. It comprises the existence of Earth’s 
thinking envelope and its contours, transformation through reflection and psycho-social 
convergence, accelerating the shift towards ultra-human states called planetisation (De 
Chardin, 1978, p. 29-32).
De Chardin (1978) is viewed as a process theologian. In line with the views of the scholars 
mentioned above regarding his vision of the noosphere and its similarity to the global entity 
of the Internet, the convergence of consciousness is a possible outcome of the Internet. 
Castells opines that “computers, communication systems, and genetic decoding and
\
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programming are all amplifiers and extensions of the human mind” (Castells, 2000, p. 31). 
De Chardin also contemplated a human phenomenon of co-reflection and a co-conscientising 
to underpin the apparent commonplace superficiality of the Earth’s technico-social 
disposition. In his opinion, this co-reflection, with decisive importance for both our 
‘understanding and our will’, is moving in the direction of a complexity-consciousness of 
planetary dimensions (De Chardin, 1978, p. 86). Understanding and decision, reflecting upon 
online activities, the power to know, the power to choose and the power to decide, have been 
given to an individual who is browsing. It is suggested that, these activities of the mind seem 
more important in online interaction.
Mooney’s (1964) reflection on de Chardin’s vision is in line with the working of online 
modules such as ‘threading’ and associated individual reflections posted on a topic which 
make a collective reflection possible:
What Teilhard had in mind, therefore, when he speaks of the ‘planetary 
maturation of mankind’, is a certain collective act of reflection, something which v 
is quite credible if we once concede his analysis of evolution and admit his law of 
complexity-consciousness. (Mooney, 1964, p. 47)
This is the point of “the progress in the complexification of matter being matched by a 
corresponding progress in consciousness” (Gray, 1969, p. 90). But De Chardin (1978) finds a 
danger in this process: “left to itself, our consciousness (however intense it may be in each 
one of us) of sharing in a planetary Flux of co-reflection is capable of building up the sort of 
religion of mere ‘evolutionary humanism’ ” (p. 91). There is a deepening of interiority (which 
may be also called growth of consciousness), according to the growth in complexity of
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matter. The energy coming out of the developed interiority is not necessarily only good as it 
can also cause “a growth in the possibilities of evil” (Gray, 1969, p. 92).
The world can only avoid this danger if humanity can make up its mind about the human 
phenomenon of co-reflection in order to find its full expression and its true place in the 
Christian phenomenon. It is a movement from the physical grounding of knowledge to a 
mystical plain. De Chardin (1978) states that “the time has come for Christianity to develop a 
precise consciousness of all the hopes stimulated by the dogma of the Universality of Christ 
when it is enlarged into this new scale” (p. 93). Being aware of the hardships, he comments: 
“how can we conceive that Christ ‘is immensified’ to meet the demands of our new Space- 
Time, without losing his personality” (p. 93). Castells (2000) states that the power of 
traditional senders like religion, morality, authority, traditional values and political ideology 
was transmitted through historically encoded social habits. His concern is valid for the 
Church in the context of evangelisation: “Not that they will disappear, but they are weakened 
unless their power becomes multiplied by the electronic materialisation of spiritually 
transmitted habits. . . . Superior spiritual powers still conquer souls but lose their superhuman 
status” (Castells, 2000, p. 406).
Interpreting his concern in the context of evangelisation, it becomes clear that participation in 
communication on the Internet can strengthen the Church’s evangelisation process. If the 
Internet connects the minds of young people, building online networks may be an opportunity 
for the Church to evangelise young people in a profound way. This possibility is discussed in 
chapter 4 in the light of de Chardin’s vision. Now, the debate moves on to explore Christian 
initiatives Online.
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“Consider, for instance, satellite telecasts of religious ceremonies which often reach a 
global audience, or the positive capacities of the Internet to carry religious information 
and teaching beyond all barriers and frontiers” (John Paul n, 2001c, para. 3).
The use of the Internet by Christians began in the 1980s (Hutchins, 2007, p. 243). The 
Church Computer User Network (CCUN), an ecumenical and national organisation started in 
the US by the United Methodist Church, is an early example of Christian initiatives online 
(Campbell, 2005, p. 64). Hutchins (2007) refers to evangelicals as using Bulletin Board 
Systems around the mid 1980s. Campbell (2005) identifies three dominant expressions of 
cyber participation by Christians: (1) cyberchurches; (2) e-vangelism and (3) Online 
Christian communities. Each of these is now considered.
Cyber churches
Campbel (2005) adopts Dixon’s approach in defining two forms of cyber churches: (a) As the 
body of all Christians who interact, using global computer networks and (b) as an 
electronically linked group of believers, aiming to reproduce in cyberspace aspects of 
conventional church life. Hutchins (2007) did some interesting research in a case study of 
ithree cyber churches where he tried to comprehend the intensity of religious experience 
taking place in them. In this study he contrasts two kinds of interactions. One is textual 
interaction and the other is graphical. “The first virtual worlds were text-based, in that their 
environments and the events occurring within them were described using words rather than 
images” (Barrie, 2003, p. 1). Hutchins (2007) talks about the ‘immersion* of a player in these 
virtual worlds. Distinguishing between the two, he says that text is better for intimate, 
intense, imaginative worlds where thought is more important than action. He identifies
Some Christian Initiatives Online
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graphics as being good for gregarious, large-scale, beautiful virtual worlds where action is 
more important. He is trying to challenge an argument in the Vatican document ‘The Church 
and Internet1 which suggests that virtual reality is no substitute for shared worship in a human 
community. Although interesting, his findings do not seem to pose a challenge to the stance 
of the Catholic Church, from a theological or communications point of view.
Campbell (2005) gives the example of the cyber church founded by Charles Henderson. It is 
a consortium of ecumenical churches and individuals who meet online every Sunday evening 
for conversations, using Internet Relay Chat (IRC). The WebChurch and Virtual Church of 
the Blind Chihuahua are other examples given by Campbell (2005) in her book Exploring 
Religious Community Online. She notes that, while dozens of cyber churches exist and 
continue to emerge online, in various forms, more are in the broadcast form rather than being 
interactive.
E-vangelism
Careaga (2002) coined the term e-vangelism which means sharing the Gospel in cyberspace. 
It involves using the Internet as a tool for missionary work to reach out to those who are 
estranged from the Church. According to Campbell, this focuses on presenting a purposeful 
Christian presence in cyberspace through a variety of means such as websites, chat rooms and 
e-mail lists. The Gospel Communication Network, launched in 1995, is presented as one of 
the first organizations to see the Internet as a potential “mission field”. Other examples are: 
Who is Jesus (http://www.ccci.org/wij/?); Gospelconfs Online Evangelism web guide 
(www.gospelcom.net/guide) and Brigada’s Online Web Evangelism Guide 
(www.brigada.org/today/articles/web-evangelism.html). Another site is e-vangelism.com by 
Careaga (Campbell, 2005, p. 66).
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The improvement in participation for an individual is a unique innovation on the Internet. My 
space, bebo, orkut and other similar social web sites have given more power to the individual
t
in the sense that anyone who is familiar with the technology can participate in online social 
interaction, transcending real life impediments. Horsfield and Teusner (2007) uphold this 
view: “In this decade we have watched the Internet evolve, moving from Oldweb to Web 2.0, 
facilitating interaction between users and resulting in the exponential growth of Internet sites 
around the world” (p. 287).
The phrase Web 2.0 signifies a new set of Internet applications such as social networking 
sites, wikis, filesharing networks, folksonomies and syndication sites. These social 
interactions are on the increase. Depending on how the Church responds to these new cultural 
spheres, it may be able to reach out to young people in the future. This may be the context in 
which the Vatican showed an interest in establishing an interactive site in 2006: “People will 
be able to find each other and work together online, and then go back and use what they have 
learned or done in their own communities” (Zenit, 2006). Campbell (2005) identifies the 
gathering of the “digital body of Christ” in online Christian Communities as a third 
significant form of online Christianity. This facilitates interactions with believers who are 
separated by geography but share some sort of religious connection. Also she cites ReaperNet 
(http://chat.reapemet.com/) as one example of online Christian Communities facilitating two 
way interaction through various computer technologies such as chat room and e-mail. 
Websites like xt3.com can be considered as initiatives by the Catholic Church initiating 
online interactions for young people.
Online Christian Communities
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Careaga (2002) suggests using the Internet as a tool for youth ministry. The findings of a 
study by the Bama Research Group (US) in 1998 regarding a future online Church for young 
people are presented by Campbell (2005). The group proclaimed that the cyber church was 
about to come. It was based on a national survey of teenagers where one out of six said they 
expected to use the Internet as a substitute for current church-based religious experience. 
Their activities, as presented by Campbell (2005), include interaction with others in chat 
rooms or e-mail exchanges about religious beliefs. Much earlier McLuhan (1967) observed 
that, “The young today reject goals. They want roles. . . . Young people are looking for a 
formula for putting on the universe -  participation mystique” (McLuhan, and Fiore, 1967, 
p. 100, p. 114). Applying this to online activity, it suggests that young people may require a 
participative experience in cyberspace, whether it be broadly religious, Christian or Catholic. 
The role of the Church may be to prepare interactive and participative cyber communities 
which are appropriate for the young. This can help narrow the distance between the realm of 
the Divine and the sphere of young people. The Internet has become a medium where a 
plethora of human experiences and needs can be met, using its ever increasing number of 
websites. Considering young people as Cybersouls, based on what is available in cyberspace, 
how can the evangelisation of the young be achieved online? What are the facilities on the 
Internet that could enable the Church to initiate a relationship with young people? What are 
the factors that could help start a spiritual dialogue with young people? If spaces of spiritual 
dialogue can be created, how can they be sustained? These are some of the issues to be 
explored in this research. Some significant areas related to the building up of an online space 
for evangelisation of young people are discussed below.
Online Youth
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In one way, Church communication can be viewed as mass communication because, on a 
day-to-day basis, the Church is dealing with a very large number of people. The same 
message of the Good News is being imparted to many people on a regular basis. However it 
is not quite like other mass communication media. It takes place in small communities, at 
different locations in the world, at different times of the day or night. Yet, in the 
communication of evangelisation, the same message is communicated all over the world, i.e., 
the message of the Good News. Therefore, before delving further into the possibilities of 
sharing the Good News Online, the relationship between communication and the Church 
needs to be clarified.
Communication and 'Communio ’ in the Catholic Church
According to Henrici (1994), “the Church is not simply an organisation constituted by 
communication - , as are all organisations. The Church is constituted in order to 
communicate” (p. 45). It was established in the previous chapter that communication is 
necessary for the fundamental evangelical mission of the Church -  spreading the Good News. 
This chapter shows that communication itself is fundamental to the Church and can 
established from the point of view of the ecclesiology of communio:
Koinonia/communion, founded on the Sacred Scripture, has been held in great 
honor in the early Church and in the Oriental Churches to this day. Thus, much 
was done by the Second Vatican Council so that the Church as communion might 
be more clearly understood and concretely incorporated into life. (Extraordinary 
Synod of Bishops, 1985, para. II-B-b-I)
Catholic Cyber Culture
Founded on the scripture (1 Cor 10:16-17) and regarded as central to the life of the Church 
from early times (Vatican n, 1964a, para. 4)3, Vatican II also upheld the theme communio. 
Thus, the Church has been seen as “a people made one with the unity of the Father, the Son 
and the Holy Spirit” (Vatican II, 1964a, para. 4). Here the term communio refers back to the 
communion of a triune God, the communion of three persons in the trinity. The ontology of 
this relational communion is expressed in the Catholic Encyclopedia in the following way: 
“For God, substantial being is being related” (Kress and Malanowski, 2003, p. 28). 
Consequently, God’s very being is the relationship between the Father, the Son and the Holy 
Spirit. This means that God’s very substance is a communicated being. Here communication 
becomes fundamental to the Trinitarian communion. Human beings are invited to be in 
communion with this inescapable ‘being with’. This communio is the model as well as the 
goal of human life. The relationship between communication and communion becomes 
explicit here. This was fundamental to the philosophy of St Thomas Acquinas because he 
used the word communicatio (communication) for communio (communion) and communitas 
(community) (Granfield, 1994, p. 4). Thus it is evident that communication is fundamental to 
community as well as communion.
The following description of this communio shows that it is a dynamic union. Theologians
use the term perichoresis to describe this communio. This means that, “God is so full of being
that his oneness is manyness, a manyness that in no way divides or separates, negates or
isolates his oneness” (Kress and Malanowski, 2003, p. 28). According to the synod of
Bishops in L985, basically it is a communion with God through Jesus Christ, in the Holy
Spirit. The Word of God and the sacraments are the means of this communion. Baptism is its
3 The main references of Lumen Gentium are from Sacred Scripture but it gives supplementary notes referring to 
the early Fatheis as follows: S. Cyprianus, De Orat Dom. 23: PL 4, 5S3, Hartel, III A, p. 28S. S. Augustinus, 
Serin. 71, 20, 33: PL 38, 463 s. S. Io. Damascenus, Adv. Iconocl. 12: PG 96, 1358 D. supplementary notes *4, 
Lumen Gentium art. 4 also preliminary notes of explanations art. 2.
door and the foundation. The Eucharist is the fount and apex of the whole Christian life 
(Vatican II, 1964a, para. 11). The communion of the Eucharistic Body of Christ builds up the 
intimate communion of all the faithful in the Body of Christ which is the Church (1 Cor. 
10:16) (Extraordinary Synod of Bishops, 1985, para. II-B-b-I).
Concrete Instances of ‘Communio’: The communication of God’s very relational being is 
reflected in the various instances of communio in the world and the Church. Kienzler (1994) 
identifies five instances of this communion in relation to the Church:
(a) Communio - Community with God: In the light of the documents of Vatican II (1964a 
para. 4; 1964a, para. 2) the instituting of the Church is like an icon reflecting the 
Trinitarian fellowship of Father, Son and Holy Spirit (1964a, para. 2)4.
(b) Communio - Eucharistic Community: The Trinitarian communion is made visible in 
the Eucharistic communion (Vatican II, 1964a, para. 7)5.
(c) Communio - The Unity of the Church: Communion originated from the trinity, was 
made concrete in the Eucharistic communion and is now imbibed and reflected in the 
structure and order of the Church through ecclesial communication.
(d) Communio - Communion of the Faithful (Fidelium): The communication which 
occurs within the Church manifests a communion between individual members as an 
assembly of individually communicating persons6 (Vatican II, 1964a, chapter 1 and 
chapter 2, para. 7).
4 “What has revealed the love of God among us is that the Father has sent into the world His only-begotten Son, 
so that, being made man, He might by His redemption give new life to the entire human race and unify it” 
Unitatis Redin teg ratio (Vatican II, 1964b. para. 2).
5 “Really partaking of the body of the Lord in the breaking of the Eucharistic bread, we are taken up into 
communion with Him and with one another. “Because the bread is one, we though many, are one body, all of us 
who partake of the one bread”. In this way all of us are made members of His Body, “but severally members one 
of another”.” Lumen Gentium (Vatican II, 1964a, para. 7).
6 “As all the members of the human body, though they are many, form one body, so also are the faithful in 
Christ. Also, in the building up of Christ's Body various members and functions have their part to play. There is 
only one Spirit who, according to His own richness and the needs of the ministries, gives His different gifts for 
the welfare of the Church.” Lumen Gentium (Vatican II, 1964a, para. 7).
86
(e) Communio - Sacrament for the World: This communio of the Church is intended to be 
the sign of salvation for the world. The commitment to justice, peace and freedom for 
all human beings and nations and to a civilization based on love, is a fundamental 
perspective of the Church today (Kienzler, 1994, p. 85-88).
According to Lumen Gentium (Vatican II, 1964a), communio is used to designate the entire 
‘mystical body of Jesus Christ’: those in glory who are purified and those still on pilgrimage 
(para. 50). Communio includes all processes and elements that make communion possible. It 
is a mutual sharing of the self. It is a dynamic, mutual and creative mediation/communication 
of the self. Community is the result of this communio. The Church is at the receiving end of 
the gift of God himself; at the same time, the Church is modeled on the Trinitarian 
community in its communication and communion. Having established the importance of 
communication in the communio and communitas (communion and community), next, the 
nature of communication in the Church is considered.
Communication and 4 Communio’ : Plude ( 1994) attempts to adapt the Church’s 
communication to the cyber age in her article ‘Interactive Communication in the Church’. 
She uses the term ‘interactive technologies’ to include ‘the impact of communication 
satellites, telephony, computer technologies and the integration of communications and 
computers. Pottmeyer’s understanding of three dimensions of Church communication are 
described by her as follows:
( 1 ) Communication within the Church {communio fidelium, communion ecclesiarum)\
(2) Extra-ecclesial communication (the Church as the sacrament of the Kingdom within 
the unity of mankind); and
(3) The self-communication of God (history of salvation) (Plude, 1994, p. 187-190).
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She establishes that all Church communication converges within the framework of divine 
self-communication. Thus the Church’s role is one of a sign or witness. Similarly, Sierra- 
Gutiérrez reflects upon communication as self mediation:
Communication, conceived as a mutual self-mediation of human beings, their 
meanings, and values becomes dynamic and transformative. It is a space where a 
co-production, a co-reference, a co-creation of new shared meanings, a co­
transformation of wholes constituted by common meanings and values is 
performed. (Sierra-Gutiérrez, 1993, p. 273)
It has been established that communication is fundamental to the Church in view of the 
ecclesiology of communio. As a new instrument of social communication, the Internet can be 
instrumental for the Church in its pilgrimage towards reaching the Trinitarian communio. As 
communication happening within communio is understood as self-mediation, a personalised 
form of online interaction would be required to initiate the journey of the Church towards this 
goal. These questions are addressed in the next chapter. Some areas of the participation of the 
Church on the Internet are discussed below.
Spheres of Interaction between the Church and the Internet
Three categories of people are connected to the Internet, using it as a medium of 
communication like any other medium. As shown in Fig 3.3, these are: core developers; 
intermediate developers and daily users with remote influence on development.
Fig 3.3 Three Categories of Internet Users
Some questions arise at this juncture. (1) What level of intimacy exists between the Church 
and the Internet? (2) Where do the Church and its baptised members stand in the above 
circles? (3) Has the Church got any power to influence the core development of the Internet? 
The participation of the Church in the above three levels of Internet use can provide ways of 
improving internal communication in the Church. In addition, this can open up opportunities 
of influencing the medium. In turn, eventually this can lead to initiating new avenues of 
evangelisation.
In the previous chapter on evangelisation, it was established that the Internet can be used by 
the Church for two main purposes: (1) improving internal communication in the Church; and 
(2) evangelisation. The Internet, with its apparent richness arising from its characteristics of 
speed of communication, geographical reach, data storage and retrieval and the ability to 
combine multimedia, seems to be suitable as a means of effective communication. This is 
based on viewing the Internet as a medium of communication.
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In the three categories in Fig.3.7, the outer group of people who migrate to the Internet prove 
that it is not just similar to any other traditional medium. They turn the Internet into a space 
for social interaction, making themselves present online by creating a personal page. By 
uploading their personal profile, photos and video clips, they make it a dynamic space. This 
seems to be a skill which many young people have acquired. They create a space for dynamic 
interaction between themselves. This includes people using web 2.0, referred to earlier in the 
previous section. It is a significant and unique aspect of cyberspace. The intermediate 
developers made it possible for the influx of daily internet users to logon. By participating on 
the Internet as either intermediate developers or core developers the Church will be enabled 
to forge a more effective and systematic engagement in its interaction with young people.
In this context of social networking, Femback (1997) draws on the work of Urry who 
suggests that cyberspace is not matter but rather a set of culturally bound relations as well as 
an empirical construct. This is a humanistic approach to cyberspace. The Catholic theology of 
evangelisation is also humanistic, according to the teachings of Pope Paul VI and Pope John 
Paul II, as discussed in the previous chapter. Some of thinking about cyberspace and catholic 
evangelisation share the same common ground -  humanism. In similar vein, some potential 
areas where the Catholic Church can take initiatives are considered below.
A Catholic Cyber Prospect
In earlier times before the advent of the Internet, the Church experienced 
‘interconnectedness’ in different parts of the world. The same message was being shared and 
the same memory was being relived in the Eucharist and the sacraments. The vehicles of the 
Good News were the existing forms of communication such as orality, literacy and 
ritual/visual presentation. Handing on the tradition was achieved both orally and in writing.
In addition, at the core of evangelisation, the sacraments were letting people participate and, 
by involvement in the rituals or visual presentation, the message was made personal and 
experiential. (Here aspects of evangelisation are being considered from the perspective of 
communication. The purpose of the study is not to analyse the aspect of grace and the divine 
nature of the sacraments.) The Good News was the common denominator in all churches in 
different parts of the world. This interconnected nature of the Church was upheld by the 
hierarchical structure as well as by the different apostolic traditions.
This does not mean that new technology, leading to McLuhan’s ‘global village’, has nothing 
to offer the Church. On the contrary, the new electronic media can impact on it in many 
ways. By availing of new developments in technology, the Church, similar to any other 
institution, can improve its communication of information both internally and externally. 
However, if the Church fails to take fuller advantage of the possibilities open to it through , ; 
great use of information technology, it is losing out on a powerful medium. Three of its 
advantages are described below:
(i) The Internet, being a global storage and retrieval system, can help retrieve the cultural 
memory of the world. If the Church, with its global presence, participates, the cultural 
diversity of the globe may be recalled. As Femback (1997) observes, ‘cyberspace is a 
repository for collective cultural memory’ (p. 37). In the context of the European Union, the 
Internet can be used for retrieval and recollection of the spiritual memory of Europe.
Not only in Europe but all over the world, a recollection of the .Christian culture can be 
instructive in informing the younger generation of the spiritual patrimony of respective 
places. It is more applicable to Europe, where Catholic culture has been a major influence in
the past. The Roman martyrology gives the names of saints and spiritual centres of the 
World. They were the cultural centres of the world at a particular time. The monastic 
Christian culture paved the way for modem culture in many locations. Bosch (1991) captures 
one such memory relating to the importance of monks.
t. The monks were poor and they worked incredibly hard; they ploughed, hedged, 
drained morasses, cleared away forests, did carpentry, thatched, and built roads 
and bridges. Even secular historians acknowledge that the agricultural restoration 
of the largest part of Europe has to be attributed to them. They turned the tide of 
barbarism in Western Europe and brought back into cultivation the lands which 
had been deserted and depopulated in the age of the invasions.
(Bosch, 1991, p. 231-232)
While, the memory of this patrimony is fading, the Internet, it seems, can retrieve it. This , 
requires a collective approach. In the context of World Youth Day, when young people move 
from their home country, there are two ways of recollecting the Christian Cultural memory. 
One is by identifying the spiritual memory of the place where the particular World Youth 
Day is located. A second way is to identify the Christian history of the place from which they 
have come. For example, in the context of Spain where WYD 2011 took place, there are 
many saints there in the Roman martyrology. As there are a lot of immigrants from various 
parts of Europe in Spain, a recollection of the importance of Christian culture in those 
locations from which they migrated to Spain could be insightful.
(ii) “The Internet is another in a line of modem technologies that undermine the traditional 
notions of civil society that require unity and shun multiplicity, while giving the impression 
that they in fact re-create such a society” (Jones, 1997, p. 25). The Internet seems to be a
medium which can be used like a web, holding links between the multiplicity of traditions, 
spiritualities, cultures, languages, liturgical practices and geographical distances that compose 
and define the Catholic Church. It is built in such a way that if a node is destroyed at one end 
of the whole system, the Internet, as such, cannot be destroyed. It is a matrix of computers, 
linked around the globe, that can work by sending data from other nodes and through 
alternative routes, if some nodes and routes are destroyed. Similarly, a bird’s-eye-view of the 
Church over time and space suggests that the Church itself can be viewed as a matrix of 
different spiritualities, liturgical traditions, founded on various cultures and a collection of 
individual churches. Theological schools try incessantly to extract meaning from the 
historical and cultural differences in the Church over time. Its survival system worked 
through its diversity. Alternatively, when the Church faced serious set-backs, its diversity 
could be viewed as a survival system developed over time. Thus decentralisation of its 
spiritual capacities or spiritual good is not new for the Church. The Internet, with a similar 
surviving mechanism, can facilitate the Church in spreading its message in the future.
(iii) Thirdly, the participation of the Church in cyberspace can make it a space free of 
constraints. The Internet is a place advocating decentralisation of authority. This trend of 
decentralisation sometimes gives the impression that the Internet is a space where there is no 
control at all because the control system is not as visible as in a single control unit. Are there 
moral laws and ethical guidelines that define the Internet, making it a space of interaction not 
for an archaic, but for a civilised society? Advocates of free speech and libertarians try to 
proclaim the Internet as a free space. The possibility of anonymity for people interacting 
online has made it easy for others to prey on those who are vulnerable through online 
interaction. As in the past, when the law of retaliation (lex talionis) ruled in Old Testament 
times, legislation found new frontiers on the Internet. Since the Internet provides such a huge
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space for human interaction, the participation of the Church in its cultural spheres can help 
the Internet change its image among ‘lay’ people who fear its negative aspects. Christian 
humanism is founded on human development and the ultimate freedom of the human spirit. 
Cyberspace is a human space. At the same time, if cyberspace can be free to the level of 
enjoying the ultimate freedom of ancient societies, there is a possibility that barbarism can 
rule in its secret shades. “Based on this perception of cyberspace as a vast treasure-trove of 
materials ready for appropriation, we often make use of whatever we find without seeking the 
person who has extended him-or herself [sic] towards us” (Mahfood, 2008).
This section on Catholic Cyber Culture has explored the fundamental necessity of 
communication as a constitutive reality of it being communio. Spheres of interaction between 
the Church and the Internet were then analysed before finally discussing some future 
possibilities online.
3.4 Conclusion
Initially, a general theory of communication was presented, followed by a review of the 
changes in models of communication with the introduction of the Internet. Then the 
discussion moved to the technology of the Internet. In unweaving the web from its origin and 
development, the progression of the Internet from an information sharing medium to a social 
space was outlined. This led to a review of the characteristics of the medium. Major changes 
in communication, making the Internet a medium of individual interaction, were then 
considered before analysing some concerns about cyber communication.
The next section dealt mainly with how cyberspace has influenced the realm of religion. 
Initially, online initiatives in the broad sphere of religion were considered. Regarding young
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people as ‘cybersouls\ the possibility of presenting Jesus Christ online was explored. Then 
the Christian view of the Internet was examined. Finally, the Catholic concept of 
communication was analysed before considering some possible initiatives online. As youth 
evangelisation online is the focus of this explanatory study, the next chapter presents an in- 
depth analysis of youth.
CHAPTER 4 
EMPOWERING YOUTH IN CYBERSPACE
The sharing of the Good News with young people through the Internet is the focus of this 
research. The three main areas for consideration in the study are: evangelisation in the 
Catholic Church, the Internet as a means of evangelisation and the involvement of young 
people in the process of evangelisation. Following the introductory chapter, the concept of 
evangelisation within the Catholic tradition was considered in chapter 2 while chapter 3 
identified the possible features of the Internet that could be used for evangelisation. Young 
people are the focus of this chapter.
With a view to exploring the possibilities of empowering young people, the first section of 
this chapter examines the concept of youth. Next, some of the important characteristics of 
young people in this information age are identified. Following this, issues regarding young 
people as natives of post-modern era are reviewed. Then, various possibilities of cyber 
relationships between young people are discussed. Finally, the theoretical foundation of a 
project of online faith development for young people is considered.
4.1 The Concept of Youth
What does the word ‘youth’ signify? Is ‘youth’ a mere biological period in the process of 
human development? According to Boran (1999), an expert in youth ministry, “Youth starts 
with puberty and finishes more or less when the body finishes growing” (p. 106). Other 
scholars in the area of youth ministry categorise youth within a particular age group. “I define 
youth ministry as the Church’s ministry to, with, by and for young people from ages fourteen
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to twenty-five” (Zanzig, 1987, p.41). However, Fulton et al, (2000) in a research context, 
consider that youth can range well beyond the age 24 and point out the anomaly in such 
categorisation. In identifying the exact population of young adults for youth ministry, Warren 
(1982) observes that it is difficult to specify this population by age. He considers that a 
particular age group as well as need groups are to be identified in order to achieve an 
effective youth ministry:
Those concerned about ministry to young adults will have to continue specifying 
the particular population they are concerned with: young marrieds under thirty; 
young singles under thirty; divorced persons of a particular age range; young 
adult homosexuals; Vietnam veterans; or the unemployed. My own use of ‘‘young 
adults” will refer to persons between twenty and thirty-five.
(Warren, 1982, p. 113)
Some concerns arise at this juncture. The first relates to those factors that constitute the 
category of people called ‘youth’. The next concern is about the terms or phrases that are 
used by the above scholars in referring to youth.
The latter will be addressed first. All these scholars seem to have used the terms youth, young 
people and young adults when referring to this physiological period in human life ranging 
from adolescence to adulthood. Also these terms have been used interchangeably without 
much distinction between them even if, literally, they have different meanings. According to 
the Oxford Dictionary (1987), the first meaning of the word youth is given as ‘the state of 
being young’. It is also used as a term to signify a young person (second meaning). As a third 
meaning, ‘youth’ is used as a collective term meaning ‘young men’ and ‘women’. The word 
‘young’ is an adjective and has the first meaning (when contrasted with ‘old’) as not far
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advanced in life, growth, development etc. Thus the word ‘youth’ seems to mean both a stage 
of life as well as a person or people of that age. In this study, the term ‘young people’ and 
‘youth’ are used interchangeably. Further information on the term ‘youth’ and ‘young people’ 
in the next section sheds more light on the concept of being young. The factors which 
constitute the category of people referred to as ‘youth’ are detailed in later sections.
The Phenomenon o f Youth
In an article entitled “Archetypal Patterns of Youth”, Eisenstadt (1963) provides some 
insights on ‘youth’. He sees ‘youth’ as a biologic phenomenon defined in cultural terms. 
Even if every human being passes through various ages and at each age he/she performs 
different tasks, Eisenstadt (1963) argues that, in most societies, the period of transition from 
childhood to full adult status or full membership in society is given a special emphasis. 
According to Boran (1999) youth is a phase in human life embracing adolescence and post­
adolescence in which many important decisions are taken. “What it means to be young is also 
shaped by culture” (Boran 1999, p. 106). He points out the social, psychological and cultural 
implications of this period. A holistic vision of ‘youth’, which contains all the crucial 
elements of any definition of age, is found in The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (1977). It 
combines the biological, social and cultural changes happening in the stages of life of a 
human being: “. . . youth thus begins with the onset of puberty and, after a number of years in 
which further experience and training are received, finally fits the individual for full 
citizenship in his own particular society and culture” {The New Encyclopaedia Britannica 
1977, p. 1090).
Youth cannot be considered merely in biological or psychological terms. There are external 
factors or agents that help to draw out, shape or develop youth as we understand it today.
Eisenstadt (1963) sheds light on this aspect of the development of youth: “‘Youth’ is the 
stage at which the individual’s personality acquires the basic psychological mechanism of 
self-regulation and self-control, when his/her self-identity becomes crystallized” (Eisenstadt, 
1963, p. 32). Viewed in this way, youth essentially carries the implications of a transitional 
and developmental process of attaining the maturity of adulthood. Those agents that shape 
youth also become important. Can the Church act as a catalyst in this development of youth? 
If the Church wants to adopt this role, an understanding of those social and cultural factors 
¿hat influence young people in the contemporary world needs to be developed.
Youth Labels
Some of the labels used to refer to young people over the past few decades provide an insight 
into their nature. Baby boomers, Generation X and Net Generation (NetGen) (Generation Y) 
are some categorisations given in relation to young people (Hill, 2001). Beaudoin (1998) 
claims that the Generation X (those bom after the late 1960s) tries to find meaning through 
immersion in popular culture, whether it be movies or music. Image is the foundation of their 
experience. In contrast, a conversation quoted by Rabey (2001) is tinged with a slightly 
negative view:
What is TNL (Tuesday Nite Live)? asked the ministry’s newsletter. It’s a 
Generation X thing. What is Generation X? It’s a generation of young adults who 
have been stereo typed as slackers, but who really are the best hope for the future. 
(Rabey, 2001, p. 3)
While Rabey (2001) indicates a labelling of young people tinged with negativity, Fulton et al. 
(2000) deem that both media and academia consider this generation as postmodern:
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Both media and academia often charge that the West has entered a postmodern, 
post-Christian or post religious society and that this change has increased the rate 
of decline of religious belief and belonging, and damaged personal and social 
morality, with particular effects on the young adult generation (sometimes 
referred to in the literature as Generation X). (Fulton et al, 2000, p. 2)
This view also suggests a negative picture of youth in the postmodern setting. Careaga (2001) 
identified three generations which constitute the majority of Net users today: baby boomers 
(bom between 1945-late 1960), Generation X (bom between 1960-1980) and the emerging 
Net Generation, as he calls them. There are some scholars who name those bom after 1980 as 
Generation Y, or millennials (Malphurs and Malphurs, 2003). Burke-Sullivan (2008) 
considers that young people of Generation Y want human community. She identifies them as 
experts in electronic and virtual communication who seem to crave actual physical presence.
These three categories capture what constitutes youth today. They find their meaning of, life 
through immersion in the image centred popular culture. Also postmodern youth are strong 
participants in the modem medium of the Internet. One major factor underlying the three 
main classifications is identified by Hill (2001). He detects those young people whose social 
reality is constructed from the messages they are exposed to by the commercial media and the 
Internet. These young people are the main subject of this research.
Young people setting out to face life on their own take responsibilities and initiatives by 
themselves. This development may be applicable to Church activities as well. Letting young 
people take initiatives and giving them the power, independence, authority as well as credit 
for those initiatives may be a necessity for the Church in order to be ‘young again’. In a
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similar vein* innovation in communications technology is opening up new ground for young 
people, giving them more power. ‘The do-it-yourself generation’, a label used by Crawford 
and Rossiter (2006), may be a suitable appellation to capture these features of young people.
While this categorisation may identify some of the characteristics of young people, Crawford 
and Rossiter (2006, p. 216) issue a marking note in this regard, observing that: “Today’s &
young -  those aged 18-30 -  are universal in their rejection of what they see to be extreme, 
oversimplified pigeonholes”.
Why is there such interest in youth today?
There seems to be an increased interest in youth today. At a general level, there is a visible 
and explicit interest in young people. There are bill boards featuring advertisements oriented 
towards young people or depicting images of them. Both business and media target youth.
Many bank websites have a special section for them. The world of entertainment is also 
orientated towards youth. Governments have special youth departments and so have 
international bodies such as the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN)., Also 
there are voluntary organisations which are dedicated specifically to youth development.
Similarly, the Church is interested in young people.
Apparent Alienation
Researchers suggest that there is an apparent absence of young people from traditional spaces 
of worship, giving rise to anxiety among the older generation. Malphurs and Malphurs (2003) 
report that only 34 per cent of Generation X  and 29 per cent of Generation Y attend a church.
A similar downward trend in the faith commitment of young Catholics is noticed by Briggs 
(2008), based on the decrease in Mass attendance from 37 per cent in the early 1970s to 19 
percent in 2002. An acceleration in the drift from the Church is observed also by Kay and
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Francis (1996). In other institutions, a similar trend is noticed. ‘Changing expectations’ and 
‘apparent disaffection of young people with traditional forms of participation in public life’ 
are two phrases used by the EU as reasons for initiating a youth portal entitled the European 
Youth Portal (European Union, 2008).
This focus on youth is not just a recent phenomenon. Much earlier, a similar alienation on the 
part of youth was observed by Cardinal Joseph Cadjin which inspired him to found the 
international organisation of Young Christian Workers (YCW) in Belgium in 1925. Powers 
(1967) considered YCW, together with its associated projects, as the largest Roman Catholic 
Organisation of the laity of that time. When Cardjin returned for vacation during his first year 
as a seminarian, he discovered that his old school friends had abandoned the Church and 
religious practice and no longer looked upon him as a friend. He considered that this change 
of attitude on the part of his friends was connected with an unprepared entry into the working 
environment (Trauth, 1967). The impact of industrialisation was a contributory factor at that 
time. This observation is endorsed by Boran (1999):
As technology advanced in the industrial society, the demands for qualified 
workers also grew. . . . For the first time in human history there were such large 
agglomerations of young people in the same place. To a certain extent youth 
became isolated from the rest of society and took on characteristics of a society 
apart, (p. 107)
These earlier developments show that alienation of young people is not new. Rather, there is 
evidence to suggest that, early on in the last century, the progress of industrialisation 
impacted on young people, leading them to become alienated from the Church. The 
establishment of YCW is an example of the Church’s response to concerns about the impact
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of industrialisation on youth during that period also it responded to concern about youth and 
delinquency, as can be seen in the next section.
Juvenile Delinquency
Juvenile delinquency was another key phrase in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which 
brought the plight of young people to the attention of the wider society. Research conducted 
by Healy and Alper (1941) goes back as far as 1876 in relation to criminal youth and their 
‘reformatories’. Similar studies were published by Mays (1972) Rutter and Giller (1983), 
Amos and Wellford (1967) and the U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
(1971). In relation to juvenile delinquency, Powers (1967) corroborates the need for the 
individual development and empowerment of a young person. In his article ‘Prevention 
through Religion’ he states that the challenge of the churches is to provide the religious and 
moral “climate” conducive to healthy growth to maturity (cited in Amos and Wellford, 1967). 
According to Johnston (1975), when such juvenile unrest brought young people into focus, 
the Church responded to this through the companion of youth, John Bosco. Oratories for 
young boys and girls established by John Bosco (1815-1888) became a beacon of light, 
recognised widely in Europe from 1847 onwards. In addition to these examples of a more 
focused interest in youth, there is a broaden interest in the concept, which is now considered.
A Universal Search for Youth: A broad thrust is discernible which underpins the interest in 
youth. This is evident in the fundamental quest for the spirit of youth in the universe. It is 
reflected in the myths of rejuvenation and events in nature. Accounts of special elixirs such as 
particular fruits and herbs that would make one young again are found in all cultures across 
the globe (Eliade cited in Clift, 1987). According to Clift (1987), this quest for ‘youth’ is also 
seen in Christianity in Jesus’ invitation for spiritual renewal: No-one can see the kingdom of
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God unless he is bom again (Jn 3: 3). Thus the interest of the Church in young people may be 
interpreted as an innate and fundamental quest for rejuvenation, which is a natural quest in 
the broader universe.
This romantic cult of youth is reflected in its contemporary expressions, according to 
Jagodzinski (2004, p. 233): “Metaphorically, they are the phantasmatic and fecund energy 
that potentially animates all persons regardless of their chronological age. Youth, from this 
perspective, mediates lived experience and transcendence.” He refers to the postmodern 
culture of youth, highlighting various spaces enfolded by them such as cyberspace, seemingly 
disparate and meaningless modem entertainments represented in movies such as Buffy the 
Vampire Slayer and X-files, trends in the lyrics of pop music, new postmodern hieroglyph 
found in music videos that can only be read by youth and video games (Jagodzinski, 2004). 
This gives rise to the need to be familiar with the culture of young people. Some of its 
characteristics are now considered.
4.2 Characteristics of Cyber-age Youth
As discussed earlier, Careaga (2001) identified three generations which constitute the 
majority of Net users today: baby boomers, Generation X and the emerging Net Generation. 
The emerging generation, who are citizens of the cyber world, are considered here in order to 
explore and understand their culture. As the Internet philosopher Turkle (1996, p. 77) 
observes, “Today children are growing up in the computer culture; all the rest of us are at best 
its naturalized citizens”. Some of the features of the cyber generation are set out below.
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Beaudoin (1998) cites pop music scholar Simon Frith in order to explain pop culture. He says 
that there are three ways of defining pop culture: as produced by a culture for  the people 
(people consume what is fed to them); as the culture o f the people (people consume what 
resonates with their own values); as the culture by the people (popular ways in which people 
live daily life). He points out that Xers are creators as much as receivers of pop culture. Their 
culture can be identified in the following terrain of their lives.
On the Net
The search by young people for free spaces where they can be in control, where they can feel 
free, where they can be with friends of the same peer group and not under the supervision and 
control of adults, is identified by Boran (1999) as one of the core elements of youth culture. 
This results in the ‘generation lap’, as Careaga (2001) labels it, as the children are lapping 
their parents in their knowledge of computers and the digital revolution. They navigate on the 
Internet almost by instinct, while their parents grapple with trying to understand how it 
works. A study on the network society reveals these details of Internet use: “The average age 
of Internet users in the US in the year 2000 was 36 years and in the UK and China it was 
below 30. In Russia only 15 % of the Internet users were older than 45” (Castells, 2000, p. 
377).
The above statistics, which confirm that young people are the natives of the Internet, provide 
a persuasive argument for opening a space of ministry of relationship to young people on the 
Internet. Beaudoin (1998) said that, even though the number of young people using the 
Internet was a small percentage of the total population, it was possible to identify their 
influence on popular culture. This situation is changed now. As mentioned in chapter 1,
Popular Culture
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Internet use by age shows that usage is highest in 12-29 year group, reaching 93% by 2009 
(Lenhart et al, 2010). This endorses the popularity of the medium for the young generation in 
the US. The 500 million users of Facebook (Elliot, 2010) provide similar evidence of 
popularity of net usage by young people. Another survey is quoted by Vogt (2011) which 
says that over 96% of young adults have joined a social network. This being the trend in the 
cyber world, the context in which many young people live their lives needs to be taken into 
account. This is considered next.
Disintegrating Families
Some of the challenges which face youth today are identified by Boran (1999, p. 116): 
“Young people are bom into an environment where there are no role models and no 
atmosphere that will nurture growth’’. Careaga (2001) cites a study in the United States, 
undertaken in 1997, which found that four out of every of five children between the age of 
nine and seventeen consider a one-parent home normal. Faced with this reality, in his view, 
Churches that build ministries on the assumption that two-parent households are the norm 
will need to change their approaches to ministry. The Church can no longer guarantee the 
faith formation of young people as it happened in the past when families were instructed to 
take care of their children (Careaga, 2001). However, it is suggested that new ways can be 
found to introduce this relationship of God to His People through the use of the Internet.
4.3 Natives of the Post-modern Era
Young people of today are natives of the post-modem age. The cultural shift from the modem 
to the postmodern, which began in the 1960s, is astonishing. Anyone bom after 1960 is 
"native" to this era. Other generations are naturalized citizens. So, whether native or 
naturalized, we all are part of the postmodern world (Gallagher, 2003).
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Post-modern thinking encourages questioning and a critical response to modernity, especially 
in terms of humanism and enlightenment thinking. Ministry in post-modern mode raises a 
series of questions for modernist assumptions. People no longer speak of universal principles 
and laws, valid for all times and places. Instead they look for the particular historical, 
cultural, sociaL and familial values that may have contributed to this particular set of 
principles and laws being useful in a particular set of circumstances. In the absence of grand 
narratives, particular movements, with clearly defined limited objectives, are now in vogue 
(Ward, 1997). As Boran (1999) sees it, in a post-modern culture, the place of residence is 
increasingly less important. It is possible to live in a rural area and be as well informed about 
the latest fashion in New York or London as youth who live in a large city in any part of the 
globe. In such circumstances, networking is of importance. Those ministering to youth and 
others can become more and more connected across the globe through the use of the Internet 
and local initiatives and practices can assume a greater significance for many more people.
According to Careaga (2001), young people steeped in this postmodern culture and heavily 
influenced by what the entertainment industry feeds them, pick and choose the ingredients for 
their own personal spirituality from a variety of belief systems. He adds that they have a self 
centered, practical and personal faith form that is more about stress reduction than salvation, 
more therapeutic than theological. However the presence of the Church on the Internet may 
provide spiritual insights to this post-modern generation who look for all kinds of information 
online. The challenge arises in finding new ways of packaging the spirituality and faith of the 
Catholic tradition in ways which befit the technology of the Internet, as well as the culture 
and taste of the post-modern generation.
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As Careaga (2001) sees it, the post-modern, multicultural, global, networked society and the 
forces sweeping our cultural landscape today - forces that N-Geners accept matter-of-factly 
as “just the way things are”- pose dramatic challenges for the Church. Beaudoin (1998) 
argues that, while most people in the past would not consider fashion and Music TV as a 
spiritual need, to Generation Xers they are as dear as any of our grandparent’s religious 
devotions. Careaga (2001) quotes Christian sociologist Bama who considers that the Church 
stands at the crossroads today and must choose between two paths:
She must choose between defending the traditional structure, which impedes 
effective ministry, or embarking on a new path that allows her to conform to her 
biblical mandate and still respond to the practical needs of her members.
(cited in Careaga, 2001, p. 63)
Here Careaga identifies a possible bipolar tension for the Church in evangelising youth. It 
involves making a 2000 year old faith, tradition and practices relevant to the present young 
generation. Jagodzinski (2004), Livingstone (2002), and Lundby (2006) also hint at a 
conflict which can originate in this postmodern situation. Jagodzinski (2004) argues that, 
today, the gulf between what is youthful and fresh and what is adult and outdated has grown 
considerably. At the same time, Livingstone (2002) sheds light on a specific issue. She 
observes a generation gap in the media literacy between parents and children: “Young people 
are ready to learn in ways less than familiar to the generation of their parents and teachers” 
(Livingstone, 2002, p. 232). Lundby (2006) also identifies this conflict:
Generational Conflict
There could be interesting cultural conflicts or encounters between those adults 
passing on the religious tradition without much competence in digital 
communication and the young people used to digital communication but not very
i
familiar with the religious tradition. (Lundby, 2006, p. 19)
This conflict may be solved to some extent by a mutual learning process. If the adults learn 
the culture and language of youth, this can help them share the religious tradition they 
inherited, rewritten in the language and culture of youth. In other words, the traditional 
structure can act as a centrifugal force for the Church to reach out to the polymorphic culture 
of young people. Beaudoin’s (1998) words, which provide an understanding of this youth 
culture of youth, can help forge a new direction in the ministry of the Church to young 
people:
Nourished on the milk of popular culture, Generation X has developed a keen 
way of finding meaning in fragmentary and disparate pop culture moments . . . .
The image is the unit of experience. . . . Fashion conveys the image of the self 
and the self as the image. (Beaudoin, 1998, p. 45, 47)
Here Beaudion is optimistic about postmodern youth. They are like ships sailing in a 
postmodern sea. The postmodern world-view is acknowledged as embracing preferences, 
being sceptical towards institutional authority, and personal experience as being equal to 
analytical or rational thought, denying any meta-narrative of meaning-making structures. A 
gloom seems to have descended on the initiatives for the development of young people, as 
this section on popular culture and other post modem developments suggests. Next, an 
attempt is made to reconstruct this image of youth imposed on them by postmodernism.
“Young people in our society are not only silent. They are a step beyond silence: they are 
mute” (Warren, 1989, p. 27). Examples such as this which paint a dark picture of youth do 
not help when juvenile delinquency and other problems of this age become the gauge of 
understanding them. For instance, two youth ministers, Kennedy and Doyle (1998), have 
tried to provide some insight into young people from Ireland. Their description includes: a 
very destructive cycle of production, promotion and consumption; industrialisation and the 
un-gaugeable impact of TV viewing; the influence of sexual content in advertising; the rise of 
non-marital and teenage births; an increase of juvenile crime (Kennedy and Doyle, 1998). 
Even if this provides one picture of Irish youth, there is another side to the story which is not 
represented in this negative and one-sided vision of reality. Warren (1989) says that very few 
young people are encouraged to articulate their life experience or even to consider their 
experiences as being valid. This may be as a result of this unbalanced generalisation.
In contrast, some recent trends endorse the initial suggestion that there is a resurgence of 
young people in the life of the Church. Evidence of this trend among young people is 
advanced by millennial writers such as Detweiler and Taylor (2003), Crawford and Rossiter 
(2006) and Briggs (2008). The New Ecclesial Movements in the Church, as well as the 
biggest international gathering of young people at World Youth Day, also suggest that some 
of the negative labels given to young people by postmodern thinkers may not necessarily 
have universal application.
Shedding Labels
One major concern of postmodernism was the loss of meta-narrative (Detweiler and Taylor, 
2003) -  one unifying life story that fits everybody. This postmodern thought raises some
Reconstructing Youth
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questions. Was there ever a ‘one world view’ in the history of the world -  one over-arching 
story labelled as meta-narrative? It sounds like the claim that John Gutenberg invented the 
printing press, when centuries before that invention, there was printing in China (Briggs and 
Burke, 2005). Ef the western world view was seen as meta-narrative, the argument regarding 
loss of a meta-narrative may be true. At the same time, questions of good versus evil or 
matter versus spirit could be considered as a meta-narrative and they continue to exist in all 
cultures and so remain valid.
The point here is that there was a belief in the suppositions of postmodern thought which 
labelled young people and alienated them from the overall picture. Some of the observations 
were true, i.e., that there are many spiritual choices now. In one way, this has made young 
people powerful because they are offered choices. Are young people able to choose the best? 
This depends, first of all, on how young people are introduced to the ‘product’. Are these 
products marketed in their language and are they ‘cool’? At the same time, the claims of 
religions are under scrutiny also because they are being compared in their entirety.
Rethinking about Postmodernism
The interpretations and conclusions of post-modernism prompt concerns. It is not the 
intention here to study post-modem philosophy in depth. At the same time, it can be seen that 
interpretations of post-modern philosophy by various people may not even represent the spirit 
of the time, or that there is another spirit driving the world which is not recognised by 
postmodern philosophers. “In other words, whatever postmodernism is, it cannot be 
mechanistic, systematic, or institutionalised, for all of these prioritize idea over person” 
(Bannon, 2007, p. 30).
I l l
If this interpretation of postmodernism truly imbibes the spirit of the time, what does it say 
about the intrusion of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) into the 
personal spaces of human communication? The growth of new institutions such as business 
chains,, celebrity models and their reality shows and rock bands with millions of young 
followers does not seem to agree with the claims of at least some post modem proponents. 
Therefore these claims need to be put under the microscope.
Metanarratives are not absent
Story telling continuously moves from one platform to another. It is like a train journey. 
Those who journey will read only what is written on the walls of the train or on the signposts 
in the stations. Instructions for travellers are written in such a way that they can be seen by 
travellers as they journey. Also they need to be catchy and presented in large script for the 
fast moving recipients of the messages. Turning to the Church, if it does not tell its story, 
others who are able to make these ‘platforms’ useful will reap the benefit.
It is true to say that young people try to make sense of life with what they find around them 
(Beaudoin, 1998). A ship can be anchored only in the water of its proximity. The eyes of 
young people can grasp the images around them, their ears like the tunes and they go after the 
pied pipers, with their fundamental quests for meaning and identity. The grand narratives in 
the postmodern world may be found to have ‘mutated’ or taken on a new form to reach young 
people. This is confirmed by Detweiler and Taylor (2003):
The literal truths, the cold, hard facts are tired. The big mythological truths of The 
Lord o f the Rings, Harry Potter, and The Matrix have taken their place. As 
postmodern philosophers announce that grand, overarching metanarratives are
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dead, Hollywood spends hundreds of millions of dollars on interlocking trilogies 
that gamer global acclaim and interest, (p.38)
A resurgence of realities from the literal world to the post-literal era of the world is reflected 
here. They continue: ‘These are much more than the escapist fantasies. They are the post­
literal cries of an audience, suffering from a lack of metanarratives, searching for supra- 
human experiences to fill their transcendence gap” (Detweiler and Taylor 2003, p. 38).
A recent study of young people, conducted by the Australian Council for Educational 
Research, indicates a similar optimism about young people and their spiritual yearnings. In 
this study, Crawford and Rossiter (2006) show how youth spirituality is structured. They 
identify a self-transcending dimension to youth spirituality which also exhibits a social 
dimension. In addition, a generational difference is noticed which tends to form their 
spirituality in ways that are different from those of the previous generation. Also the 
secularisation of spirituality, differentiating between spirituality and religiosity, spiritual 
relativism, subjectivity of youth spirituality and an appreciation of Pentecostal/Charismatic 
spirituality, can be detected in their research.
The re-emergence o f young people
It is submitted that, after the postmodern era, this change will occur with more power and 
strength because young people are able to experiment personally with what is available 
around them and choose what they consider to be the best. Some endeavours such as Opus 
Dei, which operates like a hardliner movement, confirm this suggestion. New Ecclesial 
Movements, as mentioned by John Paul II in his Apostolic Exhortation Christifideles Laid  
(1988), also show signs of this optimism. In the Encyclical Redemptoris Missio (John Paul II,
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1990b) on the ‘Permanent Validity of the Church's Missionary Mandate’ in 1990, the 
Apostolic Exhortations Ecclesia in Europa (2003) and the Apostolic Letter Novo Millennio 
Ineunte (2001a), the late Pope strongly endorsed the New Ecclesial Movements as a force for 
new evangelisation. By 1998, there were more than 50 such movements and new forms of 
community life. In the words of the late Pope: “There is great need for living Christian 
communities! And here are the movements and the new ecclesial communities: they are the 
response, given by the Holy Spirit, to this critical challenge at the end of the millennium” 
(John Paul II, 1998b, para. 7).
The existence of such new communities can be traced back to the same period of the 
beginning of the so-called postmodern generation, i.e., those bom after the 1960s. These 
ventures were very new to the traditional Church (John Paul n, 1999a) and this may explain 
why they were not seen to contribute significantly to the growth of faith. This is made clear 
by the Pope: “Their unexpected newness . . . has given rise to questions, uneasiness and 
tensions; at times it has led to presumptions and excesses on the one hand, and on the pther, 
to numerous prejudices and reservations” (John Paul n, 1998b, para. 6).
It is suggested that the Internet and communications technology can be used by the Church as 
a tool to empower young people in the contemporary world. Much earlier examples of 
empowering young people can be found in both the old and New Testaments. The Lord said 
to Jeremiah at the time of his call, “Do not say I am only a boy, for you shall go to all to 
whom I sent you” (Jer 1:4-10). David, the youngest among the sons of Jesse, was chosen by 
Samuel to be anointed as king. Jesse said: “There remains yet the youngest, but he is keeping 
the sheep. And Samuel said to Jesse, “send and bring him” (ISam 16:1-13). In the New 
Testament, five thousand people were fed from five loaves and two fish brought by a young
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man. “There is a boy here who has five barley loaves and two fish” (Jn 6:1-14). Jesus said to 
the widow’s son at Nain: “Young man, I say to you, rise” (Lk 7:11-17). “New wine must be 
put into fresh wineskins” (Lk 5:38). Could the Internet provide “fresh wineskins” to be used 
to empower youth, thereby rejuvenating the Church?
Young people can be said to dwell in an image-centered world. They are creators as well as 
receivers of popular culture. Their presence on the Net has significant influence. Their 
religious / spiritual formation is not guaranteed in their homes. In the post-modern age, their 
spiritual quest is quenched by fashion and music TV. Therefore it is considered that an 
image-centered ministry is needed, in order to foster relationship with these young people. 
This can be accomplished through the modem medium of the Internet. Would this 
international network (the Internet) foster connectedness between people? The nature of 
relationships on the Internet is explored next in order to ascertain if it facilitates building 
relationships between individuals, between individuals and God and between communities.
4.4 Cyber Relationships: Locale of Youth Ministry
Despite the limited social presence of online links, the Net successfully maintains 
strong supportive community ties, and it may be increasing the number and 
diversity of weak ties. The Net is specially suited to maintaining intermediate- 
strength ties between people who cannot see each other frequently.
(Wellman and Gulia, 1999, p. 185)
Heim (1993) explains the term interface as the Greek prosopon, which means one face facing 
another face. Two opposite faces make up the relationship. One face reacts to the other, who 
then reacts to the first one and so on ad infinitum. He considers this relationship as being
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alive and distinct from the two faces but in a state of correlation (Heim). According to this 
author, the same word prosopon later helped to describe the Trinitarian Godhead. The Father 
and the Son subsist together as an interface or distinct spirit. This ancient word suggested 
spiritual interaction between eternity and time. Heim considers that, in the information age, 
the interface shades into cyberspace which people inhabit and feel themselves moving 
through it into a relatively independent world with its own dimensions and rules (Heim, pp. 
71-82). Based on the cumulative experiences in cyberspace, online relationships are 
considered in the next section.
Online Relationships
Castells (2000) identifies the networking logic or set of relationships used within information 
technology as an important characteristic: “The morphology of the network seems to be well 
adapted to increasing complexity of interaction and unpredictable patterns of development 
arising from the creative poser of such interaction” (Castells 2000, pp. 70-71).
He is referring here to the physical connectivity and the resulting complexity of interactivity 
which reveals the underlying power of the Internet to become a network of human 
interaction. Research conducted by scientists McKenna and Bargh of New York University's 
psychology department in 1998 provides a vivid picture of the Internet's impact on 
relationships. They found that people were indeed using the Internet to form close 
relationships. McKenna and Bargh (2004) state:
The evidence suggests that rather than being an isolating, personally and socially 
maladaptive activity, communicating with others over the Internet not only helps 
to maintain close ties with one’s family and friends, but also, if the individual is
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so inclined, facilitates the formation of close and meaningful new relationships 
within a relatively safe environment, (p. 582)
In his book Media Psychology, Giles (2003) provides some interesting insights into online 
relationships. He argues that, for some authors, the experience of socialising via computer is 
barely distinguishable from face-to-face interaction, even if both are profoundly different. 
Relationships in cyberspace lack gestural and other non-verbal cues that convey para- 
linguistic verbal utterances, supplementing the verbal content of our communication, 
although “emoticons” have evolved as partial substitution for such gestures (Giles, 2003, 
p.271). The text-based nature of online communication may bestow advantages over face-to- 
face communication for some Internet users. It is particularly helpful for those users who feel 
marginalised in face-to-face interaction due to both concealed and conspicuous reasons. Giles 
points out that, for some champions of the Internet, cyber-relations are just different from 
other relationships and their unique nature has the potential to change the way humans 
interact in general. Cyberspace has the potential for a new concept of self. This may be 
confirmed by the studies of Castells (2000) who notes that: “New information technologies 
are not simply tools to be applied, but processes to be developed” (p. 31). This is highly 
significant for on-line ministry. As Giles (2003) observes: “Cyberspace offers the potential 
for a completely new concept of self, in which we are no longer constrained by geography, 
embodiment, personal history, and so on. In this parallel universe we can re-invent ourselves”
(p. 268).
At the same time, Beaudoin (1998) suggests that, in the search for perfect speed (ever-faster 
computers and breakneck modem connection rates) and full presence (advanced multi­
tasking, supercharged networks, increased hours and modes of access and “real” simulation),
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cyberspace is a metaphor for two quests. The first is full interpersonal interaction, which he 
interprets as the I-thou relationships of the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber. The second is 
an attempt to transcend human experience, imagining the Web as a metaphor for God. He 
implies that young people’s immersion in cyberspace evidences their yearning for full 
presence in both divine and human relations.
Giles (2003) identifies how an empowerment through the Internet takes place between 
societies which are dispersed across the globe. Here the Internet facilitates the creation of 
diasporic cyber communities. Also communities across the globe can attain a new identity 
through the connectivity of the Internet, emerging as virtual communities which are discussed 
in the next section.
Virtual Communities
Kelly (1994) considers that:
Cyberspace is the mall of network culture. It is the territory where the 
counterintuitive logic of distributed networks meets the odd behaviour of human 
society. And it is expanding rapidly. . . . Cyberspace is a resource that increases 
the more it is used. (Kelly, 1994, p. 185)
His observation gives a glimpse of aspects of society where it is trying to replicate itself in 
cyberspace. Virtual communities show the essential nature of human beings living in 
cyberspace - the need to ‘connect’. Rheingold (2000), the author of Virtual Communities, 
confirms this argument:
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Virtual community sits atop a hierarchy of abstractions -  language, technology, 
computing, networking, many-to-many discussion. Virtual community is also 
built upon a succession of technologies and ways of life we choose to use and live 
in and are shaped by, because they gave many people freedom and power.
(Rheingold, 2000, p. 147)
A San Francisco based online group called, Whole Earth ’Lectronic Link (WELL)* started by 
a number of aging entrepreneurs, is a well-known online community. Sociologists maintain 
that the social glue which binds the WELL into a genuine community is a complex blend of 
participants’ social skills, their amazing collective fund of expert knowledge and their 
willingness to support community members when they are in trouble (Naughton, 1999).
Castells (2000, p. 386) provides a definition of Virtual Communities: “A virtual community 
is generally understood as a self-defined electronic network of interactive communication 
organised around a shared interest or purpose, although sometimes communication becomes 
the goal in itself’. He indicates that tens of thousands of such communities were created 
throughout the world in the 1990s, most of them based in the US but increasingly reaching 
out on a global scale. There are studies which criticise the quality and implications of online 
communities, saying that they decrease participants’ communication with family members 
and social circles, while increasing their loneliness. An analysis by Wellman and his 
collaborators in 1996 proved, however, that virtual communities need not be opposed to 
physical communities (cited in Castells, 2000). Virtual communities are different forms of 
community with specific rules and dynamics which interact with other forms of community. 
They are communities, albeit not physical, and they do not replicate the patterns of 
communication and interaction in physical communities. While they are not unreal, they
operate in a different plane of reality (Wellman et al., cited in Castells, 2000). Discussion on 
youth ministry can encourage the formation of such communities in the Internet where the 
relationship of young people can be facilitated in the light of faith. It has been established that 
secular communities are active in cyberspace. The possibility of establishing faith 
communities in cyberspace in now explored.
Cyber Communities o f Faith
Beaudoin (1998) states clearly that cyberspace - particularly the Internet - is an appropriate 
medium to serve as a communal centre for Generation-X. He notes that there are many 
opportunities for communitarian action on the Internet, including organising relief for victims 
of natural disasters, circulating protest petitions and gathering like minded people from 
around the globe. Since these communities can be as bonded as some physical communities, 
they are no less real. He finds great potential for Xers in cyberspace and states that it can 
accommodate both like-minded and indifferent users who want to form cyber communities of 
faith.
He asserts that cyberspace gives Xers a voice in religious matters, using technology with 
which they are comfortable. For a generation so hesitant to talk about its faith, cyberspace 
affords opportunities for intimate faith discussion without necessitating face-to-face 
communication. The Net gives Xers scope to deepen their spiritual life by connecting with 
other spiritually curious Xers and people from around the world with a different religiosity. 
He claims that dedication to a cyber community can be as gratifying and important as 
allegiance to any real religious institution. In this way, Xers challenge religious institutions to 
rethink the definition of community. He views virtual communities as augmenting real 
communities rather than being a substitute for them (Beaudoin, 1998).
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Cyberspace has been hailed by many as an historical revolution in which technology is no 
longer a means of mastering the human environment but, as Lajoie (1996) states, becomes the 
human environment. The Church articulates the need to utilise the new media space for the 
development of young people. Studies on ministry show that youth ministry is basically 
relational. Since the Internet helps to achieve relationship through this medium and also 
because the life of post-modern youth is thoroughly linked with cyber culture, the question of 
undertaking ministry to young people in this globally ‘created’ environment has been a main 
concern of this research.
The theology of ministry, articulated in a relational perspective, captures youth ministry as 
reaching out to young people and ministering to their culture of ‘connectedness’. The reality 
of cyber relationships and cyber communities makes the Internet a suitable environment for 
the faith development of young people. The openness of the Church to understand the 
‘irreverent’ (Beaudoin, 1998) spiritual culture of the young generation opens the way for 
accomplishing a ministry online. In time, this ministry may help to move young people from 
the terrain of cyberspace to the real world of relationships. Participation in the sacraments 
and liturgy, which is considered to be the ultimate and real experience of Christian faith, can 
be realised at the second stage, after the young people have been contacted through the 
Internet.
Building on the argument so far, the task now is to devise a method for implementing youth 
ministry online. A tentative approach to accomplishing this task is presented in the next 
section.
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4.5 From Hyper Text to Hyper Being: A Proposal
Young people’s freedom, their ability to judge and choose in a non-controlled setting and 
their desire to emerge as mature and responsible citizens are the reasons which underpin this 
new thinking about postmodern youth. The challenge of how to acknowledge, develop and 
empower the younger generation still remains. It is submitted that the Internet to which 
young people are attracted in great numbers, has great potential here.
The wisdom of the philosopher William James (1892) captures the concept behind hypertext: 
“My thought belongs with my other thoughts, and your thought belongs with your other 
thoughts. Whether anywhere in the room there be a mere thought, which is nobody’s thought, 
we have no means of ascertaining” (section 2). There is a marked difference between a page 
in a book and a page on the Internet. The growth in the technology of hypertext on the 
Internet has opened up new frontiers, linking human beings together. It can be labelled the 
technology of hyperself or hyperperson in Web 2.0.
This leads to the notion of a cybersoul whereby an individual is connected, just as texts are 
connected, by hypertexting online. As discussed in chapter 3 on the Internet, if de Chardin’s 
“appearance of life in evolution” is attributed to this point of the evolution of the Internet, the 
evolution of Web 2.0 may be referred to as a critical point of ‘hominization’ (Mooney, 1964, 
p. 39) in cyberspace. This denotes the latest development of individual human presence in 
virtual communities where an individual seems to have achieved power in the media, unlike 
in the past.
122
Syneidesis is the Greek root of the word consciousness. According to Dewart (1989), it stood 
for “the knowledge obtained through consultation with someone who has privileged access to 
confidential or generally unavailable information” (p.45). This was in contrast to 
understanding based merely on one’s own resources. The reliability of this inside information 
depended on the authenticity of the source.
Later on, Dewart says that it came to mean any knowledge obtained from consultation with 
oneself. The conscious experiencer is, as a consequence: a) able to understand and appreciate 
the reality of the real; b) capable of experiencing his own reality; c) able to create a positive 
identity for himself after appreciating both his reality and that of the world (Dewart, 1989). 
Here consciousness is constituted through the interaction of the self with the reality of the 
real.
In relation to online experience, these findings about consciousness may be questioned by 
those who log on to the Internet, seeking some information. A person who searches the 
Internet may be able to get more knowledge about almost everything online rather than 
actually having those objects in front of him/her. More information about the constitutive 
elements of an object and its nuances may be gained from the Internet than from interacting 
with the reality of the object. The knowledge landscapes of the Internet may provide a 
person with the wheel, so that he or she does not have to invent it. Then, the wisdom behind 
the method and process of experiencing one’s own reality in relation to interaction with the 
world and the created identity of oneself through this interaction, may have to be looked at 
from the point of view of online experience as well. Here the reality of the virtual becomes 
the norm of constituting consciousness. Castells’ (2000) observation corroborates this
The Reality of the Virtual
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argument: “. . . the human mind is a direct productive force, not just a decisive element of the 
production system. Thus, computers, communications systems and genetic decoding and 
programming are all amplifiers and extensions of the human mind” (p. 31). In this research, 
the reality of the Church is being presented in this new medium of virtual reality.
McQuail (2000) identifies the following dimensions that are relevant and help differentiate 
‘new’ from ‘old’ media: the degree of interactivity; social presence; autonomy; playfulness 
and the degree of privacy. These can be considered as some essential elements to be taken 
into consideration by the Church in order to present itself effectively on the mosaic of the 
Internet, when interacting with youth. Some further reflections on interactivity now follow.
The Postmodern Experience o f the Self and Interactivity
In sketching the profile of the self in action, Schrag (1997) begins with the celebrated 
Cartesian phrase cogito ergo sum -  I think therefore I am. According to him, the variation in 
the experience of the postmodern self transforms the phrase into T choose therefore I am’. A 
further ‘deconstructive redescription’ of the experience of the self amends this into ‘We 
interact, therefore we are’. In A Matrix of Meanings, Detweiler and Taylor (2003)- confirm 
this: “The postmodern person yearns for community and connectedness” (p. 78). As Schrag,
(1997) sees it, “Community is constitutive of selfhood. It fleshes out the portrait of the self by 
‘ engendering a shift of focus from the self present to itself to the self as present to, for, and 
with the other” (p. 78). This seems to be true in the case of the Internet also: we interact 
' virtually, therefore we are. This interactivity, in the context of evangelisation, is considered 
next.
How is the Church using the Internet to reach out to young Catholics? This question is posed 
by Heaven (2008). Observing that the Catholic Church lacks a robust online presence, he 
suggests that, while schools, parents, chaplains and parish priests do a lot of work with youth 
in the Church, the Vatican and the bishops should provide an interactive, readily available 
source of guidance for Catholics online. The issue of reaching out to young people by using 
the latest technological medium of interaction for them is a major challenge for the Church.
The phenomenon of sharing faith needs to be considered. Various terms such as sharing faith, 
religious instruction, religious education, faith development and catechesis may be used by 
different parties involved in the process. Two broad areas, religious education and 
catechesis, are discussed below.
Religious education can be used as a generic term, assuming different meanings according to 
the source of education, its agents and content (Osmer and Schweitzer, 2003). Kieran and 
Hession (2005) explain that first of all, it can be an “educational process by which people are 
invited to explore the human religious traditions that protect and illuminate the transcendent 
dimension of their lives” (p. 32). They observe that this definition is more associated with 
education as an area of study. Also religious education can encompass mere study of religion 
.within an academic structure, without the intention of deepening the faith (See Warren, 
1989). For instance, a Catholic student could study Hinduism or Buddhism in great depth 
while having no intention of adopting either of those beliefs. “The effort of particular groups 
to transmit their respective ways of life to the younger generation” represents another way of 
religious education, according to Moran (1983, p. 12). In the strict Catholic understanding of
Interactivity and Faith Development of Youth; New Approaches
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religious education, it is seen as a programme of religious formation and faith development, 
using the language of catechesis (Kieran and Hession, 2005).
The word ‘catechesis’ originates from the Greek verb katechein. ‘To resound’, ‘to echo’, or 
‘to hand down’ are its derivative meanings (Kieran and Hession, 2005, p. 61). In its General 
Directory for Catechesis (GDC, 1998), the Church includes catechesis as one moment within 
the whole process of evangelisation:
Catechesis is one of these moments - a very remarkable one - in the whole 
process of evangelisation. The “moment” of catechesis is that which corresponds 
to the period in which conversion to Jesus Christ is formalised, and provides a 
basis for first adhering to him. (GDC para. 63)
Is the Church able to implement catechesis effectively? Moran (1983) identifies a tension 
between religion and education: “Put in starkest contrast, education is concerned with finding 
or creating order in this world, while religion is a going beyond this world” (p. 184). He 
identifies historical trends which highlight this tension between religious education and 
Christian religious education, noting that education in religious matters was central to life in 
the seventeenth century. People from families, church and school came together to teach the 
Bible, doctrine or morals. Continuing, he reports that the establishment of Catholic schools 
by the Church was in response to a secular trend prevailing in the eighteenth century which 
did not encourage Catholic education in regular schools. While this development gave 
religious instruction an educational context, Moran reports that the nineteenth century saw a 
separation of religion and education. He uses the phrase ‘Christian education’ when referring 
to the learning of Christian beliefs (Moran, 1983).
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There can be a difference between religion as part of the curriculum and Christian religious ^
education in the language of catechesis. Religious education as part of the curriculum may 
not meet the requirements of catechesis, as understood by the Church. Kieran and Hession
(2005) note that, currently here in Ireland, religious education as part of the curriculum is 
catechetical, having sacramental preparation as a central purpose. They observe that this :
model is under strain in view of the decline of Catholic religious culture and practice in Irish ?x
society in general.
This gives rise to the need to distinguish between religious education of youth as an 
important and particular duty of the Church, as opposed to religious education as part of the 
curriculum in a Catholic school setting. These two approaches may differ in their 
methodologies as well. The phenomenological philosopher, Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), 
considered that “Man’s life, his very spirit, is being studied according to the methods of 
natural science, with the effect that nature and spirit are considered equal realities, and with 
the ensuing danger that the spirit is naturalised” (cited in Ramos, 1989, p. 404)
The GDC (1998) speaks about the divine pedagogy of catechesis:
Catechesis as communication of divine Revelation, is radically inspired by the 
pedagogy of God, as displayed in Christ and in the Church. Hence it receives its 
constitutive characteristics and under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, it sets out a 
synthesis to encourage a true experience of faith, and thus a filial encounter with 
God. (GDC para. 143)
As the Church may not exercise full control over the curriculum and syllabus in a school 
setting, it is doubtful that the Church can fulfil its task of catechetical duty in this setting.
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Also some pupils may not be able to attend Catholic Schools. For instance Warren (1989) 
reports that fewer than half of the Catholic children in the US attend Catholic schools. In such 
circumstances, it is necessary to reach out to them by other means.
Therefore, the methodology, structure and climate in which information regarding faith is 
imparted may need to be reviewed. In cases where there is no catechetical programme other 
than a curriculum-oriented religious education, young people may not have an opportunity to 
learn and assimilate the Catholic faith. This indicates the need for a new way of handing on 
the faith to them. It is submitted that the development of a new catechetical programme on 
the Internet is one way of contributing to effective faith formation for young people. In the 
context of this new locale of interactivity which is widely used by young people, an 
appropriate methodology needs to be developed which facilitates sharing information online 
regarding supernatural realities. The Internet can help the Church in taking “another road” 
(Lk 2:12) in order to evangelise young people.
Social Networking and Youth
As mentioned earlier Me Quail (2000) identified the need for playfulness in new media. The 
key word among young people is ‘fun’. On the online networks, there is active participation 
between young people in order to create fun, using their own creativity and the ‘raw 
materials’ provided online which can create an atmosphere of fun. What are those ‘raw 
materials’ available online which produce fun? They include the possibility of uploading 
music, videos, the opportunity to ‘talk’ and ‘block’ as well.
‘Excitement’ is a word used by young people to represent expectations about life. Boredom 
seems to be the opposite of it. Entertainment can provide excitement for a young person. It is
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a time when somebody is either involved in an action or observing some action where one is ^
able to forget about oneself. As Granfield (1991) observes, spirituality “is primarily practical; 
it looks to action, to love in action. We achieve union with God by an ongoing series of 
decisions that open up the mind to consciousness of the divine presence” (p. 148). If the 
Church is able to provide opportunities for young people either to take part in this action of 
mystical union with God or journey with others who hold similar interests, this can generate ^
instances of excitement. Young people expect and experience fun and excitement in life.
These expectations might be understood as material expressions of one person’s longing for a 
mystical experience. In other words, their longing for the ultimate is reflected in their longing 
for the world.
Social Networking
Social networking enables young people to be concrete about their relationship with their 
friends. It helps them to be direct and clear about relationships. Some things which they are 
not able to articulate in a face-to-face interaction can be expressed without inhibition in^the 
online ‘talks’. Social networking provides a more comfortable milieu for young people. The 
natural ‘log on’ to the Internet and consequent social networking sites may be compared to 
‘initiation ceremonies’. The online interaction has a whole new language which attracts the 
young while being almost alien to most of the older generation.
The underlying principles behind the concepts, it seems, have yet to be put under the 
microscope. Some considerations are:
(a) The independence young people enjoy because of a space they own online;
(b) An iconic simulation of their real life interactions where they are able to experiment and 
learn the boundaries and horizons of relationships in their own privacy;
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(c) Objectification of one’s own self online where some interactions are made known around 
the world and the rest end up in private spaces;
(d) Absence of another person may give young people the opportunity to tread on their own, 
without inhibition; and
(e) Questions of identity of the person who is interacting; the usefulness and the real nature 
and intensity of relationships online, are also to be ascertained. The physical connectivity of 
the Internet throughout the world, its ability to provide personal representation and 
participation and its ability to manage the interactivity with accountability, can make online 
interaction feasible.
According to Granfield (1991): “The mind begins with the data of sense and consciousness 
proceeds through insight and judgement to the mystery that we call God” (p. 17). The data of 
sense that can be received in an online relationship are mainly visual. Online relationship is 
only a part of the means through which data are received into the consciousness, since we 
live in this world. But it happens that the information on a person’s profile acts like_ a 
repository, as individuals can access it and retrieve it whenever they wish. This profile and 
information moves with them wherever they move in this world. Friends also move along and 
their spaces are available for them to write messages or comments on them. Once they accept 
another person as a friend, they give permission to that person to write on their ‘scrap’ or 
‘message wall’ and vice versa. In one way, the reality of another person in one way is present 
to them more frequently or on a 24X7 basis. While there is a lot of agreement, there are 
limitations also to this presence.
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Just as a magnet attracts particles of steel, the Internet attracted a number of spheres of 
human living to the information superhighway. ‘Mosaic’, the first ever browsing software, as 
its title indicates, means an assortment. It was described in the New York Times in December 
1993 as ‘the first window into cyberspace’ (cited in Briggs and Burke, 2005, p. 244). Is the 
Church represented in this mosaic of convergence in cyberspace? Is cyberspace opening a 
window to the world of the young? Convergence on the information superhighway has 
brought together a complex mixture of various areas of human existence.
‘Facebook’ (or My Space) is a space of myself. Participating individuals look at this personal 
representation of themselves every day, can change their profile, add new inspirations to it, 
e.g., photos, videos, can go back to it, change it whenever they wish. Thus such a personal 
space represents and reflects a conscious self. Like human consciousness, it may not expose 
all that is in the consciousness of a person. Since this exposition of the self takes place in a 
public space, it may present only that which the person feels can be shared with others. Also 
it may be the case that one is able to objectify one’s personal self in the tabula rasa of a 
personal page on the Internet. Here the word tabula rasa is used to mean a clean slate or 
tablet from which the inscription can be erased any time, ready to be written upon again. On a 
blank page, individuals create an identity for themselves, write their own profiles and post 
photos which represent them. As happens in the process of interaction with the objects of the 
world, their identity evolves. In this online space, individual identity is symbolised digitally 
and made visible to others. This also becomes a space of individual interaction.
It is considered that if the icon of the Church is missing on a person’s monitor in the mosaic 
of various available icons, the Church is going to miss out. Over the centuries of evolution,
Consciousness Connected
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the Church has become a matrix of many cultures and numerous spiritualities. This ‘many­
ness’ within the ‘one’ Catholic Church may enable it to understand, journey with and 
welcome the postmodern generation who are fed on the ‘many-ness’ around them. By ‘many­
ness ’ here is meant the influx of knowledge available at the tip of one’s finger. Availing of 
the Internet, the Church can become visible and accessible to that generation.
Inferiority and the Internet
William James (1892) argues that “The only states of consciousness that we naturally deal 
with are found in personal consciousness, minds, selves, concrete particular I's and you’s” 
(section 2). A subject is conscious when operating minimally in the dream state, normally in 
the waking state, or optimally in the mystical state. There is an awareness of its various levels 
of consciousness: experiencing, understanding, knowing, feeling, deliberating, and choosing 
with freedom and responsibility (Granfield, 1991). A person who has logged on to the Net is 
not just at the minimal level of consciousness but at a more active, open and higher level due 
to choosing to log on. This arises because there is a basic alertness of the brain with its visual 
readiness and openness of the self looking for friendship, movement/activity and excitement. 
Searle (1992) submits that “Conscious states are caused by . . . features of the brain” (para. 
2).
Therefore the argument here is that, in an online interaction, there may be more opportunity 
to ‘talk’ to the brain (mind) without the distractions of the senses. There may be more clarity 
in thought, since it has to be written in an intelligible language. Reflections (as in meditation) 
on a communicated matter may then raise questions in the mind. Since the matter can be 
retained and retrieved, clarifications may be received promptly with reference to the available 
data. The state of consciousness of a person who is interacting online may be compared to
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that initial step (stage) in the growth process towards enlightened consciousness. The 
description of some qualities of a person who is on the journey towards super consciousness, 
as found in Gita, is described by Vyas (1984): “Sense-objects cease for him, who does not 
enjoy them with his senses; but the taste for them persists. This relish also disappears in the 
case of the man of stable mind when he sees the Supreme” (p. 135).
Even if this describes a person who has almost attained a mystical experience, online 
information sharing may open up further opportunities for enlightenment through knowledge. 
This thought may interest the behavioural scientists who value the importance of sensations 
and neural mechanisms. Therefore, initiating instances of interaction, as described above, 
leading to stimulation of the mind, can open up research opportunities founded on 
understanding the characteristics of the phenomenon of online interaction.
Interaction Online
The transition from normal consciousness to an enlightened consciousness is a creative 
process and involves movement. This final destination of achieving the unity between the self 
of God and the self of man is the goal of Catholic thought. Mysticism is common to a lot of 
religious traditions and stands as the starting point of interaction between them. The unifying 
factor can be mysticism, accepting the individual differences in their evolution and practices. 
Therefore the language of mysticism can be a starting point of evangelisation online which 
may be of interest also to other religious traditions. In addition, mysticism may speak to all 
because it is peaceful, tolerant and eco-friendly. Interaction on the Internet, however, is not 
embodied but electronic. Even then, in this context, the Internet evangeliser does not have to 
be concerned about online sacramentality, since mystical presence is not necessarily a result 
of sacramental celebration. This does not mean that mystical experience is completely free of
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embodied activity. Online interaction can share information regarding mystical experiences 
which, in turn, can stimulate the experience in human consciousness to prepare for 
contemplation.
An important issue raised by Deikman (1968) is relevant here:
The content of the mystical experience reflects not only its unusual mode of 
consciousness but also the particular stimuli being processed through that mode.
The mystic experience can be beatific, satanic, revelatory, or psychotic, 
depending on the stimuli predominant in each case. (p. 233)
The point to be made here is that the Church can provide the information which can act as a 
stimulus. If the Church is not providing enough to stimulate people to be in communion with 
the presence of their supreme friend, Jesus Christ, there are a lot of alternative stimuli 
available in the world around them. Young people’s consciousness will easily be stimulated 
by what is readily available to them, which may eventually develop a mystical experience in 
them that, as mentioned above, is different from the beatific or the divine. As the Sufi 
scholar, Shah (1968) has rightly pointed out, “It is said that when a horse cannot find grass, it 
will accept hay. For want of the green grass of Truth they accepted the dry hay with which he 
filled their mangers” (p. 283).
Online Faith Friends
Human beings tend to appropriate the technology to suit our requirements (Thurlow et al, 
2004). Making use of the medium of the Internet to converse with the minds of young people 
is expected to develop their interiority. It is proposed that the interconnectedness of 
personalities may be an infrastructure to build this task online (Gallagher, 2003). Creating a
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space of interactivity by authenticating a faith friend and allowing him/her to journey 
together with any young person online may be a way of deepening interiority.
The process of developing interiority may be looked at from various mystical traditions. 
Buddha believed that one can overcome the causes of sufferings by right understanding, right 
thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right 
concentration (Nicholas-Hays and Breaux, 1998). In the traditional Buddhist setting, a student 
seeks refuge to a lama who initiates a new student in a ceremony. These scholars (1998) 
explain that “going to a refuge is a symbolic way of acknowledging that we are alienated 
from the true self and that we are entrusting ourselves to the guidance of the Awakened-Mind 
within us” (p. 52). Also, in Hindu thought, a person who seeks “must necessarily approach a 
guru who is characterised by composure of mind, self-control, love, etc. Even one that is 
well-versed in the sastras (doctrines of truth) should not set about seeking Brahma- 
knowledge by himself’ (Indich, 1980, p. 112). Jesus who was Emmanuel - God with us - 
also clarified the nature of this accompaniment of God, “I have called you friends, because I 
have made known to you everything that I have heard from my Father” (John 15: 15). The 
friendship of Jesus involves learning though accompaniment. Some practical elements of the 
concept of a faith friend are discussed below.
Faithfriend as a Mentor
The concept of a ‘faith friend’ is relatively new in terms of on-line evangelisation but does 
relate to more widely used professional development concepts such as ‘mentor’ or ‘coach’. 
There is an existing literature on mentoring or coaching relating to human resource 
management for employees of various organisations. As Smith (2007) explains:
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In mentoring, junior members of staff are allocated a senior member of staff 
outside the normal line of command. . . . The junior member . . . will have an 
opportunity to review, in confidence, his or her progress, air worries or concerns 
and obtain guidance”, (p.367)
The creation of a mentoring culture in the area of initial teacher education is suggested by 
writers such as Starcevich (2009), Donaldson (2008), Sweeny (2008) and Rowley (1997) 
while others (e.g., Heathfield, 2010; Zachary, 2005; Lindenberger, 2005) identify its 
importance as part of continuous professional development.
As well as this general literature on mentoring, there is a specific literature of relevance to 
evangelisation which is considered briefly below. Traditionally, those preparing for baptism 
are given a sponsor who is expected to accompany the baptised person as a God parent on his 
or her life journey (Saunders, 2003). Also, the notion of a spiritual director is firmly 
established within the Christian tradition. Sellner (2002), Anderson and Reese (2000) and 
English (1998) identify this type of mentoring accompaniment in the Christian mystical 
tradition. Mentoring, in the context of faith, is described by Matthaei (1996) as “a nurturing 
relationship that facilitates the meaning-making, meaning discerning activity of life, in 
response to God” (p. 15). In the present study, Faithfriends (FFs) are expected to act as 
spiritual mentors to young people (referred to as Cybersouls -  CSs) who want to deepen their 
understanding of faith.
According to Anderson and Reese (2000), a mentor “is one who is able to create a space of 
trust and intimacy” (p. 12). Intellect, memory and will are considered by the great mystic,
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John of the Cross, as faculties of the soul that requires instruction for purification7. Parks 
(2000) understands mentoring accompaniment as being supportive, challenging, inspirational 
and in dialogue with the mentored. Matthaei (1996) considers that faith mentoring has 
relational, incamational and contextual dimensions. As envisaged in this research the attitude 
of a FF should incorporate the above dimensions. It is expected that a FF will develop a 
relationship with his/her CS. It is incamational because FFs are representing a particular 
youth movement or community while they are expected to be proficient in their faith 
practices. Their adeptness in ICT skills will ensure their proficiency in the context of 
cyberspace. Active collaboration, a conducive atmosphere and attitude, a professional 
relationship, a spiritual dimension and an interactive process orientation are suggested by 
English (1998) as some basic guidelines for mentorship. Accordingly, active collaboration of 
various contributors including the Church, youth movements, designers of catechetical 
programmes and ICT resources, is required in this mentoring space.
The Eastern texts also insist on the necessity of being guided by a guru (dispeller of darkness) 
(Indich, 1980), for safety’s sake as well as in order to attain the spiritual goal. In western 
religion, a spiritual “advisor” serves as a guide and teacher. The presence of a motivating and 
organising conceptual structure and the encouragement of a teacher are undoubtedly 
important in helping people to persist in their journey of faith (Deikman, 1968).
4.7 Conclusion
By analysing the world of contemporary young people, this chapter helped to clarify how an 
online ministry of evangelisation to young people can be initiated by the Church. To begin, a 
broad review the concept of youth was undertaken. It dealt with the etymology of youth,
7 John of the Cross, Theresa of Avila and many other mystics in the Christian tradition have been proposed by 
English (1998), Anderson and Reese (2000) and Sellner (2002) as exemplars of effective faith mentoring.
presented various views on young people and highlighted the contemporary interest in them 
people. In addition, ways of learning about young people were considered.
The next section identified some of the main characteristics of young people today while their 
position as natives of the post-modern era was considered in the following section. Then 
cyber relationships were reviewed. These were seen as presenting an opportunity for the 
Church to reach out to young people. Various forms of online communities were analysed 
also in the context of building faith communities.
Finally, the possibility of developing such a connectedness was explored, viewing the 
Internet as a tool to empower young people on their faith journey briefly introducing the 
concept of a Faithfriend mentoring a Cybersoul.
This chapter concluded the overall review of the literature. The next step in the study was to 
proceed to the fieldwork. Details of this part of the project are given in chapter 5, 6 and 7 
which now follows, beginning with an account of the Cyber souls web portal in the next 
chapter (chapter 5).
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CHAPTER 5 
CYBERSOULS: DESIGN, PILOTING AND IMPLEMENTATION
The focus turns to the fieldwork in this chapter. It describes the design, development, piloting 
and implementation of the online project, www. Cybersouls, ie, building on the review of the 
literature and the theoretical perspectives of the previous three chapters.
This online project was developed in order to investigate the research questions which are set 
out below. The chapter begins by delineating various aspects of the design of the project. 
Then the piloting process is discussed and its implementation is described. This is followed 
by an account of the data collection and case study selection.
5.1 Design of the Cybersouls Project
The research questions which guided the study are set out in this section, together with the 
main objectives of the project. Then the research design is detailed.
Research Questions
The key research question which inspired the design of the project is to examine how the 
Internet can be used as an environment for mentoring young people on their religious faith 
journey. This is set in the wider context of investigating how an effective web presence can 
be developed to help value based communities, such as the Catholic Church, relate to young 
people on a global level.
Related research questions which contributed to shaping the project are set out below:
(a) How can the Church make use of technology to reach out to the youth in their new 
habitats or socialising spaces?
(b) What skilLs and tools would be needed by the Church in adapting to the new medium of 
the Internet?
(c) Considering the various ‘moments of evangelisation’ developed over the years in the 
Church, to what extend is the Internet useful as a tool to continue this task?
(d) How can the freedom and digital ingenuity of a young person be a source of momentum for New 
Evangelisation?
(e) How can the information shared online influence the consciousness of young people to 
inform their understanding about faith?
(f) What is the potential of the Internet as an environment for the evangelisation of young 
people?
(g) How can the Internet empower young people as active participants in evangelisation 
using the Internet?
(h) What are some of the pastoral and theological opportunities afforded by the Internet as a 
means of evangelisation?
(i) The Internet provides the tools; the Church provides the atmosphere and young people are 
the participants. How can these seemingly distant cultural spaces be mutually 
inculturated?
These related research questions were subject to regular review during the study, as advised
by Yin (2003).
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At a more practical level, the above research questions paved the way for the following
objectives to be achieved in the project:
• To establish the potential role of the Internet as an instrument in the evangelisation of 
young people;
• To facilitate transformative virtual meetings of young people and Faithfriends 
described in detail later in order to animate faith in Jesus Christ, from a Catholic 
perspective.
Specific Objectives
1. To share faith related information between:
• Members who log on to the site (referred to as Cybersouls) and
• Leaders and members (Faithfriends representing Catholic youth movements such as 
Jesus Youth (CS).
2. To enhance faith through online mentoring using social networking technology, by:
• Inviting Cybersouls to join a faith-related community engaging in online faith 
development activities;
• Posting offline activities online, so that those who log on may also come together to 
worship and engage in other faith related commitments offline and vice versa.
3. To identify young people from different parts of the world who have a common interest
in faith, from a Catholic perspective, enabling them to:
• Share their narratives of faith;
• Discuss faith related anxieties and struggles;
• Identify opportunities and challenges in their faith journey;
• Share online resources for promoting faith development.
Operationalisation of the Research Questions
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Details of the project design are described below.
The Cybersouls Project: Elements o f the Design
It falls, in particular, to young people, who have an almost spontaneous affinity 
for the new means of communication, to take on the responsibility for the 
evangelisation of this 'digital continent.' Be sure to announce the Gospel to your 
contemporaries with enthusiasm. You know their fears and their hopes, their 
aspirations and their disappointments . . . .  (Benedict XVI, 2009)
Cybersouls is a project centred on young people. Its aim is to develop faith through online 
networking. Paving the way for this project, the previous three chapters have considered the 
concept of evangelisation in the Church, the nature of communication online and the 
participation of young people in this process.
This research is set within an online initiative of evangelisation of young people. Here, 
Faithfriend^, a concept detailed later, represent a value based community (the Catholic 
Church). Young people who want to deepen their faith online are identified as Cybersouls. 
Those who accompany the Cybersouls are called Faithfriends. In this project, the specific 
catechetical content of faith development, termed Scrolls, provides the content focus for the 
interaction between these two parties, namely Faithfriends and Cybersouls, using the 
opportunities available on the Internet.
The project is centred on the following online activities:
• A member of Jesus Youth or any other appropriate youth movement agrees to be an 
online Faithfriend;
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• Cybersouls register online to take part in the project and are then assigned a 
Faithfriend to accompany them during the project;
• Materials to promote faith development, called Scrolls, are provided to facilitate this 
interaction.
A detailed explanation of Faithfriendy, Cybersouls and Scrolls is given below.
Faithfriend
A Faithfriend (FF) is a person who has a deep grounding in the Catholic faith. He/she is an 
elder in Jesus Youth or any other relevant youth movement who makes himself/herself 
available for the faith development of a ‘cybersoul’ (CS) who would like to deepen his/her 
faith. A FF has a representative function while guiding the cybersoul on his/her faith journey, 
she/he should exhibit the following qualities:
• Love and compassion -  as Jesus himself exhibited;
• Dynamism, creativity, youthfulness etc. -  to represent the Catholic youth movement;
• Understanding and living the teachings, traditions and practices of the Church;
• Be competent in using the Internet.
The online presence of a FF is charted in Fig 5.1 below.
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Fig 5.1 A Jesus Youth Member Chooses to be an Online Faithfriend
An elder in Jesus Youth chooses to be an online Faithfriend
r
Scrolls: Lessons for Catechesis 
distributed;
Guidelines for online ministry 
circulated;
Purposes of ministry clarified; 
Nature of relationshio defined:
A FF is assigned to CS
Interaction between FF 
and CS
Interaction history 
and data stored
End session
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Cybersoul
‘Cybersoul’ (CS) is the name given to a young person who wants to deepen his/her faith, 
using the Internet. A CS may be a person who has spent time in the socialising (hanging out) 
area of faith or a person who, having been introduced to faith, would like to deepen his/her 
knowledge. In addition, people with little or no previous knowledge about faith but who 
would like to join can be facilitated. For a CS, the requirements for registration and login are 
quite limited when compared to a FF. The following flow chart (Fig 5.2) shows how CSs are 
given online entry:
Fig 5.2 Cybersouls Begin the Registration Process
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Scrolls
In this project the word ‘scroll’ denotes all faith development materials prepared to facilitate 
the interaction between a CS and a FF. The preparation of this online faith development 
material had to be undertaken prior to the entry of both FFs and CSs. The faith journey of a 
CS accompanied by a FF draws upon the deposit of faith in the Church over 2000 years, 
handed down from previous generations and forming a living tradition. The development of 
Scrolls, the online catechetical programme of www.cybersouls.ie, is depicted in Fig 5.3 
below.
Fig 5.3 Scrolls (L esson s for  O nline C atechesis)
Scrolls: Resources for Faithfriends
Input -  (CMS) 
Authorised people 
prepare and input the 
data
Topics for discussion 
Literary requirements -  
conversations, stories, 
pictures, videos, music, 
documents of the Church, 
etc.
Dynamic tools - Multiple 
choice selection, text box, 
etc.
Library
(dynamic)
1r
Scrolls'. Frame of a scroll and its content 
are stored for retrieval and reference of 
Faithfriend
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In the above three flowcharts (Fig. 5.1; 5.2 and 5.3), the interaction between FFs and CSs, 
labelled as A, is the process of interaction where the faith development Scrolls are shared. 
This can be considered as an instance of a research case under investigation. The research 
questions were addressed within the activities of this process. Also, for both FFs and CSs, 
sharing information about the research project and obtaining their informed consent to 
participate were required and achieved.
The following diagram (Fig 5.4) gives an integrated overview of the interaction in 
www.cybersouls.ie:
Fig 5.4: Interaction between a Cybersoul and Faith Friend
Input
Faithfriend
Cybersoul
Represents Jesus, Jesus 
Youth and the Church. 
Accountability 
Dynamism of youth
A
covenan t
Any young person who seeks a 
deeper knowledge of the 
Catholic Faith
t
output
>  Faith Development of a CS resulting in a better understanding of the 
Church through the relationship with FF and faith formation 
programme
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The project co-ordinator, who was also the researcher, conceived the idea of the research 
project initially in consultation with his research supervisor. The researcher then prepared an 
initial outline and developed the project further in the light of the literature review presented 
earlier in the three chapters on evangelisation, communication on the Internet and young 
people. Detailed specifications, of each module as set out above provided the necessary 
guidelines for the web developer. Readily available technologies8 and software were used to 
develop the website. (The various roles of the co-ordinator and the web administrator are 
detailed later in the section on implementation.) Before its implementation, the project was 
piloted to gain a clearer understanding of various elements involved in the project. This 
process is detailed below.
5.2 Piloting of the Project
This section is commences by explaining the particular need for undertaking a pilot run, 
given that the project is taking place in cyberspace. The attendant challenges of this type.of 
research are described together with the benefits of electronic data retrieval. Finally, an 
account of the actual piloting of the project is presented.
The Need fo r  Piloting
The novel nature of this research gave an added impetus to the need of piloting the project 
before embarking on the main study. The project was being undertaken in cyberspace, a 
social situation where young people are invited to use technology to express their own ideas
8 Technologies & Softwares used: Apache HTTP Server - Web Hosting; HTML, Javascript, XML - for building 
user interface; PHP -  server side programming; MySQL -  Database; XAMPP and FILEZILLA as local server 
and uploading files. All the above commonly used software were made available in the development of the 
website and were obtained with GNU licence (Free Software Foundation, 2007), freely available online. The 
web-administrator who singlehandedly coded the site contributed his efforts and time voluntarily to the project.
Development of the Project
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about faith, reflect on faith practices and apply their new understanding in real life. This is a 
dialogical process where an invitation-response model applies. At the same time, information 
is shared between a FF and a CS. The Scrolls provide the information on the teachings of the 
Catholic Church which is shared in such a way that a better understanding about the Church 
may be formed within the consciousness of young people. Also the presence or the absence 
of a response from the young person to the invitation of the FF may provide feedback to that 
FF on which she/he can reflect. Therefore, the challenges associated with this new research 
accentuated the need for piloting.
The Challenges o f This Research
The fact that the project took place in cyberspace differentiates it from other research. The 
unusual nature of this research is emphasised when similar cases are identified by Gergen and 
Gergen (2003, p. 599) as a new challenge in case study research. They consider computer 
communication, in general techno-revolution, as the most significant cultural transformation 
of contemporary history. In this shift of circumstance, they have made efforts ,-.to 
conceptualise the changes in the whole scenario of research: new research sites are launched 
because of the invention of Internet communication. Here they observe that not only the 
effectiveness and the efficiency of reaching out to the population have been changed but also 
that new ways of conceptualising research methods are evolving.
Another issue related to the innovation of information technology, especially the Internet, is 
conceptualised by the same researchers as the impact of meaning making in the society. In 
this context, they question the relevance of traditional research methods which depended on 
the communication technology of the past (Gergen and Gergen, 2003, p. 599). In response to 
this issue, new ways of qualitative analysis arose, using various software and computer
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technologies which are still in the developing stages (Weitzman, 2003, p. 310; see also Lazar 
et al, 2010). Due to its newness, the piloting of the project also looked at different ways of 
data retrieval.
Electronic Data Retrieval
The possibility of storing and archiving the electronic interactions on the Internet makes it an 
ideal space for facilitating the collection of research data. In contrast, in other research, data 
collection techniques such as questionnaires or interviews are used, with the help of some 
technology (written, audio etc.) to capture data. An advantage in this new medium is that 
electronic data is more readily available. The initial preparatory discussions for this project 
were carried out online and this electronic data was also archived.
As discussed earlier in chapter 3 on online communication, examples of various models of 
communication, such as transmission, interaction and constructivist models, can be identified. 
The model implemented in this project adopted an interactive approach with a constructivist 
objective, rather than a linear approach where mere transmission of messages occurs. Another 
unusual feature of this model is that it incorporated a dimension of personal accompaniment 
which, compared to other models available online, can be seen as a unique factor in this 
research. Effective ways of online accompaniment were also tested during the piloting phase.
Piloting led to some changes in the design and approaches. The first pilot version of the 
website allowed for the registration of participants, validation and authentication modules, 
data entry forms, interactive materials, instructions, personal representation pages, 
monitoring of interactivity and data retrieval facilities. These various elements tested during 
the piloting phase are set out in Fig 5.5 below:
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Fig 5.5 Online Activities Involved in the Project
Developing 
Instructional Faith 
Development 
Materials
Writing themes:
Spirit: Interactive -  questions, answers.
Resources: Teachings of the Church -  Catechism of the Catholic 
Church (CCC), Bible, Jesus Youth charism, youth culture.
Uploading online using an editor
Evaluation: content, methods of interaction, effectiveness, appeal to 
young people, A theological advisor approved the themes.
Identifying Faith 
Friends
A Team of at least 10 JY leaders
Qualifying terms: Experience in JY, good credentials, knowledge in 
mentoring, familiarity with the teachings of the Church, thorough 
understanding of themes of Cyber souls and its purposes, knowledge of 
netiquette, recommended by the required JY Co-ordinators
Setting up the Site Designing and customisation to ensure the following:
Themes that interest young people;
Encouraging interaction and empowerment;
Facility to develop themes and making them available to view; 
Opportunity for frequent evaluation of the site and interactions;
Making sure that all trajectories of interactions are traced;
Saving the messages shared;
Having the whole corpus of data from the discussions on preparations 
to the online interactions stored and made available to the researcher.
Information and 
invitation
Techniques for promotion
Electronic - E-mail, main page Jesus Youth website, within the module 
of social networking;
JY retreats;
Prayer meetings.
Research design 
and data analysis
Identifying the problem: Online Evangelisation of Youth.
Identifying the possible solution: Accompaniment by Faithfriends. 
Identifying the systems involved: The Church, the Internet, young 
people.
Identifying the groups of people involved: Faithfriends, young 
people, web team, theme builders, concept discussion groups and the 
researcher.
Implementing the solution: In the preparatory discussions; in the 
language and text of the design; in the literature review; in the 
implementation of the design;
Data retrieval: Documentation of all data; Data collection; Applying 
the research methodology; Data Analysis; Report of the Findings; 
Application of the findings.
Online Piloting o f  the Project
In order to pilot the project, the researcher identified five potential FFs and ten potential CSs 
belonging to the Jesus Youth movement who were from Ireland and so within the reach of the 
researcher. The FFs were allowed to register by clicking on the home page in the same
interface given to the CSs. Later, when the data entered were verified, they were promoted to 
the level of FFs. The piloting process highlighted some practical issues regarding the 
registration of Faithfriends which were rectified immediately. They were given a separate and 
private link to register and the amount of data collected from them differed from those of CSs 
since they had to be verified as authentic. This piloting phase helped to develop clearer norms 
of identifying and choosing a FF as described below.
Norms of Identifying and Choosing a Faithfriend (FF)
All FFs had to be practising Catholics. It was crucial that they were able to interact with 
young people, to speak their language and understand them. As stated previously, a 
knowledge of the Internet and computers was another pre-requisite for FFs. Moreover a 
confidence to accompany a young person online on his/her journey of faith was important. 
Again, as mentioned earlier, co-ordinators in Jesus Youth, an international Catholic youth 
movement, undertook the task of identifying FFs who met the above requirements 
nominating them to the co-ordinator.
Once a FF was identified, the co-ordinator contacted that person and obtained his/her 
consent. Then an invitation was sent to that FF online to register on the site. Once registered, 
the co-ordinator confirmed the details and authorised each candidate to act as a FF. The 
acceptance of a person as a FF was not automatic. This authorisation to become a FF ensured 
that the person was authentic and avoided the possibility of inappropriate people acting in this 
role.
An induction process for authorised FFs followed. As it is possible to create tester accounts, 
in this project the accounts Cstesterl to Cstester50 were created in order to simulate a CS
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being allocated to a FF. Initially, the co-ordinator simulated the role of a CS. Then, once the 
FF was comfortable using the site and was ready to accompany a CS, a real person who 
wanted to deepen the journey of faith was allocated to him/her. Initial identification, consent, 
recommendation, authentication and induction were involved in the preparation of each FF.
Piloting also shed light on the versatility of interactivity in relation to a scroll. Provision was 
given by the editor of the scroll to include dynamic snippets of comment buttons and other 
tools to enhance interactivity in a dynamic manner.
5.3 Research Ethics
Another task which had to be completed before implementation was to obtain the approval of 
the research ethics committee for the study. As part of this process, a Plain Language 
Statement was prepared to inform the participants about the research and their involvement in 
it. An Informed Consent Form was also set up to obtain the consent of each participant taking 
part in the research. Both of these were included in the Cybersouls portal. As the project 
involved human participation, an application detailing these preparations was sent to the 
Research Ethics Committee of Mater Dei Institute of Education where this research was 
undertaken. After thorough examination, the project was approved as it met the required 
ethical standards.
5.4 Implementation of the Project
Incorporating the modifications identified through piloting and in line with the project 
specifications, the website www.cybersouls.ie was launched on 25th June 2010. (Screen shots 
of some pages of the website are provided in Appendix A, B, C and D.) Prior to the launch, 
ten FFs had been identified, mainly from Jesus Youth. A contact list was prepared and an e­
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mail was sent to some young adults on this list, inviting them to join. A facebook page was 
set up and, after 50 days, a daily registration rate of at least one new CS was reached. This 
level of registration was deemed to be sufficient for the purpose of the research as by 100 
days the number of CS was expected to reach 100. The collaborative participation of all 
parties involved, leading up to the launch of the website, clarified various elements to be 
considered in the implementation of the project. As the processes involved in the 
implementation were ongoing, they were subject to regular review. The activities involved in 
the implementation process are identified below.
A Collaborative Implementation
The participants in the Cybersouls project were grouped into three categories: Administrative 
Level, Faithfriends Level and Cybersouls Level. The scope of participants at the various 
levels varied according to their roles and tasks, as explained below.
Administrative Level
The co-ordinator of the project, the web-administrator and the author of themes constituted 
the team responsible for the administration of the total project. The researcher undertook the 
roles of co-ordinator and author of the Scrolls. A senior academic in Roman Catholic 
Religious Education in Ireland and author of catechetical publications, Dr Patrick Devitt of 
Mater Dei Institute of Education, Dublin City University, approved the Scrolls before the co­
ordinator uploaded them onto the website.
Role of the co-ordinator: As previously mentioned, the researcher assumed the role of the 
co-ordinator. In addition to undertaking the steps involved in initiating the project, his other 
responsibilities as co-ordinator involved:
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1. Developing the specifications of the project;
2. Formulating the initial design of the outline of the project and time line;
3. Decision making in relation to aspects such as graphics, colour, language, vocabulary, 
layout and flow of control within the actual operations of the web-project;
4. Regular communication with the web-administrator;
5. Identification of future FFs and CSs;
6. Initial pilot run of the project before the actual launch;
7. Creation of various catechetical materials (Scrolls);
8. Obtaining approval for the Scrolls;
9. Registration and authentication of FFs;
10. Induction of FFs by allocating tester CSs;
11. Publicity of the website, inviting CSs to register;
12. Allocation of a FF to each registered CS;
13. Monitoring the interactions for any fraudulent/inappropriate behaviour etc.
Most of the above responsibilities were ongoing during the design, development, piloting and 
implementation of the project.
Role of web-administrator: The Web-administrator of the project was a professional 
systems analyst. During an initial discussion in which the co-ordinator shared the concept 
with him, he indicated that the proposed project was feasible. His roles involved:
1. Undertaking a feasibility study of various modules in the project;
2. Identifying the software and hardware requirements;
3. Registration of name and web-space for the project;
4. Actual coding;
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5. Carrying out a dry run of the project with dummy data;
6. Modification of the modules after the dry run etc.
Faithfriends Level
Faithfriends (FFs) are those who are directly in contact with the project administrators. The 
project was initially introduced to them through the Jesus Youth movement when its co­
ordinators in various countries sent a list of proposed FFs to the co-ordinator. The 
responsibilities of a Faithfriend involved:
1. Registration with reference to the local co-ordinator of the movement who authorises 
a FF;
2. Activation of the account via his/her e-mail;
3. Undergoing an induction into the site;
4. Initiating the accompaniment of CSs as and when it is felt he/she is ready for such an 
interaction;
5. Making use of various modules in the site for faith enrichment, especially Scrolls.
6. Reporting any issues relating to the site or to communication between a CS and a FF 
to the co-ordinator.
Faithfriends were informed that they might need to accompany as many as five active CSs on 
the Cybersouls website. (A screen shot of the registration form of FFs is provided in 
Appendix B).
Cybersouls Level
Cybersouls (CS) were those who registered of their own free will with the intention of 
deepening their Catholic religious faith. For research purposes, as participation in the site was
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restricted to those over 18, any prospective participants were asked to confirm this age 
requirement.
Once they registered and activated their account using their e-mail, a FF was put in touch 
with them in the Cyber souls website. This gave them an opportunity to send messages to their 
FF, the co-ordinator as well as the web-administrator.
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An overall picture of all participants in the Cybersouls portal according to their roles and 
hierarchical levels is set out in Fig 5.6 below.
Fig 5.6 Overall View of the Roles of Participants in the Cybersouls Project
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The one-to-one interaction between a CS and a FF was recorded digitally. These online 
interactions occurred mainly when Scrolls were being considered. (Screen shot of a sample 
scroll is provided in Appendix D.) Also there were additional opportunities for sending
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messages between FFs and CSs besides the discussions attached to a scroll. All CSs were 
able to communicate directly with the co-ordinator and web-administrator at any point. It is 
to be noted that the portal is named after the third level i.e., Cybersouls which clarifies the 
nature of the study primarily as being inductive9. The next section sets out various methods 
used in data collection.
5.5 Data Collection and Case Study Selection
The various methods of data collection undertaken in this study are described below. A 
mixed methods empirical design was adopted which prioritised a qualitative analytical 
approach as the primary research technique. The rationale behind choosing a qualitative study 
is next for consideration.
A Qualitative Approach
Three conditions are put forward by Yin (2003, p. 5) when identifying which research 
strategy is to be chosen for a study: (a) the type of research question posed; (b) the extent of 
control an investigator has over actual behavioural events and (c) the degree of focus on 
contemporary as opposed to historical events. Accordingly, a case study approach is chosen 
when, a “how” or “why” question is being asked about a contemporary set of events over 
which the investigator has little or no control (Yin, 2003, p. 5). The space for online 
interaction within the Cybersouls project is not a tightly controlled setting. The freedom, 
privacy and power to choose are the same as for anyone who has access to the Net. Online 
evangelisation is contemporary as it is a relatively new phenomenon. Hence, all the 
conditions specified by Yin (2003) are relevant to the research project.
9 An inductive approach is adopted in the coding o f the data in the analytical process. A t the sam e tim e the 
theoretical know ledge acquired in the literature review  gives it a deductive dim ension. L evins and S ilver (2007) 
suggest the use o f a  com bination o f  these two approaches as a m ethod o f  coding w hen using softw are.
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The case studies under consideration here also have some unusual features. In this research, 
online communication is the tool being used for evangelisation. Cyberspace is the actual 
space where this communication takes place. Also, since online communication is mainly 
multimedia, various components involved in conveying the message are to be considered. 
Collaborative communication involves incoming and outgoing messages. When mutually 
interactive communication occurs between a CS and a FF in relation to the message of the 
Good News, the faith development of a young person may be said to be initiated. Thus a 
multiple-methods approach or triangulation was adopted since varieties of data, theories and 
methods were used in order to achieve validity of the results (Berg, 2009). Hence, in this 
research, a mixed methods approach with a qualitative focus was adopted to maintain the 
validity of the outcome.
“Contextuality is an aspect of the dynamism and complexity of a case. Case study researchers 
recognise that cases are shaped by their many contexts -  historical, social, political, 
ideological, organisational, cultural, linguistic, philosophical and so on” (Mabry, 2008, 
p.217). The research of online evangelisation, based on using the Cybersouls project, took 
place in concrete life situations. It is situated within the new meaning-making systems of 
technologies of social communication. The next section reports on the process of data 
collection and the selection of case studies for analysis.
Data Collection
Data from the Cybersouls portal was collected at various times during the project:
• At the time of registration (Screen shots of the registration forms of FFs and CSs are 
provided in Appendixes B and C.);
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• Through the use of a questionnaire sent to CSs at the cut off point of the project10 
(Screen shot of questionnaire form is provided in Appendix F.);
• On an ongoing basis through the interaction between a FF and a CS in the context of a 
particular scroll (Screen shots of an example of interactions in a case are provided in 
Appendix I.).
All data mentioned above were posted on the website digitally. Thus it was easy to export the 
data in a suitable form into the software for analysis. The data was collected at different times 
from different settings in order to facilitate comprehensive data collection. Ttriangulation in 
data collection11 was achieved by collecting data from multiple sources. As Thurmond (2001) 
notes:
Triangulation is the combination of at least two or more theoretical perspectives, 
methodological approaches, data sources, investigators, or data analysis methods.
The intent of using triangulation is to decrease, negate, or counterbalance the 
deficiency of a single strategy, thereby increasing the ability to interpret the 
findings, (p.253)
Lazar et al (2010) also observe that quantitative data can be used as a triangulation tool for 
corroborating results in relation to case studies.
Computer Assisted Database Compilation using NVivo
The above mentioned data was extracted in table format from the website. This was 
transferred into MSWord format, to be converted into text files for importation into NVivo.
10 The data o f  interaction the participants developed w ithin 100 days from  a  C S ’s interaction  w ith a  F F  was 
considered for the project. The questionnaire was sent on the 100th day o f  the registration  o f  the first C ybersoul.
11 “The use o f m ultip le data  sources to support and interpretation is know n as data source triangulation” (L azar 
et al, 2010, p.295).
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As a computer aided qualitative data analysis system (CAQDAS), NVivo is used globally as
an efficient tool for undertaking analytical work (Saldana, 2009). QSR International
\
developed this software (NVivo Training, 2011). NVivo enables the management of multiple 
sources of data, making it a versatile tool for qualitative analysis (Bazeley, 2007). The range 
of facilities it offers include: coding relevant data in various sizes and organising it in linear 
or dynamic structures, memoing codes with their contextual information and recalling the 
data source or codes in line with the research requirements.
The Cybersouls database was designed with the intention of making use of the robust 
architecture of NVivo. This enabled the researcher to extract unforeseen patterns which could 
arise during the analytical process. “NVivo’s sophisticated query tools let you uncover subtle 
trends and patterns” (QSR International, 2008b, p.3). The scope of collected data is next for 
discussion.
' Scope of the Data
The data collected for more detailed qualitative analysis relates to the interactions between a 
CS and a respective FF during the first 100 days following the launch of the site.
A drama frame is a way of picturising qualitative data based on the roles, settings, and 
scripts. “The drama frame is well suited for studies concerned with communication as 
performance” (Lindlof and Taylor, 2002, p.236). A drama frame of the Cybersouls project is 
presented in Figure 5.7 below illustrating the communication between participants.
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Fig 5.7 A Drama Frame of Communication in Cybersouls
The co-ordinator initiates Task A (see Fig 5.7). This involves both online and real world 
activities which precede the cyber activities. First of all a FF had to be identified. This 
identification was clarified in the earlier section on piloting.
In the above Data Frame (Fig 5.7) Task A was comprised of contacting a FF, authenticating 
each one, giving him/her an initiation into the online interaction by acting as a CS and, 
finally, being allocated a real person. This preceded Task B which is an automatic process
when a CS clicks on the button t Re8a,?r a c ^ rs®ul I 0n the home page. Certain details were 
sought to open an account in the Cybersouls website: Login Name, E-mail ID, Password, 
Retype Password, Your Name, Gender, Country of origin, and address and contact 
(optional). At this point each one was asked to confirm being over 18. A tick box was 
provided for anybody who did not wish to take part in the research. Also at this stage 
participants were asked to type in a value from an image to distinguish between computers 
and humans in order to avoid accounts being created automatically to spam the website. (This 
is technically known as captcha (Carnegie Mellon University, 2010)). This was the first data
164
collection point in relation to an individual CS (A screen shot of the registration form of CSs 
is provided in Appendix C).
The information collected was kept in the secure custody of the coordinator. He regularly 
examined the data submitted for any suspected fraudulent information and allocated a FF at 
the earliest opportunity.
Data Importation: As this was an online project, the traditional process of transcribing data 
to adapt them to digital format was not necessary. Demographic details of all participants - 
both CSs and FFs - were first imported into Excel and then, as attributes of case nodes 
imported into NVivo. Data were organised into a folder hierarchy by data type (for example, 
that of FF and CS) so as to track their source. NVivo stores data in ‘nodes’ which are 
repositories for themes and categories. One such node type is a case node which is a single 
file which stores each participant’s contribution from any source, be it their fundamental 
interaction or their individual messaging (Bazeley, 2007).
These case nodes, once populated, were linked to the demographics tables and their returns 
from the quantitative survey. This facilitated integration between the qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of the data. Thus, intangibles such as attitude and beliefs (for example, 
data coded in a node which hosts all references to personal opinion) could be intersected with 
tangibles such as belongingness to a church for detailed analyses in order to help the 
researcher understand the phenomena under scrutiny (Lewins and Silver, 2007).
Coding in NVivo: NVivo helps to code data in a very efficient manner. Autocoding and 
manual coding are two different methods of singling out data. At a practical level, autocoding
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is more appropriate in the first stage of analysis, when the data is to be reviewed from various 
angles. Manual coding is more suitable in the second stage of the study when grounded 
theory is applied. This is done later in chapter 7 where a detailed analysis of conversations is 
carried out. Autocoding was undertaken in the initial data processing stage, as can be seen 
below.
Initial Data Processing: Digital data in relation to a total 56 Cybersouls who had completed 
three or more Scrolls by day 100 were obtained from the space of interaction on the website 
www.cybersouls.ie. These were copied into MS Word. The next step was to arrange the data 
according to the requirements of NVivo8. Compatibility of the data format with NVivo was 
established in order to increase the speed of data processing and to facilitate autocoding. 
Various levels of headings were created in MS Word. These are identification marks in 
NVivo,. which help to separate each case. Hence, all labels of Scrolls were aligned as 
‘HeadingT, the names of FFs as ‘Heading2’ and the names of CSs as ‘Heading 3’. Following 
this process the autocoding of data to:
♦ Heading 1 separated, coded and ordered data related to all Scrolls;
♦ Heading 2 captured data in connected with a FF;
♦ and Heading 3 coded and displayed data in relation to a CS,
This initial autocoding helped to comprehend the actual size and spread of the data. A huge 
volume of data was generated, well beyond the scope of this study. This gave rise to the need 
for careful data reduction. As Berg (2009, p.54) counsels: “Qualitative data need to be 
reduced and transformed in order to make them more readily accessible, understandable and 
to draw out various themes and patterns”. Lazar et al (2010) also point out the need for some
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precautionary measures to be taken in relation to data collection when it is being used for 
research purposes:
All of the automated methods for computerised data collection are capable of 
producing voluminous data sets. This can pose a substantial problem for 
researchers. It is well known that while filling disks with data is easy, analysis 
and interpretation of that data is often much harder. Choosing appropriate data 
granularity and proper data management are crucial components of any 
automated data collection system, (p.308)
Selection o f  a Representative Sample of Data
Initially, a self selection method (Lazar et al, 2010) empowered each participant to take part 
in the research. This was achieved by asking all those who wished to take part in the 
Cyber souls project, while registering, to choose to become part of the research. As mentioned 
earlier, by day 100 of the site’s operation, 119 participants had registered. Of these, 56 CSs 
(47%) had completed three Scrolls or more; six participants had ceased interaction after:the 
second scroll and 27 (23%) did not continue after the first scroll. Thirty (25%) of those who 
registered initially did not continue. These results are shown in Fig 5.8 below.
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Fig 5.8 Usage of Scrolls by Cybersouls
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The high performance rate of the Cybersouls site, with 119 Cybersouls registering during the 
first 100 days of its operation, was very gratifying and generated an enormous amount of data 
(Screen shots of examples of interactions within a case are provided in Appendix I.) 
However, since this is primarily an exploratory study, using a qualitative approach, data for 
analysis had to be chosen carefully in order to keep it manageable within the time frame of 
the study. Robust techniques were applied when choosing a representative sample for 
analysis. Firstly, a sample set was created, using the responses to the questionnaire as a basis 
for selection. This is called Survey Sampling (Lazar et al, 2010). Another sample set was 
created based on the data created by the level of usage of the website. This is entitled Usage 
Sampling (Lazar et al, 2010). These sampling processes are explained below.
Data Reduction by Survey Sampling
One way of reducing data was to create a subset of participating CSs representative of' 
different sets of favourability. This was achieved by investigating if there was an underlying
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construct of “favourability” in relation to eight questions on a Likert-type questionnaire sent 
to CSs. These questions sought information on aspects of favourability towards the 
Cybersouls project. The following Likert items were used:
(CSQ-1) The scrolls/themes in this website helped me to reflect seriously about my 
faith.
(CSQ-2) I like interacting via social networking sites such as Facebook, Bebo, Orkut, 
My space etc.
(CSQ-3) I feel part of the online Cybersouls community.
(CSQ-4) I am closer to my parish/community because of the Cyber souls website. 
(CSQ-5) I understand my Catholic faith better now.
(CSQ-6) I would recommend the Cybersouls website to a friend in order to deepen 
his/her faith.
(CSQ-7) My Faithfriend in the Cybersouls website has helped me to deepen my faith. 
(CSQ-8) Taking part in the Cybersouls project has enlivened my faith.
Participants were given a choice of responses: Strongly disagree, Disagree, Agree, Strongly 
agree. In addition, they were offered an opportunity for further comments: I f  you have any 
additional comments to make about the Cybersouls website, kindly make them below.
The survey was constructed using Google Forms and a web-link was provided on in the 
Cybersouls website. (Screen shot of questionnaire form is provided in Appendix F.) 
Participants were given a time frame of two weeks to reply. The survey was made available 
to the 119 CSs who had registered by day 100 of the site operation and a total of 58 CSs 
responded, yielding a response rate of just under half (49%).
Since survey data collection was offered in Google Forms, the transfer of the collected data 
on to an excel spreadsheet was easily achieved. The data obtained from this survey were 
mainly used for two purposes:
(a) To obtain a general picture of participants’ views on the website. (These findings are 
presented in chapter 6.);
(b) To obtain a reliable sample set.
The creation of the sample set for qualitative analysis is detailed below.
Constructing a Reliable Scale of Favourability: Pallant (2001) points out that it is 
important to check the reliability of a scale defined as a set of items with high levels of 
correlation indicative of an underlying construct. A method of assuring reliability is to 
examine whether the data from individual scale items are internally consistent, i.e., if they all 
measure the same underlying construct favourability. Cronbach’s (1951) alpha coefficient is a 
commonly used indicator of such internal consistency. It is used for scores which fall along a 
continuum (SLegle, 2003). First, a Cronbach’s alpha test was undertaken which included all 
the eight items in the questionnaire listed above.
The data relating to the 58 Cybersouls who had completed the survey were transferred to 
SPSS. A Cronbach’s alpha test was applied to the data obtained on the eight questions from 
these 58 Cybersouls.
Table 5.1 Initial Case Processin g Summary with 8 Variables
N %
Cases
Valid 57 98.3
Excluded3 1 1.7
Total 58 100.0
a. List wise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.
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As can be seen from Table 5.1 above, one of the items relating to one CS was incomplete. 
Thus only the valid data from the remaining 57 CS was included in the test for internal 
consistency:
Conventionally it is accepted that, if the value of Cronbach’s alpha is above 0.7, there is a 
good internal consistency within the survey. In this test, as can be seen in Table 5.2, the
coefficient is 0.720 which, though adequate is at the bare minimum.
Table 5.3 Inter-item Correlation Matrix in Survey
CSQ-1 CSQ-2 CSQ-3 CSQ-4 CSQ-5 CSQ-6 CSQ-7 CSQ-8
CSQ-1 1.000 -.171 .240 .310 .375 .274 .410 .545
CSQ-2 -.171 1.000 1 -.053 -.105 -.041 -.160 -.076
CSQ-3 .240 -.177 1.000 .450 .400 .343 .383 .316
CSQ-4 .310 -.053 .450 1.000 .534 .349 .456 .439
CSQ-5 .375 -.105 .400 .534 1.000 .471 .599 .601
CSQ-6 .274 -.041 .343 .349 .471 1.000 .169 .349
CSQ-7 .410 -.160 .383 .456 .599 .169 1.000 .554
CSQ-8 .545 -.076 .316 .439 .601 .349 .554 1.000
Note: Table 5.3 depicts the inter-item correlation matrix for the eight items in the 
survey. As can be seen, survey item CSQ2 has a negative value whereas all the 
other items are in positive correlation to other variables.
It can be seen from the inter-item correlation matrix shown in Table 5.3 above that one 
particular question does not seem to measure the same construct as the other questions due to 
the negative values of the correlation. The item in question is: CSQ-2 - 1 like interacting via 
social networking sites such as Facebook, Bebo, Orkut, My space etc. The item-total statistics
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Table 5,2 First Result of Reliability Test
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items
J2 0 .755 8
in Table 5.4 below, with eight preliminary variables, also indicate that a higher alpha value
would be obtained if that particular item were deleted.
Table 5.4 Item-Total Statistics
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted
Scale
Variance if
Item
Deleted
Corrected
Item-Total
Correlation
Squared
Multiple
Correlation
Cronbach's Alpha 
if Item Deleted
CSQ-1 21.6316 7.844 .435 .337 .689
CSQ-2 22.0000 9.750 -.156 .064 C¡§26
CSQ-3 21.8246 7.647 .440 .296 .687
CSQ-4 22.4912 6.504 .583 .384 .650
CSQ-5 21.9123 6.867 .681 .571 .635
CSQ-6 21.5088 8.004 .443 .312 .689
CSQ-7 21.9298 7.602 .563 .491 .667
CSQ-8 21.9474 7.194 .640 .516 .648
Accordingly, after deleting the variable represented by question CSQ2, Cronbach’s alpha^test 
was applied again to the remaining data collected from 7 questions from the 58 Cybersouls. 
As is evident from Table 5.5 below, this resulted in a reliability value of 0.825 which 
indicates that there is a strong internal consistency between responses to the seven questions 
and that a reliable scale underlies the Cybersouls’ response to these survey items..
Table 5.5 Reliability Statistics with 7 Variables
Cronbach's
Alpha
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items
.825 .828 7
Then, using these seven questions, a “favourability” score of all CS who participated in the 
survey was calculated in SPSS and classified into three levels: Less Favourable, Favourable 
and Most Favourable. Three samples each were chosen from the Less Favourable and Most 
Favourable levels while four samples were chosen from the Favourable section giving a total 
of 10 samples. Those who completed a greater number of Scrolls were chosen from the Most 
Favourable and Favourable categories. In the remaining Less Favourable category the three
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samples chosen included one who had finished the least number of Scrolls, one with a 
medium level of scroll completion and one who had worked through a large number of
Scrolls. This yielded an overall total of ten CSs for inclusion in the detailed qualitative
analysis, using survey sampling.
Usage Sampling
Reviewing the overall usage of the Cybersouls website, the researcher observed that there 
were some CSs who had not completed the questionnaire but were still continuing to interact 
on the site. It was considered useful to include data in the sample for detailed analysis which 
related to some of these CSs. There were 13 participants in this category from which three 
were chosen for inclusion, based on their usage of Scrolls, i.e., one who had finished the 
highest number of Scrolls, one the second highest score and a third with the lowest 
completion rate.
The Final Sample Selected for Qualitative Analysis
Combining the ten Cybersouls selected from the survey sampling with the additional three 
identified through usage sampling, gave an overall total of 13 Cybersouls chosen for
qualitative analysis, as detailed in Table 5.6 below.
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Table 5.6 Selected Participants for Qualitative Analysis
Case Level of favourability CS
Gender
CS
Favourability
score
Scrolls
finished FF
Gender
FF
1 Less Fav CSA32 M 16 3 FFA19 M
2 Less Fav CSA51 M 18 11 FFA21 M
3 Less Fav CSA19 F 20 5 FFA14 M
4 Favourable CSA35 M 21 11 FFA4 M
5 Favourable CSA45 F 21 11 FFA15 M
6 Favourable CSA52 F 21 7 FFA22 F
7 Favourable CSA30 M 22 6 FFA6 F
8 More Fav CSA11 F 23 24 FFA10 F
9 More Fav CSA46 F 24 21 FFA10 F
10 More Fav CSA50 M 28 23 FFA1 M
11 Usage CSA6 F N/A 5 FFA5 M
12 Usage CSA9 F N/A 5 FFA8 F
13 Usage CSA7 F N/A 4 FFA6 F
Total 13 136 11
These 13 cases selected for qualitative analysis provide data relating to the on-going 
communication which took place between a CS and a FF during the identified number of 
Scrolls they had completed together. There are eight female and five male CSs in this cohort. 
They interacted with four female and seven male FFs; as two female FFs (FFA10 and FFA6) 
accompanied two Cybersouls each in Case 8/9 and Case 7/13 respectively.
There are differences between the participants in the selected sample in relation to a range of 
demographics. Their gender, country of origin, vocational status and knowledge and practice 
of their faith are some of the factors which may have impacted on the effectiveness of the 
CSs interventions. Also, there was a wide variation in the completion rate of Scrolls which 
ranged between three and 24. This cohort of 13 CSs, together with the interactions of the 11 
FFs who accompanied them, yielded an overall total of 136 scroll-based interactions for 
consideration.
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This chapter focussed on the Cybersouls project. The research questions have been set out 
and their operationalisation explained. In addition, various elements of the research design 
were clarified.
The piloting of the project was described, prefaced by a discussion on the need for piloting 
and the challenges of this research. Also the approval of the research from an ethical 
perspective was established.
Next, details were given on the collaborative approach used in the implementation of the 
project.
A description on the data collection process clarified the methods and approaches adopted in 
this part of the research. Finally, the sampling techniques used to select the cohort of thirteen 
cases for qualitative analysis were explained. The next chapter considers findings of the 
questionnaire sent to the CSs and selected case descriptions.
5.6 C onclusion
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CHAPTER 6 
QUESTIONNAIRE FINDINGS AND DESCRIPTION  
OF SELECTED CASES
This chapter commences with a presentation of the findings arising from the online 
questionnaire sent to CSs. This is followed by a review of the research questions. Next, 
having clarified some of the approaches to the analysis of case studies, using NVivo, the 
focus turns to the cohort of thirteen cases chosen for more detailed analysis, as identified in 
the previous chapter. The main characteristics of each of these cases are presented and the 
chapter concludes with a consolidation of these findings.
6.1 Findings: Online Questionnaire
As mentioned in chapter 5, an online questionnaire was sent to the 119 Cybersouls who had 
registered by day 100 of the site’s operation, seeking their views on various aspects of the 
Cybersouls project. The questionnaire had eight specific questions, as listed previously in 
chapter 5, together with an option to include additional open response comments at the end. 
A total of 58 Cybersouls responded, giving a response rate of 49%. The findings relating to 
this questionnaire now follow.
Question 1: Impact o f  the Scrolls on Faith
The impact of the Scrolls on the faith of participants was explored in this final closed 
question. Here, once again, the results were very positive, with 95% (55) of the respondents 
either agreeing or strongly agreeing that the Scrolls had helped them to reflect on their faith. 
Detailed results are provided in Fig 6.1 which now follows. Also this addresses the research
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question: What skills and tools would be needed by the Church in adapting to the new 
medium of the Internet?
Fig 6.1 The Scrolls/themes in this website helped me to reflect seriously about my faith
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This question concerned one of the main features of the website, namely Scrolls. They 
contain some of the Catholic themes which were later shared by a FF with a CS and the 
conversation and interaction progressed around them. The use of multimedia, layout, 
language and a facility to interact were incorporated within a Scroll. How these features are 
synthesised and how they have been utilised by the participants is discussed in detail in 
chapter 7.
Question 2: Social Networking
This question investigated preferences regarding the usage of other social networking sites.
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Fig 6.2 I like interacting via social networking sites such as Facebook, Bebo, 
Orkut, Myspace etc.
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The response, as seen in Fig 6.2 above, shows that the majority of the sample (46/81%) are 
positively disposed to social networking on the Internet. The remaining eleven (19%) 
indicated that they did not like to interact by using social networking sites. Given the overall 
positive disposition to using other social networking sites, it can be concluded that 
participants are in a position to compare the Cybersouls website with other sites. Also this 
findings is valuable in order to substantiate claims made later in the more detailed analysis.
Question 3: The Online Cybersouls Community
The communal dimension of the online site was explored in this question. As depicted in Fig
6.3 below, similar to the positive trends in the first four questions, the vast majority of 
respondents (51/88%) CSs feel part of the online Cybersouls community leaving only seven 
(12%) who disagreed with this statement.
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Fig 6.3 I feel p art o f  the online Cybersouls com m unity
A community feeling can be considered as one of the driving forces of online interaction. The 
Church being a community, and young people sharing common defining elements, as 
discussed earlier in the respective chapter 5, this issue is closely connected to the research 
questions. A response from CSA7 regarding this question is interesting:
I feel like I am part of Cyber souls. But I don’t have a community feeling. Maybe . 
it’s because of the kind of interaction. I only have contact with my faith friend 
right and so I don’t usually have the feeling that there are many people out there 
along with me. Maybe it’s because I don’t interact with the other members. 
(Comments from CSA7, Survey in Cybersouls, 2010)
At present, the main interaction on the website is between a FF and a CS i.e., a one-to-one 
relationship. While this seems to have generated a community feeling for most of the 
respondents, a more public forum may bring an added dimension to this ‘community feeling’, 
given the view expressed by CSA7 above. Various levels of interaction occurring between
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participants, which may define communities in the Cyber souls website, are considered later 
in the detailed analysis.
Question 4: Website Usage and Parish/Community Involvement
The possibility of involvement in the Cybersouls project forging closer links for participants 
with their parish/community was probed in this question. What are some of the pastoral and 
theological opportunities afforded by the Internet as a means of evangelisation? This is a 
research question posed in chapter 5 with a view to finding out how the Internet can be used 
as a conduit to inspire young people to take part in the real life activities of the Church at 
parish or community level.
Results, shown in Fig 6.4, below, differ from the mainly positive responses reported in 
relation to the previous four questions. Here, opinions were evenly divided as just over half 
of the respondents (30/52%) CSs disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement that they 
were closer to their parish community because of their involvement with the Cybersouls 
website, leaving 48% who agreed/strongly agreed with the statement.
Fig 6.4 I am closer to my parish/community because of the Cybersouls website 
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Comments made by some respondents in relation to this question are worth noting. One, who 
disagreed with the statement, explained: ‘‘I do not belong to a parish. So I don’t know in what 
way Cybersouls will help in my parish activities and relations” (Comments from CSA7, 
Survey in Cybersouls, 2010). This raises the issue of alienation of young people, as 
mentioned in chapter 4, where they seem to be absent from the traditional places of worship 
(Briggs, 2008). However, taking into account the short time span of this study, the fact that 
almost half of the participants endorsed the statement can be interpreted as a positive 
achievement of this web portal.
In addition, some of the interactions and discourses between CSs and FFs, which are detailed 
later, indicate a more positive attitude to this question.
Question 5: Understanding o f Faith
Catechesis is one of the moments of evangelisation, as detailed in chapter 2. A core objective 
in setting up the Cybersouls website was to provide an online facility enabling young people 
to get a better understanding of the Catholic Faith through catechesis. Here, Question 5 
probed for information on another major research question: ‘considering the moments of 
evangelisation, to what extend is the Internet useful as a tool?’ The relevant findings are 
presented in Fig 6.5.
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Fig 6.5 I understand my Catholic faith better now
As can be seen from this figure, a significant majority of the sample, (49/85%), either agreed 
or strongly agreed that the Cybersouls website had given them a better understanding of the 
Catholic faith. It is noted that nobody strongly disagreed with the statement while only nine 
(15%) disagreed with it. This question is connected to the capacity of the Internet to act as a 
medium of information-sharing on faith. It addresses the research question: ‘What is the
potential of the Internet as an environment for the evangelisation of young people?’ Results
suggest that the Internet does have a potential in this regard.
Question 6: Recommending Cybersouls Site to Others
The aim of Question 6 was to ascertain how participants felt about recommending the 
Cybersouls site to a friend as a means of deepening faith. As can be seen in Fig 6.6 below, 
there was almost full endorsement of this idea, with only one respondent voicing dissent. As 
those who strongly agreed with the proposition (31/53%) outnumbered those who agreed 
with the proposition (26/45%), this adds more strength to this positive outcome.
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Fig 6.6 I would recommend the Cybersouls website to a friend in order to deepen 
his/her faith
Question 7: Impact o f Faithfriend on faith
FFs were the focus in Question 7. Their effect on the faith of participating CS was 
investigated. Findings are depicted in Fig 6.7.
Fig 6.7 My Faithfriend in the Cybersouls website has helped me to deepen my 
faith
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The presence and response of a FF is a way of evangelising youth online. How can the 
Church make use of technology to reach out to youth in their new habitats or socialising 
spaces? Question 7 addresses this research question. A total of 22 FFs was allocated to the 
above 58 CSs who replied to the questionnaire. Some FFs had more than one Cybersoul 
allocated to them. Considering the differences in personalities, their individual and cultural 
difference and other factors that varied with each FF, it is noteworthy that, here again, 52 
(90%) either agreed or strongly agreed that their FF had helped to deepen their faith. The 
factors relating to FFs which contributed to this positive outcome are considered later in the 
more detailed analysis of findings. Offering FFs online may present an opportunity for the 
Church in this regard. The involvement of FFs is a major element of this research project, 
making it unique and breaking new ground.
Question 8: Impact o f Cybersouls project on faith
This question sought to find out from respondents if their participation in the Cybersouls 
project had enlivened their faith. Results are set out in Fig 6.8 below.
Fig 6.8 Taking part in the Cybersouls project has enlivened my faith
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Findings indicate that the project had a positive impact on the faith of participants. A total of 
90% (52) of the 58 CS who responded either agreed or strongly agreed that the Cybersouls 
project has enlivened their faith. This overall positive response suggests that the objective of 
deepening their faith has been a reality for the majority of respondents, providing information 
related to the primary research question of examining how the Internet can be used for the 
evangelisation of youth online.
Question 9: Additional Comments
The final question (9) was an open question which sought additional comments from CSs 
about the website. The response rate is set out in Fig 6.9 below.
Fig 6.9 Additional Comments
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As can be seen, 40 (69%) availed of the opportunity to make general observations on this 
online project. An analysis of the responses now follows. As some of the comments covered 
more than one issue, the total number (56) exceeded the number of respondents (40). The 
analysis enabled the comments received to be grouped into six areas -  (a) general views on
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the website; (b) compliments on the site; (c) appraisal of FFs and (d) Scrolls; (e) specific 
aspects of the site which were of interest and finally (f) some suggestions.
The majority of the comments, 28 in total, were in Group (a) and they were all positive. 
Fifteen of them expressed general satisfaction with the site, e.g., “a brilliant concept” 
(CSA30); “a very good website” (CSA44); “it’s been a great help to me” (CSA42). A further 
five respondents specified the usefulness of the site for young people. A comment by CSA43 
captures this aspect rather well: “It is good for the new generation . . .  is like serving the old 
fine wine in a newly fashionable mug”. Of the remaining eight comments, three (CSA13, 
CSA33 and CSA53) related to the spiritual nourishment provided by the site; two (CSA26 
and CSA28) said, “it helped me to think about my faith” and another duo (CSA20 and 
CSA52) commented on how well organised the site was. The remaining comment (CSA50) 
was that “Cybersouls should replace facebook”!
Turning to Group (b), the eight comments here expressed congratulations/thanks to the 
researcher for setting up the site, e.g., “Thank you very much for creating such a wonderful 
resource” (CSA11).
FFs were the focus in Group (c). All five comments here were positive, endorsing the help 
and support provided by Faithfriend; e.g., “Faithfriends are very helpful” (CSA18); “My 
Faithfriend has been a huge moral support to me” (CSA26).
While only four comments related specially to the Scrolls (Group (d)), they all expressed 
reservations about them, e.g., “I think the Scrolls are a little bit complicated’ (CSA34); 
“Scrolls may not be easy for an average user to understand” (CSA37).
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In Group (e), three respondents identified particular aspects of .the site which appealed to 
them, e.g., “the dialogue sessions” (CSA30); “connecting with another practicing Catholic” 
(CSA39).
The final Group (f) consisted of eight suggestions. Two of them advised making the site more 
popular and better promoted (CSA35 and CSA27). A third respondent, CSA19, suggested 
that the site needed to be a bit clearer and easier to navigate; while CSA37 considered that it 
should be “optimised for mobile devices”. The remaining four put forward suggestions 
regarding possible changes to the site. These included recommendations about books 
books/movies/videos/web sites based on a catholic point of view (CSA35); having discussion 
forums for members on faith related subjects (CSA40); adding an FAQ section (CSA37) and 
giving some topics for reflection and then asking for feedback (CSA38).
This concludes the review of the comments received in response to the invitations in 
Question 9 of the questionnaire. Findings indicate an overall positive response to the 
Cybersouls website including the critical and creative suggestions, apart from the reservations 
about the Scrolls recorded by four participants.
Questionnaire: Overview
All 58 Cybersouls who responded to the questionnaire indicated a generally positive attitude 
towards the Cybersouls website, apart from the response to one question (Q 4). The above
findings capture their attitudes towards two main features:
(1) In relation to the various components of the Cybersouls website:
The majority of respondents seem to be positively disposed to all questions related to the
various components of the site, having made use of them. Regarding FFs and Scrolls, their
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attitude is generally very positive. The structure of the website and other issues raised by 
certain CSs are considered later in the more detailed analysis.
(2) In relation to the effects of the site on their personal and community life:
Some of the CSs commented that the Cyber souls website had helped them in a general way in 
their personal life and in their relationship with God. At the same time, just over half of the 
respondents indicated that the site had not increased their affinity to a parish or community. A 
comment from one participant is interesting in this regard: “I feel that it is too early for me to 
answer the questions” (Comments from CSA22, Survey in Cybersouls, 2010).
It is considered that the running of the website for a longer period and further post-doctoral 
research at a later stage, following the completion of this pioneering project, may provide 
additional insights over time. As mentioned in chapter 5, since a regular review of the 
research questions can bring greater clarity to the study, this task is now undertaken.
6.2 Review of Research Questions
All the research questions set out in chapter 5 emanate from the main research question 
exploring how an effective web presence can be developed which can help value-based 
communities such as the Catholic Church to relate to young people at a global level. The 
research questions can be clustered under three main areas the Church, the Internet and 
Young People.
The possibility of the convergence of these three spheres at a given time is at the core of this 
thesis. This synthesis can occur in various ways, depending on the levels of interaction and 
their mutual benefit. There are three linear ways for this interaction to take place. An example
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of a linear model is given in Fig 6.10. In this configuration, the Internet is just a medium 
benefiting the interaction between the Church and young people. Here, young people, as well 
as the Church, may be using the Internet as a medium for their own private communication.
Fig 6.10 Linear Merge of the Three Spheres
The Church The Internet Youth
In the second linear model, youth replaces the Internet at the centre. In this situation, the 
Church may be using the energy of young people for its growth from one side while the 
Internet may be catering for the needs of young people from the other side. But neither may 
contribute to the development of young people in the long run.
In the third linear interaction of these three spheres, the Church is positioned at the centre. 
Young people may be interacting with the Church for their immediate and temporal benefits. 
The Internet may be targeting the traffic of the Church for its own benefit, while not giving 
anything in return to the Church.
The ideal situation is to have a dynamic synthesis of these three spheres where each one can 
benefit from the presence of the other two, as shown in Fig 6.11.
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F ig  6.11 D yn am ic M erge o f T hree Spheres
Research Questions Pertaining to Various Spheres of the Research
The Church
(a) How can the Church make use of technology to reach out to the youth in 
their new habitats or socializing spaces?
(b) What skills and tools would be needed by the Church in adapting to the new 
medium of the Internet?
(c) Considering the various ‘moments of evangelisation’ developed over the 
years in the Church, to what extend is the Internet useful as a tool to 
continue this task?
The Internet
(d) What is the potential of the Internet as an environment for the 
evangelisation of young people?
(e) How can the Internet empower young people as active participants in 
evangelisation using the Internet?
(f) What are some of the pastoral and theological opportunities afforded by the 
Internet as a means of evangelisation?
Youth
(g) How can the freedom and digital ingenuity of a young person be a source of 
momentum for New Evangelisation?
(h) How can the information shared online influence the consciousness of 
young people to inform their understanding about faith?
Convergence of these Spheres
(i) The Internet provides the tools; the Church provides the atmosphere and 
young people are the participants. How can these seemingly distant cultural 
spaces be mutually inculturated?
Evangelisation can come about at the centre where the union of these three spheres occurs. 
This gives rise to some questions: Can the Church and the Internet be kept on the same plane 
of interaction? Can the world of youth fall on the same plane as that of the Church and the 
Internet, as depicted in Fig 6.11? The quality of communication on the Internet and the 
sacramental nature of the Church are issues which arise here in impacting on this dynamic of 
the three spheres. In general, it may be considered that the Church stands for the Divine; 
youth represents humanity and the Internet models the Universe. This alliance holds immense 
possibilities for the future of humanity:
The Church has so much to talk about with youth, and youth have so much to 
share with the Church. This mutual dialogue, by taking place with great 
cordiality, clarity and courage, will provide a favourable setting for the meeting 
and exchange between generations, and will be a source of richness and 
youthfulness for the Church and civil society. (John Paul II, 1988, para. 46)
The Cybersouls research project attempted to bring together these three spheres, offering a 
favourable setting for this mutual dialogue, as envisioned by Pope John Paul II, providing a 
source of richness and youthfulness for the Church and civil society. The research questions 
are fundamentally connected to the above three spheres and their convergence, as set out in 
Figure 6.10. The detailed analysis investigates if the above spheres intersected in the 
Cybersouls project.
6.3 Case Studies using NVivo
Before embarking on the details of the selected case studies, some pertinent issues regarding 
the case study method are considered.
Relying on theoretical propositions, developing case descriptions, depending on both 
qualitative and quantitative data and examining rival explanations, are cited by Yin (2009) as 
strategies to be carried out during a case study. Thus, in the last section the theoretical 
propositions were reiterated in the review of the research questions. A major task in this 
chapter is the development of case descriptions. This is achieved primarily by quantifying the 
main qualitative and descriptive elements of each case, as detailed below.
The case descriptions of the interactions between the 13 CSs and the 11 FFs which occurred 
on the Cyber souls website was initiated, using NVivo 8, as described in the previous chapter.
Lazar et al (2010) suggest forming an integrated description of the unit of analysis before 
probing into the larger trends buried in the data. As explained earlier, the data relating to the 
interaction of the 13 cases were separated manually in MSWord and imported on to NVivo. 
(This also facilitated a considerable reduction of the load of the software.) Autocoding of this 
data in NVivo, using Heading 1 and Heading 2 together, separated the data relating to the 13 
CSs according to the number of Scrolls completed by each one. Different combinations of 
autocoding produced different sets of data and the list was presented in a table in an excel 
sheet for cross reference and analysis. This autocoding helped to identify major components 
to be considered in the more detailed analysis now presented.
The set of all interactions between a CS and a FF is considered to be a case in this study. The 
following Figure (6.12) provides a straightforward example of a case to be analysed.
Strategies for Case Studies
Fig 6.12 Elements in a Case
The participants, called CSs and FFs, vary according to each individual case selectedvfor 
investigation, as listed in Table 5.6 in chapter 5. Also considerable variation occurred in the 
number of Scrolls completed and the conversations shared between them (see Table 9.1 List of 
Scrolls in Appendix E). There are both quantitative and qualitative differences in the data 
created within each case being considered. For instance, the time taken for a participant to 
finish scrolls varied, as the pace of finishing a scroll was not set by the co-ordinator. Rather 
FFs and CSs were given the freedom to set the pace in each case, at their own convenience.
In order to distinguish them more clearly than just using their coded references, the names of 
birds taken from the Bible were assigned to the 13 CSs in the cohort for analysis while 
corresponding names of trees, were assigned to their 11 FFs as detailed in Table 6.1 below.
6.4 Case Descriptions
Table 6.1 Pseudonyms Given to Selected CSs and FFs
Case CS Ref. No. Pseudonym FF Ref. No. Pseudonym
1 CSA32 Dove (Gen 8:8) FFA19 Acacia (Ex. 25:5)
2 CSA51 Eagle (Lev 11:13) FFA21 Almond (Eccl. 12:5)
3 CSA19 Falcon (Job 28:7) FFA14 Cedar (Ezek. 31:3-5)
4 CSA35 Hawk (Lev 11:16) FFA4 Cypress (1 Kings 5:8)
5 CSA45 Heron (Lev 11:19) FFA15 Fig (Gen. 3:7)
6 CSA52 Ostrich (Lev 11:16) FFA22 Oak (Gen. 35:4)
7 CSA30 Swallow (Ps 84:3) FFA6 Sycamore (Luke 19:4)
8 CSA11 Owl (Lev 11:17) FFA10 Olive (Deut. 24:20)
9 CSA46 Peacock (1 Kingsl0:22) FFA10 Olive (Deut, 24:20)
10 CSA50 Pigeon (Lev 1:14) FFA1 Palm (Ps. 92:12)
11 CSA6 Raven (Lev 11:15) FFA5 Pine (Isa. 41:19b)
12 CSA9 Seagull (Lev 11:16) FFA8 Poplar (Gen. 30:37)
13 CSA7 Stork (Lev 11:19) FFA6 Sycamore (Luke 19:4)
In this analysis, following some general observations, the nature of the communication which 
occurred in each case is described. The main task centres on the identification of factors 
pertaining to each case which are significant for the research. Quantification of some of the 
qualitative research findings is applied as a research method in this section. Also the level of 
conversation in each case is identified. This refers to the number of times a conversation has 
been exchanged between a CS and FF at any one point of interaction. A FF sends a scroll 
addressing the CS, and a conversation is initiated in relation to the scroll, with exchanges 
occurring between the two (FF-CS-FF-CS . . . etc.). Silverman (2001), referring to this as 
adjacency pairs, points out that it is an important element of conversation analysis. The 
analysis of the 13 individual cases now follows.
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General Observations: CS Dove and FF Acacia are both male. In the initial interaction with 
his FF Acacia, CS Dove mentioned that he was an active participant in the youth movement 
Pure in Heart. His initial conversations showed great enthusiasm towards joining the 
Cybersouls website. Acacia was selected as a FF primarily because of his participation in 
Youth 2000, being recommended by a leader of the movement.
Communication using Scrolls: Three Scrolls were completed between CS Dove and FF 
Acacia. Two of these were on ‘Introduction’ and one on ‘Suffering’. Nine conversations in 
total took place during their interactions - five conversations by the FF and four by the CS. 
The maximum time taken for CS Dove to respond was 8 days, while FF Acacia took a 
maximum of 22 days to reply to his CS. The average number of words in the conversations of 
CS Dove was 44, whereas FF Acacia had 157 words on average.
Comments: Factors to be considered here include the time taken for each participant to 
respond to the other; the average amount of communication; and the intensity of personal 
communication. There seems to have been only one level of conversation between this CS 
and his FF. Another possible influencing factor is the response of the FF which may or may 
not have addressed the issues raised by the CS. The ability of the FF to connect with a CS and 
vice versa are important factors to be taken into account. These are issues which need to be 
probed in the detailed analysis.
Case 2 -  Interaction between CS Eagle and FF Almond
General Observations: As in Case 1, both CS Eagle and FF Almond are male. The significant 
number of Scrolls completed (11) naturally yielded more conversations to be analysed. Eagle,
Case 1 -  Interaction between CS Dove and FF Acacia
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the CS, is actively involved in the Jesus Youth movement. He showed great enthusiasm and 
expectations during the interactivity of the Cybersouls project. Almond, being the co­
ordinator of Jesus Youth in Ireland, was selected by the project co-ordinator to become a FF, 
having been recommended also by the International co-ordinator of Jesus Youth. As a Jesus 
Youth co-ordinator, he has undergone leadership training to accompany young people.
Communication using Scrolls: A total of 11 Scrolls was completed between the CS and his 
FF in this case -  three on ‘Introduction1; four on ‘Suffering’ and another four on 
‘Happiness’. This resulted in 59 conversations being shared between them -  31 by CS Eagle 
and 28 by FF Almond. The higher number of conversations initiated between the two 
indicates that deeper communication occurred in this case. The minimum time taken by the 
CS to respond to a scroll or conversation was 1 day while the maximum time was 22 days. In 
the case of his FF Almond, the time taken ranged between 1 day and 10 days. The average 
number of words in an Eagle (CS) conversation was 141, while FF Almond had only 
81 words on average.
Comments'. This case indicates that it is the CS rather than FF who provided the greater input 
in terms of the amount and content of communication and depth of contribution during the 
discussions. While the CS typed in and shared 4,371 words, only 2,268 words, i.e., just over 
half of that, was shared by this FF in the course of the 59 conversations initiated between the 
two. At the same time, FF Almond seems to have been very regular in communicating and 
responding to Eagle, his CS. He was encouraging and showed his appreciation of the 
conversations initiated by his CS. They responded to each other three times in succession. 
This level of interaction also shows an increase in the depth of interaction between the two in 
comparison with that which occurred in Case 1. The common element in this case, which
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seemed to assist the interaction, was that both are participants in Jesus Youth. Therefore, their 
shared cultural background seems to have led to a positive outcome.
Case 3 - Interaction between CS Falcon and FF Cedar
General Observations: The interaction between Falcon, a female CS and Cedar, a male FF, is 
considered in this case. While CS Falcon had been introduced to Jesus Youth, she did not 
continue her participation. Likewise, her engagement in the parish as an altar server and in a 
parish youth group did not endure. In her initial interactions, she commented on her 
unfamiliarity with the Cybersouls website with her FF, Cedar. He is an active member of 
Jesus Youth and was recommended as a FF by a co-ordinator of this movement. It is worth 
noting that the contribution of a FF can be thought provoking and intense. This FF seemed to 
have a really interesting way of developing a conversation and continuing it.
Communication using Scrolls: Five Scrolls were completed by both of these participants 
within the stipulated time. Four of the Scrolls were from the ‘Introduction’ while the fifth 
dealt with ‘Suffering’. While working through these five Scrolls, 35 conversations developed 
between the two. This indicates that a commendable level of discussion took place in relation 
to a scroll, with enough time given to developing the discussions. The maximum time taken 
by the CS to respond was 7 days, while the maximum time taken by her FF to respond was 9 
days. The average number of words in the conversations of CS Falcon was 110 and that of 
her FF Cedar 120 words. All these figures point to a good level of compatibility between the 
two.
Comments: Hie total of words shared amounted to 2,090 for the CS and 1,920 in the case of 
the FF. As there were 7 conversations, on average, attached to a scroll, this is indicative also
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of the depth of discussion which occurred. A detailed reading of the conversations also 
confirms the quality of discussions. The language, structure and the process control of the 
website www.cybersouls.ie seem to have facilitated the development of conversations. It is 
noted that conversations between the CS and her FF reached a maximum of five levels in 
succession at one point of interaction. This indicates that a promising and deep level of 
communication and discussion occurred in this case. (In order to provide an example of the 
detailed exchanges between a FF and a CS, an account of interactions in Case 3 is provided in 
Appendix I.)
Case 4 -  Conversation between CS Hawk and FF Cypress
General Observations: Hawk is the CS and Cypress is the FF in this duo. Both of these 
participants are male. CS Hawk is active in Jesus Youth. The level of enthusiasm in his 
conversations seemed rather low. Cypress, his FF, had studied theology and is a graduate in 
Computer Science. He is active in parish activities and the parish priest recommended him to 
become a FF.
Communication using Scrolls: In this case the CS and his FF completed 11 Scrolls between 
them. Four ‘Introduction’ and four ‘Suffering’ Scrolls were finished, together with three 
Scrolls on ‘Happiness’. A total of 35 conversations took place relating to the 11 Scrolls 
shared between them, giving an average of three conversations attached to each scroll. This is 
lower per scroll when compared with Case 3. Yet, for the 11 Scrolls, with one exception, all 
were completed and finalised within a maximum of 4 days by both the CS and his FF. 
However, the average word count was on the low side -  54 for the CS and only 34 for the FF.
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Comments: During his 16 conversations attached to the 11 Scrolls, the CS in this case used 
only 864 words. As his FF only used 646 words in 19 conversations, these figures suggest a 
lower level of activity on the part of this particular FF both in enhancing the interaction or 
contributing to it. Also in comparison with Case 2, where 11 Scrolls had also been completed, 
the communication seemed to be limited. At the same time by reading the texts in the 11 
Scrolls, responding to interactive questions and watching the videos displayed etc., both of 
these participants have spent time and energy while engaging in their exchanges. This makes 
the case interesting.
Case 5 - Interaction between CS Heron and FF Fig
General Observations: A female CS Heron and a male FF, Fig were the participants in this 
case. She is active in her parish and appeared to be enthusiastic about this project. Fig is a 
computer graduate who showed interest in the study. The co-ordinator recruited him to 
become a FF on the recommendation of a parish priest.
Communication using Scrolls: The FF initially sent the first scroll of introduction and 
subsequently together they completed a total of 11 Scrolls. Two ‘Introduction’ Scrolls and 
two on ‘Suffering’ were sent by the FF and were duly completed by the CS. These were 
followed by a further four Scrolls on ‘Happiness’ and another three on ‘Faith’ were 
completed by the CS within the stipulated time. A total of 70 conversations developed 
between them - 36 from the CS and 34 from her FF. The maximum time taken by the CS to 
reply to her FF was 14 days while the FF took a maximum of seven days to respond. 
However, the time taken to reply varied from 1 to 9 days in the case of the CS and from 1 to 
5 days for her FF. The conversations of the CS had an average of 186 words while those of 
the FF averaged 78 words.
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Comments: These are some interesting features in the communication between CS Heron and 
FF Fig. First of all, the increase in the level of communication between the two is noted. 
Secondly, as the exchanges reached four in succession at one point, this is indicative of an 
intense level of communication. Thirdly, the regularity and dedication shown by both of these 
participants in communicating are commendable. Fourthly, the variation in the contributions 
made by both of them, especially the CS, makes this case rich in data. Even if the total
number of words shared by her FF (2,652) is far lower than that of the CS (6,692), the
number of conversations (CS -  36 and FF - 34) seems to be close. It can mean that this FF 
has tried to address each CS conversation, even if in fewer words. It can also be concluded 
that, in this case, the CS contributed more to driving the conversation forward.
Case 6 - Interaction between CS Ostrich and FF Oak
General Observations: Two females - CS Ostrich and FF Oak are represented in this case. 
This CS came in contact with Jesus Youth and was introduced to the website at one of its 
prayer meetings. Oak was the FF assigned to accompany Ostrich. Having made a year’s 
commitment as a leader in Jesus Youth, she worked as a missionary.
Communication using Scrolls: A review of the interaction of CS Ostrich and FF Oak within 
the stipulated time frame showed that seven Scrolls had been completed -  one ‘Introductory’ 
scroll, four on ‘Suffering’ and another 2 on ‘Happiness’. This resulted in a total of 32 
conversations. The maximum time taken by CS Ostrich to respond was 7 days while her FF 
Oak took a maximum of 22 days to reply. The longer time taken by her FF to respond to her 
Ostrich may have affected the process of accompaniment. Also this may have impacted on
the average number of words in a conversation which stood at 60 for the FF and only 45 for 
the CS in this case.
General Comments: The average of over four conversations per scroll suggests a 
comparatively good rate of interaction. At the same time, as the highest number of successive 
conversations was only two, this may be indicative of a lack of depth and a lack of creativity 
and dynamism on the part of both participants. Yet, an initial enthusiasm and development of 
friendship could be detected in the textual interactions. While the newness of the concept 
may have been an issue, it is not clear why the FF here took so long to respond to her CS.
Case 7 -  Interaction between CS Swallow and FF Sycamore
Gênerai Observations: This describes the interaction between CS Swallow and his FF 
Sycamore. The Cybersoul, Swallow, was very enthusiastic about the Cybersouls portal and 
FF Sycamore was assigned to accompany him on his journey of faith. She is very active in 
Pure in Heart and was recommended as a FF by a parish curate. Her enthusiasm was evident 
in her communication with her CS. (This FF also accompanied another CS in Case 13.)
Communication using Scrolls: Six scrolls were completed between Swallow and his FF 
Sycamore - one each on ‘Introduction’, ‘Faith’ and ‘Sacraments’ and the other three on 
‘Happiness’. Within these six Scrolls, they completed 69 conversations between them, 31 
being initiated by the CS and 38 by his FF. It is also interesting to note that both the CS and 
his FF responded considerably regularly and frequently to the other person’s communication. 
FF Sycamore responded the same day to her CS’s conversations which took an average of 3 
days for a reply. The average number of words in the cybersoul’s conversation was 44 while 
that of his FF was 110.
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Comments'. FF Sycamore seemed to have had the upper hand both in terms of the number of 
conversations (38:31) and the pace of response. However, as the level of communications 
reached a maximum of six in their conversations, this indicates that they achieved 
considerable depth in their interaction.
Case 8 -  Interaction between CS Owl and FF Olive
General observations: These were two female participants in Case 7, the CS Owl and her FF 
Olive, Here again, they both are female participants. As they completed 24 Scrolls, they 
exceeded the completion score in all the other cases. CS Owl's interactions indicate that she 
enjoyed the accompaniment of her FF online. Olive, an active leader in Jesus Youth who had 
undertaken its leadership training programme, was recommended by a co-ordinator of Jesus 
Youth as aFF.
Communication using Scrolls: As reported above, the CS and her FF in this case completed 
24 Scrolls together. These included four Scrolls each on ‘Introduction’, ‘Suffering’, 
‘Happiness’, ‘Faith’, ‘Prayer’ and ‘Sacraments’ which were covered over 79 conversations. It 
is interesting to record that the maximum time taken for a scroll to be completed was less 
than one week. The average number of words in the conversations of CS Owl is only 35 
while the corresponding average of her FF is 57.
Comments: When compared with some of the previous cases, the average number of words in 
the conversations is less. Likewise, the total number of words exchanged between this CS and 
her FF is comparatively smaller. Therefore it is to be assumed that, in this particular 
interaction, it was not the volume of interaction but rather the frequency of response and
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regularity of conversations that were significant in driving communication. In a conversation 
the CS, Owl, said that, each evening, she eagerly awaited the response of her FF.
Case 9 -  Interaction between CS Peacock and FF Olive
General Observations: Olive, the same FF, as in Case 7, also accompanied another female 
CS, Peacock in Case 8. Here again, the completion of Scrolls reached a high score (21). The 
CS, Peacock is an active member of Jesus Youth. As mentioned in the previous case, a co­
ordinator of Jesus Youth recommended Olive as a FF.
Communication using Scrolls: A total of 21 Scrolls was completed in this case. Four Scrolls 
each were completed for the first five themes: ‘Introduction’, ‘Suffering’, ‘Happiness’, 
‘Faith’, and ‘Prayer’. Finally, one scroll on ‘Sacraments’ was finished. This work involved 
78 conversations between the CS and her FF, 38 from CS Peacock and 40 from her FF Olive. 
The maximum time taken for CS Peacock to respond to her FF was 12 days. As in the 
previous case with the same FF, the response time was short, the maximum time taken being 
four days. The average number of words used by the CS was 45 while her FF used 33.
Comments: In this case and the previous one (Case 7), where Olive acted as a FF, both CS 
were completely new to her. The common factor which may have helped the interaction was 
that all three participants are female. Other than that, this case included totally different 
features which could have occurred due to cultural differences. Even though the total number 
of words shared by the FF in the two cases varied considerably (Case 7 -  CS: 1,080, FF: 
2,539 words; Case 8 -  CS: 1,733, FF: 1,324 words), two features are common to both of 
these interactions - regularity of contact by the FF and the frequency in sending a scroll.
While the responses of both CSs also showed considerable variation, both of them seem to 
have taken part in the project with enthusiasm.
Case 10 -  Interaction between CS Pigeon and FF Palm
General Observations: Pigeon, a CS, was accompanied by Palm, the assigned FF, in this 
case. Both are male participants. CS Pigeon is active in the Jesus Youth movement. His 
initial conversations in the introductory Scrolls revealed his enthusiasm and eagerness in 
relation to the project. FF Palm, as a Jesus Youth leader, had received training in youth 
leadership. The co-ordinator of Jesus Youth in Ireland recommended him as a FF.
Communication using Scrolls: This duo completed 23 Scrolls, the second highest level 
among the cases selected for analysis. Four Scrolls each were completed on the first five 
themes: ‘Introduction’, ‘Suffering’, ‘Happiness’, ‘Faith’, and ‘Prayer’, in addition to three 
Scrolls on ‘Sacraments’. CS Pigeon read the Scrolls and responded to the interactive 
questions carefully. Exchanges between this CS and his FF took place over 114 conversations 
-  50 by CS Pigeon and 64 by his FF Palm. While the maximum time taken by the CS to 
respond was 14 days, he took more than a week to do so on only three occasions. Otherwise 
there was evidence of continuity, dedication and regularity in responding to a scroll sent by 
his FF. The maximum response time of FF Palm was only four days. This suggests that this 
FF kept up the momentum in responding to his CS. The average number of words in the 
conversations of CS Pigeon was 120 while that of his FF was 75.
Case 11 -  Interactions between CS Raven and FF Pine
General Observations: CS Raven interacted with FF Pine in this case. Raven is female and 
Pine is male. As mentioned in the section on selection and reduction of data, the CSs in cases
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10, 11 and 12, while continuing their interaction on the website, did not respond to the survey 
questions. CS Raven, is an active member of Youth 2000. At the introductory stage she 
expressed eagerness about the project, coupled with some apprehension. Pine, the FF 
accompanying her, as a Jesus Youth leader, was recommended by a co-ordinator of this youth 
movement.
Communication using Scrolls: Four ‘Introduction’ Scrolls and one on ‘Suffering’ constituted 
the total of five Scrolls completed between CS Raven and FF Pine over the course of 28 
conversations. The response time between these two participants was short, the maximum 
time taken by the CS to respond to her FF being just two days, with her FF replying in the 
same time period. (This is very close to a ‘live chat’.) The conversations of the CS averaged 
61 words while her FF used 94.
Comments: The interaction between CS Raven and her FF Pine seems to have taken place 
within short intervals which may have been an important driving force in their 
communication. Also, reflecting on the volume of communication initiated by her FF to that 
of the CS, there seems to be a danger that the CS may have been somewhat intimidated. As 
the maximum level of communication was only two, this may be indicative also of a lack of 
depth in the conversation.
Case 12 -  Interactions between CS Seagull and FF Poplar
General Observations: Both participants in this case are female - CS Seagull and her FF 
Poplar. Seagull’s initial enthusiasm for the project was moderate. As a Jesus Youth leader, FF 
Poplar had undertaken its leadership training programme.
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Communication using Scrolls: Similar to Case 10, five Scrolls were completed this time, over 
24 conversations between CS Seagull and her FF Poplar - four in ‘Introduction’ and one in 
‘Suffering’. It seems that CS Seagull took more time to respond to her FF. The maximum 
time she took to reply was 24 days while her FF responded in 7 days. The average number of 
words communicated by the CS in a conversation was 36, with a corresponding average of 55 
from her FF.
Comment: In this case there seems to be an imbalance between the number of words 
communicated by the FF when compared to that of her CS. It is observed however that their 
interactions, even if brief, were substantial. They seemed to encompass reading, reflection 
and serious learning. CS Seagull communicated 549 words and received 770 words from her 
FF. These contributions need to be analysed in more depth in order to identify the 
undercurrents in their interaction.
Casel3 -  Interaction between CS Stork and FF Sycamore
General Observations: The interaction in this case is between CS Stork and her FF Sycamore 
who also accompanied another CS in Case 7. Stork, the CS under consideration, has 
participated in Youth 2000 and the youth movement Pure in Heart. She showed great 
enthusiasm and appreciation for the project. FF Sycamore was assigned to accompany Stork 
on her journey of faith. She is very active in Pure in Heart and as mentioned in Case 7, was 
recommended as a FF by a parish curate. Her enthusiasm was evident in her communication 
with her CS.
Communication using Scrolls: Four Scrolls were sent by FF Sycamore to her CS Stork - One 
on ‘Introduction’ and the other three on ‘Suffering’. It is remarkable that, within just four
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Scrolls, they completed 86 conversations between them, initiating 46 each. It is also 
interesting to note that three Scrolls, involving around 80 conversations, were completed 
within a record time of three days. The average number of words in the CS’s conversation 
was 60 while that of her FF was 80.
Comments: To have developed around 80 conversations within three days, as happened in 
this case, is very significant. Some elements relating to their cultural affinity may become 
apparent in this case.
Case 13 completes the consideration of the individual cases selected for more detailed 
analysis. All the above mentioned conversations were subject to close scrutiny, using NVivo. 
A composite analysis of the findings is presented in the next section.
6.5 Consolidation of Case Studies
General Comments: A total of 24 participants was involved in the 13 cases under review 13 
CSs and 11 FFs, two FFs covering two cases each. Regarding the gender balance, there are 
five male Cybersouls and seven male FFs, whereas there are eight female CSs and four 
female FFs. This indicates that the male/female ratio is almost inversely proportional between 
CSs and FFs, with males predominating on the FF side and females on the CS side.
Usage of Scrolls and Conversations: A total of 136 Scrolls was completed over the 13 case 
studies (see Table 5.6). However, the completion rate for individual CSs varied considerably, 
ranging from three to 24. More than ten Scrolls were completed in six cases, while the 
completion rate of the remaining six varied from three to seven. The participating CSs and 
their FFs shared 718 conversations between them, giving an average of 55 per case and
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almost five conversations per scroll. In total, 339 conversations were initiated by CSs while .t
379 were initiated by FFs.
The cumulative word count in the 13 cases amounted to 57, 499. This will be considered in 
more detail in the next chapter. A wide spread was observed in the number of words shared, 
the highest number being 10,754 and the lowest only 961. More than 5,000 words were 
exchanged between a CS and a FF in five cases; another four cases shared between 5,000 and
2,000 words while just over 1000 words were shared in three cases. The exchange of words 
was just below 1000 in the remaining one case.
Comparing the number of words shared between CSs and their FFs in individual cases, four 
shared a balanced number of words between them. In five other cases the FFs shared 
considerably more words. The number of words shared by a CS exceeded those of a FF in 
only three cases. The count of the succession of conversations at any one point gives an 
indication of the level of conversation between a CS and a FF. Considering this variable, it 
can be concluded that deep levels of communication were evident in most of the cases. Only 
three cases had less than three levels of conversation, while the remaining ten cases had three 
or more levels, the maximum level reaching seven. In some cases, while the time taken to 
respond to the other participant seemed long, the conversations seem to have deepened in 
quality. In contrast, in other cases, when more time was taken, there seemed to be less depth 
in communication.
Factors Influencing Interaction: Some of the factors driving the conversation can be 
identified in this descriptive study. The virtual presence of another person may be the primary 
catalyst for this online journey. Prompt and immediate response by participants, addressing
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each question or conversation shared by the other party, acknowledgement, appreciation, 
clarification and contributing to the learning space may all be factors which impact positively 
on the conversation in the CSs’ faith development journey. Additional factors, such as 
creative and dynamic interaction, using multimedia, also seem to have contributed to the 
journey of participants in the Cybersouls portal. The contribution of the Scrolls to the 
progress of journey is another aspect which needs to be evaluated. The influence of the 
newness of concept, the terminologies used in the website, its layout and user friendliness all 
need to be taken into account in further analysis. Overall, there is a rich data set to be studied 
in more depth which is expected to produce more significant insights into the nature of online 
faith development through accompaniment. This task is undertaken in the next chapter (7).
6.6 Conclusion
The chapter commenced with a presentation of the findings relating to the questionnaire. The 
analysis revealed an overall positive attitude in the responses of participants to the 
Cyber souls website. The strategies in using NVivo as a tool for analysing the findings related 
to the 13 Case Studies were then explained. Next, the findings in respect of each of the 13 
case studies were presented followed by a consolidation of the results. The more detailed 
analysis of these case studies, is considered in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 7
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SELECTED CASES
A detailed analysis of the data relating to the 13 selected cases is the main content of this 
chapter. Various methods and techniques used while conducting this analysis are set out in 
the opening section. The next section features the dynamics of online interaction in the 
project. Following on from this, the characteristics of virtual communication are examined. 
Finally, the concept of cyberspace as a space for evangelisation is examined.
7.1 Methods of Analysis
Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2007) uphold the need to utilise more than one type of analysis, to 
increase its validity. This section sets out the methods which informed the researcher in 
undertaking the analysis of the data. Primarily, a qualitative approach was adopted in 
addressing this task.
One of the established and basic qualitative methods, Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 
1967), was the basic method applied. Grounded theorists suggest a careful, line-by-line 
reading of the text while looking for processes, actions, assumptions, and consequences 
(Ryan and Bernard, 2003). Constant comparison is a basic activity of this method (Charmaz, 
2006). In this study manifest-content-analysis was adopted in quantifying various elements 
involved in the communication between CSs and FFs. The interplay of manifest and latent 
content analysis was applied as the need arose (Berg, 2007; Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2007).
Fundamentally, the data under consideration here comprised sets of conversations between 
two individuals -  a CS and a FF. Hence, various guidelines of Conversation Analysis (CA) 
and Discourse Analysis (DA) (Silverman, 2001) are also included. According to Silverman, 
CA involves “people’s methods for producing orderly social interaction in sequential order” 
(level of conversation), while DA “studies a discourse as texts and talk in social practices in 
rhetorical and argumentative organization” (p. 189). CA and DA were applied to the data 
embedded in the Scrolls provided on the website. The initial findings from the data were 
presented already in chapter 6.
Web-based in-depth interviews are mentioned by Berg (2007, p. 125) as a way of taking 
advantage of the technology available for research. Cybersouls can be categorized under 
asynchronous environments. The communication in the Cyber souls project is unique as it 
took place between a CS and a FF in a closed environment of Cyberspace in an asynchronous 
manner. It is not the same as e-mail, message boards or private bulletin posts referred to by 
Berg. Having had faith development as its purpose, it tried to initiate discussions based on 
faith material presented in Scrolls.
Key Word in Context (KWIC) is prescribed by Onwuegbuzie (2007) as an important method 
to assist qualitative inquiry. The application of this method assisted the researcher in 
extracting latent trends buried in the data while comparing codes relating to variables.
Theory Based Research
According to Yin (2003, p. 28) “for case studies, theory development as part of the design 
phase is essential whether the ensuing case study’s purpose is to develop or test theory.” This 
“theory-before-research” approach (Berg 2007, p.319) is adopted in this study. The theory
211
covered in the first three chapters assisted the research design and helped the researcher to 
identify the research questions. Possible theoretical landscapes for the study were discussed 
initially and this also informed the development of the research project. Berg adds that 
theory-before-research can support generalisations arising from the study. The model adopted 
in this study, as described in Fig 7.1 below, is an adaptation of the version given by Berg 
(p.321):
Fig 7.1 Research Model Adopted in this Study
Research 
Idea
=E
Design
F
Data
Processing
Analysis
= = F
/
• Consider • Literature
/
f • Data collection • Strategies for
the issue review • Data compilation analysis
of online • Research • Data selection / • Interpretation of
evangelis questions ^  ■4- .reduction the data
ation of • Determine ^  ^ • Consider*"“- — — J , • Address
youth for single or multiple .^ 4  * mResearch ------------- ► research questions
study cases Questions • Review of
• Specifications • Organize and findings
• Methods code data ! • Offer
1 /
• Describe cases explanations of the
• Begin problem or topic in
I comparisons the research idea
• Propositions and
suggestions
Hence, case study being the methodology used as the encompassing method, this research has 
the characteristics mentioned in Fig 7.1 even if other methods of analysis were applied also 
during the data collection and analysis.
Application o f the Methods in This Study
To initiate the detailed analysis of the 13 selected cases, the conversations of CSs and FFs 
were separated. A general open invivo-coding (Charmaz, 2006) in NVivo gave rise to more
212
reading, reflecting and constant comparing of the data. Significant words, phrases, sentences, 
meanings, emotions, undercurrents and anything else the researcher found significant in 
relation to the research were coded as case nodes in NVivo. These relevant codes constituted 
the foundational elements of emergent theory in a crude form. Pertinent memos connected to 
snippets of codes were entered as the coding progressed. These coded segments of the data 
were labelled appropriately and made available for further and closer observation. Grounded 
theory and content analysis were applied to this ongoing process.
Those codes were re-read, rearranged and classified as the patterns buried in the data began to 
emerge. Axial coding (Adams et al, 2008) was adopted here to sort the codes according to the 
central ideas prevalent in the data. The case nodes in NVivo were converted to tree nodes. to 
bring the related codes under emergent sub-categories and central themes. (A screen shot of 
the coding of themes using tree nodes is provided in Appendix G.) It was seen that some 
trends were common to both CSs and FFs. Then key words in the codes were identified in 
their context (KWIC). Conversations were looked at together in their order (CA) and 
meaning (DA) as they occurred between a CS and a FF in each case. As a result of analysing 
the data, three main themes emerged. These are: the Dynamics of Online Interaction; the 
Characteristics of Virtual Communication and Evangelisation in Cyberspace. As the 
dynamics of online interactions primed interactivity between FFs and their CSs, they are first 
for consideration. The thirteen cases under review have been listed in Table 5.6 in chapter 5.
The allocated pseudonyms given (Table 6.1, chapter 6) to the CSs and FFs are re-used here in 
reporting on the analysis in this chapter.
than 250 codes each from the conversations of these participant types. This included careful *
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The interactive and dynamic tools embedded in the Cybersouls portal and deeply connected 
to youth culture differentiate this journey from other approaches to evangelisation. Scrolls, 
used to carry the message of the Good News, are made up of texts, pictures and videos, 
providing a foundation for communication between CSs and their FFs. While the number of 
words in individual Scrolls varied from 111 to 600, all Scrolls incorporated both texts and 
pictures. They integrated a facility to comment, using either comment boxes or conversation 
snippets. Some were built with interactive modules such as radio buttons, ‘match the 
following’ and ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions, while others used videos to convey a message. 
Meditative videos created and launched in Youtube were included to suit a particular theme 
in the Cybersouls project. In addition, videos from Youtube uploaded by others, which the 
co-ordinator found relevant to a specific theme, were included in a scroll. Cumulatively, -the 
material on these Scrolls contributed to the dynamism of the communication in Cybersouls.
Dynamic Components
As can be seen in Table 7.1 below, the Scrolls contained a wide range of tools. A more 
detailed distribution of these components, by scroll, is given in Appendix H.
7.2 The Dynamics of Online Interaction
Table 7.1 Summary of Tools Used in Scrolls
D ynam ic
tools
T ext P icture Video
Com m ent
box
Yes
/no
M atch the 
follow ing
Choose 
from  the 
list
N um ber o f
C onversation
snippets
Total 24 24 6 24 5 2 2 42
As can be seen in Table 7.1, six Scrolls incorporated at least one Youtube video. All Scrolls 
had ‘Comment boxes’ in order to evoke a response from the CS. Five Scrolls contained
‘yes/no* questions while another two Scrolls each had ‘match the following’ and ‘choose 
from the list’ options. All Scrolls had been provided with at least one (maximum three) 
‘conversation snippets’ which, if used, could increase the interactivity of the communication. 
The above compilation and use of catechetical material, using multimedia, is one advantage 
of the medium of the Internet in conversing with young people. This was expected to increase 
the connectivity with young people who now live in an image centred-world in Cyberspace 
(Beaudoin, 1998). Also, the use of these dynamic tools constructed a space in Cybersouls 
where dialogue and interactivity thrived. A subsequent analysis of the conversations revealed 
that all these tools had been used by participants in their communications. So it can be 
concluded that the development of a dynamic and interactive catechesis using multimedia 
(Castells, 2000) had engaged constructively with young people (John Paul II, 1979). Some of 
the conversations selected for analysis revealed explicit appreciation of these interactive 
approaches, as can be seen below.
Scrolls
As explained earlier, Scrolls contained the main catechetical material which carried the 
message of the Good News. All discussions which evolved in this portal were as a result of 
sharingScrolls. The analysis of the conversations revealed that the terminology of ‘scroll’ 
also conveyed an important message. A query in NVivo to search for the word ‘scroll' and its 
variants identified 20 instances of its use by participants in different forms which were 
embedded in their conversations. The first was a general mention of Scrolls, showing their 
acceptance and familiarity with using the terminology, e.g., “I find it enriching to be able to 
go online and have this great website and read the Scrolls assigned and be able to share the 
faith openly” (Sycamore, Case 7 Conversations, Scroll 1). This clearly demonstrated an 
appreciation of Scrolls. Another one refers to the word ‘scroll* with fondness “This makes
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me more happy; that is why I wrote it in the above scroll. . . what you think?” (Pigeon, Case 
7, Scroll 10). The participants have used the verb 1scroll’ also to communicate: “I thought I 
scrolled u back on the previous ones. So waited for ur [sic] reply . . (Pigeon, Case 7, Scroll 
19). His FF seemed to have used it in the same way, as a verb, “No need to worry. Whenever 
you have time scroll me back” (Palm, Case 7, Scroll 21). The above examples show the 
participants’ acceptance of the term and how they became comfortable with its usage. The 
culture of young people seems to favour terminologies like this online as a catch phrase. 
Similar usage in other online networking are: ‘writing on the wall’ (Facebook), ‘scrapping’ 
(Orkut), ‘tweeting’ (Twitter) etc. These types of terminologies seem to give the inhabitants of 
these online communities a unique ‘clan’ outlook. Therefore the usage of these kinds of 
‘clannish’ terminologies can increase the connectivity to young people (Dulles, 2006). 
Instances of participants utilising and appreciating other dynamic tools now follow.
Images
Discussions seem to have progressed around the pictures used in Scrolls. A FF said that “The 
blind woman who is making her journey with the walking stick is an apt picture on what is 
faith” (FF Palm, Case 10, Scroll 13). This refers to a picture of a blind woman with a white 
cane, used to depict the enlightenment of faith. The FF captured the meaning clearly and the 
CS also continued the discussion along the same lines, showing how the images could 
influence the discussions online. On another occasion a CS connected an image of a pupa 
turning into a butterfly with the topic of prayer:
As the pupa turns into butterfly, prayer transforms our life from each & every 
bondage, sin or problem into a child of God's freedom. The more we pray the 
more we can experience the freedom & love of God. Prayer is the shortest 
distance between us and a problem. (CS Peacock, Case 9, Scroll 18)
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These instances confirm that direct use has been made of the images for discussion, 
endorsing the claim that the use of multimedia ‘talks’ to the mind of youth online, as 
proposed in chapter 3.
Conversation Snippets
The fact that all participants made use of the conversation snippets was evident from the high 
number of conversations reciprocated and deepened. Conversation snippets, which could be 
initiated dynamically between two participants, were the main component that made this 
space one of dialogue and interactivity. This is clarified in later discussions. The dynamic 
interactive space of communication between a CS and a FF was constructed in a versatile 
manner with these conversation snippets.
Youtube videos
There were two kinds of videos used in the construction of Scrolls, as mentioned above, 
video meditations made specifically for the project and those posted from youtube. Both of 
them seem to have worked well with the participants. Six Scrolls were embedded with 
videos. The open coding in NVivo produced 20 instances of participants commenting about 
these videos. Some examples now follow. The first comment refers to a video meditation 
which was prepared as the fourth scroll on the theme of happiness. This meditation was part 
of a reflection on happiness called Be joyful cos God loves you.
As i went through the video the thing that struck me initially was the distance . . .
I have heard the story about the walk to Emmaus many times and read the bible 
passage also but till this day failed to take note about the distance which they 
travelled . . (CS Eagle, Case 2, Scroll 12)
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This CS seems to have listened carefully to the meditation. The constructive reflection on this 
video contains 291 words in the original version, abbreviated to 47 quoted above. The 
reflection continued and there were two more levels of conversation (clarified later) between 
the CS and his FF where the discussion became more profound. The capacity of multimedia 
to proclaim the Gospel creatively on the Internet is visible in this example.
Another comment about a video meditation prepared specifically for the Cybersouls project 
probably confirms one of the important assumptions on which this study was initiated, i.e., 
how the so called ‘nonrear online communication can mediate the immediacy of the power 
of the word of God. This video meditation was part of the fourth scroll on suffering and was 
about embracing healthy change. CS Eagle’s reflection on this meditation suggests that the 
content is applicable to every Christian: “The cycle of falling dying and rising is of great 
importance to every Christian. I would say that falling is a thing that happens every now and 
then to human beings” (CS Eagle, Case 2, Scroll 4). However, the comment below clearly 
articulates Peacock’s experience in the Cybersouls website.
Our words and music carries great power. It has the power of life and death. The 
music, voice and words of this meditation have an inner healing & life giving 
effect. Problems & sufferings even death can be solved with Jesus. The message 
of Holy Eucharist which is our bread of life is absolutely true. May God bless us 
all! (Peacock, Case 9, Scroll 4)
Peacock and her FF completed a total of 21 Scrolls involving 78 conversations. Such a 
comment from this active CS endorses the fact that careful preparation of videos which can 
contribute to the story line in a scroll can be effective in carrying the message of the Good
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News. These kinds of creative uses of the media can mediate the immediacy (Granfield, 
1991) of the Good News in cyberspace.
As referred to earlier, other videos from youtube posted to contribute to the story line in a 
scroll were utilised and appreciated by the participants. Some conversations confirm this, 
e.g.:
I think a Lot of people will relate to this video. I find myself often using these 
exact excuses to avoid sharing my faith. I sometimes feel I dont know enough and 
the fact that I am young I feel people might not listen to me but when I really 
consider it, these are just excuses. (CS Owl, Case 8, Scroll 16)
The Internet, which young people are bom into, was easily conquered by them and this is 
explicit in their additional postings of videos mainly from youtube and other links through 
which they tried to convey some message in their reflective spaces.
The data on conversations conveyed an important message in this section: the dynamic and 
interactive space created in the Cybersouls website was a space which could constructively 
influence the minds of young people through the careful use of some of the tools which were 
specific to communication on the Internet, as identified earlier in the literature review.
7.3 Characteristics of Virtual Communication
Various elements relating to the participation of CSs and FFs in this project and quantitative 
measures of their interactions were set out in chapter 6. Regarding the selected cases, their 
conversations are considered now, in more depth, in the light of the theory developed in the 
previous chapters.
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Conversations were initiated by a FF after introducing a scroll to a CS. An example of an 
introductory conversation now follows:
Dear Owl, Welcome to this great venture. I am Palm, living and working in 
Dublin. I really appreciate your interest in deepening your faith. May the Holy 
Spirit lead us to the ultimate source of all wisdom, knowledge and love. Let's start 
our online faith journey here. (FF Palm, Case 8, Scroll 1)
The above conversation preceded the contents of a scroll and other conversations were 
reciprocated between a FF and a CS as the CS read and responded to the contents of a scroll. 
The following is an example of this kind of conversation between a CS and a FT. Notice the 
flow of communication between the two participants taken from Case 3.
(Content of Scroll): May this journey begin by lighting the candle of faith. Post a 
similar prayer here.
Falcon: Let this journey show us the true meaning of being devoted to Christ.
Cedar: Thats wonderful. Sometimes before starting a journey it is always good to 
know where you are and where are we going. Don't you think so? . . . GOD 
Bless you.
Falcon: Hi again! I'm going to try my best to answer your questions honestly. The 
most important thing that motivates me to know more about my faith is the 
security it brings. . . . Hope this message is not too long.
Cedar: Hi, Thanks for your honest answer. Very soon you will find that GOD will 
reveal more of his goodness in your life. . . .  Do you cherish a one to one 
relationship with Jesus?
Falcon: I've always found myself talking in my mind about anything and
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everything. . . . Here's a link to a song that I really like:
http ://www. y outube.com/watch ?v=lD_pCr_Xmc&feature=related
Cedar: The song’s got a good caption. Is it just two of you in the family? . . . Also
I was thinking of taking on the next scroll which is to do with another topic of
"suffering" . . .  let me know and I will pray for you as your friend in faith.
Falcon: I have two brothers and both my parents. . . .  I hope that the Lord 
continues to give us his great blessings and keep us in his hands.
Cedar: Hi again, sorry I took some time to come back. Almost all the people that I 
know talks [sic] about a call of GOD in their life. . . . Do let me know if you need 
more clarification.
Falcon: I think, I'm understanding what you mean. But I cannot come up with an 
answer . . .  I'm not sure if this has to be made into another scroll but if so, feel 
free.
(Case 3, Scroll 1)
An introductory conversation between two participants and the continuation of another set of 
conversations are given above to show how conversations occurred in the virtual reality of 
the Cybersouls project. The conversations considered here are asynchronous. This interactive 
and dialogical communication seems to possess features of a constructivist model of 
communication (Pearson and Nelson, 2000; Granfield, 1994). This communication model 
was presented in chapter 3 as part of the discussion on various models of communication.
A perceived tension between the real and the virtual was identified in the discussions in the 
previous chapters, asking how real the virtual is (Mirzoeff, 1999, Castells, 2000, Rheingold, 
2000). Suppose the communication between the above participants had taken place face-to-
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face. If they wanted to retrieve it the next day, it has to be recalled from their memory. 
Sometimes this can be a tedious task and may be only partly retrieved. In contrast, with 
communication online, a person can go back at any time and find the exact conversation 
there, th is objectivity and tangibility of online communication make it more real in one way. 
In other words, the reality of the virtual is, in a way, more ‘real* than the real itself.
At the same time, it is considered that the geographical distance between persons 
communicating can impoverish an online communication, in comparison with the real 
(McQuail, 2000). However, the data of interactive communication developed on the 
Cyber souls portal spoke eloquently about the depth and reality of online communication. 
NVivo enabled the coding of all similar communications from both CSs and their FFs. These 
were quantified in the previous chapter. An analysis of these codes in relation to the 13 cases 
being considered here revealed the following categories:
a) Fluency of communication - language and words;
b) Emotions and gestures;
c) Development of interactivity, trust and relationship;
d) Conscious reflection -  personal, serious communication.
Let the data speak as each of these four categories is now considered in more detail.
a) Fluency o f  Communication
Ease of communication or fluency is something which may go unnoticed in our daily lives. 
This may happen also in the case of communication online. In general, the communications 
from the 13 case studies seemed to be normal, lively and fluent. The use of colloquial 
language is considered to be a sign of normality in communication (Danesi, 2000) and words
exchanged indicated liveliness and informality. Also, there were expressions of apology, 
gratitude and agreement. Some examples from the conversations between CSs and their FFs 
endorse these points:
Colloquial Language
Their language indicated ease and normality:
Ohh cool, I am back to track now, Am fully .. . (CS Pigeon, Case 10);
Wow! What a beautiful way you have taken suffering in your life!
(IT7 Oak, Case 6);
Addressing Personally
Addressing each other personally, even after the initial communication, showed liveliness as 
well as informality, making a personal impression:
Olive, 1 would like to let you know . . . (CS Owl, Case 8);
Aw great Swallow, I didn't know . . . (FF Sycamore, Case 7);
Expressions of apology
These showed how the communication of the other party was considered important by the 
receiver:
I would like to apologize for not being so active thus far but I will try harder from 
now on. Thank you for sticking with me. (CS Falcon, Case 3)
Hi Dove, Sorry for the delayed response but it has been a bit hectic in work! .. .
(FF Acacia, Case 1)
Similar expressions of gratitude and agreements were also identified in further analysis.
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The above examples show that the language and words used by the participants in the 
communication in the Cybersouls portal were similar to those used in daily life. This 
confirms the notable level of fluency in online communication (Danesi, 2000) making it all 
the more real.
b) Emotions and Gestures
It was seen in chapter 3 that the Internet, when understood as a virtual space, transformed the 
idea of space away from reality to the interior world of the self (Mirzoeff, 1999). The way in 
which people viewed this human interaction online was different. Some people found various 
landscapes in cyberspace in which different human needs could be met. In other words, 
human beings used it for their own purposes. This section clarifies an important dimension of 
human reality, the world of emotions and gestures, captured in the virtual space of the 
Cybersouls portal.
Human communication contains emotions and gestures, making it qualitatively affective and 
hearty. Similar emotions and gestures were identified in the communication between CSs and 
FFs online, making the communication more human (Thurlow et al, 2004) as identified in 
chapter 3. The word of God is to be presented to this human presence. This presence, 
unveiled here, will contribute to more effective evangelisation in the future. Also it confirms 
that online space is not a sterile space. Some of the emotions and gestures captured in the 
interactions given below clarify this stance.
Excitement
The journey started by both CSs and FFs was seen to be explicitly exciting:
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I go between thinking sometimes I am advanced to discovering very often i'm 
begining again, but its a start anyway. Looking forward to deepening my faith in 
this new way. God Bless” (CS Heron, Case 5)
I'm really excited to accompany you on this faith journey! (FF Oak, Case 6)
The expressions of excitement differed in two ways. On the part of CSs, they wondered how 
the journey was going to unfold in this virtual space (given the newness of the venture) and 
expressed eagerness about deepening their faith (a personal journey). FFs showed fervour in 
accompanying them and sharing faith online. The need for deepening their faith journey on 
the part of CSs and the fervour of FFs in accompanying them and sharing faith online can be 
complimentary. This confirms the views that the optimism of youth and the willingness of 
elders to accompany complement each other (Paul VI, 1975a and John Paul II, 1998b). The 
participants were able to express their emotions vividly and it seemed that people had great 
expectation about such a journey online.
Apprehension
There were some expressions of apprehension:
As for what I expect from this endeavor, I hope to learn as much as I can and 
share as well. Sharing with someone I do not know and have never seen but still 
knowing that they only have good intentions for me gives a sense of comfort.
(Falcon, Case 3)
Only three of the 13 Cybersouls expressed concerns about being accompanied by a person 
unknown to them as well as their unfamiliarity with this new concept. It is observed that none 
of the FFs expressed this kind of an emotion. The induction they received may explain this.
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The issue of trust may be an important factor for consideration, at least for some people. How 
to win the confidence of people in allowing themselves to take part in this kind of a personal 
journey may be an important question to be asked.
Appreciation
Instances of mutual appreciation were found in the conversations of both CSs and FFs:
Hey Sycamore! Sorry Im still figuring this out-just saw this beautiful post now!!
Wow. . . praise God for you Sycamore! How encouraging it is to read all of the 
above . . . (CS Stork, Case 13);
. . . very good reflection Eagle, when I think about beatitudes , yes. this is the 
great assurance (FF Almond, Case 2).
The occurrence of words of appreciation shows the beginning of a relationship on which this 
kind of a ministry could be built. Interactivity was beginning to take shape and the responses 
of both participants were crucial in developing it, as can be seen below.
Acknowledgement and confirmation
Continuation of a conversation occurred gradually arising from the acknowledgement and 
confirmation of the other party. Specific instances of these were identified in the 
communication, expressing the desire to continue the conversation and the new journey. The 
apprehension expressed earlier seemed to have given way to further deepening of the 
relationship, as seen below.
I agree with the above statements. Faith saves us from all worries.
(CS Peacock, Case 9)
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What a wonderful thought . . .  You should share these thoughts with someone 
else as well. May be someone else who is going through a similar situation.
(FF Palm, Case 10)
The above examples were not only indicative of the fluency with which a normal 
communication progresses through acknowledgement and confirmation of a previous thought 
but also showed some signs of eagerness on the part of the CS to continue the conversation, 
with the FF providing encouragement. Emotions and gestures play a crucial part in human 
communication and the presence of these in online communication increased its 
wholesomeness and confirmed its fluency (Thurlow et al, 2004). Also, this was the starting 
point of an online professional relationship where interactivity was beginning to take shape.
c) Development o f Relationship, Trust and Interactivity
Cyberspace, as a human space, functions at different levels in its technical viability to make 
an interactive space.
Relational Space
Explicit signs of enjoying the interaction and accompaniment were found in the conversations 
of both participants, as can be seen in the examples cited below:
So its easier to talk about faith when I am talking to people who have faith.
(CS Heron, Case 5)
Ha Ha, you made me laugh so much there!!! You are funny!!! See the Lord 
always always brings Joy to his own. This is wonderful, it is strange how two 
faith friends can be so powerfully inspired without even having met one another, 
isn't it amazing how our Spirtuality [sic] works within us all.
(FF Sycamore, Case 13)
In the above example there are explicit signs of recognising the presence of the other 
companion. It is not just a specific word that makes this clear. The relational aspect is 
inherent in the set of words that constitutes the conversation. Both the CS and FF seemed to 
enjoy the company of the other party, showing that even if people had not met, strong 
relationships could be developed online (McKenna and Bargh, 2004). This ministry was 
expected to develop on relationships, as discussed in the theory in both Chapters 3 and 4.
Developing Trust
Relational interaction may be said to exist when trust developed between participants. This 
was evident in the sharing of personal issues between a CS and a FF:
When I was ten years old I experiencesd [sic] war in my country, it lasted for 4 
years. I experienced hunger, loss, fear at that time I was angry with God and 
questioning him why we have to go through all this sufferings . . .
(CS Ostrich, Case 6)
It is observed that instances of sharing very personal struggles with their FFs showed that 
their CSs trusted them. This trust is a sign of relationship online (Thurlow et al, 2004).
Dialogue and interactivity, built up on online relationships, seemed to develop on this 
dynamic space. There were three dimensions to this interactivity: Communication using 
Scrolls', initiation of conversations and further deepening of communications {Level of 
Conversations). These dimensions cannot be compartmentalised as elements of each may be 
interlinked to one another. They are next for consideration.
Communication Using Scrolls
At the outset, as indicated previously, a FF sent a scroll to a CS. It comprised of texts, 
pictures, videos and interactive tools as detailed earlier. Initial communication originated 
from the construction of a scroll, a FF understanding it and sending it to a CS who was 
notified of the process by e-mail. The interplay of communication between an external agent 
who prepared each scroll and the FF who then ‘owned’ it before sending to the CS made this 
a unique space, as seen in Fig 7.2 below. The externally pointed arrows indicate the increase 
in the number of Scrolls, while the internally pointed arrow shows the flow of 
communication, from the external agent through the FFs to the CS s. The depth of this 
dimension depends on the number of themes covered.
Interactivity
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Fig 7.2 Dimensions of Interactivity between Cybersouls and Faithfriends
Initiation of Conversations
Once the CS received notification of a new scroll, she/he logged in, read the content, 
reflected on it and responded to the questions or suggestions. The initial communication from 
a FF was considered complete only when the CS replied with a textual conversation at the 
specified location in the scroll. This added a second dimension as there was more than one 
opportunity for initiating conversations within a scroll, depending on its versatility. Again, 
regarding conversations an externally pointed arrow indicates the increase in the number of 
conversations, with the inward pointing arrow indicating the dialogical process between the 
duo of a CS and a FF. At times, a particular scroll was concluded with limited conversations 
and the pair proceeded to the next one, covering a great number of Scrolls. In such instances, 
however, the quality of the dialogue might have suffered.
Communication deepened when the FF replied to the previous message and the conversation 
was reciprocated as often as the participants wished at a particular point in the scroll. 
Silverman (2001) identified this process as ‘adjacency pairs’. Once again, the external arrow 
in Fig 1.2 relating to level of conversations indicates the number of times the conversations 
were reciprocated, while the internal arrow shows the reciprocity of the dialogue. The greater 
the number of adjacency pairs, the greater the opportunity for more reflection, dialogue and 
deepening of interiority. All of this took place within the closed space created by the 
interaction of the minds of two participants around one strand of a topic originating from the 
scroll.
Six prescribed themes were covered within the 24 Scrolls. The conversations initiated by a 
CS and a FF, which were their own interpretations on the content of Scrolls, showed their 
capacity to reflect, their engagement with the topic and their interest in accompanying the 
other party. The level of conversations indicated the depth of dialogue and interactivity. »In 
addition, it provided a space for creativity and dynamic contributions. This upholds the 
qualitative dimension of evangelisation as discussed in chapter 2 (Paul VI, 1975b).
Fig 7.3 below captures the virtual reality of the interactive landscape which appeared in the 
Cybersouls portal.
Level of Conversations
Fig 7.3 Interactive Landscape in Cybersouls Portal
»Max Level »Scrolls lonversations
In this figure, the middle line depicts the number of Scrolls completed in each case. The 
maximum level of conversations reached in each case is shown in the bottom line, while the 
top line presents the actual number of conversations completed in each case. A considerable 
amount of information was processed during the completion of the overall total of 136 
Scrolls, with 708 conversations developing between the 13 CSs and their corresponding FFs. 
The adjacency pairs or level of conversations varied from one to seven, indicating deep 
reflection and sharing of ideas by some participants. Only one case did not progress beyond 
level one, while two others reached level two. Another six cases stayed at level 3 and the 
remaining of four cases increased their level of interactivity achieving levels between 4 and 
7. An abbreviated example of this interactive process shows how the levels of conversation 
developed.
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The conversation between FF Sycamore and CS Swallow in Case 7 commenced when the FF 
initiated the discussion with an introduction to the scroll on the topic of Faith. Using the 
content of the scroll, the conversations progressed through various levels.
Level 1 <
Level 2
Level 3
 ^ FF Sycamore: Dear Swallow, I feel faith is everything we have . . .  It 
is what we cling to in tough times and. . . in the good times also . .. 
What is Faith?
(Content of Scroll) .. .
What do you think about the above statements?
CS Swallow: These statements are profound and require a lot of 
consideration. . .
V
r FF Sycamore: Faith is our only way to Heaven and prayer is our faith 
in action . . . Faith gives us tremendous Hope . . .
CS Swallow: I like the way you have structured this and it is very 
reassuring.
v
r
FF Sycamore: That is great to hear. I am so happy you found it 
helpful. I find at times when our faith is tested it is harder but staying 
with Adoration increases the love of God in our daily lives . . .
i
CS Swallow: I agree that the tests open us up spiritually and that the 
Holy Spirit becomes more powerful within us . . . Sometimes this is 
 ^just so hard. I am sorry to hear of your . ..
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Level 4 {
FF Sycamore: Thank you so much Swallow, I have come a long way 
since . . . and have a new life now . . . and I am Blessed with so many 
many Christian friends . . . and of course my faith in God has 
increased so much from this heavy cross and . . .
CS Swallow: I was thinking the same thing recently. If it wasn't for 
( the cross then our faith would not have been deepened.
Level 5
FF Sycamore: I understand this so much as I have been there myself 
with my cross in life. Always remember God is with you . ..
While the conversations relating to this part of the scroll ended here at level 5, at another 
location on the same scroll the discussion between CS Swallow and FF Sycamore proceeded 
to level 6. This is just one example of the rigorous interactive process which took place in the 
dynamic space of the Cybersouls portal. Examples of specific conversations cited in the next 
section show how intense and diverse the reflection which occurred could become.
d) Consciousness Connected
Conscious Reflection: Drawing on de Chardin’s (1960) work, the Internet is viewed as a 
space which connects human consciousness in a way that leads to a collective reflection. This 
is discussed in the literature review (chapter 2) as a firm foundation on which this research 
was built. The dynamic space of connectivity was identified in the above interactive 
landscape. There is evidence of conscious and collective reflection taking place in the 
conversation which now follows.
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I am having some problems, I mean when I try to be holy then some sort of force 
is coming to me and would make do some sin. This is what happening for the past 
couple of years. And this won’t last, Lord will pull me back . . .
(CS Pigeon, Case 10)
This CS mentioned that 'over the past couple of years' he became aware of a particular 
experience. He reflected on his own action and, using the scroll sent by his FF, was trying to 
communicate with him. He noticed a pattern about his life which he could reflect on, 
comprehend and articulate.
A slight difference is discernible in a longer reflection, abbreviated below.
Another thing that came to my mind is about the change of dependancy [sic] as 
we grow up . . . Initially as kids its basically security . . . and they depend on their 
parents for that . . . and as time passes it becomes dependancy [sic] on friends 
who are our peers for friendship and support . . . At a certain period of time the  ^
search will be not only for friendship but also for emotional support a well . . .
This can in turn develop as relationships . .. (CS Eagle, Case 2)
Initially he reflected on childhood needs and on his own childhood. Then he recollected 
changes over time observed in his own life. This is a good example of deep and coherent 
reflection taking place on the Cyber souls portal. The following reflection from Case 5 
endorses this point.
One of the biggest suffering sent to me was the death of my brother . . .  it seemed 
so pointless, he loved life . . . My brother accepted his death and tried to make it 
easier for his siblings, telling us he was not afraid and that everything would be
235
alright. Have never written any of this down before so I feel quite upset now. 
maybe its good to do. (CS Heron, Case 5)
It is interesting to note that CS Heron wrote about this very intimate and upsetting experience 
for the first time in Cybersouls. A range of words and phrases used by other participants such 
as ‘I think’, ‘I mean’, ‘I often think, ‘I understand’, ‘what comes to my mind’ indicated the 
inclusion of an element of reflection when addressing a particular topic. They retrospectively 
thought about their own reality and reflected on it.
A similar reflective process was identified also in the conversations of FFs, e.g.:
Yes I think it hits us all when we think deeply on it. I know for myself I find it so 
much easier to bear now as I am so into the faith but for a time in my life when I 
was luke-warm [sic] some years back I would have to say this statement is so real 
but now I feel I am growing more and more each day and it is a wonderful 
journey of a soul that wants and yearns to see my Lord. (FF Sycamore, Case 7)
This sensitive piece is a vivid example of the reflective process in operation. The same FF 
also recalled her personal growth and the change that faith made to her life, articulating it 
clearly in other conversations. Her reflections were on her personal page of the Cyber souls 
portal, available for revisiting at any time.
A reflection from another FF contributed to the discussion of faith in a scroll:
I think Faith, in fact, is something that we practice every day in our lives . . . And 
we've exercised it from the very moment we were bom. I suppose it's true that 
your mother even encouraged you to feel that we could trust her when we lay in
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her arms. And we learned day by day that was true, she would not drop us, that 
she was reliable, and we could put our faith in her arms. (FF Fig, Case 5)
These examples directly address a crucial research question: How can the information shared 
online influence the consciousness of young people to inform their understanding of faith? 
Their capacity for recollection, comprehension, reflection and contributing to the discussion 
were evident in the examples cited above. How was this achieved? The influence of FFs, 
their probing questions, together with the questions posed in the Scrolls, seemed to prime this 
process. The discernible interest displayed by CSs was another contributing factor.
A collective reflection
As explained previously, the space was an interactive and dynamic space between two 
participants a CS and a FF. The reflection which took place in the Cybersouls portal was not 
confined to their private spaces. Rather, it occurred in the three dimensional dynamic 
landscape created at the interactive space between a CS and a FF.
Communal reflective action also occurred in this online site. The Scrolls, which were 
carefully prepared catechetical topics, acted as a shared foundation for discussions between 
the participants. Thus, within the cases under review, it was possible to have up to 26 
different responses to the same topic when a particular scroll was shared by each of the 13 
cases. An autocoding conducted in NVivo (according to caption of Scrolls and the name of 
the Cybersouls) gives the completion rate of Scrolls by case, in descending order, as set out in 
Table 7.2 below.
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Table 7.2 Completion Rate of Scrolls within 13 Cases
Caption of Scrolls Cases
Introduction - Part 1 12
Suffering: The Problem of Suffering - Part 1 12
Introduction: Knowing about Your Faith - Part 3 10
Introduction: A Prayer to Begin With - Part 2 9
Happiness: Expressions of Happiness and Its Yearning - Part 1 8
Introduction: Please tell me more - Part 4 8
Suffering: Embracing Healthy Change - Meditation - Part 4 7
Suffering: Suffering is not in Vain - Part 3 7
Happiness: True Happiness - Part 2 7
Suffering: Why Suffering? - Part 2 7
Happiness: Be Joyful, cos God loved you - meditation - Part 4 6
Happiness: What can offer you real happiness? - Part 3 6
Faith: What is Faith? - Part 1 5
Sacraments: An Old Mug - Part 1 4
Faith: How can we talk about faith? - Part 2 4
Faith: How did you come into your faith? - Part 3 4
Prayer: Healing Prayer - Part 4 3
Faith: How can we grow in faith? - part 4 3
Prayer: What happens in prayer? - part 2 3
Prayer: What is prayer? - Part 1 3
Prayer: Why do I not pray? - part 3 3
Sacraments: Celebrations of Important Moments in Life - Part 2 2
Sacraments: Sacred Moments in Life - Sacraments - Part 3 2
Sacraments: The Man who Climbed on the Sycamore Tree - Part 4 1
For instance, it can be seen that two Scrolls were each completed in 12 of the 13 cases. This 
meant that, in these two Scrolls, the same catechetical topic was shared by 24 participants (13 
CSs and 11 FFs), all of whom read these Scrolls, reflected on the material, responded and 
continued conversations around them. Here the minds of 24 participants were connected to 
the same thought material. This constituted a collective reflection which happened in private 
spaces because the communication within a case was not available to participants of other 
cases. This was to protect the confidentiality of discussions. The possibility of opening up the 
discussion on a particular topic to other participants might be considered as a suggestion for 
the future. Then this collective reflection, occurring in an open space, could increase the
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sense of community. Another possibility is the tagging of a topic which might help collective 
reflection and provide mutual support.
In the above discussions it emerged that the fluency of communication of the participants and 
their emotions and gestures rendered the human communications in virtual space similar to 
that in real life. Instances of interactivity, trust and relationship made it a relational and 
dialogical space. The creation of a dynamic interactive space and the examples of deep and 
collective reflection established that the convergence of consciousness is a possible outcome 
when using the Internet. It became clear that, in an online interaction, there might be more 
opportunity to ‘talk’ directly to the brain, without the distractions of the senses. There might 
be more clarity of thought, since the conversations had to be written in an intelligible 
language. Reflections on a communicated matter gave rise to further questions. Since all the 
communications are retained and can be retrieved, clarifications could be made promptly. It 
is submitted that all of these aspects of communication contribute to making virtual 
communication tangibly real.
7.4 Evangelisation in Cyberspace
“The media can cross walls and be secretly present touching the hearts of those who are 
seeking” (Babin, 1991, p. 202). It was seen in the previous section that the hominisation of 
the Cyber souls project made it an effective space where the Church might connect 
constructively with the minds of youth. FFs interacting with CSs in this dynamic space of 
interactivity, where the minds of these people came together, was seen as an infrastructure on 
which the Kingdom of God might be built. Findings showed that the interactive space of an
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intense togetherness of minds is possible to achieve online, as argued earlier in the literature 
review.
In this section, the data obtained in the project examines how spreading the Good News is 
possible in Cyberspace. Various activities undertaken in the Cybersouls project were 
analysed to see how this intended evangelisation process worked out in practice. The 
preparations for initiating faith development - a moment of evangelisation - which took place 
in the Cybersouls portal, are reviewed. Considering the various ‘moments of evangelisation’ 
(Paul VI, 1975b; John Paul II, 1979) developed over the years in the Church, to what extend 
was the Internet useful as a tool in continuing this task?
Faith Education Online
The possibility of accomplishing faith education as one of the ‘moments of evangelisation’ 
(Paul VI, 1975b) was discussed earlier in chapter 2. It was discovered that some dimensions 
of evangelisation can be performed in spaces other than actual corporeal human communities. 
Thus, in this project, the evangelising of youth was envisaged as taking place in the 
Cyber souls portal through faith education, coupled with online accompaniment. Two areas of 
the research help to understand how this was achieved:
Content of Scrolls: These contained the catechetical material shared by FFs with their 
CSs. Scrolls provided the spiritual wisdom of the Church in a tangible way through 
the Internet, creating this opportunity for a new evangelisation.
Usage of Scrolls: Here, data relating to the interactions which developed around the 
spiritual themes shared by CSs and their FFs in the Scrolls is considered.
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Each one is now considered in sequence.
Content of Scrolls
During the construction of the Scrolls it was ensured that the content was Catholic and 
contained language that ‘spoke* to the culture of youth.
Resources Used
The catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC, 1994) as the official teaching of the Church, 
Scripture as the foundation of Christian living and the teachings of saints, augmented with 
general relevant stories as lived examples of these teachings, were used to build narratives in 
Scrolls which were both interesting and of good quality. Some examples will clarify this: 
Quote used from CCC: “Prayer is “a vital and personal relationship with the living and true 
God (CCC, para. 2558)” (.Scroll 17: What is prayer?).
Teachings of the Saints:
If God did punish us for our sins always -  this world would not exist because our 
sins are massive and grave. If God did not grant material goods to some of those 
who pray, it shows that these temporal blessings are not his concern. When he 
gives prosperity to some people it is not prosperity but his love that is to be 
considered important (Augustine, City of God).
(iScroll 7: Suffering is not in vain).
Use of Scripture: “Read Matthew 5:3-10 or watch the above video on beatitudes and match 
the following: . . (Scroll 11: What can offer you real happiness?).
The preparation of the Scrolls was the starting point of assimilating the wisdom of the 
Catholic way of life in a digital format.
Character and Language of the Content
The construction of the Scrolls started with four short introductory Scrolls framed with the 
purpose of initiating accompaniment on the journey in faith development, and imbibing a 
spirit of knowing and praying for each other. The first major Scrolls addressed universal 
human conditions such as happiness and suffering. This approach was inspired by young 
people who were asked to raise questions to be addressed and published in the blog: 
https://faithfriend.wordpress.com, everyday in Lent 2010. “Why are there so many people 
suffering in the world while others are enjoying a great life?”, was a question asked by a 
young person in the parish. This approach ensured that the language and content of the 
Scrolls resonated with young people and addressed questions raised by them (John Paul n, 
1979). An example of the language used now follows.
The theme of accompaniment of a FF was conveyed in an introductory scroll:
. . .  I thank God for giving me a Faith Friend who will accompany me in my 
journey of Faith online. I pray that [name of the Faith Friend] be rewarded by the 
Lord for her/his support and prayer for me. Amen.
(Scroll 2: A Prayer to Begin With)
A prayer was included in the second scroll requesting that the accompaniment would proceed 
in a spiritual climate from the outset.
Considerable care was taken to ensure that the resources used to prepare the content of 
Scrolls were imbibed from the wisdom of the Church and that the language used to write 
them connected with the culture of youth (Dulles, 2006). The next step involved the 
digitisation of the Scrolls, as detailed earlier in the section on the dynamics of online 
interaction. Twenty four Scrolls were prepared, digitised and made available to each FF who 
read each scroll and wrote an introduction before sending it to the assigned CS. FFs used 
these Scrolls to proclaim the Good News to their CSs. Various elements of the usage of the 
Scrolls by both FFs and CSs show how the Cybersouls space became a spiritual space.
Usage of Scrolls
The question of how the Church can make use of technology to reach out to youth in their 
new socialising spaces is addressed in this section. The previous section, dealing with the 
content of Scrolls, showed how the Good News was presented to CSs, whereas how this was 
dealt with by the participants is considered here. The usage of Scrolls by both CSs and FFs 
revealed how the participants responded to the message of Christ online.
Spiritual Discussions
Signs of spiritual discussions were obvious in the quantification of the conversations and 
words shared between the CSs and their FFs. In general, when two conversations were 
reciprocated in a scroll between a CS and a FF, this could be equated with one completed 
instance of communication. For example, if a scroll was completed between a CS and an FF
involving two conversations (one each) attached to a scroll, the rate of completion of 
conversations12 in that scroll was one. Chapter 3 on Internet Communication described the 
interaction model of communication occurring when a communication is reciprocated 
between two parties (Pearson and Nelson, 2000). A quantitative measure of this interactivity 
shows that sufficient conversations have been reciprocated, reflecting the characteristics of an 
interactive model. Fig 7.4 below shows the rate of completion of conversations between a CS 
and a FF, together with the number of Scrolls completed in each case.
Fig 7.4 Average Rate of Completion of Conversations between Cases
In all the cases depicted in this Figure, the average rate of completion of conversations 
exceeded one. This means that more than two conversations were initiated between the two 
participants on a particular scroll. In general this is indicative of a satisfactory level of
12 The average rate of completion of conversations is obtained by dividing the rate of conversations in a case by 
the number of participants. For example in Case 1 there were three scrolls and nine conversations. Therefore the 
rate of completion of conversation was 9/(3*2) = 1.5 i.e., the total number of conversations completed in a case 
divided by the number of scrolls, times the number of participants.
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discussion being attached to a scroll. As can be seen in Fig 7.4, there are five cases where the 
completion rate is between one and two. Another four averaged between two and three per 
scroll, a further duo completed between three and four conversations, while the remaining 
two reached an average of more than five conversations in a scroll. This quantitative 
representation of an overall commendable level of interaction is augmented with more 
specific examples which confirm the presence of in-depth discussions.
Following the four introductory Scrolls, five main topics were covered in the remaining 20 
Scrolls: Suffering, Happiness, Faith, Prayer and Sacraments. Both CSs and their FFs took 
part in the discussions on the themes covered in the Scrolls. In addition, in some cases, 
tangents of the themes arose, increasing the depth of dialogue. An example of a conversation 
in the introductory scroll is:
Dear Owl, Welcome to this great venture. I am Olive, living and working in . . .  I 
really appreciate your interest in deepening your faith. May the Holy Spirit lead 
us to the ultimate source of all wisdom, knowledge and love. Let’s start our 
online faith journey here. Olive.
(FF Olive, Case 8, Scroll 1: Introduction)
This is an introduction to the first scroll send by FF Olive to her CS Owl. The FF seemed to 
have a clear understanding of the concept of the Cybersouls portal. The phrase deepening 
your faith captured the intention of faith development. The small prayer in the message made 
it a spiritual space. A welcome statement and the spirit of initiation of accompaniment were 
evident in this conversation.
In Case 9, (which had the same FF, Olive), the effort made to get to know one another
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CS Peacock: “Thank you dear Olive, I will also keep you and your family in my 
prayers, lam  living n working in . . .  I live with my . . . God bless you always.”
FF Olive: *7 am from  . . . .
CS Peacock: ‘7 am from . .. (Case 9, Conversations, Scroll 1: Introduction)
A conversation on the theme of suffering provides further insights on the nature of the 
discussions on the Cybersouls portal:
Oak: Dear Ostrich, This topic is a hard one, but I think we can both prayerfully 
write our thoughts on suffering. I look forward to hearing from you! God bless 
you! (FF Oak, Case 6, Scroll 5: Suffering)
This was the introduction provided by FF Oak to that particular scroll. These two participants 
had already introduced themselves to each other in the introductory Scrolls and 
conversations. FF Oak commented on how hard the topic was and invited her CS to reply. 
Having read the scroll, her CS addressed the question “Do you want to share any personal 
experience of suffering?” (Scroll 5) as follows:
When I was ten years old I experiencesd [sic] war in my country, it lasted for 4 
years. I experienced hunger, loss, fear at that time I was angry with God and 
questioning him why we have to go through all this sufferings, now I am grateful 
for everything that happened. It showed me new dimension in life and 
strengthened [sic] my faith. (CS Ostrich, Case 6)
This personal experience of suffering in this CS’s life was closely connected to the theme of 
suffering. The following is an extract from her FF Oak’s reply which also included a personal
confirmed the introductory nature of the conversation:
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Wow! What a beautiful way you have taken suffering in your life! I too have 
experienced some suffering in my life - about a year ago I was diagnosed with 
thyroid cancer, but through that time, I was really able to experience God’s grace 
in my life . . . and also was able to connect with all others suffering . . .
(FF Oak, Case 6)
This discussion on suffering was initiated by the FF. Her CS, having read the content of the 
scroll, replied to the questions asked and the discussion continued. It took a personal slant, 
also covering how one can learn from suffering. In the course of their conversations they 
discussed the cause of suffering and its prevalence in the world. They reached an altruistic 
reflection on the topic, thinking how it helped them to understand other people who suffered, 
in the light of the sufferings of Jesus. Supporting one another through prayers, they concluded 
the discussion with the last scroll on this theme, an audio/video meditation on healing 
through the Eucharist. This is an example of a discussion on a fundamental human and 
Christian theme which took place between a FF and her CS.
Another example of reflection on a different theme confirms that discussions which can 
pierce the human consciousness took place on the Cybersouls portal. In comparison with the 
previous case, this was a longer discussion and parts of the conversations which occurred in 
relation to two Scrolls are cited in order to understand how deep the discussions can be on a 
particular topic.
In Case 10, FF Palm introduced this new set of Scrolls on the theme of happiness. While 
there were four Scrolls on happiness, the focus here is on the first and the final one.
experience of suffering, showing empathy with her.
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FF Palm: Dear Pigeon, In one of your previous scrolls you mentioned that all the 
others around you are enjoying the life. How do you define a happy life? . ..
(FF Palm, Case 10)
The introduction had three more lines with a quotation as a motto and prayer. The scroll 
continued, posing the following question to the CS: “Do you agree that every moment of our 
life is a pursuit of happiness?” The CS Pigeon replied to his FF, addressing this question very 
personally.
CS Pigeon: Yes , I create happiness inside me so others see me as a happy person 
. . . same with almost everyone who is around me, I am person who doesnt have a 
good house, even doesnt have a toilet, how could I enjoy my life ..Others think I 
am so happy . . .  I create happiness.
FF Palm: Yes Pigeon . . .  I know you create happiness around the people whom 
do you meet every day. At the same time you need to make sure that Christ is v 
being formed in the other person. Only he can give the long lasting happiness . . .
(CS Pigeon and FF Palm, Case 10)
Notice the reply of FF Palm where he connects with the previous response of his CS and 
Pigeon tries to speak about Christ there. The scroll material continued and his CS responded 
to it. The conversation proceeded, being reciprocated between them, and the CS shared an 
issue with which he was struggling. The continuity of conversations is an indication of how 
young people can develop trust online and seek support through spaces such as these.
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CS Pigeon: Today i dont find happiness in money or any other thing. I want see 
and experiance [sic] happiness from my soul . . .  A pure soul free from all 
addictions . . .
FF Palm: Good thought for the day . . . may be for the moment. It would be great 
if you continue in this thought for the next few hours .. .
CS Pigeon: As an adult I do struggle . . .  my heart is always seeking . . . , So I will 
seek in others . . . make me so happy for a day . . .  I agree the fact if am truly into 
a relation with God then, the things wont [sic] matter me . . . even great saints had 
some problems . . . st. paul [sic] have one area he really struggled . . .  so I have 
one dark room . . .
FF Palm: Pigeon Please see the following videos . . .  I really appreciate your 
openness. St.Paul and other saints might have got some struggle in their spiritual 
life. But they were always trying to come out from that. . . . They did not keep 
any dark room in their life . . . But sometimes we do . . .  A lazy mind is devils 
workshop . . .  If you cannot see the videos please type [sic] in youtube.
CS Pigeon: ohhh please I dont ever rate myself with saints . . .  I mean all the 
people with flesh have some sort of addiction. . . Today I am back into my 
business, this is a cool video . . .  I am struggling and I need someone who is 
helping me to come out of this, knew the solution that I have to spent more time 
with Lord . . .
(CS Pigeon and FF palm, Case 10)
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The discussion on happiness in the first scroll ended here and FF Palm sent another two 
Scrolls on the same theme. The conversations of his CS Pigeon seemed very personal, 
offering opinions about the topic, seeking directions about personal issues, asking for 
clarification about the conversations etc. The FF tried to give guidance and provided some 
thoughtful discussions and his CS responded to them. Then FF Palm sent the last scroll on 
happiness which is an audio/video meditation prepared for the Cyber souls website entitled 
‘Walking with Jesus’. He used the following introduction:
FF Palm: Dear Pigeon, When I listened to the meditation, i could feel the warmth 
of Christ's Love who was standing beside me when I did the meditation. Jesus is 
the only person who knows me inside out and could love me in the way I am.
(FF Palm, Case 10).
CS Pigeon meditated on it and commented positively on the video. It is amazing how a video 
posted on Youtube can have a profound influence on people. Then the discussion continued 
with some suggestions from his FF. CS Pigeon reflected on his desire for change. These were 
articulated clearly. He said that the problem he faced was a problem shared by many young 
people of his age.
CS Pigeon: . . . truly an amazing one, this reminds me a true hope for my future. I 
am afraid for the life at the moment, going through some sort of difficulties. This 
video reminds me, whether am I walking with Lord in my difficult situations . . . 
this lead into a situation whenever I [was] in trouble, [I will] be with Christ and 
offer him my weakness, this make a happy [sic] . . .  So I would say I am walking 
with Christ and when time comes I will get His blessings amen.
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FF Palm: You still amaze me Pigeon, When I read all your posts here, I wonder 
how much inspiring your thoughts are. Sometimes I think you are too spiritual, 
but at some other time I think you are not . . .  I gave the retreat talk from . . . to . .
. Its really worth. Please copy that in a stick and try to listen when you go to . ..
CS Pigeon: I am having some problems, I mean when I try to be holy then some 
sort of force is coming to me and would make do some sin . . . And this wont last 
Lord will pull me back,. . . My sins create a distance between me and God but He 
is coming again and again so this make my life more interesting . . .
FF Palm: I will fight the fight and press on towards the Goal.
(CS Pigeon and FF Palm, Case 10)
This is a classic example which shows how two people can initiate deep spiritual dialogue 
online. In this discussion, CS Pigeon stands as a representative of many young people of 
similar age who want to lead a spiritual life but can be challenged in ways connected to 
certain developments in technology such as online pornography. While the above discussion 
was centred on the topic of happiness, new tangents of dialogue emerged around it. This 
young person’s revelations were indicative of the support and accompaniment which young 
people require these days. CS Pigeon’s openness and desire for change were addressed by his 
FF Palm who referred him to a video from Youtube and asked him to listen to an audio 
retreat. All these suggestions were proposed to the person in the same language, the language 
of the Internet and communication technology i.e., a multimedia language (Castells, 2000).
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This example of dialogue which took place in the Cybersouls website clearly demonstrates 
how this new ministry can communicate with, address relevant issues and influence the 
consciousness of youth. The discourse shows that in-depth discussions on faith can take place 
online, making it an intimately spiritual space.
7.5 Conclusion
An analysis of the 13 selected cases was the focus in this chapter. It commenced with an 
overview of various methods of analysis and detailed how they were applied in this study. 
Three main themes emerged from this initial process: the dynamics of online communication; 
the characteristics of virtual-human communication and evangelisation in Cyberspace. A 
detailed analysis of each theme was presented. The interactive tools were described and 
relevant data showed how the CSs relate positively to them. The section on communication in 
Cyberspace provided numerous examples to support the view that this is profoundly a human 
space. In the next section on evangelisation on the Cyber souls portal, an analysis of the data 
revealed the depth of discussion that developed around the material on the Scrolls, providing 
evidence that the kingdom of God can be disseminated effectively online. Therefore it can be 
concluded that, by presenting the Good News online in such a way as to influence their 
minds, the Church can reach out to youth in their new habitat of online networks.
Now that the in-depth analyses have been presented, a synthesis of the overall study, together 
with conclusions, are set out in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER 8 
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The main strands of the study are woven together in this concluding chapter. It commences 
with an overview of the total project. This is followed by a synthesis of the research findings, 
addressing the research questions identified relating to three main spheres of the study and 
summarising key findings. Next, suggestions for expanding the project are identified together 
with possible areas for future research. Some final reflections conclude the study.
8.1 Overview of the Study
This section consolidates the study, briefly recapitulating the overall research path. The 
opening chapter introduced the project, explaining the background to the enquiry. It set out 
the primary objective of the thesis and described its overall structure.
The research project can be divided into two main interrelated strands: the literature review 
and the fieldwork. The literature review was conducted to clarify the rationale underpinning 
the study, to develop research questions and to establish, at a theoretical level, the feasibility 
of carrying out the research. Then the fieldwork put the theory to the test.
The review of the literature focused on material relevant to three topics -  evangelisation, the 
Internet and youth. This was in keeping with the broad objective of the research which set out 
to explore the possibility of using the Internet for the evangelisation of young people.
The chapter on evangelisation (chapter 2) explored this concept, establishing that it is a core 
element of the Catholic Church’s mission. Later in the discussion, the teachings of Popes 
Paul VI and John Paul II in relation to evangelisation in the modem world were examined.
Communication on the Internet was reviewed in chapter 3. It commenced with a general 
overview of the concept before presenting an in-depth examination of Internet 
Communication. This included exploring the possibility of using the Internet for youth 
evangelisation.
In chapter 4, the focus was on young people. Various aspects of youth were examined 
including cyber-youth and the possibility of virtual evangelisation in the context of Web 2.0.
The fieldwork commenced with the design of the Cyber souls project. This was detailed in 
chapter 5 which concentrated on the specifications of the project, leading to its piloting and 
implementation. Also, data collection and case study selection were described. The findings 
from the online questionnaire were presented in chapter 6, together with case descriptions for 
the cohort of selected cases. Finally, a detailed qualitative analysis of data relating to a 
sample of 13 cases was presented in chapter 7.
8.2 Research Findings
A synthesis of the research findings in this exploratory study is presented in this section. It 
will be recalled that the main research question was to test the efficacy of the online 
mentoring of young people (Cybersouls -  CSs) by Faithfriends (FFs) intended to deepen their 
understanding, appreciation and appropriation of their faith tradition. The research findings 
revealed a positive outcome to the main research question, establishing that a web 2.0
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environment can be developed effectively to accomplish online mentoring of young people 
by FFs.
Reviewing the findings in more detail, at a quantitative level, it will be recalled that, in the 
first 100 days of its operation, the Cybersouls portal attracted 119 CSs who were 
accompanied and mentored by 35 authenticated and trained FFs.
At a qualitative level, the detailed analysis of the interactions between the CSs in the 13 
sample cases and their respective FFs provided evidence of the depth of the exchanges that 
could take place, as individual FFs mentored their particular CSs.
In addition, the positive opinions of participants regarding the Cybersouls portal, obtained 
through the terminal questionnaire, endorsed the effectiveness of this online approach to 
evangelisation.
Cumulatively, these findings confirmed that youth evangelisation can be achieved online by 
engaging FFs as mentors who accompany young people on their exploration and 
appropriation of faith. Other research questions also emerged in the course of the study. 
Relevant findings relating to these issues are next for consideration.
Spheres o f the Research and Related Research Findings
Convergence of the spheres of the Church, youth and the Internet was achieved in the course 
of the research process. A review of additional research questions (a - i) undertaken in 
chapter 6 identified these three main areas of the study in relation to specific research 
questions. As the three spheres are not mutually exclusive, the questions pertaining to each
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sphere are interrelated. Findings in relation to the three individual spheres and related &
research questions are now presented.
The Church and Evangelisation
It was established in the literature review that evangelisation is the primary and 
encompassing mission of the Church. In more recent times, the importance of making use of 
the media for evangelisation was reiterated by Paul VI and John Paul II. In this research, the 
concept of harnessing online communication to reach the youth of today emerged from the 
initial investigation. The possibility of a personalised mode of virtual evangelisation of young 
people, envisaged in the theoretical phase, was put into effect. The Internet, considered as an 
instrument of social communication by the Church, was identified as a very effective medium 
to accomplish a dialogical and constructivist model of evangelisation. Young people/ as 
leading characters of the virtual areopagus of cyberspace, were the main participants of 
evangelisation.
The first three research questions (a/b/c) which relate to the sphere of the Church and 
evangelisation are:
(a) How can the Church make use of technology to reach out to the youth in their new 
habitats or socialising spaces?
(b) What skills and tools would be needed by the Church in adapting to the new medium 
of the Internet?
(c) Considering the various ‘moments of evangelisation’ developed over the years in the 
Church, to what extend is the Internet useful as a tool to continue this task?
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The field work demonstrated that the Church has to adapt to a collaborative and constructivist 
model of using the Internet to underpin an effective approach to the evangelisation of young 
people. Collaboration between youth movements in the Church and religious educators with a 
digital outlook can initiate effective spaces of evangelisation online. The challenge to the 
Church is to take part in the core development of the Internet in order to initiate spaces of 
effective evangelisation. Considering various moments of evangelisation, catechesis or 
learning about the faith tradition, which is an essential part of evangelisation, can be achieved 
online.
As indicated previously, three teams collaborated to get the Cyber souls project underway -  
the evangelisation team, the web team and the youth team, demonstrating the crucial need for 
off-line and organisational inputs in order to achieve online effectiveness. The scope of each 
team is now recalled briefly, details being provided earlier in chapter 5. The evangelisation 
team had to undertake a number of tasks. It had to prepare faith development materials and 
authenticate FFs. Regarding the preparation of the material incorporated in the Scrolls, 
attention had to be given to their authentic content, i.e., catechism, scripture, teachings, 
traditions and application to life. The approach involved dynamic story-telling, using 
interactivity and multimedia, taking full advantage of the potential of Web 2.0. Sensitivity to 
contemporary youth culture had to be reflected in the language used, while design aspects 
such as layout, aesthetics and interactivity had to be addressed in a manner that engaged 
young people.
Turning to the web team, skills were needed to draft the specifications for the online site and 
then to design and develop it. Finally, the tasks of the administrative team included 
authenticating FFs and managing them online. It can be concluded that the Church needs to
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develop a collaborative approach to bring together the required resources in order to take part jr
in the ‘core development’ of the Internet.
T h e  Internet a n d  C o m m u n i c a t i o n
Prefaced by a broad appraisal of communication, the earlier discussion on this topic then 
moved to consider communication, using the Internet as a means of social communication.
The Internet was seen as providing an environment for developing relationships and offering 
an opportunity for accompaniment and mentoring. From a communications point of view 
also, the constructivist model was found to be effective in the process of evangelisation, 
facilitated by two way interactivity on the Internet. Cyberspace, as a space incorporating 
multimedia, has the potential to connect the minds of young people constructively.
The following three research questions related to the sphere of the Internet:
(d) What is the potential of the Internet as an environment for the evangelisation of young 
people?
(e) How can the Internet empower young people as active participants in evangelisation 
using the Internet?
(f) What are some of the pastoral and theological opportunities afforded by the Internet 
as a means of evangelisation?
The research confirmed the capacity of the Internet to create socialising spaces, making it a 
conducive environment for youth evangelisation. Building on the full potential of web 2.0, 
the proficiency of multimedia and social networking enhanced the effectiveness of 
evangelisation using this medium. This suggests that the capacity of the Internet for
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incorporating multimedia needs to be exploited, recognising its efficacy for dialogue and ^
interactivity. Digitising the Catholic materials relevant to the religious education of young *-
people, creating multimedia (images, audios and videos) and utilising other online resources
are ways of making use of the full potential of web 2.0. An image centered and interactive 
story telling methodology, enabling catechesis, to be adapted to the language of young *
people, can stimulate their interest, leading them to become creative and active participants in 
evangelisation. This online research afforded young people the opportunity to display their 
freedom-to-leam, resourcefulness and proficiency in cyberspace. Therefore it can be said that 
this digital empowerment of young people creates authentic pastoral and theological 
opportunities for evangelisation.
Y o u n g  P e o p l e  as Participants
Some of the characteristics of modem youth were identified in chapter 4. These included 
having an innate curiosity and a desire to be active learners, rather than being told what to do 
(see Careaga, 2001). The high level of Internet usage by the younger generation (Elliot, 2010;
Lenhart et al, 2010) suggests that it caters for some of these needs. Youth culture necessitates 
the adaptation of the Good News to the digital space. Introducing authorised FFs as mentors 
in the web 2.0 environment and allowing them to accompany young people on their journey 
of faith can constitute an effective means of evangelisation.
Two other research questions involved the sphere of youth:
(g) How can the freedom and digital ingenuity of a young person be a source of 
momentum for New Evangelisation?
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(h) How can the information shared online influence the consciousness of young people 
to inform their understanding about faith?
Table 8.1 below provides a general picture of the activities undertaken by FFs and their CSs 
in this study:
Table 8.1 Online Activities of FFs and CSs
Faithfriends Cybersouls
Reading Scrolls Reading
Writing an appropriate introduction Reflecting
Sending the scroll to the Cybersoul Responding
Reviewing the response of the Cybersoul Opinion sharing
Asking further questions for clarification Addressing questions asked in the scroll
Addressing any issues raised by 
Cybersouls
Addressing questions asked by the 
Faithfriend
Answering any questions Sharing issues regarding faith
Asking questions to develop the process 
of reflection Asking for prayer and support
Concluding and sending new scroll Clarifications
Sending reminders
Contributions: Greater in both quantity 
and quality - confirms their capacity for 
accompaniment
Contributions: Quantitatively smaller but 
developing qualitatively
There seems to be a close link between the presence and efforts of FFs and the online 
activities of CSs. It may be said that the presence of a FF constituted a motivating factor for 
the CS to engage. Also the fluency of communication with their FFs seems to have 
influenced the conversations of CSs.
In addition to their ICT skills, understanding of youth and the faith tradition, some of the 
more specific factors relating to the functions of a FF that motivated a CS to take part in 
reflective activity were identified as follows:
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1. The frequency and regularity of the interaction of a FF is a key factor. While moderating 
and observing the interactions on a daily basis, the researcher noted that, having 
communicated with the FF, the CS logged in daily or at times more frequently in 
anticipation of a reply from his/her FF.
An analysis of the regularity of replies from a FF shows that, for the 13 cases analysed in 
depth, replies were more regular in five cases. The frequency pattern showed that a quick 
reply increased the likelihood of conversations being reciprocated. In contrast, when a FF 
failed to reply on a regular basis, deeper reflection was less likely to occur.
2. The capacity of a FF to initiate communication and sustain it also seemed to influence 
the reflective process. Acknowledgement, clarification, asking and addressing questions 
and expressing appreciation were some of the constructive approaches adopted by FFs in 
their interactions.
3. Relationship and trust were important. It was noted that, in cases where the conversation 
was very formal, the interaction failed to develop. In contrast, when the FF was able to 
develop a relationship that at the same time respected boundaries, trust and interactivity 
thrived at both a quantitative and a qualitative level.
4. Fluency in online communication is a factor which can help the flow of communication 
between two people. Having the linguistic ability to express normal human situations 
may help the other person feel ‘at home’. This can be vital in developing a professional 
relationship, leading to deep communication, as was evidenced in some of the findings.
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5. The ability to develop conversations can be underpinned by the knowledge and wisdom 
of a FF, Creative thinking may be helpful in developing a theme when interacting with a 
CS.
6. Sharing the knowledge of faith, engaging in a dialogue of personal reflections on faith, 
making comparisons and clarifications, are all expected to increase the depth of one’s 
inferiority. This development was discernible in the case studies where FFs had to 
respond to a range of issues raised by their CSs.
7. Findings show that, together with their personal reflective stories, FFs referred to Christ 
as a friend, protector, guide, helper and companion. Also they used other explicitly 
theological terms to represent Christ. This may be interpreted as showing that FFs had a 
good understanding of their own role of accompaniment being focused on Christ.
8. A general respect for the other person was discernible on the part of FFs, being expressed 
in gentle queries and a sincere interest in their respective CSs. A general acceptance of 
boundaries between the communicators was evident in the exchanges between FFs and 
their CSs.
Cumulatively, these factors enabled FFs to have a positive influence in their interactions 
when mentoring individual young CSs. The careful selection and training of FFs ensured that 
they had the ability to act as effective mentors.
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Taking a composite view of the research results relating to these spheres -  the Church, young 
people and the Internet -  some of the important factors emerged in the research are depicted 
in Fig 8.1 below:
Fig 8.1 Im portant Factors in the i Research
S p h e r e s
Involved
The Church The Internet Young People
Constituting
F a c t o r
Evangelisation Communication Culture
G o a l C o m m u n i o Interaction Empowerment
R a w  material The Good News
Instruments of 
Social
Communication
Participants
M e t h o d Incarnation Dialogue Accompaniment
O n u s  o n Global Church Core Web Developers Young People
Strength
Youth
Movements Web 2.0 Freedom and Ingenuity
A d a p t a t i o n
Material
Catechesis Multimedia Minds of Young People
In Practice Faithfriends Scrolls Cybersouls
A Qualitative Study of Youth Evangelisation on the Internet using C y b e r s o u l s  Portal
A c h i e v e m e n t
Evangelisation 
in Cyberspace
Dynamics of 
Online Interaction Virtual Communication
Convergence o f the Spheres
The possibility of the convergence of these three spheres, the Church, youth and the Internet 
as envisaged in the literature review, was achieved in an effective manner. This gave rise to 
an important overarching research question, as set out below:
(i) The Internet provides the tools; the Church provides the atmosphere and young people 
are the participants. How can these seemingly distant cultural spaces be mutually 
inculturated?
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In the theoretical discussions which preceded the fieldwork, the dynamic convergence of the 
spheres of the Church, youth and the Internet was proposed as a space for evangelisation. 
Then, moving on to the fieldwork, the Cyber souls project was developed to test the efficacy 
of the Internet as a tool for evangelisation. A thorough analysis of the data which emerged 
supports the thesis that the Internet can be used constructively for youth evangelisation. This 
achieved the main objective of the research which was to establish the potential role of the 
Internet as an instrument in the evangelisation of young people. Figure 8.2 below captures the 
overlay of the three spheres that emerged to construct this dynamic space of evangelisation.
Fig 8.2 Convergence of the Three Spheres Forming the Space of Evangelisation
The cyberspace of Cyber souls was creatively prepared with a view to making it a human 
space of accompaniment to facilitate discussions on matters of faith. Here, cyberspace, 
human space and ecclesial space merged to create a space of evangelisation. The preparation 
of Scrolls needed both the wisdom of the Church as well as knowledge of dynamic online
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tools. The selection of FFs needed to assure their authenticity, maturity in faith and 
connectivity to youth. CSs are at the intersection between Cyberspace and human space. Thus 
the efficacy of an online environment of evangelisation is dependent on the calibre of the 
offline resources and organisational capacities that are utilised.
Setting up the online Cybersouls site and facilitating the registration of young people marked 
the starting point of this evangelisation for CSs. Then online FFs, authenticated by the co­
ordinator, were effective in accompanying and mentoring these young souls who wanted to 
deepen their understanding of faith. Research findings showed that, using the dynamic 
catechetical material, termed Scrolls, to engage the CSs, FFs achieved a high level of success 
in this regard. The profound human space created between the interaction of the CSs and their 
FFs was enriched by the catechetical material on the Scrolls. The Good News seems to have 
permeated cyberspace where its wisdom resonated with the consciousness of young people 
through dialogue and prompted reflective thought.
Drawing together the evidence gathered in the course of this investigation, the key findings of 
the research can be summarised as follows:
(i) Effective mentoring by a Faithfriend enhances the potential of the web 2.0
environment for youth evangelisation. Such effective mentoring depends on 
careful selection and training of Faithfriends, particularly their knowledge of the 
faith tradition, proficiency in ICT skills and understanding of youth culture.
(ii) A collaborative and constructivist model of using the Internet underpins an effective
approach to evangelisation with young people.
(iii) Making use of the full potential of web 2.0, the proficiency of multimedia and social
networking enhances the effectiveness of online evangelisation.
(iv)The efficacy of an online environment of evangelisation is dependent on the calibre of 
the offline resources and organisational capacities that are utilised.
8.3 Suggestions for Expanding the Project
In the light of the research conducted, some suggestions for expanding the project now 
follow.
Virtual Re pr es en ta ti on o f  Individuals'. The participants in the C y b e r s o u l s  website had 
individual ‘web-pages’ with their names on them. Unlike other social networking sites, their 
photos and other demographic details were not permitted to be displayed online in these 
profiles. Some participants may wish to provide and make available online of a more detailed 
profile.
L i n k a g e  to Offline Activities: More collective reflection could lead to the possibility of having 
offline meetings in groups. Also, specific offline activities could be arranged for online 
participants who reside in the same area. This would help to ensure the process of 
evangelisation as its sacramental elements could be catered for in the setting of a real life 
community.
Interest G r o u p s : Allowing interest groups such as youth movements and parish youth groups 
to register is another suggestion for expansion. In addition, a code could be provided on the 
C y b e r s o u l s  web portal to make this site part of their web presence.
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experience, by incorporating mobile applications, could be another way of expanding the
project.
T h e  R o l e  o f  Faithfr¿ends: Some issues regarding aspects of the role of FFs may need to be 
further considered.
• The extent to which their role is confidential.
• The question of addressing disclosures that may arise in the context of the legal
obligations in a particular country and the Internet Law and Regulations?
• The conceptualisation of the role a FF - whether she or he is a spiritual director or
merely a fellow traveller.
8.4 Possible Areas of Future Research
This was an exploratory study, limited by both time constraints and personnel, being confined 
to one researcher. It is hoped, however, that having made a start in this innovative area of 
research, it will provide an impetus for further enquiry in this field. Possible topics for 
consideration are set out below.
Creating a  S e n s e  o f  C o m m u n i t y : The possibility of opening up the discussion on a particular 
topic to other participants was a suggestion made in chapter 7. It is considered that this 
collective reflection, occurring in an open space, could increase the sense of community.
Research exploring how relationships similar to real life relational ties in a community can be 
fostered in an online community would be beneficial in progressing this possibility.
Mobile Applications: Adapting the web portal of Cybersouls to the up to date browsing *
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Learning from One Another. The tagging of a topic or a discussion created by an individual 
might encourage collective reflection and provide mutual support. This could open up the 
possibility of learning from other participants. However, limitations would need to be placed 
on tagging, taking into account the sensitivity of a case, together with issues of confidentiality 
and privacy. The development of online peer support for faith education is another area of 
research for the future.
Evangelisation: Quantitative Dimensions'. The research in this project was focussed primarily 
on a qualitative dimension of evangelisation. Testing quantitative aspects of evangelisation is 
another area which merits investigation. The need to cater for a larger number of CSs would 
require the selection and training of a greater number of FFs. Also it would necessitate the 
construction of more of the dynamic and interactive tools and resources appropriate to the 
expectations of young people. The development of additional suitable material for use in 
Scrolls constitutes another important research task.
Moderation: A growth in the number of participants would involve identifying further 
resources for moderation of the website. Some of the activities of CSs and FFs can be 
automated. Automatic analysis of the words and phrases they use in their interactive spaces 
online can be a way of achieving this. CSs who have achieved a certain level of 
accomplishment online could be given more power to undertake some responsible tasks. 
Exploring these possibilities would involve additional research.
Stages of Faith: Research is needed regarding how to deal with CSs at different stages of 
their faith development, as participants may vary from beginners to advanced. Preparing 
appropriate faith materials for each of these categories is another challenge in undertaking
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online evangelisation. Appropriate research would provide useful insights into addressing this 
challenge.
Religious Education and the Internet: This research established the robust general enthusiasm 
which young people have for the Internet and confirmed its specific potential for use by the 
Church as a means of youth evangelisation. These findings have implications for future 
developments in the wider field of religious education. Further research, investigating the 
possibilities afforded by the Internet in the arena of religious education, would make a 
valuable contribution to ensuring that online opportunities are incorporated and used to best 
advantage in this educational setting in the future.
8.5 Final Reflections
The Cyber souls research project is an example of the Church being represented in the mosaic 
of the convergence of Web 2.0 in cyberspace. This has opened a window to the world of 
youth. The convergence of the faith of the Church and youth culture on the information 
super highway has brought together a complex mixture of various aspects of human 
existence. Initiating instances of interaction, as undertaken in the Cybersouls project, 
provided opportunities for evangelisation founded on understanding the characteristics of the 
phenomenon of online interaction. This addressed the research question: “What would be 
involved in building on this information shared online in order to transform young people?” 
From the time of making the project available to young people online, their registration, login 
and use of the site, they were enabled to display the potential of the medium. The registration 
of a young person was a critical point of allowing individual participation in this project. 
Then, in their private living spaces, the participants were able to take part in the project
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without the constraints of any physical community around them. An expression of their 
freedom and power to communicate was visible here.
The detailed analysis of the data obtained in the Cybersouls website allowed the 
conversations to ‘speak’. The tools of online communication and their capacity to facilitate 
interactivity made dynamic story telling possible in the language of young people who are 
active participants of this medium. The profound nature of this virtual human space became 
evident in some of their conversations. The depth of the discussions undertaken in this 
research proved its capacity for influencing human interiority to accomplish a qualitative 
dimension of evangelisation. The examples of dialogue which took place in the Cybersouls 
website revealed clearly how this new ministry can communicate with and influence the 
consciousness of youth. The ensuing discussions showed that in-depth dialogue on faith can 
take place in online spaces, making it an intimately spiritual space.
Evangelisation has been central to the mission of the Church since its inception. Over an 
extended time period, developments in the wider world, e.g., the invention of printing, have 
impacted on how the task of evangelisation has been addressed in different ages. In the 
contemporary world, the advent of the Internet provides yet another new means of spreading 
the Good News, especially to young people who have embraced this medium with such 
enthusiasm. This exploratory study has tested and established the efficacy of the Internet for 
the evangelisation of youth by engaging Faithfriends to mentor them in deepening their 
understanding, appreciation and appropriation of their faith tradition. “While acknowledging 
that “there is always a ‘more’ that goes infinitely beyond what we have already grasped” 
(Hought, 1986, p. 21), it is hoped that the insights provided in this research advance in some 
measure the engagement of young people in building the Kingdom of God in the years ahead.
270

Appendix A
Th« Project Youth questions
mm
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CASTING OUT INTO THE DEEP!
"Behold,I am with you always,untili the end of bme’ (Mtt 28:20}
This is a brand new concept of spiritual networking online, a new tool for accompanying 
young adults in their journey of faith onfme.
Faittifriends who are authonsed by a Catholic youth movement, will accompany you if you 
want to deepen your journey of faith online
Anybody over 18 is invited to register and login to be accompanied by a Faithmend m this 
online journey.
Jesus Youth Mater Dei Institute
m
Archdiocese of Dublin
Home page of the web portal www.cybersouls.ie
272
Registration form of FFs
Appendix B
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Appendix C
Registration Form of CSs
Cybersouls
Welcome to an online journey of faith!
•  Keyitffef as a C ybeisonl
Home | About
• -  Mandatory fields
Login Name: 
E-mail ID; 
Password:- 
Retype Password:
Your Wame: 
Gender
Country of origin:
Address and contact(optional):
Are you over 18:- Yes. ® Ho.
I consent to the use of online activities for research.
&
&
Mote: Reaae read Terms & Concfibona below, before you finish 
registration
Printable version
Terms and Conditions
Research Project Cybersouls is an online project« is 
designed to develop the faith of young peopie through 
their online interaction with Failhfriends Cybersouis is a 
term given to those who want to initiate their journey of
I Agree to the Terms ft Conditions
Enter Security Code shown
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Sample Scroll
W hy Suffering? - P a rt 2
Suffering in the World ]
line discussion on suffenng continues from prewous sciotf ., WÊÊ
♦Why is there suffering?' is a  ve»y natural 
and crucial question puzzling us for 
centuries.
In general, suffenngs are occasions which 
cause pain for us, In this life we constantly 
experience sufferings of many different Kinds 
and size -  physical and moral ewis, illness, 
death, injustices, wars, natural disasters, 
earthguaKes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, 
etc
Suffering is a hum an  condition as much 
as it is the condition of ail conscious living 
beings.
If God, Paths» almighty, the creator of heaven 
and earth, cares for all his creatures, why 
does so much ewl occur?
Why are there so many people suffering m 
the world and why are others enjoying a great 
fife? This, for human beings, is a mystefy that 
Often evokes the cry, “Why?*
The apostle Paul tried to  an sw er this 
question, saying, 'Death (suffering) came 
into the world through sin (Bom 5:12)/
that m ean  that all suffering is cau sed  by sin? It is true that some suffering IS caused by our 
is This howevai, may not seem completely true in the case of people who suffer through no fault
their own
a friend of mine said to me, *We have only a small vision, but God has the frill picture * W e may not 
able to comprehend why' God permits suffenng for some people Because of the complexity of the 
fern, there’s no simple or quick answer.
Natural A pproach to Suffering -  empirical or matenal approach
people suffer because of matenal poverty or iHness; others do not In general, poverty is 
onsidered to be a cause of suffenng llPheaffh in mind and body are examples of suffering Therefore, 
should mean that those who are wealthy and healthy don't suffer. But even those who seem  to be 
a great time may also be suffenng in a different way.
Would wealth health or other matenal goods bring happiness to us and enable us to say, 1 will
not suffer anymore?”
Is it okay to say that suffenng is not just for some people; that all people suffer one way or
other?
PhiutiK a sk  any *>f yum gr type yum replies le  the abtwe queitiene here
Table 9.1 List of Scrolls
Order of
Scrolls
Name of Scrolls
1 Introduction - Part 1
2 A Prayer to Begin With - Part 2
3 Knowing about Your Faith - Part 3
4 Please tell me more - Part 4
5 The Problem of Suffering - Part 1
6 Why Suffering? - Part 2
7 Suffering is not in Vain - Part 3
8 Embracing Healthy Change - Meditation - Part 4
9 Expressions of Happiness and Its Yearning - Part 1
10 True Happiness - Part 2
11 What can offer you real happiness? - Part 3
12 Be Joyful, cos God loved you - meditation - Part 4
13 What is Faith- - Part 1
14 How can we talk about faith? - Part 2
15 How did you come into your faith- - Part 3
16 How can we grow in faith? - part 4
17 What is prayer? - Part 1
18 What happens in prayer? - part 2
19 Why do I not pray? - part 3
20 Healing Prayer - Part 4
21 An Old Mug - Part 1
22 Celebrations of Important Moments in Life - Part 2
23 Sacred Moments in Life - Sacraments - Part 3
24 The Man who Climbed on the Sycamore Tree - Part 4
Appendix F
Questionnaire Form
Your views on 'Cybersouls' website 
please
As part of my research project I need to get your views on the 
Cybersouls website. So, kindly complete this short survey before 
Friday 15 October 2010. It will only take few minutes.
* Required
Taking part in the Cybersouls project has enlivened my faith. *
Tick one of the options below
0  strongly disagree 
0  disagree 
0  agree 
©  strongly agree
I understand my Catholic faith better now. # 
Tick one of the options below
©  strong^ disagree
0  disagree
0  agree
0  strongly agree
• •
♦ • • • •
My Faithfriend in Cybersouls website has helped me to deepen 
my faith. #
Tick one of the options below 
0  strongly disagree 
0  disagree 
0  agree 
0  strongly agree
The scrolls/themes In this website helped me to reflect seriously 
about my faith. *
Tick one of the options below
0  Strongly disagree 
0  disagree 
0  agree 
0  strongly agree
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Questionnaire Form
I am closer to my parish/community because of the Cybersouls 
website *
Tick one of the options below 
0 strongly disagree 
0 disagree 
0  agree 
0 strongly agree
- E
I feel part of the online Cybersouls community.# 
Tick one of the options below
strongly disagree
disagree
I like interacting via social networking sites such as Facebook, 
Bebo, Orkut, Myspage etc. *
Tick one of the options below
0  Strongly disagree 
0  disagree 
0  agree 
0  strongly agree
I would recommend the Cybersouls website to a friend inorder 
to deepen his/her faith. *
Tick one of the options below
0  strongly disagree 
0  disagree 
0  agree 
0  strongly agree
If you have any additional comments to make about the 
Cybersouls website, kindly make them below. 9
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Appendix G
Screen Shot of Coding of Themes (Tree Nodes) in NVivo
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Appendix H
Table 9.2 Dynamic Tools Used for Interactivity and Conversation in Scrolls
Topics Scroll Text Picture Video
C om m ent
box
Yes
/no
Match
the
following
C hoose 
from  
the list
Number of 
Conversation 
snippets
Intro Scroll 1 X X X X 2
Intro Scroll 2 X X X 1
Intro Scroll 3 X X X X 3
Intro Scroll 4 X X X X 2
Suffering Scroll 5 X X X 3
Suffering Scroll 6 X X X 2
Suffering Scroll 7 X X X 1
Suffering Scroll 8 X X X X 1
Happiness Scroll 9 X X X X 3
Happiness Scroll 10 X X X X 2
Happiness Scroll 11 X X X X X 2
Happiness Scroll 12 X X X X 1
Faith Scroll 13 X X X 2
Faith Scroll 14 X X X X 2
Faith Scroll 15 X X X 1
Faith Scroll 16 X X X X 1
Prayer Scroll 17 X X X 1
Prayer Scroll 18 X X X 2
Prayer Scroll 19 X X X 1
Prayer Scroll 20 X X X X 1
Sacraments Scroll 21 X X X X 3
Sacraments Scroll 22 X X X X 3
Sacraments Scroll 23 X X X 1
Sacraments Scroll 24 X X X 1
Total 24 24 6 23 5 2 2
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Case 3 - FF Cedar and CS Falcon. (Pseudonyms are used to protect confidentiality.) 
Scroll 1
Screen Shots of Interactions of Case 3
Introduction - Part 1
G e n e r a l  I n t r o d u c t io n
Dear Falcon dow are you? Welcome to thte journey of faith online, I am very happy to Journey with you 
online during this project As I see It, this Is a very new venture of Journeying together on the Internet In 
order to understand, learn about and deepen our faith Hope to get to know you more over the coming
days. GQD Bless, Cedar
How are you?
Itrycjfons to Faithfrienc
Welcome to this journey of faith online
I am very happy to journey with you online during 
this project
As I see it, this Is a very new venture of 
journeying together on the Internet In order to 
understand, learn about and deepen our faith
So that I can get to know you a little better, may I 
ask you some questions which you are free to 
answer?
in y rw  opinion where tk> you stand In relation I© your own journey of faith? 
>t started/I do not know 
A beginner 
Advanced 
feH advanced
May this jmmioy begin by lighting the candle of faith Post a similar prayer here
show us the true meaning of being devoted to Christ
r;
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Case 3, Scroll 1 (cont’d)
Thats wonderful Sometimes before starting a journey it Is always good to 
know where you are and where are we going Donft you think so? Imagine 
going to a distant place, 1 am 6ure 1 would plan it out, the time required, fuel 
for the car extra tyre etc So that 1 can get to know you a littie better, may 1 
ask you some questions which you are free to answer? You have identified 
yourself as a beginner In this journey What Is the most important thing that 
motivates you know more about your faith? What would you expect as an 
outcome of this endeavour? Hope 1 don't 1 sound very serious with the above, 
but feel free to ask me any questions and 1 will try my best to answer them 
Let me know If there is anything specific that you would like me to pray for 
you GOD Bless you
Posted by FF Cedar
Hi again! I'm going to try my best to answer your questions honestly The 
most jmportani thing that motivates me to know more about my faith is the 
security It brings That does seem selfish but 1 feel a certain protective shield 
around me because of my faith in Chdst and going to church every Sunday 
Interacting with my fdends who might be less religious or maybe not religious 
at all 1 appreciate that 1 have God to turn to, to talk to, and to pray to While 
this shelter motivates me, 1 hope to also learn to become a good Christian for 
life and to practice the same beliefs that my parents taught me so well-that 
church is essential and God is always with us As for what 1 expect from this 
endeavor 1 hope to learn as much as 1 can and share as well Sharing with 
someone 1 do not know and have never seen but still knowing that they oniy 
have good intentions for me gives a sense of comfort 1 would like to 
apologize for not being so active thus far but 1 will try harder from now on. 
Thank you for sticking with me 1 also have some questions for you that you 
can answer if you want Where do you stand in your development of faith? 
And were you bom into a Christian family or did you take the decision 
yourself? Hope this message Is not too long
1
* * * * *  CS Falcon
. _____
Hi Thanks for your honest answer Very soon you wMI find that GOD will 
reveal more of his goodness in your life The word of GOD tells us that you 
have come to know Jesus because GOD the father has attracted you to him 
If he has called you, then he certainly has a plan for you. This has pretty much 
been my experience Although 1 was raised a Christian, 1 came closer to GOD 
and my faith through an incident in my family and 1 believe is a miracle when 
everyone around had little expectation that my father would survive a bloody 
acddent Praise GOD that my father Is completely healthy now. The faith 
journey that 1 had begun then has seen its ups and downs But where 1 am 
now, 1 wouldn’t have dreamt five or six years before GOD has taken me 
through many situations which 1 know 1 am not at all capable of 1 would say 
being in that relationship with my Jesus is a great treasure in my life 1 laugh, 
cry, upset, pray with him Do you cherish a one to one relationship with 
Jesus?
Posted by FF Cedar
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Case 3, Scroll 1 (cont’d)
I've always found myself talking in my mind about anything and everything 
And I always felt that I was talking to God. There was never a doubt in my 
mind that was what I was doing. I feel like God can hear everything and God 
knows everything I feel like this was the beginning of having a one to one 
relationship with Jesus To me the lines between God and Jesus are blurry 
because I talk as if I'm speaking to both entities I am glad to hear your fattier 
is happy and healthy Actually just over a week ago, I was In a car accident 
with my brother--my very first car accident Fortunately it was of no fault of 
mine and no one was seriously injured But I can't help but replay the few 
seconds over and over I swerved onto the opposite lane and crossed the 
road onto the grass on the other side We were so blessed because there was 
no oncoming traffic and we were only feet away from crashing into an 
electricity pole I praise Jesus everyday that my brother and I didn't get hurt I 
know I wouldn't forgive myself if something had happened to my brother I feel 
that God hands down infinitely more blessings than I deserve Here's a link to 
a song that I really like http //www youtube com/watch? 
v=!D_pCr_Xmc&feature=related
CS Falcon
The song's got a good caption Is it just two of you (n the family? Say hello to 
your brother for me please Also I was thinking of taking on the next scroll 
which is to do with another topic of ' suffering'' Before that could you also 
share the area of faith that you would Nke to grow more, I am asking this 
because for our faith to grow it is very important that we take that extra step 
out of our comfort zones For example we may be comfortable in our current 
situation and happy to stay there as long you can. From the word of GOD we 
know that unless a mustard seed fails to the ground and dies, It cannot grow 
up (mat 13)_ From this parable Jesus teaches us about the death to our 
worldly things that we are attached to and grow up Into heavenly things So 
may be take a quite time to sit with Jesus and pray to holy spirit and he wHI 
reveal many things to you If you have Identified an area In your life that you 
would like GOD to intervene, may It be prayer, word of god, charity let me 
know and I will pray for you as your friend in faith
I have two brothers and both my parents I'm not entirely sure what you mean 
by me sharing the area of faith that I would like to grow more, Could you 
please clarify? Also I would like God to intervene for me in my family life, I 
want all my family., nuclear and extended, to be safe and healthy There are 
so many tragedies which take place everyday to countless people and I want 
to pray that my family may feel the least amount of pain possible We have 
been blessed abundantly and I hope that the Lord continues to give us his 
great blessings and keep us In his hands
CS Falcon
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Case 3, Scroll 1 (cont’d)
Hi again, sorry I took some time to come back Almost all the people that I 
know talks about a call of GOD In their life Many a time when someone has 
an encounter with Christ, then they cannot sit still, they would want to spread 
that love and bring others to him I am reminded the story of women who had 
many husbands, to whom Jesus asked for a drink When she realised that 
Jesus was no ordinary person, she went and started talking about him to the 
entire village and inviting them to come and listen to him Even after 2000 odd 
years of the death and resurrection of our lord, people are still facinated about 
their encounter with Jesus This encounter with Jesus Is Infact a call that GOD 
the father is placing in the hearts of his children The purpose of the call Is 
because GOD wishes to reveal more of him to us and to grow in a relationship 
with us And GOD has placed a similar call in your life too Faicon Maybe it is 
a desire to know more about GOO through the scriptures, may it is some 
talent that you have, may be it is a desire to spend more time in prayer etc 
This is what I meant by the area of faith If you haven't really had such 
thoughts then it is a good idea to spend few minutes every day, asking GOD 
reveal more about his caH in your life Do let me know ff you need more 
clarification
Posted by FF Cedar
I think I'm understanding what you mean But I cannot come up with an 
answer for where my area of faith is or what my call is I feel like I will have to 
be introspective and also ask God what he has in mind for me. Thank you for 
your explanation And also thank you for your prayer, I don't know exactly how 
this will proceed if I should ask a question or not But I was curious on your 
views of non-Christians and life after death for them I'm not sure If this has to 
be made into another scroll but if so, feel free
Posted by CS Falcon
J
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Case 3, Scroll 2
A Prayer to  B egin  With Part 2
Now that we have a Ifttle understanding about each other, let us explore a bit more about our faith and 
other questions starting with the one you just raised Lets say the following prayer
Lord Jesus, I thank you for the friendship that you had given us in your name. I ask for your holy spirit 
to hover over our communications and discussions, so that your wisdom and knowledge is shared and 
utilised for the glory of your kingdom As we embark on this journey, f ask you to wash us and protect 
us with your precious blood, that you so generously shed in Calvary for us Mother mary, we ask for 
/our intercession, so that the Father's will is fullfifled in our lives as we embark this Journey of faith In 
Jesus name we pray Amen_________________________________________________________
Dear Falcon
G en eral Introduction
have said this prayerfor you that this online journey which we are making together may be guided by 
the Holy Spirit I will request you to say the same prayer that the same Holy Spirit may be our guide in
this journey.
'rayer
Lord Jesus, I ask your Holy Spirit to guide us 
both in this online Journey of faith. May this 
online presence remind us that God's loving 
presence is very close to us because you have 
said, "Behold, I am with you, always, until the 
end of t»me,, (Mtt 28;20),
May we learn from the wisdom of the Church 
which will be shared in this online space and 
through this interaction may we increase In 
our understanding and love for you.
May my patron saint {say the name of your 
natron saint you received in your baptism or confirmation) be praying for me now. I thank God for 
giving me a Faith Friend who will accompany me In my journey of Faith online, I pray that (name 
of the Faith Friend) be rewarded by the Lord for her/his support and prayer for me. Amen
May the guardian angels God has entrusted us with always be on and by our side while we read, 
and discuss the knowledge of faHh shared here
285
Appendix I (cont’d)
Case 3, Scroll 3
K n o w in g  a b o u t  Your Faith P art 3
General Introduction
J e a r i  Falcon
Thank your prayers, sorry for the delay In asslgining this scroti The past week has been very tiring and 
rewarding at the same time. Last week GOD blessed us with a beautiful baby boy Please pray for us
as we try to be good Christian parents
Time for the next scroll! Your question about the fate of non Christians and what happens to them after 
life is quite an interesting one It has been very confusing for me when I was initially growing up
Rather than giving you an answer as to yes or no, I would like to Invite you to ponder more as to why is 
this a question in your heart Is it Just to satisfy your gap of knowledge about this scenario of 
unbelievers or is it because you are worried and you really want them to get to heaven? The catholic 
church gives us many teaching about unbelievers, If they will go to heaven, will there be a judgement 
etc But when you read the bible you will know that Jesus was not Interested In the laws, but in the final 
vision of why the law was established The laws were instantiated so that the people observing the laws 
may become worthy of heaven So the importance Is the people and not the law
So this question is basically the call of the GOD in your life to understand where your faith is The Lord 
God called to the man, and said to him, 'Where are you? (Gen 3:9)
This is one of the first questions asked by God in the Scripture
Knowing about our faith will tel! us where we are Some questions like have I received baptism, how 
many times do I go for the sacraments, do I pray for the non believers, do I live an active Christian life 
hat proclaims my faith without much use of words, will help you realise where you are In this journey to 
OD our father
But the Lord God called to the man, and said to 
him, QWhere are you? (Gen 3 9)
This is one of the first questions asked by God in 
the Scripture
Knowing about our faith w i  tell ua where we are 
These questions may help us understand your 
faith
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Since there are several sacraments, I believe the two most people receive
frequently are holy communion and reconciliation. I receive holy communion 
weekly but reconciliation I receive every few months So that is why my 
answer to "How often do you receive the sacraments?" Is "As often as I can" 
Congratulations on your new baby boy I will pray that he stays healthy and 
happy as he grows The question of what happens to non-Christians after 
they pass away is something that was brought up in a conversation between 
me and one of my closest friends She believes in God and has many strong 
values but I know that she does not receive her sacraments regularly I know 
that Christians themselves are split Into several categories like Roman 
Catholic to Presbyterian But anyways what we discussed was about non- 
Christians Such as people who have worship different deities (Different 
religions such as Hinduism and Judaism) Most families who pass on their
I
 religion to their chikfren and most of these children pick up the religion and 
practice it because they were taught ft They have no thoughts of Christianity 
or Jesus Christ. So we were saying that it is not their fault or anyone's 
because it is handing down traditions/family customs I understand that true 
heaven is reached by the people's actions but with the ten commandments, 
one stating "Keep holy the Sabbath day/’ and another stating "You shall have 
no other God besides me," the result is confusing. Children are taught that the 
ten commandments must always be the basis-you have to follow these to be 
a good Christian but what about non-Christians who are truly wonderful 
people? This is a deep argument and I do not expect a straight answer but it 
is interesting learning what other people think
Posted by cs Falcon
H Falcon <br><br> Thanks for your prayers and wishes I will convey them 
to my wife <brxbr> Have a read of this article: http://www cephas- 
library com/catholic/catholic_pope_says_nonbellevers_can_be_saved html 
Let me know what you think
Posted by pp Cedar
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Falcon ^ay be you can ignore the previous article in the message. I 
read more before I asked you to read it. Basically I wanted to 
convey that any body from any cast or religion who really want to know GOD, 
he wM reveal himself to them I believe this from the numerous conversions 
that I have read and heard during preachings But most of us are content with 
what we have. There is no thirst to really know him or there is no guidance 
Often many people experience a kind of void or thirst In their life which is only 
fulfilled by GOD, but unfortunately not many from other religions know about 
it And they find other means to try and satisfy that 8t Augustine has rightfully 
said that man can only find his completeness in GOD. According to the 
catholic faith we believe that any one from another religion, although he does 
not know Christ, but because he was righteous in his deeds, such as keeping 
the society laws and there was absolutely no opportunity to know about the 
Gospel, such a person will enter heaven But who are we to judge, For 
example I do not know If a person is obedient to the laws of the society or not 
GOD alone knows that So in the end we cannot really say If a person will 
enter heaven or not, weather believer or non-believer The only person who 
will be able to proclaim that will be himself, because of his communion with 
GOD. This is why Christ was abie to say that those who have seen him has 
seen the father He and father are one Christ extends this invitation to us in 
asking us to be perfect like his heavenly father. This Is why K Is very important 
that we live a transparent lives so that people who interact with us can see our 
faith in action St Francis famous words - "preach gospel at all times, use 
words if necessary" Another darky that I would tike to bring to you is that we 
are not justified by our actions, but only by GOD's grace If that were the case, 
then Christ did not have to come and die for us This grace we receive 
through sacraments Let me know your thoughts It Is getting very exciting
FF Cedar
He» Cedar 'rm sorry on taking a whole week to respond to your message I 
have been in the middle of doing a lot of things and becoming overwhelmed I 
am praying that these coming few months will be productive and fruitful for 
me I am starting to understand what you mean by being righteous in his/her 
deeds and that being the "gateway" to heaven And I use the term "gateway” 
very loosely because as you said who are we to Judge That point reminds me 
of the conversation I had with my friend because that is exactly what she 
brought up She thinks It does not matter what we think because ultimately It 
is not up to us and it does not concern us It is between that man/woman and 
God I do not want to stray away from this subject but I'm hoping that we are 
winding up to a conclusion My next train of thought enters Into something that 
you wrote -St Francis’ words ’preach gospel at all times, use words If 
necessary" That is a very meaningful quotation It brings me to the Idea that 
we Christians should always preach the word of God, As much as I agree wKh 
this and wish all my loved ones to join me in following Gocfs teachings, how 
deep does this saying go? Does K mean everyday, every moment spread the 
word of the Lord? I was just wondering when it comes to circles of friends, 
how are we to spread our faith without seeming overbearing or unwelcome? 
Please feel free to respond to this train of thought or expand on the earlier 
one.
Posted by cs Falcon
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Thanks for your prayers To elaborate on preaching gospel at all times If you 
agree with me, preaching Is also In other words of conveying the message of 
Jesus Whatever we use, words, actions or thoughts are basically a vehicle to 
take what is in me to some one else So If I have the message of the gospel In 
me, then I can use words to take K out of me and give it to others I can act 
and do things in a way for example showing the other cheek when other beat 
me on the one cheek, Is a way of telling others that I am living the message 
that Jesus gave me to others When I think with the message of the gospel In 
me, then ail my future plannings automatically get the message of the gospel 
and others who are part of It also gets the message
Okay I understand We can preach through actions and words which do not 
bluntly say religious things After all, God's teachings are universal not only in 
religion I think when people see you as a healthy, wholesome person who 
has good family communication and nice friends, they see someone they 
admire. And through that, they can learn about God as well Here's another 
song that's playing on the Christian radio station near us I really like K It's 
x f§ and hurt http //www youtube com/watch?
hi Faimn /0J are vefy much correct When you have an excellent relationship 
with everyone around, a healthy life style etc you will become the admiration 
of eveyone But when you try and be a good Christian, H Is something more 
and may be somethlg different Simply put being a chrtsrian Is taking up your 
cross and following jesus whereverhe leads you This may not ger you the 
admiration of all, but will certainly get you thw admiration of the most high 
GOD It Is from this conviction the holy spilt helps us to produce the fruits of 
love, peace and joy When people see our lives very adament at following the 
will of GOD, eagerness to spread the gospel's message of love, then they will 
notice or admire us in another way, which has the potential to lead them to 
eternal life So It is up to us, how i choose to be an admiration?
Posted by FFCedar
FF Cedar
)&ob=av2e
Posted by cs Falcon
Appendix I (cont’d)
Case 3, Scroll 4
P l e a s e  t e l l  m e  m o r e  -  P a r t  4
G e n e r a l  I n tr o d u c t io n
Dear Falcon how have you been? How is everyone el home?Hope yog ere ok with t ie  above 
(question Please do let me know If my responses are ok for you or If there something that you would 
ike me to change Do let me know If I am too fast or too alow, Pravere. c edar _________________
We are still In thebeginnlng stage of this Journey 
Hope It Is ok to ask some more questions to know 
each other
Please do not hesitate to ask any question about 
myself also at any time
If  yes, please indicate the movement or your own Parish Choir or Youth Mass etc In the space below 
9.
Jesus Youth,
Youth 2000,
Legion of Mary,
Catholic Youth Care,
Pure in Heart,
Parish Choir,
Youth Mass,
Ministry of the Word,
Eucharistic Ministers etc 
rer, please specify below.
P I*  .1^  i r td k  o ro  if y o u  p a r t  o f  a n y  o f  I t a  a b e v o ?  (  to l l  m o  m o m )
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I was previously part of Jesus Youth of America, the Parish Choir, end Youth 
Masses at my Church Since I am at college now, It Is harder to go to my 
regular Church so I am not as active In that community I also used to be an 
altar server for three to four years when I was younger I try to go to mass at 
my college Chapel or Church when I have the time As of now, I do not 
consider myself part of any of the above What about you?
Posted by c s  Falcon
I was a little confused on where to post so I answered your question as a start 
to this conversation
Posted by CS Falcon
hi, thanks for sharing that Myself, I am part of the jy movement I try to attend 
the prayer meetings every week Its a great source of love of god How is 
everything else with you? Do you miss everyone at home, since you are away 
from them? How is your personal prayers going?
I am doing well I am pretty close to home and I try to go home every 
weekend But this semester at school has been more strenuous than last year 
since I am working as well as taking classes I am busy all the time and 
exam6 are starting I have one at least every week I pray every night and I try 
to remember to pray in the morning as well I also pray before taking my 
exams How is your family?
hi, sorry to have taken so long to come back to you Happy to know that you 
are progressing well Everyone at home are fine Baby ryan Is growing very 
fast Can i suggest that you say this prayer when you wake up daily along with 
your other prayers Holy spirit fill me with your love and wisdom
Thank you for the prayer suggestion M try to keep that in my mind as I go 
through my days
CS Falcon
So what more do we need to discuss In this scroll? Getting to know each 
other In what aspect? Sorry If I'm a little confused, I am Just much better with
** CS Falcon
I Falcon We will get to know as we go along exploring the scrolls, but more 
importantly get to know our savior better I will assign the new scroll soon
Post0dby FF Cedar
Okay
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T h e  Problem o f  Suffering Part 1
S u f f e r i n g  in  t h e  W o r ld
Dear Falcon There are some very interesting thoughts described above. Since this topic is about 
[suffering which is one of the core aspects of Christianity, I think it will be good to take some time to go 
■through and thoroughly understand this topic wal, Please answer the above questions and shook some 
[questions if you have any Also when you get time, read some text on the origin of suffering, eg 
iittp //en wikipedia orq/wiki/Sufferinq____________ _____________________________________________
Why are there so many people suffering in the 
world while others are enjoying a great life?
The Problem of Suffering
Human beings have been puzzled by the enigma 
of suffering from ancient times Before the time of 
Christ, in the life of Buddha there were many 
instances of understanding suffering around him
One afternoon his father took young Buddha to 
the annual Ploughing Festival The king began the 
ceremony by driving a fine pair of beautifully 
decorated bullocks Buddha sat down under a 
rose-apple tree and watched everyone He 
noticed that while people were happily enjoying 
Ives, the bullocks had to work terribly hard and plough the field They did not look happy at all
Then he noticed various other creatures around him He saw a lizard eating ants But soon a snake 
came caught the lizard, and ate it Then, suddenly a bird came down from the sky, picked up the snake
and so it was eaten also
Buddha thought that all these creatures might think that they were happy for a while, but that 
they ended up suffering
Jesus, the Son of God, suffered on the cross and died for us
In 13th Century Saint Francis of Assisi was so moved by the suffering of people around him that
he used to live like them
In recent times, Mother Teresa was inspired to alleviate the suffering of people considering them 
each individually as another Jesus Christ himself who suffered for human kind
So suffering is a puzzle that baffled us for centuries which continues to pose various questions in our 
ind This question was asked by a young personfrom Ireland: Why some people are suffering while
others are having a good time?
mt nr, you thm  of the Moty shove and the anigma of suffering?
Thank you for sharing the story about the young Buddha I've never heard It before 
and it was interesting And about the enigma of suffering, I think that is a question 
I that almost everyone in this universe has thought of at one point or another Either 
when seeing others who suffer so much or when something unfortunate happens 
to you, saying "Why me!?" I think ft's a complex, abstract concept Of course, by
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Appendix I (cont’
Case 3, Scroll 5 (cont’d)
Falcon , how are you? Flrt of all thankyou for being patient vyfth me for 
taking a long time to reply to discussions Now along with the story of budha, 
let me share a scenario that a priest friend once told me One day for dinner, 
mom told her two boys, 1 have prepared your faviourlte dissert today So 
quickly finish your vegetables and rice' But the boys did not like the 
vegetables But the elderly boy patiently sat and completed his food The 
younger one kept on crying and refused to eat his dinner and wanted to eat 
his dissert first So the good mom had to use the rod on him occasionally to 
make him finish the dinner. At the end of the dinner both the boys got the 
dinner they have been eagerly waiting for Now tell me what do you think of 
the sufferings of these boys or boy?
FF Cedar
I think another option may have been to let the younger one be and not use 
the rod on him This way he wouldn't finish his dinner and thus, would not get 
dessert And see his older brother get it because he was a good boy and ate 
all his dinner without fuss Hitting the younger one to forcefully make him 
finish dinner is one way to do it but it seemed that the fairest thing to do was 
let the older boy receive dessert and the younger boy not because he didn't 
finish his dinner Hopefully, he learns from his mistakes (or his sufferings)
hi. thats really interesting to see how you are thinking of a different end to the 
story Can S ask you, why you think this sort of end Is preferable? In the above 
story both the boys received the dinner and dissert Sometimes GOO the 
father is the mom in the story The good mom does not like the children to go 
hungry and not have the nutritions that are required for their growing years 
Coming back to the topic of suffering the point I wanted to make here was 
thttat the elder boy did not have any suffering but the younger one did The 
elder boy already had rhe discipline in him to wait for the dinner to be 
completed before having the dissert The dinner or the vegetables in the story 
is GOD s win for our lives The dissert is the rewars which Is heaven Itself, 
Most of the sufferings in this world is because we are In search of shortcuts 
like the younger boy. who was impatient to get to the dissert without finishing 
the dinner When you look at the elder boy, there is peace around him, he is 
the Joy of his mother and he is confident of his dissert This doesn't 
necessarily mean that the elder boy thouroughly enjoyed his dinner There 
may be times when he found it dry and pale But he was determined to go 
through it, because he wanted the dissert It is the same with all of us who try 
to follow GOD's will At times the roads will get bumpy At times we are not 
sue if there is any point of doing ail that In the story above the elder son 
completely trusted his mother. However dry or tasteless his dinner was, he 
was ready to go through it because he was sure of his reward Let me know 
what your thoughts are on this? Also think about the younger boy Why do 
you think he did not like to go through the dinner?
W poS * *  FF Cedar
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Case 3, Scroll 5 (cont’d)
I think I interpreted your story In a different, more literal way I saw the older 
brother as more mature and experienced than the younger one I feel that he 
ate his dinner and waited for dinner patiently because he knows that his 
mother will not let him eat dessert without finishing his vegetables, Since he is 
older, he knows more He understands that no matter what, dinner comes 
before dessert The younger boy fe more Immature and still growing and 
understanding My thought of letting the younger boy skip dessert was so that 
he could learn what his mother wants. He makes mistakes and sometimes 
disappoints his parents (or God) because he is still learning what is right and 
wrong This is why I thought that it would be preferabie for the younger boy to 
skip dessert I understand now you meant the dessert to be a metaphor for 
the rewards in heaven This way, it is different It would be best for the 
younger brother to understand what is right and finish his vegetables But this 
story can be interpreted in a different way We are the younger boy-we 
always make mistakes and disappoint the Lord but he looks to us to correct 
our mistakes and not to sin again This way people can learn from us (as the 
younger brother can see his older brother receive dessert) And I guess 
having grown up in such a different society In America, I do not think hitting a 
child is ever a good idea There are other ways to show what the child did 
inflicting pain I hope now that you understand what I mean
* CS Falcon
thats good thinking It is true that the ways we are brought up is different, but 
hey the gospel did survive for moe than 2000 years communicating the same 
message and still challenging and transforming lives So i think you and i can 
draw a little bi of hope from that What i wanted convey Is that they pain or 
suffering in the form of a rod which gives physical pain or pain due to the lack 
of not being able to have somethings leads to a form of suffering And the 
primary cause of this is lack of obedience Is that an acceptable conclusion?
Posted by, FFCedar
That suffering comes from a lack of obedience to God Yes, I think that's an 
acceptable conclusion Is that what you were thinking?
Posted by, CS Falcon i
»
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H th$ qutttkm of §ufftrfng dtar I© you? Do you want to add anything more I©
¡¡don't think the questions of suffering wffl ever be crystal dear to me It's true, why 
are people suffering-good people? When others who might not be following the 
true path to God are millionaires? It's the belief that material things can't measure 
up to what it really means to be with God Seeing what you have isn't
believing you have to believe without the evidence
* - - —    —  ----
Case 3, Scroll 5 (cont’d)
Do you want to share any personal ©xperitne# of §ufterlng?
This Is a question which has few overtones
We believe that God Is omnipotent (all-powerful).
How can an omnipotent God allow suffering?
Uneven distribution of wealth, health, and 
happiness may also be attributed to the work of 
God
How can this be if God is love and the source of 
justice?
Simply, how can God allow some people suffer 
because of no fault of their own?
The discussion on suffering will be continued in 
the next scroll as well
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